ACS Chemical Health & Safety最新文献

The partnership of ExxonMobil and Georgia Tech via the initiative “Partnership in Academic Laboratory Safety”, PALS, adopts an interdependent mindset of management of risks and safety for the permanent employees and an integral component of the student experience. In this Case Study, we report how the collaboration between academia and the private sector has mutually enhanced our safety programs and led to safety management being understood as a transferable skill for students. We also report on the specific tools that the program has developed to create, promote, and sustain a lived culture of safety to the benefit of all stakeholders.

It is common for accident reports and the analysis of large-scale disasters, such as the Deepwater Horizon blowout, to point to communication failures. This narrow explanation implicitly assumes that accidents could be prevented if employees spoke up about safety. In contrast, the first author of this paper, whose professional experience is introduced in this Commentary to provide context, has frequently observed that there are, in fact, many cases when employees speak up but are not listened to. These patterns of communication (or lack thereof) occur at the intersection of personal, leadership, and organizational factors, which jointly affect how safety issues are recognized, communicated, and addressed. As such, communication problems are at “the tip of the iceberg” of safety problems, not at their root. In this paper, we review research on high-reliability organizations (HROs) with excellent safety records to identify their communication patterns and practices and how they contribute to the ability to enact five principles of HROs: preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, deference to expertise, commitment to resilience, and sensitivity to operations. We then apply this lens to investigate the Deepwater Horizon disaster, based on court documents, expert reports, and personal interviews. Specifically, we investigate how the communication patterns between the onshore experts and the offshore crews compared to the recommendations of HRO theory and how existing discrepancies might help explain the accident. We found that many employees were aware of safety issues and communicated concerns openly, but there was little organizational response to the issues they raised. This failure to listen was largely owed to factors that were not directly related to communication, such as time pressure and lack of resources, and a culture that valued a “can do attitude” and getting things done so much that it got in the way of sensitivity to operations, expert-based guidance, and communication about problems. Moreover, the challenges of the project and its aggressive timeline created an extreme, almost toxic, commitment to resilience. Based on these findings, we discuss recommendations for improving safety in offshore oil and gas production.

Accurate and precise monitoring of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and volatile sulfur compounds (VSCs) is critical to protect individuals against occupational and environmental exposure. Whole-air sampling containers are commonly employed in monitoring, such as fused-silica lined (FSL) canisters, polyvinyl fluoride (PVF) bags, and foil-lined bags. However, these containers have not yet been fully validated, and previous recovery studies are weakened by contradictory findings, short study time, no humidified samples, and unfeasibly high concentrations of VOCs and VSCs. This study evaluated FSL canisters, PVF bags, and foil-lined bags for the recovery of VOCs and VSCs over a period of 20 and 14 days, respectively. This recovery evaluation aimed to quantify the recovery over time of 64 VOCs and 14 VSCs at practical concentrations in the previously specified containers. To better represent field samples, sample containers were prepared at a relative humidity (RH) of 40%, with each set prepared at a “high” (20 ppb for VOCs and 500 ppb for VSCs) and “low” concentration (1 ppb for VOCs and 7 ppb for VSCs). Containers were analyzed intermittently throughout the evaluation period, and sample results were modeled using a first-order natural decay model. From the findings, modeling constants were determined by regression, and a majority (70%) of VOC and VSC models were found to be a good fit (R² > 0.8). PVF bags were found to have higher recoveries for many VSCs than foil-lined bags, and were stable for periods similar to or longer than previously believed. FSL canisters showed a full recovery (>90%) for all VOCs and VSCs over the entire length of the evaluation (20 days for VOCs, 14 days for VSCs). Foil-lined bags were found to have lower recoveries for all VSCs compared to PVF bags.

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This Commentary discusses the most common safety issues observed in a variety of academic and industrial research laboratories over the author’s 45-plus year career. It highlights the issues and provides additional references for further information. The list can serve as a good tool to help laboratories identify potential safety issues in areas commonly overlooked.

Industrial amines are combined with acids in concentrated forms for various applications. Recently, an explosion occurred when a scientist was screening different acids and selected concentrated nitric acid to mix with an aliphatic amine. This Case Study describes the incident and aftermath, the chemistry behind the incident, and a short review of the hazards of mixing oxidizing acids with amines, with a focus on hypergolic fuels. An SOP with recommended reaction setup is described as well as corrective actions that were identified after a safety review.

The intrinsic nature of Research and Development (R&D) activities─the continuous use of new chemicals and development of cutting-edge, sustainable processes at a rapid pace─can increase the potential for Process Safety and Reactive Chemicals accidents. Industrial and academic laboratories have experienced several significant laboratory accidents and near misses. In an effort to decrease laboratory incidents, Dow, with a large global R&D presence, reviewed internal Root Cause Investigations which indicated that improvements were needed in chemical hazard recognition skills, chemical storage and handling, and inventory management. This paper presents a Dow initiative to address and combat such incidents through the charter of a multidisciplinary team composed of Reactive Chemicals, Process Safety, and Environment, Health, & Safety experts along with R&D researchers, who have collaborated to develop and deliver training modules which focus on high-interest safety topics. Module topics were chosen based on recurrence metrics and potential event severity. Modules provide laboratory personnel with basic topic knowledge, specific hazard awareness regarding the topic, and guidance on how to implement appropriate safeguards. The long-term objective is reducing the number and severity of incidents. Over two years, 10 modules have been delivered in various media; at least a quarter of global Dow R&D personnel have independently engaged with this training content, in addition to those directed to it by leaders, peers, safety experts, or training requirements. In addition to the development of enhanced training delivered via multiple platforms, the team has identified and recommended improvements or additions to existing safety management systems designed to identify hazards and control risk.

While preparing 10?600 L of a 25% aqueous solution of sodium chlorite (NaClO₂), the solid salt was spilled and not cleaned up promptly. Combustible materials, including cardboard sheets and polypropylene fabric, became contaminated with solid sodium chlorite. Subsequently, a spark, initiated by inadvertently striking metal drum sealing rings together, ignited the oxidizer-contaminated combustible materials. The fire spread to a polypropylene bag containing 800 kg of sodium chlorite. The contents of the bag detonated causing one fatality, two serious injuries, and extensive property damage. The incident was thoroughly investigated, leading to the conclusion that a series of process safety management failures occurred which created the conditions driving the incident. The investigation is summarized and discussed, with an emphasis on the investigation procedures used to support the root cause analysis and conclusions. Recommendations are provided to help prevent similar incidents.