Pub Date : 2024-09-01Epub Date: 2024-07-25DOI: 10.1037/xge0001624
Meymune Nur Topçu, William Hirst
Do collective crises have an impact on the characteristics of mental time travel for individuals and collectives? The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique context to address this question due to the intersection it created between the personal and the collective domains. In two studies (N = 273), we examined the valence and perceived agency involved in memory and future thinking for personal and collective domains. The second study also included a longitudinal component with 43 participants completing both studies. In research done prior to the pandemic, a valence-based dissociation between personal and collective events was consistently observed in Western samples. We wanted to see if these patterns changed during different stages of the pandemic. In the first study, participants no longer exhibited the usual positivity bias for the personal future, while in the second study, they did not exhibit the usual negativity bias for the collective future. The second aim of the current article was to assess the agency people attribute to themselves and their nation over events and how that relates to valence. People always attributed more agency to themselves over positive events than negative events in both personal and collective domains. Perceived nation agency, however, was associated with positivity in the collective domain but with negativity in the personal domain. Longitudinal analyses confirmed these patterns. Taken together, these results indicate that a collective crisis that has immediate and profound effects on personal lives can alter the patterns observed for mental time travel, especially for the future. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"When the personal and the collective intersects: Memory, future thinking, and perceived agency during the COVID-19 pandemic.","authors":"Meymune Nur Topçu, William Hirst","doi":"10.1037/xge0001624","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001624","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Do collective crises have an impact on the characteristics of mental time travel for individuals and collectives? The COVID-19 pandemic provides a unique context to address this question due to the intersection it created between the personal and the collective domains. In two studies (<i>N</i> = 273), we examined the valence and perceived agency involved in memory and future thinking for personal and collective domains. The second study also included a longitudinal component with 43 participants completing both studies. In research done prior to the pandemic, a valence-based dissociation between personal and collective events was consistently observed in Western samples. We wanted to see if these patterns changed during different stages of the pandemic. In the first study, participants no longer exhibited the usual positivity bias for the personal future, while in the second study, they did not exhibit the usual negativity bias for the collective future. The second aim of the current article was to assess the agency people attribute to themselves and their nation over events and how that relates to valence. People always attributed more agency to themselves over positive events than negative events in both personal and collective domains. Perceived nation agency, however, was associated with positivity in the collective domain but with negativity in the personal domain. Longitudinal analyses confirmed these patterns. Taken together, these results indicate that a collective crisis that has immediate and profound effects on personal lives can alter the patterns observed for mental time travel, especially for the future. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141759076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chayce R Baldwin, Martha K Berg, Jiayin Yuan, Walter J Sowden, Shinobu Kitayama, Ethan Kross
Moral norms balance the needs of the group versus individuals, and societies across the globe vary in terms of the norms they prioritize. Extant research indicates that people from Western cultures consistently choose to protect (vs. punish) close others who commit crimes. Might this differ in cultural contexts that prioritize the self less? Prior research presents two compelling alternatives. On the one hand, collectivists may feel more intertwined with and tied to those close to them, thus protecting close others more. On the other hand, they may prioritize society over individuals and thus protect close others less. Four studies (N = 2,688) performed in the United States and Japan provide self-report, narrative, and experimental evidence supporting the latter hypothesis. These findings highlight how personal relationships and culture dynamically interact to shape how we think about important moral decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
道德规范兼顾了群体需求和个人需求,全球各个社会在优先考虑的规范方面各不相同。现有研究表明,西方文化中的人们总是选择保护(而不是惩罚)与自己关系密切的犯罪者。在自我优先程度较低的文化背景下,这种情况是否会有所不同?先前的研究提出了两种令人信服的选择。一方面,集体主义者可能觉得自己与亲近的人更紧密地联系在一起,因此会更多地保护亲近的人。另一方面,他们可能会将社会置于个人之上,从而减少对亲密他人的保护。在美国和日本进行的四项研究(N = 2,688)提供了支持后一种假设的自我报告、叙述和实验证据。这些研究结果凸显了人际关系和文化是如何动态地相互作用,影响我们对重要道德决定的思考。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"Culture shapes moral reasoning about close others.","authors":"Chayce R Baldwin, Martha K Berg, Jiayin Yuan, Walter J Sowden, Shinobu Kitayama, Ethan Kross","doi":"10.1037/xge0001626","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001626","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Moral norms balance the needs of the group versus individuals, and societies across the globe vary in terms of the norms they prioritize. Extant research indicates that people from Western cultures consistently choose to protect (vs. punish) close others who commit crimes. Might this differ in cultural contexts that prioritize the self less? Prior research presents two compelling alternatives. On the one hand, collectivists may feel more intertwined with and tied to those close to them, thus protecting close others more. On the other hand, they may prioritize society over individuals and thus protect close others less. Four studies (<i>N</i> = 2,688) performed in the United States and Japan provide self-report, narrative, and experimental evidence supporting the latter hypothesis. These findings highlight how personal relationships and culture dynamically interact to shape how we think about important moral decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142140207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Briony Swire-Thompson, Kristen Kilgallen, Mitch Dobbs, Jacob Bodenger, John Wihbey, Skyler Johnson
Disinformation is false information spread intentionally, and it is particularly harmful for public health. We conducted three preregistered experiments (N = 1,568) investigating how to discredit dubious health sources and disinformation attributed to them. Experiments 1 and 2 used cancer information and recruited representative U.S. samples. Participants read a vignette about a seemingly reputable source and rated their credibility. Participants were randomly assigned to a control condition or interventions that (a) corrected the source's disinformation, (b) highlighted the source's low expertise, or (c) corrected disinformation and highlighted low expertise (Experiment 2). Next, participants rated their belief in the source's disinformation claims and rerated their credibility. We found that highlighting low expertise was equivalent to (or more effective than) other interventions for reducing belief in disinformation. Highlighting low expertise was also more effective than correcting disinformation for reducing source credibility, although combining it with correcting disinformation outperformed low expertise alone (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 extended this paradigm to vaccine information in vaccinated and unvaccinated subgroups. A conflict-of-interest intervention and 1 week retention interval were also added. Highlighting low expertise was the most effective intervention in both vaccinated and unvaccinated participants for reducing belief in disinformation and source credibility. It was also the only condition where belief change was sustained over 1 week, but only in the vaccinated subgroup. In sum, highlighting a source's lack of expertise is a promising option for fact-checkers and health practitioners to reduce belief in disinformation and perceived credibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Discrediting health disinformation sources: Advantages of highlighting low expertise.","authors":"Briony Swire-Thompson, Kristen Kilgallen, Mitch Dobbs, Jacob Bodenger, John Wihbey, Skyler Johnson","doi":"10.1037/xge0001627","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001627","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Disinformation is false information spread intentionally, and it is particularly harmful for public health. We conducted three preregistered experiments (<i>N</i> = 1,568) investigating how to discredit dubious health sources and disinformation attributed to them. Experiments 1 and 2 used cancer information and recruited representative U.S. samples. Participants read a vignette about a seemingly reputable source and rated their credibility. Participants were randomly assigned to a control condition or interventions that (a) corrected the source's disinformation, (b) highlighted the source's low expertise, or (c) corrected disinformation and highlighted low expertise (Experiment 2). Next, participants rated their belief in the source's disinformation claims and rerated their credibility. We found that highlighting low expertise was equivalent to (or more effective than) other interventions for reducing belief in disinformation. Highlighting low expertise was also more effective than correcting disinformation for reducing source credibility, although combining it with correcting disinformation outperformed low expertise alone (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 extended this paradigm to vaccine information in vaccinated and unvaccinated subgroups. A conflict-of-interest intervention and 1 week retention interval were also added. Highlighting low expertise was the most effective intervention in both vaccinated and unvaccinated participants for reducing belief in disinformation and source credibility. It was also the only condition where belief change was sustained over 1 week, but only in the vaccinated subgroup. In sum, highlighting a source's lack of expertise is a promising option for fact-checkers and health practitioners to reduce belief in disinformation and perceived credibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11378866/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142140208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-09-01Epub Date: 2024-08-01DOI: 10.1037/xge0001628
Sisi Wang, Geoffrey F Woodman
One of the key human cognitive capabilities is to extract regularities from the environment to guide behavior. An attentional set for a target feature can be established through statistical learning of probabilistic target associations; however, whether an array of attentional sets of predictive target features can be established during intentional learning, and how they might guide attention, is not known yet. To address these questions, we had human observers perform a visual search task where we instructed them to try to use color to find their target shape. We structured the task with a fine-grained statistical regularity such that the target shapes appeared in different colors with five unique probabilities (i.e., 33%, 26%, 19%, 12%, and 5%) while we recorded their electroencephalogram. Observers rapidly learned these regularities, evidenced by being faster to report targets that appeared in higher probability colors. These effects were not due to unequal sample sizes or simple feature priming. More importantly, equivalent speeding across a set of high-probability colors suggests that the brain was driving attention to multiple targets simultaneously. Our electrophysiological results showed larger amplitude N2 posterior contralateral component, indexing perceptual attention, and late positive complex (LPC) component, indexing postperceptual processes, for targets paired with high-probability colors. These electrophysiological data suggest that the learned attentional sets change both perceptual selection and how postperceptual decisions are made. In sum, we show that multiple attentional sets can be established during intentional learning that accompanies general task acquisition and that these attentional sets can simultaneously guide attention by enhancing both perceptual attention and postperceptual processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Intentional learning establishes multiple attentional sets that simultaneously guide attention.","authors":"Sisi Wang, Geoffrey F Woodman","doi":"10.1037/xge0001628","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001628","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>One of the key human cognitive capabilities is to extract regularities from the environment to guide behavior. An attentional set for a target feature can be established through statistical learning of probabilistic target associations; however, whether an array of attentional sets of predictive target features can be established during intentional learning, and how they might guide attention, is not known yet. To address these questions, we had human observers perform a visual search task where we instructed them to try to use color to find their target shape. We structured the task with a fine-grained statistical regularity such that the target shapes appeared in different colors with five unique probabilities (i.e., 33%, 26%, 19%, 12%, and 5%) while we recorded their electroencephalogram. Observers rapidly learned these regularities, evidenced by being faster to report targets that appeared in higher probability colors. These effects were not due to unequal sample sizes or simple feature priming. More importantly, equivalent speeding across a set of high-probability colors suggests that the brain was driving attention to multiple targets simultaneously. Our electrophysiological results showed larger amplitude N2 posterior contralateral component, indexing perceptual attention, and late positive complex (LPC) component, indexing postperceptual processes, for targets paired with high-probability colors. These electrophysiological data suggest that the learned attentional sets change both perceptual selection and how postperceptual decisions are made. In sum, we show that multiple attentional sets can be established during intentional learning that accompanies general task acquisition and that these attentional sets can simultaneously guide attention by enhancing both perceptual attention and postperceptual processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11377161/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141859980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
People see societal groups as less moral, warm, and likable if their ideology is more dissimilar to the ideology of the self (i.e., ideological prejudice). We contribute to the debate on whether ideological prejudice in the United States is stronger in conservatives, progressives, or neither. Investigating the American National Election Studies, we found that between 1972 and 2021, ideological prejudice was stronger in conservatives. However, investigating studies conducted to develop the agency-beliefs-communion model, we found that between 2016 and 2021, ideological prejudice was stronger in progressives. We report various analyses of both research programs and two new studies that rule out several explanations for this contradiction. Additional analytic and experimental evidence suggests that political rule (vs. opposition) may explain the robust heterogeneity in asymmetric ideological prejudice. Ideological prejudice shifted toward being stronger in conservatives when the United States was governed by Democrats and toward being stronger in progressives when the United States was governed by Republicans. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Political rule (vs. opposition) predicts whether ideological prejudice is stronger in U.S. conservatives or progressives.","authors":"Johanna Woitzel, Alex Koch","doi":"10.1037/xge0001643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001643","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>People see societal groups as less moral, warm, and likable if their ideology is more dissimilar to the ideology of the self (i.e., ideological prejudice). We contribute to the debate on whether ideological prejudice in the United States is stronger in conservatives, progressives, or neither. Investigating the American National Election Studies, we found that between 1972 and 2021, ideological prejudice was stronger in conservatives. However, investigating studies conducted to develop the agency-beliefs-communion model, we found that between 2016 and 2021, ideological prejudice was stronger in progressives. We report various analyses of both research programs and two new studies that rule out several explanations for this contradiction. Additional analytic and experimental evidence suggests that political rule (vs. opposition) may explain the robust heterogeneity in asymmetric ideological prejudice. Ideological prejudice shifted toward being stronger in conservatives when the United States was governed by Democrats and toward being stronger in progressives when the United States was governed by Republicans. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142107981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
People's concern with maintaining their individual reputation powerfully drives judgment and decision making. But humans also identify strongly with groups. Concerns about group-based reputation may similarly shape people's psychology, perhaps especially in contexts where shifts in group reputation can have strategic consequences. Do individuals allow their concern with their group's reputation to shape their reactions to even large-scale societal suffering versus benefits? Examining both affective responses and financially incentivized behavior of partisans in the United States, five preregistered experiments (N = 7,534) demonstrate that group-based reputational incentives can weaken-and sometimes nearly eliminate-affective differentiation between present-term societal harms and benefits. This can occur even when these societal harms and benefits are substantial-including economic devastation and national security threats-and when the consequences impact ingroup members. Individuals' sensitivity to group-based reputation can even cause them to divert resources from more effective to less effective charities. We provide evidence that partisans care about group-based reputation in part because it holds strategic value, positioning their group to improve its standing vis-a-vis the outgroup. By allowing group-based reputational incentives to reduce their sensitivity to societal outcomes, partisans may play into the other side's cynical narratives about their disregard for human suffering, damaging bridges to cooperation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
人们对维护个人声誉的关注,是判断和决策的强大驱动力。但人类对群体也有强烈的认同感。对群体声誉的关注可能同样会影响人们的心理,尤其是在群体声誉的变化会产生战略后果的情况下。个人是否会因为对群体声誉的关注而影响他们对即使是大规模的社会苦难与利益的反应?通过对美国党派成员的情感反应和经济激励行为进行研究,五个预先登记的实验(N = 7534)表明,基于群体声誉的激励会削弱--有时甚至几乎消除--对当前社会危害和利益之间的情感区分。即使这些社会危害和利益是巨大的--包括经济破坏和国家安全威胁--而且后果影响到群体内成员时,这种情况也会发生。个人对群体声誉的敏感性甚至会导致他们将资源从更有效的慈善机构转移到效果较差的慈善机构。我们提供的证据表明,党派成员之所以关心基于群体的声誉,部分原因是声誉具有战略价值,能使他们的群体提高相对于外群体的地位。如果让基于群体的声誉激励降低了他们对社会结果的敏感度,党派人士就可能会被另一方冷嘲热讽,说他们漠视人类的痛苦,从而破坏合作的桥梁。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"Group-based reputational incentives can blunt sensitivity to societal harms and benefits.","authors":"Charles A Dorison, Nour S Kteily","doi":"10.1037/xge0001645","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001645","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>People's concern with maintaining their individual reputation powerfully drives judgment and decision making. But humans also identify strongly with groups. Concerns about group-based reputation may similarly shape people's psychology, perhaps especially in contexts where shifts in group reputation can have strategic consequences. Do individuals allow their concern with their group's reputation to shape their reactions to even large-scale societal suffering versus benefits? Examining both affective responses and financially incentivized behavior of partisans in the United States, five preregistered experiments (<i>N</i> = 7,534) demonstrate that group-based reputational incentives can weaken-and sometimes nearly eliminate-affective differentiation between present-term societal harms and benefits. This can occur even when these societal harms and benefits are substantial-including economic devastation and national security threats-and when the consequences impact <i>ingroup</i> members. Individuals' sensitivity to group-based reputation can even cause them to divert resources from more effective to less effective charities. We provide evidence that partisans care about group-based reputation in part because it holds strategic value, positioning their group to improve its standing vis-a-vis the outgroup. By allowing group-based reputational incentives to reduce their sensitivity to societal outcomes, partisans may play into the other side's cynical narratives about their disregard for human suffering, damaging bridges to cooperation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142107980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Boredom is unpleasant, with people going to great lengths to avoid it. One way to escape boredom and increase stimulation is to consume digital media, for example watching short videos on YouTube or TikTok. One common way that people watch these videos is to switch between videos and fast-forward through them, a form of viewing we call digital switching. Here, we hypothesize that people consume media this way to avoid boredom, but this behavior paradoxically intensifies boredom. Across seven experiments (total N = 1,223; six preregistered), we found a bidirectional, causal relationship between boredom and digital switching. When participants were bored, they switched (Study 1), and they believed that switching would help them avoid boredom (Study 2). Switching between videos (Study 3) and within video (Study 4), however, led not to less boredom but more boredom; it also reduced satisfaction, reduced attention, and lowered meaning. Even when participants had the freedom to watch videos of personal choice and interest on YouTube, digital switching still intensified boredom (Study 5). However, when examining digital switching with online articles and with nonuniversity samples, the findings were less conclusive (Study 6), potentially due to factors such as opportunity cost (Study 7). Overall, our findings suggest that attempts to avoid boredom through digital switching may sometimes inadvertently exacerbate it. When watching videos, enjoyment likely comes from immersing oneself in the videos rather than swiping through them. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Fast-forward to boredom: How switching behavior on digital media makes people more bored.","authors":"Katy Y Y Tam, Michael Inzlicht","doi":"10.1037/xge0001639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001639","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Boredom is unpleasant, with people going to great lengths to avoid it. One way to escape boredom and increase stimulation is to consume digital media, for example watching short videos on YouTube or TikTok. One common way that people watch these videos is to switch between videos and fast-forward through them, a form of viewing we call digital switching. Here, we hypothesize that people consume media this way to avoid boredom, but this behavior paradoxically intensifies boredom. Across seven experiments (total <i>N</i> = 1,223; six preregistered), we found a bidirectional, causal relationship between boredom and digital switching. When participants were bored, they switched (Study 1), and they believed that switching would help them avoid boredom (Study 2). Switching between videos (Study 3) and within video (Study 4), however, led not to less boredom but more boredom; it also reduced satisfaction, reduced attention, and lowered meaning. Even when participants had the freedom to watch videos of personal choice and interest on YouTube, digital switching still intensified boredom (Study 5). However, when examining digital switching with online articles and with nonuniversity samples, the findings were less conclusive (Study 6), potentially due to factors such as opportunity cost (Study 7). Overall, our findings suggest that attempts to avoid boredom through digital switching may sometimes inadvertently exacerbate it. When watching videos, enjoyment likely comes from immersing oneself in the videos rather than swiping through them. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142000037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Angeliki Charalampaki, Anthony Buck Ciston, Elisa Filevich
Despite the ubiquitous presence of tactile information in our daily activities, studies of how we experience agency of our actions have rarely relied on manipulated visuo-tactile feedback. Instead, what is often manipulated are the distal (and arbitrarily associated) consequences of our actions. The few studies that did investigate whether tactile information contributes to the experience of agency have been limited to the binary assessment of tactile feedback about the outcome of an action being present or absent. Here, we went beyond the coarse comparison of agency with versus without tactile feedback and introduced instead an experimental manipulation where we could control the amount of mismatch between predictions and observations. Participants (N = 40) reached with their right hand toward a ridged plate with a specific orientation and saw online feedback that could match or differ from their action in one of three ways: the physical plate's orientation, the action's timing, or the hand's position in space. Absolute subjective ratings revealed that an increased mismatch in tactile information led to a diminished sense of agency, similar to what has been reported for spatial and temporal mismatches. Further, estimations of metacognitive efficiency revealed similar Mratios in identifying visuo-tactile violation predictions as compared to visuo-temporal violations (but lower than visuospatial). These findings emphasize the importance of tactile information in shaping our experience of acting voluntarily and show how this important component can be experimentally probed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
尽管触觉信息在我们的日常活动中无处不在,但有关我们如何体验自己行为的代理权的研究却很少依赖于经过操控的视觉-触觉反馈。相反,被操纵的往往是我们行为的远端(和任意关联的)后果。为数不多的几项研究确实调查了触觉信息是否有助于代理体验,但这些研究仅限于对行动结果存在或不存在的触觉反馈进行二元评估。在这里,我们超越了有触觉反馈与无触觉反馈的粗略比较,而是引入了一种实验操作,即我们可以控制预测与观察之间的不匹配程度。参与者(N = 40)将右手伸向一个有特定方向的棱形板,并看到在线反馈,这些反馈可能在以下三个方面之一与他们的动作相匹配或不同:物理板的方向、动作的时间或手在空间中的位置。绝对主观评分显示,触觉信息不匹配的增加会导致代入感的降低,这与空间和时间不匹配的报道类似。此外,对元认知效率的估算显示,在识别视觉-触觉违规预测方面,Mratios 与视觉-时间违规预测(但低于视觉-空间违规预测)相似。这些发现强调了触觉信息在塑造我们的自愿行为体验方面的重要性,并展示了如何通过实验对这一重要组成部分进行探究。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"Contributions of tactile information to the sense of agency and its metacognitive representations.","authors":"Angeliki Charalampaki, Anthony Buck Ciston, Elisa Filevich","doi":"10.1037/xge0001634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001634","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Despite the ubiquitous presence of tactile information in our daily activities, studies of how we experience agency of our actions have rarely relied on manipulated visuo-tactile feedback. Instead, what is often manipulated are the distal (and arbitrarily associated) consequences of our actions. The few studies that did investigate whether tactile information contributes to the experience of agency have been limited to the binary assessment of tactile feedback about the outcome of an action being present or absent. Here, we went beyond the coarse comparison of agency with versus without tactile feedback and introduced instead an experimental manipulation where we could control the amount of mismatch between predictions and observations. Participants (<i>N</i> = 40) reached with their right hand toward a ridged plate with a specific orientation and saw online feedback that could match or differ from their action in one of three ways: the physical plate's orientation, the action's timing, or the hand's position in space. Absolute subjective ratings revealed that an increased mismatch in tactile information led to a diminished sense of agency, similar to what has been reported for spatial and temporal mismatches. Further, estimations of metacognitive efficiency revealed similar Mratios in identifying visuo-tactile violation predictions as compared to visuo-temporal violations (but lower than visuospatial). These findings emphasize the importance of tactile information in shaping our experience of acting voluntarily and show how this important component can be experimentally probed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141901931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Icy Yunyi Zhang, Alice Xu, Ji Y Son, James W Stigler
This article explores the role of sensorimotor engagement in students' learning of a challenging science, technology, engineering, and math-related concept. Previous research has failed to distinguish two features commonly associated with embodiment: sensorimotor engagement and visuospatial concreteness. In the current research, we ask whether sensorimotor engagement-operationalized as watching a video of hands manipulating paper representations-offers unique benefits beyond the visuospatial concreteness of a dynamic visualization of the same process. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions to learn about the shuffle() function in R: a Watch Hands Moving Objects group, which watched a video with hands; a Watch Moving Objects group, which watched a video with a dynamic visualization in which objects moved without hands; or a control group, which watched a live-coding video that did not include either hands or visuospatial representations. Results revealed that only participants in the Watch Hands Moving Objects group demonstrated significantly superior performance compared with both the Watch Moving Objects group and control groups. These findings highlight the unique benefit of sensorimotor engagement for learning, contributing to a deeper understanding of how embodiment can enhance the learning process. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
本文探讨了感官运动参与在学生学习具有挑战性的科学、技术、工程和数学相关概念中的作用。以往的研究未能区分通常与体现相关的两个特征:感觉运动参与和视觉空间具体性。在当前的研究中,我们提出了这样一个问题:感官运动参与--操作为观看双手操作纸张表征的视频--是否比同一过程的动态可视化的视觉空间具体性更有独特的益处。参与者被随机分配到三种学习 R 中 shuffle() 函数的条件之一:观看双手移动物体组,即观看有手的视频;观看移动物体组,即观看有动态可视化的视频,其中物体在没有手的情况下移动;或对照组,即观看不包含手或视觉空间表征的实时编码视频。结果显示,与观看移动物体组和对照组相比,只有观看双手移动物体组的参与者表现出明显的优势。这些发现凸显了感官运动参与对学习的独特益处,有助于加深对体现如何促进学习过程的理解。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"Watching hands move enhances learning from concrete and dynamic visualizations.","authors":"Icy Yunyi Zhang, Alice Xu, Ji Y Son, James W Stigler","doi":"10.1037/xge0001622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001622","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article explores the role of sensorimotor engagement in students' learning of a challenging science, technology, engineering, and math-related concept. Previous research has failed to distinguish two features commonly associated with embodiment: sensorimotor engagement and visuospatial concreteness. In the current research, we ask whether sensorimotor engagement-operationalized as watching a video of hands manipulating paper representations-offers unique benefits beyond the visuospatial concreteness of a dynamic visualization of the same process. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions to learn about the shuffle() function in R: a Watch Hands Moving Objects group, which watched a video with hands; a Watch Moving Objects group, which watched a video with a dynamic visualization in which objects moved without hands; or a control group, which watched a live-coding video that did not include either hands or visuospatial representations. Results revealed that only participants in the Watch Hands Moving Objects group demonstrated significantly superior performance compared with both the Watch Moving Objects group and control groups. These findings highlight the unique benefit of sensorimotor engagement for learning, contributing to a deeper understanding of how embodiment can enhance the learning process. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141901932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
People express essentialist beliefs about social categories from an early age, but essentialist beliefs about specific social categories vary over development and in different contexts. Adapting two paradigms used with Western samples to measure social essentialism, we examined the development of essentialist beliefs about seven social categories (gender, race, nationality, religion, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and team fan bases) among 5- to 10-year-old children (N = 88) and adults (N = 273) in Iran, a population that is underrepresented in psychology research. Focusing on natural-kind reasoning, we investigated the relative contribution of biological perception of social categories as well as cultural and motivational factors in the development of essentialist beliefs about these categories. Our findings suggest that biological perception of social categories plays a key role and that cultural and motivational factors become more relevant in essentialist reasoning about social categories that are not perceived as biologically marked. The developmental patterns of essentialist reasoning in our study also closely parallel those found in other cultures, namely the United States and Turkey, further suggesting the primary role of biological perception of social categories in natural-kind reasoning about the social world. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
人们从很小的时候就开始表达关于社会类别的本质主义信念,但是关于特定社会类别的本质主义信念会随着成长和不同环境的变化而变化。我们调整了西方样本中用于测量社会本质主义的两个范式,考察了伊朗 5 至 10 岁儿童(88 人)和成人(273 人)对七个社会类别(性别、种族、国籍、宗教、社会经济地位、民族和球队球迷基础)的本质主义信念的发展情况。我们以自然类推理为重点,研究了社会类别的生物感知以及文化和动机因素在这些类别的本质主义信念发展过程中的相对作用。我们的研究结果表明,对社会类别的生物学认知起着关键作用,而文化和动机因素在对未被视为具有生物学特征的社会类别进行本质主义推理时变得更为重要。在我们的研究中,本质主义推理的发展模式也与其他文化(即美国和土耳其)中的发展模式密切相关,这进一步表明了社会类别的生物感知在有关社会世界的自然类推理中的主要作用。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved)。
{"title":"The development of social essentialist reasoning in Iran: Insight into biological perception, cultural input, and motivational factors.","authors":"Ghazale Shahbazi, Hossein Samani, Tara M Mandalaywala, Khatereh Borhani, Telli Davoodi","doi":"10.1037/xge0001616","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001616","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>People express essentialist beliefs about social categories from an early age, but essentialist beliefs about specific social categories vary over development and in different contexts. Adapting two paradigms used with Western samples to measure social essentialism, we examined the development of essentialist beliefs about seven social categories (gender, race, nationality, religion, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and team fan bases) among 5- to 10-year-old children (<i>N</i> = 88) and adults (<i>N</i> = 273) in Iran, a population that is underrepresented in psychology research. Focusing on natural-kind reasoning, we investigated the relative contribution of biological perception of social categories as well as cultural and motivational factors in the development of essentialist beliefs about these categories. Our findings suggest that biological perception of social categories plays a key role and that cultural and motivational factors become more relevant in essentialist reasoning about social categories that are <i>not</i> perceived as biologically marked. The developmental patterns of essentialist reasoning in our study also closely parallel those found in other cultures, namely the United States and Turkey, further suggesting the primary role of biological perception of social categories in natural-kind reasoning about the social world. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141889408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}