Pub Date : 2017-12-11DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P189
Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro
In this paper, a qualified sentimentalist thesis is put forward to explain the relation between emotion and value, in special the acquisition of concepts and evaluative competences. This thesis advocates, on the one hand, that feelings are the essential elements for the characterization of emotions and, on the other hand, that values should be understood by reference to emotions. Two objections are considered: the circularity and the recalcitrance objections. To answer these, the idea that feelings can have intentional objects will be defended, along with the idea that evaluative concepts are higher-order concepts about adequacy conditions of evaluative emotional experiences. As for the recalcitrance objection specifically, we will argue that the sentimentalist thesis is in a better position than its main rival, the judgmentalist thesis. Lastly, we will show how the sentimentalist can explain levels of complexity among emotions and values. The final result is an attempt to show how a sentimentalist thesis may be coherent about the relation between emotion and value.
{"title":"Emoções e valores: uma abordagem sentimentalista","authors":"Leonardo de Mello Ribeiro","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P189","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, a qualified sentimentalist thesis is put forward to explain the relation between emotion and value, in special the acquisition of concepts and evaluative competences. This thesis advocates, on the one hand, that feelings are the essential elements for the characterization of emotions and, on the other hand, that values should be understood by reference to emotions. Two objections are considered: the circularity and the recalcitrance objections. To answer these, the idea that feelings can have intentional objects will be defended, along with the idea that evaluative concepts are higher-order concepts about adequacy conditions of evaluative emotional experiences. As for the recalcitrance objection specifically, we will argue that the sentimentalist thesis is in a better position than its main rival, the judgmentalist thesis. Lastly, we will show how the sentimentalist can explain levels of complexity among emotions and values. The final result is an attempt to show how a sentimentalist thesis may be coherent about the relation between emotion and value.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124320197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-11DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P303
M. Estrada
En este articulo pretendo principalmente mostrar por que Descartes afirma que la buena fortuna no es necesaria para alcanzar la felicidad. Primero mostrare la diferencia que Descartes establece entre felicidad y dicha. Luego mostrare que Descartes considera que la felicidad solo puede obtenerse mediante la practica de la virtud ya que esta constituye el bien supremo al que puede aspirar cada individuo y expondre las razones que apoyan esta afirmacion. Al estar la virtud enteramente en nuestro poder se ve claramente que el favor de la fortuna no es necesario para alcanzar la felicidad. Tambien mostrare que si bien los bienes de la fortuna pueden producir contento, no son necesarios para lograr la felicidad del individuo. Sin embargo, Descartes indica que estos bienes si son importantes para lograr alcanzar el bien supremo del conjunto de todos los seres humanos. Finalmente expondre brevemente que, segun Descartes, la virtud tambien es necesaria para poder disfrutar adecuadamente del favor de la fortuna.
{"title":"Buena fortuna y felicidad en la ética cartesiana","authors":"M. Estrada","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P303","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P303","url":null,"abstract":"En este articulo pretendo principalmente mostrar por que Descartes afirma que la buena fortuna no es necesaria para alcanzar la felicidad. Primero mostrare la diferencia que Descartes establece entre felicidad y dicha. Luego mostrare que Descartes considera que la felicidad solo puede obtenerse mediante la practica de la virtud ya que esta constituye el bien supremo al que puede aspirar cada individuo y expondre las razones que apoyan esta afirmacion. Al estar la virtud enteramente en nuestro poder se ve claramente que el favor de la fortuna no es necesario para alcanzar la felicidad. Tambien mostrare que si bien los bienes de la fortuna pueden producir contento, no son necesarios para lograr la felicidad del individuo. Sin embargo, Descartes indica que estos bienes si son importantes para lograr alcanzar el bien supremo del conjunto de todos los seres humanos. Finalmente expondre brevemente que, segun Descartes, la virtud tambien es necesaria para poder disfrutar adecuadamente del favor de la fortuna.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122943586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Resenha de \"Care and Respect in Bioethics\"","authors":"A. Bonella","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P375","url":null,"abstract":"Review of DALL’AGNOL, Darlei. Care and Respect in Bioethics. Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016. ISBN: 978-1-4438-9783-9","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123982632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-11DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P289
A. Couto
My aim in this paper is to show a tension in the nozickian entitlement theory. The tension is between the enforcement of the rectification principle in ideal epistemic conditions and the first two clauses of the theory. In order to do that, I argue that the principle of rectification in the above conditions entails a weird theoretical result: it is better applied under relative ignorance than under ideal conditions, which suggests that Nozick’s theory is too rigid. The underlying point is that Nozick neglects some important aspects concerning the effects of time in property claims. I finish the paper suggesting that we can face this problem in two ways and that both imply costs. The first one is to keep the theory as it was conceived, accepting the objection that it is, in a way, implausible. Or we can change the theory and weaken its purely historical character. And it is not clear how this can be done without raising difficulties.
{"title":"Menos informação é melhor do que mais: um puzzle sobre a teoria da titularidade de Nozick","authors":"A. Couto","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P289","url":null,"abstract":"My aim in this paper is to show a tension in the nozickian entitlement theory. The tension is between the enforcement of the rectification principle in ideal epistemic conditions and the first two clauses of the theory. In order to do that, I argue that the principle of rectification in the above conditions entails a weird theoretical result: it is better applied under relative ignorance than under ideal conditions, which suggests that Nozick’s theory is too rigid. The underlying point is that Nozick neglects some important aspects concerning the effects of time in property claims. I finish the paper suggesting that we can face this problem in two ways and that both imply costs. The first one is to keep the theory as it was conceived, accepting the objection that it is, in a way, implausible. Or we can change the theory and weaken its purely historical character. And it is not clear how this can be done without raising difficulties.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121559232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-11DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P267
Gabriel Guedes Rossatti
Hannah Arendt and Charles Taylor are two of the philosophers who have most seriously tackled the problem of individualism in the contemporary world and, thus, my proposal is to approximate their respective theories. I shall argue, therefore, that both depart from the very same premise, i.e. the massive presence of individualism at the heart of the ideology of Modernity, as well that both propose fundamentally the same sets of solutions for this problem: 1) the need for a retrieval of republican principles in order to reanimate politics under the conditions of modernity and 2) this in order to recuperate the meaning of the world as something common to human beings. Thus, my proposal aims at the discussion of certain key-elements present in the theory of Taylor in order to throw light on the “communitarian” or dialogical aspects present in the theory of Arendt.
{"title":"Hannah Arendt e Charles Taylor pela retomada da realidade do mundo","authors":"Gabriel Guedes Rossatti","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P267","url":null,"abstract":"Hannah Arendt and Charles Taylor are two of the philosophers who have most seriously tackled the problem of individualism in the contemporary world and, thus, my proposal is to approximate their respective theories. I shall argue, therefore, that both depart from the very same premise, i.e. the massive presence of individualism at the heart of the ideology of Modernity, as well that both propose fundamentally the same sets of solutions for this problem: 1) the need for a retrieval of republican principles in order to reanimate politics under the conditions of modernity and 2) this in order to recuperate the meaning of the world as something common to human beings. Thus, my proposal aims at the discussion of certain key-elements present in the theory of Taylor in order to throw light on the “communitarian” or dialogical aspects present in the theory of Arendt.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131775384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-11DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P323
Márcio Junglos
The Phenomenology of inclusiveness characterizes itself as a new work in the area of phenomenology. Seeking phenomenological sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Waldenfels, the article attempts to develop inclusiveness in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox and, moreover, to show its ethical perspectives toward an ethic that intends to be inclusive. From Husserl, we find the basis for a phenomenology of inclusiveness, which was put forth in his Krisis . Such inclusiveness is characterized by a latent reflective attitude, an attitude of inclusion in the life-world , an attitude of not closing our thesis, and, finally, an attitude that avoids the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles. With the radicality of thought from Merleau-Ponty, the text presents support for a complicity of meaning. Now, the subject sees his/herself as complicit in his/her relationship with the live-world thus withdrawing the heavy burden that previously was placed solely on the subject as the ultimate endower of all meaning. The constitutive process entails a radical attitude that enables an incarnate inclusiveness, conveying the inclusive scope to the horizontality of life. However, as Waldenfels investigated the progress of ethical theory, he added an ethical-practical character to the constitutive dimension. For Waldenfels, what was previously excluded from the established order appears at the threshold, providing inclusive opportunities. After these considerations, the text reveals an inclusiveness, which is open, latent, included in the life-world , non-reductionist, complicit in the constitutive process, and has an ethically responsive character.
{"title":"Phenomenology of inclusiveness: ethical perspectives","authors":"Márcio Junglos","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P323","url":null,"abstract":"The Phenomenology of inclusiveness characterizes itself as a new work in the area of phenomenology. Seeking phenomenological sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Waldenfels, the article attempts to develop inclusiveness in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox and, moreover, to show its ethical perspectives toward an ethic that intends to be inclusive. From Husserl, we find the basis for a phenomenology of inclusiveness, which was put forth in his Krisis . Such inclusiveness is characterized by a latent reflective attitude, an attitude of inclusion in the life-world , an attitude of not closing our thesis, and, finally, an attitude that avoids the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles. With the radicality of thought from Merleau-Ponty, the text presents support for a complicity of meaning. Now, the subject sees his/herself as complicit in his/her relationship with the live-world thus withdrawing the heavy burden that previously was placed solely on the subject as the ultimate endower of all meaning. The constitutive process entails a radical attitude that enables an incarnate inclusiveness, conveying the inclusive scope to the horizontality of life. However, as Waldenfels investigated the progress of ethical theory, he added an ethical-practical character to the constitutive dimension. For Waldenfels, what was previously excluded from the established order appears at the threshold, providing inclusive opportunities. After these considerations, the text reveals an inclusiveness, which is open, latent, included in the life-world , non-reductionist, complicit in the constitutive process, and has an ethically responsive character.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130823952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P519
M. Tonetto
The aim of this paper is to assess whether Kant’s moral theory is suitable to deal with our obligations to take care of nonhuman animals and the environment. Kant’s ethics distinguishes persons , that is, rational beings with unconditional values who are considered as ends in themselves, from things, which have only relative worth. In relation to nature as a whole and to nonrational beings, Kant argues that we have only indirect duties or duties with regard to them. According to some philosophers, Kant’s ethics has anthropocentric starting points which lead to speciesist conclusions. This paper will argue that indirect duties can be in accordance with nonhuman interests, such as the suffering of nonhuman animals, the preservation of species and ecosystems, and so on. Thus Kant’s moral philosophy may contribute to environmental ethics because it justifies at least animal welfare and environmental protections as constraints on unrestricted human action.
{"title":"Kant’s concept of indirect duties and environmental ethics","authors":"M. Tonetto","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P519","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to assess whether Kant’s moral theory is suitable to deal with our obligations to take care of nonhuman animals and the environment. Kant’s ethics distinguishes persons , that is, rational beings with unconditional values who are considered as ends in themselves, from things, which have only relative worth. In relation to nature as a whole and to nonrational beings, Kant argues that we have only indirect duties or duties with regard to them. According to some philosophers, Kant’s ethics has anthropocentric starting points which lead to speciesist conclusions. This paper will argue that indirect duties can be in accordance with nonhuman interests, such as the suffering of nonhuman animals, the preservation of species and ecosystems, and so on. Thus Kant’s moral philosophy may contribute to environmental ethics because it justifies at least animal welfare and environmental protections as constraints on unrestricted human action.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"130 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123074532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P475
A. Pinzani
The paper starts from an expression used by Kant in the Doctrine of Right : Beati possidentes . It then discusses Kant’s arguments for justifying the possession of land by individuals and by political community. Its main hypothesis is the following: If we consider unacceptable the application of the Beati possidentes principle on a global level, then we have a good reason to reject it also on the domestic level. It reaches this conclusion not by pointing out the undesirable consequences of the principle, for this would be an empirical argument resulting from a consequentialist approach. Rather, it chooses a procedimental approach, showing that the way in which land was initially distributed was neither rightful on the domestic nor on the global level
{"title":"Beati Possidentes? Kant on Inequality and Poverty","authors":"A. Pinzani","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P475","url":null,"abstract":"The paper starts from an expression used by Kant in the Doctrine of Right : Beati possidentes . It then discusses Kant’s arguments for justifying the possession of land by individuals and by political community. Its main hypothesis is the following: If we consider unacceptable the application of the Beati possidentes principle on a global level, then we have a good reason to reject it also on the domestic level. It reaches this conclusion not by pointing out the undesirable consequences of the principle, for this would be an empirical argument resulting from a consequentialist approach. Rather, it chooses a procedimental approach, showing that the way in which land was initially distributed was neither rightful on the domestic nor on the global level","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127171843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P493
Ronald Tinnevelt
Within the global justice debate the demandingness objection is primarily aimed at utilitarian theorists who defend a version of the ‘optimizing principle of beneficence’ to deal with the problem of global poverty. The problem of demandingness, however, is hardly ever raised within the context of the dominant institutional theories of global justice that see severe poverty as a human rights violation. Nor are the fundamental underlying questions posed by most of these theorists. Which specific responsibilities do individual moral agents have regarding institutional and structural forms of injustice (1)? Which political spheres, organized public spaces, or political practices are necessary to create a setting in which these responsibilities can be discharged (2)? Does a ‘defensible and psychologically feasible conception of responsibility’ (Scheffler 2002, 62) exist that is restrictive – yet demanding – enough to deal with the complex challenges of our globalizing age (3). This paper addresses questions (1) and (3) on the basis of a critical analysis of Iris Marion Young’s social connection theory of responsibility.
在全球正义的辩论中，要求性的反对主要针对功利主义理论家，他们捍卫一种版本的“善行优化原则”来处理全球贫困问题。然而，在将严重贫困视为侵犯人权的占主导地位的全球正义体制理论的背景下，几乎从未提出过要求的问题。大多数这些理论家提出的根本问题也不存在。对于不公正的制度性和结构性形式，个体道德行为人负有哪些具体责任(1)?哪些政治领域、有组织的公共空间或政治实践是创造一个可以履行这些责任的环境所必需的?是否存在一种“可辩护的、心理上可行的责任概念”(Scheffler 2002, 62)，这种概念是限制性的——但也是要求性的——足以应对我们全球化时代的复杂挑战(3)。本文在对Iris Marion Young的责任社会联系理论进行批判性分析的基础上解决了问题(1)和(3)。
{"title":"The implications of being implicated. Individual responsibility and structural injustice","authors":"Ronald Tinnevelt","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N2P493","url":null,"abstract":"Within the global justice debate the demandingness objection is primarily aimed at utilitarian theorists who defend a version of the ‘optimizing principle of beneficence’ to deal with the problem of global poverty. The problem of demandingness, however, is hardly ever raised within the context of the dominant institutional theories of global justice that see severe poverty as a human rights violation. Nor are the fundamental underlying questions posed by most of these theorists. Which specific responsibilities do individual moral agents have regarding institutional and structural forms of injustice (1)? Which political spheres, organized public spaces, or political practices are necessary to create a setting in which these responsibilities can be discharged (2)? Does a ‘defensible and psychologically feasible conception of responsibility’ (Scheffler 2002, 62) exist that is restrictive – yet demanding – enough to deal with the complex challenges of our globalizing age (3). This paper addresses questions (1) and (3) on the basis of a critical analysis of Iris Marion Young’s social connection theory of responsibility.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120990472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P395
Eric R. Boot
This paper aims to clarify how Kant understood the relation between the two spheres of morals (Right and virtue). Did he, as O’Neill claims, acknowledge the need for civic virtue as necessary for maintaining a liberal state? Or did he take the opposite view (shared by many contemporary liberals) that citizens’ virtuous dispositions are irrelevant and that all that matters is the justice of institutions? Though The Metaphysics of Morals gives the impression that Kant shared the latter position, I will argue that, in fact, Kant held a position somewhere between the Rousseauian view (which O’Neill believes Kant endorsed) that the essential difficulty of politics concerns the cultivation of civic duty in citizens, and contemporary liberals’ exclusive focus on the justice of institutions, by arguing that it is the laws themselves that foster respect for the laws. In short, Kant views virtue as the felicitous by-product of legality.
{"title":"Kant and the In(ter)dependence of Right and Virtue","authors":"Eric R. Boot","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P395","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to clarify how Kant understood the relation between the two spheres of morals (Right and virtue). Did he, as O’Neill claims, acknowledge the need for civic virtue as necessary for maintaining a liberal state? Or did he take the opposite view (shared by many contemporary liberals) that citizens’ virtuous dispositions are irrelevant and that all that matters is the justice of institutions? Though The Metaphysics of Morals gives the impression that Kant shared the latter position, I will argue that, in fact, Kant held a position somewhere between the Rousseauian view (which O’Neill believes Kant endorsed) that the essential difficulty of politics concerns the cultivation of civic duty in citizens, and contemporary liberals’ exclusive focus on the justice of institutions, by arguing that it is the laws themselves that foster respect for the laws. In short, Kant views virtue as the felicitous by-product of legality.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"186 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132838309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：