Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P437
Darlei Dall’Agnol
The paper examines Kant’s conception of respect, especially in his work Metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of virtue (briefly Tugendlehre or Doctrine of Virtue ), the second part of his The Metaphysics of Morals , and its place in contemporary ethics. The main question it asks is this: is respect just a feeling , a particular virtue or a moral duty/right ? The initial hypothesis is that, in the relevant sense, respect is so to speak a “dutright,” that is, a duty that is at the same time a right. It leads to a fundamental principle, namely respect for persons , defining ‘person’ as a bearer of rights/obligations. Leaving Kant’s metaphysical commitments aside, it shows that this is one of the most important Kantian contributions to contemporary ethics
{"title":"Respect in Kant’s Tugendlehre and its place in contemporary ethics","authors":"Darlei Dall’Agnol","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P437","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines Kant’s conception of respect, especially in his work Metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of virtue (briefly Tugendlehre or Doctrine of Virtue ), the second part of his The Metaphysics of Morals , and its place in contemporary ethics. The main question it asks is this: is respect just a feeling , a particular virtue or a moral duty/right ? The initial hypothesis is that, in the relevant sense, respect is so to speak a “dutright,” that is, a duty that is at the same time a right. It leads to a fundamental principle, namely respect for persons , defining ‘person’ as a bearer of rights/obligations. Leaving Kant’s metaphysical commitments aside, it shows that this is one of the most important Kantian contributions to contemporary ethics","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"169 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131896839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P389
M. Borges, T. Mertens, A. Pinzani
{"title":"Kant's Metaphysics of Morals as guidance in a morally and legally complex world","authors":"M. Borges, T. Mertens, A. Pinzani","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P389","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121625380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P423
M. Borges
In this paper, I analyze the place of the Metaphysics of morals in the Kantian system. I claim that this work is the passage between a pure part of ethics and a practical anthropology. Although this book was first conceived to be a pure moral theory - moralia pura-, it ended up dealing with principle of applications of the moral law to sensible moral beings- philosophia moralis applicata . I also hold that the Doctrine of Virtue presents some sensible elements that are important to understand how morality affects us.
{"title":"The Metaphysics of Morals: between the a priori and a practical anthropology","authors":"M. Borges","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P423","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I analyze the place of the Metaphysics of morals in the Kantian system. I claim that this work is the passage between a pure part of ethics and a practical anthropology. Although this book was first conceived to be a pure moral theory - moralia pura-, it ended up dealing with principle of applications of the moral law to sensible moral beings- philosophia moralis applicata . I also hold that the Doctrine of Virtue presents some sensible elements that are important to understand how morality affects us.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"363 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122436919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P533
Delamar José Volpato Dutra, N. D. Oliveira
The hypothesis of this paper is that legal positivism depends on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism because of the non necessary connection thesis between law and morality that legal positivism is supposed to acknowledge. The paper concludes that only when based on strong moral cognitivism is it consistent to sustain the typical non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Habermas’s Philosophy of law is confronted with both positions.
{"title":"Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of Law","authors":"Delamar José Volpato Dutra, N. D. Oliveira","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P533","url":null,"abstract":"The hypothesis of this paper is that legal positivism depends on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism because of the non necessary connection thesis between law and morality that legal positivism is supposed to acknowledge. The paper concludes that only when based on strong moral cognitivism is it consistent to sustain the typical non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Habermas’s Philosophy of law is confronted with both positions.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121633436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-01DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P459
T. Mertens
Despite Kant's explicit statement that every murderer must suffer death, there are at least four situations to be found in Kant's work in which the killing of a human being should not lead to the death penalty: when too many murderers are involved; when a mother kills her illegitimate child; when one duellist kills the other; when one person pushes another off a plank in order to save his life. This paper discusses these situation and concentrates on the last situation - Kant's interpretation of the plank of Carneades – with an eye to what they learn us about Kant understanding of the law. Does Kant acknowledge a legal vacuum? In order to come to a conclusion, Kant's 'solution' of the plank is compared with those suggested by other authors, such as Cicero, Pufendorf and Lon Fuller in his famous 'speluncean explorers' case.
{"title":"Emergencies and criminal law in Kant’s legal philosophy","authors":"T. Mertens","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N3P459","url":null,"abstract":"Despite Kant's explicit statement that every murderer must suffer death, there are at least four situations to be found in Kant's work in which the killing of a human being should not lead to the death penalty: when too many murderers are involved; when a mother kills her illegitimate child; when one duellist kills the other; when one person pushes another off a plank in order to save his life. This paper discusses these situation and concentrates on the last situation - Kant's interpretation of the plank of Carneades – with an eye to what they learn us about Kant understanding of the law. Does Kant acknowledge a legal vacuum? In order to come to a conclusion, Kant's 'solution' of the plank is compared with those suggested by other authors, such as Cicero, Pufendorf and Lon Fuller in his famous 'speluncean explorers' case.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"160 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121402862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P35
Luiz Philipe de Caux
The article synthesizes the revisions Axel Honneth imposed to his work after the critical reception of The Struggle for Recognition (1992) and proposes to unterstand them as intermediate steps towards the new critical model stabilized in Freedom's Right (2011), which Honneth calls normative reconstruction. The purpose is not to examine the methodical determinations of normative reconstruction, but to go through the intellectual path taken by Honneth between his two main books, making explicit the revisions and the new presuppositions of his “mature” work. These revisions, focused in an unterstanding of intersubjectivity and social ontology considered by Honneth as more adequate, sustain and justify the decisions of method of that latter book. Since the beginning of his theoretical work, Honneth had to deal with the objection of systematically commiting a kind of naturalistic fallacy as he sought the basis for a critical theory of society in the concrete experience of suffering. Even The Struggle for Recognition was still justifiably subjected to that same criticism, as Honneth himself admitted. I argue that the aim of the revisions carried out in the decade of 2000 was to solve that gap finding, on the one hand, an index of rationality internal to the very act of recognition and, on the other hand, an index of rationality present in the social norms and practices historically sedimented through relations of recognition
{"title":"Intersubjetividade e ontologia social nas revisões da teoria do reconhecimento de Axel Honneth","authors":"Luiz Philipe de Caux","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P35","url":null,"abstract":"The article synthesizes the revisions Axel Honneth imposed to his work after the critical reception of The Struggle for Recognition (1992) and proposes to unterstand them as intermediate steps towards the new critical model stabilized in Freedom's Right (2011), which Honneth calls normative reconstruction. The purpose is not to examine the methodical determinations of normative reconstruction, but to go through the intellectual path taken by Honneth between his two main books, making explicit the revisions and the new presuppositions of his “mature” work. These revisions, focused in an unterstanding of intersubjectivity and social ontology considered by Honneth as more adequate, sustain and justify the decisions of method of that latter book. Since the beginning of his theoretical work, Honneth had to deal with the objection of systematically commiting a kind of naturalistic fallacy as he sought the basis for a critical theory of society in the concrete experience of suffering. Even The Struggle for Recognition was still justifiably subjected to that same criticism, as Honneth himself admitted. I argue that the aim of the revisions carried out in the decade of 2000 was to solve that gap finding, on the one hand, an index of rationality internal to the very act of recognition and, on the other hand, an index of rationality present in the social norms and practices historically sedimented through relations of recognition","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128305721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P165
Oscar Horta
Seres humanos intervem frequentemente na natureza por razoes antropocentricas ou ambientalistas. Um exemplo de intervencao consiste na reintroducao de lobos em areas previamente habitadas por eles com a finalidade de se criar o que e conhecido como “ecologia do medo”. Na primeira parte deste artigo discutem-se as razoes que tem sido utilizadas em favor dessa medida, e explica-se por que sao incompativeis com um enfoque nao especista. Para tal, expoem-se os motivos pelos quais tal medida prejudica notavelmente animais como os cervos, sem tampouco ser benefica para os proprios lobos. Em seguida, argumenta-se que, se abandonamos uma perspectiva especista, devemos mudar por completo o modo pelo qual intervimos na natureza. Em vez de intervir por motivos ecologistas ou antropocentricos, nosso objetivo ao faze-lo deve ser o de reduzir os danos sofridos pelos animais nao humanos. A visao idilica segundo a qual os animais nao humanos vivem vidas paradisiacas na natureza e completamente incorreta, e de fato ha fortes razoes para considerar que o sofrimento e a morte prematura prevalecem de forma clara sobre a felicidade desses animais. Isso faz com que seja ainda mais importante que nosso objetivo seja melhorar sua situacao e dar-lhes nossa ajuda, em vez de causar-lhes danos. Isso entra em conflito de maneira significativa com alguns ideais ecologistas fundamentais cuja defesa nao e compativel com a consideracao dos interesses dos animais nao humanos.
{"title":"Contra a ética da ecologia do medo: por uma mudança nos objetivos de intervenção na natureza","authors":"Oscar Horta","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P165","url":null,"abstract":"Seres humanos intervem frequentemente na natureza por razoes antropocentricas ou ambientalistas. Um exemplo de intervencao consiste na reintroducao de lobos em areas previamente habitadas por eles com a finalidade de se criar o que e conhecido como “ecologia do medo”. Na primeira parte deste artigo discutem-se as razoes que tem sido utilizadas em favor dessa medida, e explica-se por que sao incompativeis com um enfoque nao especista. Para tal, expoem-se os motivos pelos quais tal medida prejudica notavelmente animais como os cervos, sem tampouco ser benefica para os proprios lobos. Em seguida, argumenta-se que, se abandonamos uma perspectiva especista, devemos mudar por completo o modo pelo qual intervimos na natureza. Em vez de intervir por motivos ecologistas ou antropocentricos, nosso objetivo ao faze-lo deve ser o de reduzir os danos sofridos pelos animais nao humanos. A visao idilica segundo a qual os animais nao humanos vivem vidas paradisiacas na natureza e completamente incorreta, e de fato ha fortes razoes para considerar que o sofrimento e a morte prematura prevalecem de forma clara sobre a felicidade desses animais. Isso faz com que seja ainda mais importante que nosso objetivo seja melhorar sua situacao e dar-lhes nossa ajuda, em vez de causar-lhes danos. Isso entra em conflito de maneira significativa com alguns ideais ecologistas fundamentais cuja defesa nao e compativel com a consideracao dos interesses dos animais nao humanos.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127452603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P83
F. A. G. Oliveira
Discussoes sobre moralidade e justica no campo internacional frequentemente, quando rejeitam a teoria realista, acabam adotando duas posicoes gerais possiveis: comunitaristas ou cosmopolitas. Cada qual prioriza diferentes modos de interpretacao de direitos e obrigacoes e possuem variantes. Para a discussao aqui proposta, perceber em que medida a soberania nacional se faz valer de alguns pressupostos importantes da perspectiva comunitarista que, aqui alocada, chamaremos de defensores do estado-nacao, e fundamental para compreender o modo como o estado-nacao vem sendo destacado como o ator primordial das discussoes no âmbito internacional. Para tal, procuraremos situar essa perspectiva em dois momentos. Ambas terao como fio condutor a leitura de um dos maiores defensores dessa perspectiva nos debates atuais sobre o tema, David Miller. No primeiro momento sera analisada a obra “ On Nationality ” e, posteriormente, “ National Responsibility and Global Justice ” de modo que seja possivel identificarmos mais profundamente o conceito de nacionalidade defendido por Miller e como ele se apresenta diante dos desafios globais atuais, seus avancos e tambem limites.
{"title":"A nação e a arena internacional: desafios climáticos globais","authors":"F. A. G. Oliveira","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P83","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P83","url":null,"abstract":"Discussoes sobre moralidade e justica no campo internacional frequentemente, quando rejeitam a teoria realista, acabam adotando duas posicoes gerais possiveis: comunitaristas ou cosmopolitas. Cada qual prioriza diferentes modos de interpretacao de direitos e obrigacoes e possuem variantes. Para a discussao aqui proposta, perceber em que medida a soberania nacional se faz valer de alguns pressupostos importantes da perspectiva comunitarista que, aqui alocada, chamaremos de defensores do estado-nacao, e fundamental para compreender o modo como o estado-nacao vem sendo destacado como o ator primordial das discussoes no âmbito internacional. Para tal, procuraremos situar essa perspectiva em dois momentos. Ambas terao como fio condutor a leitura de um dos maiores defensores dessa perspectiva nos debates atuais sobre o tema, David Miller. No primeiro momento sera analisada a obra “ On Nationality ” e, posteriormente, “ National Responsibility and Global Justice ” de modo que seja possivel identificarmos mais profundamente o conceito de nacionalidade defendido por Miller e como ele se apresenta diante dos desafios globais atuais, seus avancos e tambem limites.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133874987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P127
J. Oliveira
In this article, we intend to analyze Hans Jonas's interpretation of Nietzsche's section 125 of The Gay Science, as it is presented in the reflection developed in the lectures taught by Jonas at Carleton College, Ottawa, during the winter semester of 1952-1953 and kept in the (unpublished) notes entitled The Theory of God, preserved in the Philosophisches Archiv Hans Jonas, at the Universitat Konstanz. For this, we start with the Jonasian analysis of the fear of the unknown as a central element in the philosophies of Epicurus and especially Pascal, to show how Nietzsche deepens the reflection begun by the philosopher of Port-Royal and how the intensification of fear and feeling of loneliness would present itselves as a possibility of confronting nihilism. From the point of view of Jonah's own interests, we would not only be dealing with a theory about God in the strict sense, but a reflection on technology as “the will of unlimited power”, i. e., as the exercise of man who, alone and without God, seeks dominion over the world.
{"title":"A teoria de Deus e o desafio do niilismo: Hans Jonas a propósito de Nietzsche","authors":"J. Oliveira","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P127","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we intend to analyze Hans Jonas's interpretation of Nietzsche's section 125 of The Gay Science, as it is presented in the reflection developed in the lectures taught by Jonas at Carleton College, Ottawa, during the winter semester of 1952-1953 and kept in the (unpublished) notes entitled The Theory of God, preserved in the Philosophisches Archiv Hans Jonas, at the Universitat Konstanz. For this, we start with the Jonasian analysis of the fear of the unknown as a central element in the philosophies of Epicurus and especially Pascal, to show how Nietzsche deepens the reflection begun by the philosopher of Port-Royal and how the intensification of fear and feeling of loneliness would present itselves as a possibility of confronting nihilism. From the point of view of Jonah's own interests, we would not only be dealing with a theory about God in the strict sense, but a reflection on technology as “the will of unlimited power”, i. e., as the exercise of man who, alone and without God, seeks dominion over the world.","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129582985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-30DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P147
Raissa Wihby Ventura
Review of Velascos' El Azar de las Fronteras: Politicas Migratorias, justicia y ciudadania
回顾Velascos的《边境的随机:移民政策、司法和公民身份》
{"title":"Resenha de El azar de las fronteras: Políticas migratórias, justicia y ciudadanía de J. C. Velasco","authors":"Raissa Wihby Ventura","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017V16N1P147","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Velascos' El Azar de las Fronteras: Politicas Migratorias, justicia y ciudadania","PeriodicalId":143268,"journal":{"name":"Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"30 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133685683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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