Journal of Experimental Psychology: General最新文献

Ensemble coding (the brain's ability to rapidly extract summary statistics from groups of items) has been demonstrated across a range of low-level (e.g., average color) to high-level (e.g., average facial expression) visual features, and even on information that cannot be gleaned solely from retinal input (e.g., object lifelikeness). There is also evidence that ensemble coding can interact with other cognitive systems such as long-term memory (LTM), as observers are able to derive the average cost of items. We extended this line of research to examine if different sensory modalities can interact during ensemble coding. Participants made judgments about the average sweetness of groups of different visually presented foods. We found that, when viewed simultaneously, observers were limited in the number of items they could incorporate into their cross-modal ensemble percepts. We speculate that this capacity limit is caused by the cross-modal translation of visual percepts into taste representations stored in LTM. This was supported by findings that (a) participants could use similar stimuli to form capacity-unlimited ensemble representations of average screen size and (b) participants could extract the average sweetness of displays when items were viewed in sequence, with no capacity limitation (suggesting that spatial attention constrains the number of necessary visual cues an observer can integrate in a given moment to trigger cross-modal retrieval of taste). Together, the results of our study demonstrate that there are limits to the flexibility of ensemble coding, especially when multiple cognitive systems need to interact to compress sensory information into an ensemble representation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Creativity is a driving force for human development and has fascinated scholars for centuries. Surprisingly little is known about the cognitive underpinnings of putting creative ideas into action, however. To shed light on this part of the creative process, we tracked how hand movements unfolded when choosing between either a traditional or a creative use of a given object. Participants could freely decide between both options (Experiment 1, N = 51 adults) or were prompted to select a specific use (Experiment 2, N = 51 adults). Temporal as well as spatial measures of action unfolding revealed behavior to be strongly biased toward traditional options when choosing an available, more creative option eventually. Creative behavior thus comprises two obstacles: not only coming up with new ideas, but also overcoming a lasting bias toward using old ones. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

In a conventional (Stroop) priming paradigm, it was well documented that objective prime-target incongruency delays response time (RT) to target compared to prime-target congruent condition. Recent evidence suggests that incongruency between the target and subjectively reported prime identity also delays RT over and above the classic congruency effect. When the prime is rendered invisible, the former effect is fundamentally a bottom-up (BU) stimulus-driven congruency effect and the latter a top-down (TD) guess-driven congruency effect. An influential theory of consciousness, global neuronal workspace theory, postulates that the long-lasting simultaneous and reciprocal interaction between TD decision network and BU input network is preserved during conscious processing and disabled during unconscious processing. Current study is focused on testing this theoretical postulation using two behavioral experiments. Our results showed that indeed TD-congruency and BU-congruency produced additive RT effects on prime-invisible trials, which implies that TD and BU prime representations are activated in independent neuronal populations. Meanwhile, an underadditive interaction effect was observed as prime visibility rose, which is a signature that TD and BU prime representations recruited overlapping neuronal populations during conscious perception. In addition, we suggest that current behavioral paradigm might be a financially friendly alternative to detect the presence of representational overlap in the brain between a wide range of mental representations, such as expectation, prediction, conscious/unconscious perception, and conscious/unconscious working memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Humans and animals form cognitive maps that allow them to navigate through large-scale environments. Here we address a central unresolved question about these maps: whether they exhibit similar characteristics across all environments, or-alternatively-whether different environments yield different types of maps. To investigate this question, we examined spatial learning in three virtual environments: an open courtyard with patios connected by paths (open maze), a set of rooms connected by corridors (closed maze), and a set of isolated rooms connected only by teleporters (teleport maze). All three environments shared the same underlying topological graph structure. Postlearning tests showed that participants formed representations of the three environments that varied in accuracy, format, and individual variability. The open maze was most accurately remembered, followed by the closed maze, and then the teleport maze. In the open maze, most participants developed representations that reflected the Euclidean structure of the space, whereas in the teleport maze, most participants constructed representations that aligned more closely with a mental model of an interconnected graph. In the closed maze, substantial individual variability emerged, with some participants forming Euclidean representations and others forming graph-like representations. These results indicate that an environment's features shape the quality and nature of the spatial representations formed within it, determining whether spatial knowledge takes a Euclidean or graph-like format. Consequently, experimental findings obtained in any single environment may not generalize to others with different features. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Current models of second language (L2) acquisition focus on interactions with a first language (L1) at the level of speech sound targets. In multilinguals, the degree of interaction between the articulatory plans that guide speech in each language remains unclear. Here, we directly address this question in bilingual speakers. We use a sensorimotor adaptation paradigm to drive the acquisition of novel articulatory plans for speech in one language and then measure the extent to which these new motor plans influence articulatory plans in the speaker's other language. Twenty L1-French, L2-English bilinguals adapted their speech production to a real-time alteration of vowel sounds. In one session, the adaptation was acquired during French sentence production; in a second session, the adaptation was acquired during English sentence production. In each session, cross-language transfer of these novel articulatory plans for speech was assessed using a transfer task that involved the production of French and English words with heavily noise-masked auditory feedback. Sensorimotor adaptation that countered the vowel sound alteration was observed in both French and English. Regardless of the linguistic context in which the adaptation was acquired, the adaptation transferred to the production of words in both languages. The amount of transfer did not depend on whether the adaptation was acquired in the participant's L1 or L2. In a second experiment, the result was replicated with 20 L1-English, L2-French speakers. The experiments support the idea that, in bilinguals, the interaction between L1 and L2 articulatory motor plans is rapid and bidirectional. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Studying how intergroup prosociality evolves in war-torn societies is critical for gaining a better understanding of conflict perpetuation. Rwanda provides a unique example of how two groups must reconcile and manage their intergroup biases following a genocidal process. In this study, we employed a novel intended behavior task to measure intergroup prosociality among former genocide perpetrators, genocide survivors, and their children in Rwanda. Participants were required to choose between various individuals representing their own in-group or their out-group as recipients of their prosocial intentions. We measured how frequently they selected in-group or out-group individuals and to what extent choosing each individual induced cognitive conflict, as measured by reaction times (RTs) and midfrontal theta (FMθ) activity. The results indicated that survivors and their children selected former perpetrators and their offspring less frequently. Furthermore, selecting them involved a higher cognitive conflict, as evidenced by longer RT and a higher FMθ, compared to choosing their own in-group. For the group composed of former perpetrators and their children, we observed a dissociation. They selected out-group individuals more frequently, perhaps as a compensatory behavior for their past wrongdoings. Nonetheless, selecting the out-group individuals involved a higher cognitive conflict than selecting their own in-group. Importantly, we observed a similar intergroup prosociality bias in the children of both survivors and former perpetrators, mirroring that of their parents. These results are important for understanding how past conflicts influence intergroup prosociality bias and the extent to which this bias is transmitted to the next generation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Executive functions (EFs) are cognitive functions that help direct goal-related behavior. EFs are usually measured via behavioral tasks assessed in highly controlled laboratory settings under the supervision of a research assistant. Online versions of EF tasks are an increasingly popular alternative to in-lab testing. However, researchers do not have the same control over the testing environment during online EF assessments. To assess the extent to which EFs assessed in-lab and online are related, we used data from the Colorado Online Twin Study (CoTwins; 887 individual twins aged 13.98-19.05) and constructed an Lab Common EF factor and an Online Common EF factor from four EF tasks assessed in-lab and online. The Lab Common and Online Common EF factors were genetically identical (rA = 1.00) but phenotypically separable (r = .77, 95% confidence interval [0.59, 0.94]) indicating that these EF factors have the same genetic underpinnings but may be differentially influenced by environmental factors. We examined phenotypic, genetic, and environmental correlations between the EF factors and a general cognitive ability factor (g) assessed in the lab and found similar relationships between Lab Common EF and g and Online Common EF and g. Overall, these results suggest that Common EF factors assessed in different contexts are highly related to each other and similarly related to other cognitive outcomes. These findings indicate that online task-based EF assessments could be a viable strategy for increasing sample sizes in large-scale studies, particularly genetically informed studies. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Research on color-emotion associations provides evidence that hue, chroma, and lightness relate to various emotional experiences. Most of this research has assessed these relationships via isolated color swatches while confounding color dimensions. We broadened the medium in which color-emotion associations were made by manipulating color in photographs varying in valence and/or arousal, and we solely focused on the chroma dimension. In Experiment 1, participants perceived neutral and positive-valence photographs to be happier and more arousing when displayed chromatically, relative to achromatically. In Experiment 2, participants increased the chroma content of photographs to make them appear maximally happy, and they decreased the chroma content of photographs to make them appear maximally sad. In Experiment 3, participants altered the chroma content of photographs to their preferred levels, with positive-valence photographs containing the most chroma, followed by neutral, then negative-valence photographs. In Experiment 4, participants increased the chroma content of photographs to make them appear maximally positive or arousing, and they decreased chroma to make photographs appear maximally negative or calming. This pattern was similar regardless of the initial valence/arousal content of the images. These results indicate that chroma may convey emotion-relevant information independent of hue or lightness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Peer review is a core component of scientific practice. Although peer review ideally improves research and promotes rigor, it also has consequences for what types of research are published and cited and who wants to (and is able to) advance in research-focused careers. Despite these consequences, few reviewers or editors receive training or oversight to ensure their feedback is helpful, professional, and culturally sensitive. Here, we critically examine the peer-review system in psychology and neuroscience at multiple levels, from ideas to institutions, interactions, and individuals. We highlight initiatives that aim to change the normative negativity of peer review and provide authors with constructive, actionable feedback that is sensitive to diverse identities, methods, topics, and environments. We conclude with a call to action for how individuals, groups, and organizations can improve the culture of peer review. We provide examples of how changes in the peer-review system can be made with an eye to diversity (increasing the range of identities and experiences constituting the field), equity (fair processes and outcomes across groups), and inclusion (experiences that promote belonging across groups). These changes can improve scientists' experience of peer review, promote diverse perspectives and identities, and enhance the quality and impact of science. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Memories are not perfect recordings of the past and can be subject to systematic biases. Memory distortions are often caused by our experience of what typically happens in a given situation. However, it is unclear whether memory for events is biased by the knowledge that events usually have a predictable structure (a beginning, middle, and an end). Using video clips of everyday situations, we tested how interrupting events at unexpected time points affects memory of how those events ended. In four free recall experiments (1, 2, 4, and 5), we found that interrupting clips just before a salient piece of action was completed, resulted in the false recall of details about how the clip might have ended. We refer to this as "event extension." On the other hand, interrupting clips just after one scene had ended and a new scene started, resulted in omissions of details about the true ending of the clip (Experiments 4 and 5). We found that these effects were present, albeit attenuated, when testing memory shortly after watching the video clips compared to a week later (Experiments 5a and 5b). The event extension effect was not present when memory was tested with a recognition paradigm (Experiment 3). Overall, we conclude that when people watch videos that violate their expectations of typical event structure, they show a bias to later recall the videos as if they had ended at a predictable event boundary, exhibiting event extension or the omission of details depending on where the original video was interrupted. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).