Jens Mazei,Julia B Bear,Rebecca Schaumberg,Joachim Hüffmeier
Amanatullah and Morris (2010) advanced and tested central propositions from the field of gender differences in negotiation. They observed that women more readily anticipated backlash and requested lower salaries than men, yet only when they negotiated for themselves and not when they advocated for others (i.e., interaction effects). These insights are key building blocks of current theory explaining why and when women and men differ in salary negotiations. However, the research by Amanatullah and Morris had low statistical power and never received a close replication. Moreover, other conceptually related research has revealed divergent results. Thus, we conducted a close replication (total N = 517) of the seminal research by Amanatullah and Morris. We did not observe a Gender × Advocacy interaction on anticipated backlash and salary requests. We only observed a main effect of gender on salary requests, which was mediated by anticipated backlash. Moreover, consistent with the original study, women (as compared to men) rated their negotiation style as less competitive, but only if they negotiated for themselves (and not when they advocated for others), and there were no effects regarding negotiators' chosen verbal statements. We discuss the relevance of these novel insights for theory and research on gender differences in negotiation, as well as its implications for women's pay and workplace success. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Explaining gender differences in negotiation: A close replication of Amanatullah and Morris (2010).","authors":"Jens Mazei,Julia B Bear,Rebecca Schaumberg,Joachim Hüffmeier","doi":"10.1037/xge0001886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001886","url":null,"abstract":"Amanatullah and Morris (2010) advanced and tested central propositions from the field of gender differences in negotiation. They observed that women more readily anticipated backlash and requested lower salaries than men, yet only when they negotiated for themselves and not when they advocated for others (i.e., interaction effects). These insights are key building blocks of current theory explaining why and when women and men differ in salary negotiations. However, the research by Amanatullah and Morris had low statistical power and never received a close replication. Moreover, other conceptually related research has revealed divergent results. Thus, we conducted a close replication (total N = 517) of the seminal research by Amanatullah and Morris. We did not observe a Gender × Advocacy interaction on anticipated backlash and salary requests. We only observed a main effect of gender on salary requests, which was mediated by anticipated backlash. Moreover, consistent with the original study, women (as compared to men) rated their negotiation style as less competitive, but only if they negotiated for themselves (and not when they advocated for others), and there were no effects regarding negotiators' chosen verbal statements. We discuss the relevance of these novel insights for theory and research on gender differences in negotiation, as well as its implications for women's pay and workplace success. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"268 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145986207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The mental speed hypothesis of intelligence proposes that individual differences in intelligence arise from variations in the information processing speed. However, studies using reaction times to investigate this relationship show only low-to-moderate correlations (Sheppard & Vernon, 2008). To obtain more precise measures of mental speed, researchers have analyzed the latencies of event-related potential components associated with higher order cognitive processes, providing strong evidence for the mental speed account with latent correlations ranging from -.49 to -.89 (Schubert et al., 2017, 2023). However, it remains unclear to what extent the relationship between speed and intelligence is specific to decision-related processes or also holds true for nondecisional working memory (WM) processes. In this study, we take an integrative approach to (a) evaluate the generalizability of the relationship between information processing speed and intelligence with regard to the speed of WM encoding and (b) extend previous research by examining the role of WM capacity. To this end, we collected data on electroencephalographic measures, WM capacity, and intelligence from 141 participants and analyzed latent correlations using a latent state-trait model to account for measurement error and situation-specific variance. Our results indicate that information processing speed during WM encoding, as measured by the latencies of late event-related potential components, is not significantly related to intelligence or WM capacity. These findings suggest that the relationship between mental speed and intelligence depends on factors that warrant further investigation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"The relationship between intelligence, working memory capacity, and information processing speed during encoding.","authors":"Kathrin Sadus,Anna-Lena Schubert,Sven Lesche,Wiebke Hemming,Christoph Löffler,Dirk Hagemann","doi":"10.1037/xge0001896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001896","url":null,"abstract":"The mental speed hypothesis of intelligence proposes that individual differences in intelligence arise from variations in the information processing speed. However, studies using reaction times to investigate this relationship show only low-to-moderate correlations (Sheppard & Vernon, 2008). To obtain more precise measures of mental speed, researchers have analyzed the latencies of event-related potential components associated with higher order cognitive processes, providing strong evidence for the mental speed account with latent correlations ranging from -.49 to -.89 (Schubert et al., 2017, 2023). However, it remains unclear to what extent the relationship between speed and intelligence is specific to decision-related processes or also holds true for nondecisional working memory (WM) processes. In this study, we take an integrative approach to (a) evaluate the generalizability of the relationship between information processing speed and intelligence with regard to the speed of WM encoding and (b) extend previous research by examining the role of WM capacity. To this end, we collected data on electroencephalographic measures, WM capacity, and intelligence from 141 participants and analyzed latent correlations using a latent state-trait model to account for measurement error and situation-specific variance. Our results indicate that information processing speed during WM encoding, as measured by the latencies of late event-related potential components, is not significantly related to intelligence or WM capacity. These findings suggest that the relationship between mental speed and intelligence depends on factors that warrant further investigation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145956042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Daniel Perez-Zapata,Andrea Isoni,Tadeusz Zawidzki,Ian Apperly
In pure coordination games, players aim to give the same response without communication. Cognitive science research has focused on the reasoning and common knowledge necessary as the background conditions for coordination, with less attention paid to the challenge of intuiting responses on which coordination might be possible. Most studies have examined coordination within university samples from a single country, and so the extent of the challenge of coordinating between heterogeneous groups of people may have been underestimated. We conducted three empirical studies (two preregistered) with participants from the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Chile, plus a globally distributed sample (total N = 520). Without communicating, participants were asked to coordinate on answers to simple questions such as "name a city." All groups coordinated at rates far above chance but often coordinated on different responses. Study 1 showed that participants from one group could nevertheless anticipate the responses of another group, while Studies 2 and 3 showed that participants could coordinate with a partner from a different group. Crucially, between-group partners most often coordinated on new responses that were rarely considered for within-group coordination, providing the strongest evidence to date to support Schelling's claim that coordination requires distinctive reasoning, beyond primary and secondary salience. These findings provide evidence that coordination decisions are variable and flexible, resulting in accurate adaptations to achieve coordination. Where previous work has focused predominantly on the forms of reasoning that support coordination, the present findings suggest that it is equally important to examine the content of coordination solutions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Three international studies on pure coordination games: Adaptable solutions when intuitions are presumed to vary.","authors":"Daniel Perez-Zapata,Andrea Isoni,Tadeusz Zawidzki,Ian Apperly","doi":"10.1037/xge0001876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001876","url":null,"abstract":"In pure coordination games, players aim to give the same response without communication. Cognitive science research has focused on the reasoning and common knowledge necessary as the background conditions for coordination, with less attention paid to the challenge of intuiting responses on which coordination might be possible. Most studies have examined coordination within university samples from a single country, and so the extent of the challenge of coordinating between heterogeneous groups of people may have been underestimated. We conducted three empirical studies (two preregistered) with participants from the United Kingdom, South Africa, and Chile, plus a globally distributed sample (total N = 520). Without communicating, participants were asked to coordinate on answers to simple questions such as \"name a city.\" All groups coordinated at rates far above chance but often coordinated on different responses. Study 1 showed that participants from one group could nevertheless anticipate the responses of another group, while Studies 2 and 3 showed that participants could coordinate with a partner from a different group. Crucially, between-group partners most often coordinated on new responses that were rarely considered for within-group coordination, providing the strongest evidence to date to support Schelling's claim that coordination requires distinctive reasoning, beyond primary and secondary salience. These findings provide evidence that coordination decisions are variable and flexible, resulting in accurate adaptations to achieve coordination. Where previous work has focused predominantly on the forms of reasoning that support coordination, the present findings suggest that it is equally important to examine the content of coordination solutions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145956120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Drawing upon both social identity and balanced identity theories, the social identity model of behavioral associations (SIMBA) presents a novel way of conceptualizing and measuring the relationships among the constructs of social identity, group norms, and individual-level behavior-that is, as cognitive-behavioral associations that mutually interact in a triadic constellation and can be measured both implicitly and explicitly. While the social identity approach suggests that the interaction between social identity and group norms shapes individual behavior, the SIMBA-through adopting the methodological underpinnings of balanced identity theory-advances this theorizing to highlight that interactions among the three constructs are reciprocal and extend to the prediction of both social identity and group norms. Across four studies (total N = 540), we tested the SIMBA in the context of drinking behavior in relation to student (Studies 1, 2, and 3) and British national (Study 4) identities. On implicit measures, there was good support for the prediction that the strength of any one association in the SIMBA could be predicted by the interactive strength of the remaining two. Evidence for this prediction was largely absent on explicit Likert-type measures; we argue that this difference may be dependent on the explicit measures possessing theoretically meaningful zero points. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Measuring associations among social identification, group norms, and alcohol consumption: Testing a social identity model of behavioral associations (SIMBA).","authors":"Emily A Hughes,Joanne R Smith","doi":"10.1037/xge0001864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001864","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing upon both social identity and balanced identity theories, the social identity model of behavioral associations (SIMBA) presents a novel way of conceptualizing and measuring the relationships among the constructs of social identity, group norms, and individual-level behavior-that is, as cognitive-behavioral associations that mutually interact in a triadic constellation and can be measured both implicitly and explicitly. While the social identity approach suggests that the interaction between social identity and group norms shapes individual behavior, the SIMBA-through adopting the methodological underpinnings of balanced identity theory-advances this theorizing to highlight that interactions among the three constructs are reciprocal and extend to the prediction of both social identity and group norms. Across four studies (total N = 540), we tested the SIMBA in the context of drinking behavior in relation to student (Studies 1, 2, and 3) and British national (Study 4) identities. On implicit measures, there was good support for the prediction that the strength of any one association in the SIMBA could be predicted by the interactive strength of the remaining two. Evidence for this prediction was largely absent on explicit Likert-type measures; we argue that this difference may be dependent on the explicit measures possessing theoretically meaningful zero points. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145956122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Craig Thorburn,Lin Zhou,Frederic Dick,Nazbanou Nozari,Lori L Holt
There is growing recognition that short-term changes in speech perception influence speech production. These effects offer new insight into interactions of perception and production and shed light on phonetic convergence, the subtle alignment of speech patterns that emerges between communication partners. Across three experiments, we investigate the representations underlying perceptual effects on speech production. Building from the established influence of preceding context on speech perception, we strategically pair contexts to shift perception of target syllables and test whether these perceptual effects influence speech production. Experiment 1 shows that speech contexts rich in articulatory-phonetic information shift speech perception and alter acoustic patterns of speech production. Experiment 2 demonstrates that continuous natural speech filtered to possess subtly different spectral profiles that do not impact articulatory-phonetic information also affects both perception and production. Strikingly, Experiment 3 reveals that even nonspeech tones induce perceptual context effects that influence speech production. The findings point to a much broader scope of perception-production transfer than reported previously and challenge the necessity of social interaction, covert imitation, and articulatory-phonetic information in sensorimotor speech interactions. This emphasizes the need to extend models of speech motor control to account for perceptual influences of other talkers' speech on speech production and to accommodate general auditory processes in sensorimotor models of speech. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Speech motor control is not sequestered from general auditory processes.","authors":"Craig Thorburn,Lin Zhou,Frederic Dick,Nazbanou Nozari,Lori L Holt","doi":"10.1037/xge0001901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001901","url":null,"abstract":"There is growing recognition that short-term changes in speech perception influence speech production. These effects offer new insight into interactions of perception and production and shed light on phonetic convergence, the subtle alignment of speech patterns that emerges between communication partners. Across three experiments, we investigate the representations underlying perceptual effects on speech production. Building from the established influence of preceding context on speech perception, we strategically pair contexts to shift perception of target syllables and test whether these perceptual effects influence speech production. Experiment 1 shows that speech contexts rich in articulatory-phonetic information shift speech perception and alter acoustic patterns of speech production. Experiment 2 demonstrates that continuous natural speech filtered to possess subtly different spectral profiles that do not impact articulatory-phonetic information also affects both perception and production. Strikingly, Experiment 3 reveals that even nonspeech tones induce perceptual context effects that influence speech production. The findings point to a much broader scope of perception-production transfer than reported previously and challenge the necessity of social interaction, covert imitation, and articulatory-phonetic information in sensorimotor speech interactions. This emphasizes the need to extend models of speech motor control to account for perceptual influences of other talkers' speech on speech production and to accommodate general auditory processes in sensorimotor models of speech. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145956121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although preliminary evidence suggests that humans often react aversely to artificial intelligence (AI)-generated creative works, we have little understanding of how robust or persistent these reactions may be. In a series of 16 preregistered experiments (N = 27,491), we examine how evaluations of creative writing are affected by whether participants believe the content is produced with an AI model. We find consistent evidence of an AI disclosure penalty: Participant evaluations of creative writing decrease when they believe writing samples were written by an AI model-or with the help of one-rather than a human author alone, and this effect is mediated by perceived authenticity. The AI disclosure penalty is sticky, persisting across evaluation metrics, contexts, kinds of written content, and multiple interventions derived from prior research aimed at moderating the effect. Our results indicate that AI disclosure penalties about creative writing may be stubbornly difficult to mitigate, at least at this time. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"The artificial intelligence disclosure penalty: Humans persistently devalue AI-generated creative writing.","authors":"Manav Raj, Justin M Berg, Rob Seamans","doi":"10.1037/xge0001889","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001889","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Although preliminary evidence suggests that humans often react aversely to artificial intelligence (AI)-generated creative works, we have little understanding of how robust or persistent these reactions may be. In a series of 16 preregistered experiments (<i>N</i> = 27,491), we examine how evaluations of creative writing are affected by whether participants believe the content is produced with an AI model. We find consistent evidence of an AI disclosure penalty: Participant evaluations of creative writing decrease when they believe writing samples were written by an AI model-or with the help of one-rather than a human author alone, and this effect is mediated by perceived authenticity. The AI disclosure penalty is sticky, persisting across evaluation metrics, contexts, kinds of written content, and multiple interventions derived from prior research aimed at moderating the effect. Our results indicate that AI disclosure penalties about creative writing may be stubbornly difficult to mitigate, at least at this time. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145933417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
People effortlessly recognize objects of various materials and predict their behavior from visual information. However, research on causal perception has largely underexplored dynamic interactions involving nonrigid objects, often treating spatiotemporal causality as independent of object properties. To address this gap, we introduce a novel causal perception phenomenon in which speed profiles alone evoke the perception of elastic, nonrigid motion in interactions between simple geometric figures, ultimately shaping causal perception. Using an ambiguous-motion stimulus involving a separation event, we show that a line segment elongating with a disc at its end before separating can be interpreted in two distinct ways-as a rigid stick pushing a disc or as a disc pulling an elastic band. Across four experiments, deceleration before separation followed by rapid postseparation motion consistently biased perception toward the elastic band interpretation, demonstrating the critical role of kinematic regularities in shaping both causal and material perception. Four follow-up experiments using a pause-detection task revealed sensitivity to motion dynamics inconsistent with a stretched elastic band, even when causal and material perception was entirely task-irrelevant, further indicating the perceptual nature of this phenomenon. These findings illustrate how subtle kinematic patterns can simultaneously reverse perceived force dynamics and causal roles, accompanied by corresponding shifts in material perception, contributing to a unified framework for material and causal perception. Ultimately, this work provides new insights into how the visual system uses kinematic information to assign causal agents and patients in dynamic interactions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"A pushing stick or a pulled rubber band: Material perception reverses the causal arrow in agent-patient dynamics.","authors":"Jimin Ju,Sung-Ho Kim","doi":"10.1037/xge0001893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001893","url":null,"abstract":"People effortlessly recognize objects of various materials and predict their behavior from visual information. However, research on causal perception has largely underexplored dynamic interactions involving nonrigid objects, often treating spatiotemporal causality as independent of object properties. To address this gap, we introduce a novel causal perception phenomenon in which speed profiles alone evoke the perception of elastic, nonrigid motion in interactions between simple geometric figures, ultimately shaping causal perception. Using an ambiguous-motion stimulus involving a separation event, we show that a line segment elongating with a disc at its end before separating can be interpreted in two distinct ways-as a rigid stick pushing a disc or as a disc pulling an elastic band. Across four experiments, deceleration before separation followed by rapid postseparation motion consistently biased perception toward the elastic band interpretation, demonstrating the critical role of kinematic regularities in shaping both causal and material perception. Four follow-up experiments using a pause-detection task revealed sensitivity to motion dynamics inconsistent with a stretched elastic band, even when causal and material perception was entirely task-irrelevant, further indicating the perceptual nature of this phenomenon. These findings illustrate how subtle kinematic patterns can simultaneously reverse perceived force dynamics and causal roles, accompanied by corresponding shifts in material perception, contributing to a unified framework for material and causal perception. Ultimately, this work provides new insights into how the visual system uses kinematic information to assign causal agents and patients in dynamic interactions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145903564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ranked among the most serious global threats, misinformation spreads in part because people share it on social media. Based on theories that people usually share misinformation unintentionally, interventions typically aim to curb misinformation's spread by helping people distinguish fact from falsehood. However, people sometimes intentionally spread misinformation despite recognizing its falsity. Understanding and curbing this type of sharing requires new theory and tools. Leveraging insights from moral psychology, the present research examines whether people will be more reluctant to share misinformation when they think carefully about its moral implications. Engaging in such moral deliberation, we theorize, leads people to judge misinformation as more unethical to share, which inhibits them from forming intentions to share it. Five experiments (four preregistered, N = 2,509 U.S. and U.K. social media users, including a demographically representative U.S. sample) tested a moral-deliberation procedure in which participants list reasons why it would be ethical or unethical to share different news headlines on social media. This procedure-relative to control conditions that prompted nonmoral deliberation, prompted nondeliberative thinking about morality, or included no prompt-reduced intentions to share fake news about business, health, and politics, even when the news was flagged as false. These effects were (a) larger when the fake news aligned with participants' politics, (b) reversed for real news, (c) still observed after a delay, and (d) mediated by moral judgments. Our results offer a theoretical foundation for new tools to fight society's "infodemic" of misinformation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Moral deliberation reduces people's intentions to share headlines they recognize as \"fake news\".","authors":"Daniel A Effron,Judy Qiu,Deborah Shulman","doi":"10.1037/xge0001887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001887","url":null,"abstract":"Ranked among the most serious global threats, misinformation spreads in part because people share it on social media. Based on theories that people usually share misinformation unintentionally, interventions typically aim to curb misinformation's spread by helping people distinguish fact from falsehood. However, people sometimes intentionally spread misinformation despite recognizing its falsity. Understanding and curbing this type of sharing requires new theory and tools. Leveraging insights from moral psychology, the present research examines whether people will be more reluctant to share misinformation when they think carefully about its moral implications. Engaging in such moral deliberation, we theorize, leads people to judge misinformation as more unethical to share, which inhibits them from forming intentions to share it. Five experiments (four preregistered, N = 2,509 U.S. and U.K. social media users, including a demographically representative U.S. sample) tested a moral-deliberation procedure in which participants list reasons why it would be ethical or unethical to share different news headlines on social media. This procedure-relative to control conditions that prompted nonmoral deliberation, prompted nondeliberative thinking about morality, or included no prompt-reduced intentions to share fake news about business, health, and politics, even when the news was flagged as false. These effects were (a) larger when the fake news aligned with participants' politics, (b) reversed for real news, (c) still observed after a delay, and (d) mediated by moral judgments. Our results offer a theoretical foundation for new tools to fight society's \"infodemic\" of misinformation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145903561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paul Hoffman,Clementine Figgis,Rachel Gorton,Ruohan Xu
Semantic cognition (use of acquired world knowledge to guide behavior) is critical in everyday life. Semantic cognition is often assumed to be preserved in later life, compensating for functional declines in other cognitive domains. However, aging research rarely considers age-related effects on nonverbal knowledge or on semantic control processes that regulate how knowledge is activated and used. We addressed this by conducting the most detailed assessment of semantic cognition across the adult lifespan to date, involving 537 adults aged between 20 and 91. Verbal semantic knowledge increased linearly across adulthood while nonverbal knowledge reached a plateau at age 50. In contrast, controlled semantic processing showed age-related decline, particularly in the ability to inhibit task-irrelevant semantic knowledge. These results indicate that semantic cognition is not uniformly preserved in old age: Though older people know more than young people, they are less able to use their knowledge flexibly in novel situations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"The rise and fall of semantic cognition: Knowledge accumulation in later life is offset by declines in semantic control.","authors":"Paul Hoffman,Clementine Figgis,Rachel Gorton,Ruohan Xu","doi":"10.1037/xge0001898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001898","url":null,"abstract":"Semantic cognition (use of acquired world knowledge to guide behavior) is critical in everyday life. Semantic cognition is often assumed to be preserved in later life, compensating for functional declines in other cognitive domains. However, aging research rarely considers age-related effects on nonverbal knowledge or on semantic control processes that regulate how knowledge is activated and used. We addressed this by conducting the most detailed assessment of semantic cognition across the adult lifespan to date, involving 537 adults aged between 20 and 91. Verbal semantic knowledge increased linearly across adulthood while nonverbal knowledge reached a plateau at age 50. In contrast, controlled semantic processing showed age-related decline, particularly in the ability to inhibit task-irrelevant semantic knowledge. These results indicate that semantic cognition is not uniformly preserved in old age: Though older people know more than young people, they are less able to use their knowledge flexibly in novel situations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2026-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145903560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joan Danielle K Ongchoco,Kimberly W Wong,Brian J Scholl
The events that occupy our thoughts in an especially persistent way are often those that are unfinished-from half-written papers to unfolded laundry. These events seem to also be privileged in memory, as in the "Zeigarnik effect": When people carry out various tasks, but some are never finished due to extrinsic interruptions, memory tends to be better for those tasks that were unfinished. But just how foundational is this sort of "unfinishedness" in mental life? The Zeigarnik effect is often explained by appeal to the salience of goals or the weight of obligation, but might unfinishedness also be spontaneously prioritized even in visual processing-independent of these high-level social/motivational factors? Across four experiments (N = 120), observers viewed paths that gradually unfolded through mazes, from a start point to an end point. Probes briefly appeared along the path, and observers later simply reproduced their positions. Critically, each path either reached its end point or stopped shortly before-remaining visually unfinished. Although this manipulation was entirely task-irrelevant, it greatly influenced performance-with more precise reproductions on unfinished trials. This same pattern held across multiple experiments, even while carefully controlling for various lower level visual properties, and it generalized across different types of displays. This new visual Zeigarnik effect shows how vision extracts an unexpectedly rich property that is usually associated with higher level thought, and how the unfinishedness of events is privileged in the mind at a deep level. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
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