Anjie Cao, Alexandra Carstensen, Shan Gao, Michael C Frank
Cultural differences between the United States and China have been investigated using a broad array of psychological tasks measuring differences between cognition, language, perception, and reasoning. Using online convenience samples of adults, we conducted two large-scale replications of 12 tasks previously reported to show differences between Western and East Asian cultures. Our results showed a heterogeneous pattern of successes and failures: five tasks yielded robust cultural differences, while five showed no difference between cultures, and two showed a small difference in the opposite direction. We observed moderate reliability for all multitrial tasks, but there was little relation between task scores. As in prior work, cross-cultural differences in cognition (in those tasks showing differences) were not strongly related to explicit measures of cultural identity and behavior. All of our tasks, data, and analyses are openly available for reuse, providing a foundation for future studies that seek to establish a robust and replicable science of cross-cultural difference. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
美国和中国之间的文化差异是通过一系列测量认知、语言、感知和推理之间差异的心理任务来研究的。我们利用在线成人便利样本,对以前报道过的显示西方和东亚文化差异的 12 项任务进行了两次大规模的重复研究。我们的结果显示了成功和失败的不同模式:五项任务产生了强烈的文化差异,五项任务显示文化间没有差异,两项任务显示了反方向的微小差异。我们观察到所有多试任务都具有适度的可靠性,但任务得分之间的关系不大。与之前的研究结果一样,认知方面的跨文化差异(在那些显示差异的任务中)与文化认同和行为的明确测量结果关系不大。我们的所有任务、数据和分析都是公开的,可供重复使用,这为今后的研究奠定了基础,有助于建立健全和可复制的跨文化差异科学。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA,保留所有权利)。
{"title":"United States-China differences in cognition and perception across 12 tasks: Replicability, robustness, and within-culture variation.","authors":"Anjie Cao, Alexandra Carstensen, Shan Gao, Michael C Frank","doi":"10.1037/xge0001559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001559","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Cultural differences between the United States and China have been investigated using a broad array of psychological tasks measuring differences between cognition, language, perception, and reasoning. Using online convenience samples of adults, we conducted two large-scale replications of 12 tasks previously reported to show differences between Western and East Asian cultures. Our results showed a heterogeneous pattern of successes and failures: five tasks yielded robust cultural differences, while five showed no difference between cultures, and two showed a small difference in the opposite direction. We observed moderate reliability for all multitrial tasks, but there was little relation between task scores. As in prior work, cross-cultural differences in cognition (in those tasks showing differences) were not strongly related to explicit measures of cultural identity and behavior. All of our tasks, data, and analyses are openly available for reuse, providing a foundation for future studies that seek to establish a robust and replicable science of cross-cultural difference. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141310773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01Epub Date: 2024-04-25DOI: 10.1037/xge0001564
Alicia Duval, Anne L Beatty-Martínez, Stamatoula Pasvanis, Arielle Crestol, Jamie Snytte, M Natasha Rajah, Debra A Titone
Menopause is associated with declines in cognitive control. However, there is individual variability in the slope of this decline. Recent work suggests that indices of cognitive control are mediated by communicative demands of the language environment. However, little is known about how the impact of bilingual experience generalizes across the lifespan, particularly in females who exhibit steeper cognitive decline due to increasing age and menopausal transition. Thus, we investigated whether diversity of language use in distinct communicative contexts modulated the effects of aging and menopause on cognitive control in an adult lifespan sample of healthy females. We performed robust linear regressions on a sample of 120 females (age range 20-65 years) to characterize age- (n = 120) and menopause-related (n = 59) declines in cognitive control (as assessed by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) and to determine whether they are modulated by different facets of bilingual language experience, including the diversity of language use (i.e., language entropy) in home and workplace environments. Workplace but not home language diversity modulated age- and menopause-related declines in cognitive control, suggesting that females may compensate for decline by virtue of adapting to the externally imposed demands of the language environment. These findings have implications for identifying which aspects of bilingual experience may contribute to cognitive reserve in healthy aging. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Language diversity across home and work contexts differentially impacts age- and menopause-related declines in cognitive control in healthy females.","authors":"Alicia Duval, Anne L Beatty-Martínez, Stamatoula Pasvanis, Arielle Crestol, Jamie Snytte, M Natasha Rajah, Debra A Titone","doi":"10.1037/xge0001564","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001564","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Menopause is associated with declines in cognitive control. However, there is individual variability in the slope of this decline. Recent work suggests that indices of cognitive control are mediated by communicative demands of the language environment. However, little is known about how the impact of bilingual experience generalizes across the lifespan, particularly in females who exhibit steeper cognitive decline due to increasing age and menopausal transition. Thus, we investigated whether diversity of language use in distinct communicative contexts modulated the effects of aging and menopause on cognitive control in an adult lifespan sample of healthy females. We performed robust linear regressions on a sample of 120 females (age range 20-65 years) to characterize age- (<i>n</i> = 120) and menopause-related (<i>n</i> = 59) declines in cognitive control (as assessed by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) and to determine whether they are modulated by different facets of bilingual language experience, including the diversity of language use (i.e., language entropy) in home and workplace environments. Workplace but not home language diversity modulated age- and menopause-related declines in cognitive control, suggesting that females may compensate for decline by virtue of adapting to the externally imposed demands of the language environment. These findings have implications for identifying which aspects of bilingual experience may contribute to cognitive reserve in healthy aging. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140864953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
People can report summary statistics for various features about a group of objects. One theory is that different abilities support ensemble judgments about low-level features like color versus high-level features like identity. Existing research mostly evaluates such claims based on evidence of correlations within and between feature domains. However, correlations between two identical tasks that only differ in the type of feature that is used can be inflated by method variance. Another concern is that conclusions about high-level features are mostly based on faces. We used latent variable methods on data from 237 participants to investigate the abilities supporting low-level and high-level feature ensemble judgments. Ensemble judgment was measured with six distinct tests, each requiring judgments for a distinct low-level or high-level feature, using different task requirements. We also controlled for other general visual abilities when examining how low-level and high-level ensemble abilities relate to each other. Confirmatory factor analyses showed a perfect correlation between the two factors, suggesting a single ability. There was a unique relationship between these two factors beyond the influence of object recognition and perceptual speed. Additional results from 117 of the same participants also ruled out the role of working memory. This study provides strong evidence of a general ensemble judgment ability across a wide range of features at the latent level and characterizes its relationship to other visual abilities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"A general ability for judging simple and complex ensembles.","authors":"Ting-Yun Chang, Oakyoon Cha, Isabel Gauthier","doi":"10.1037/xge0001582","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001582","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>People can report summary statistics for various features about a group of objects. One theory is that different abilities support ensemble judgments about low-level features like color versus high-level features like identity. Existing research mostly evaluates such claims based on evidence of correlations within and between feature domains. However, correlations between two identical tasks that only differ in the type of feature that is used can be inflated by method variance. Another concern is that conclusions about high-level features are mostly based on faces. We used latent variable methods on data from 237 participants to investigate the abilities supporting low-level and high-level feature ensemble judgments. Ensemble judgment was measured with six distinct tests, each requiring judgments for a distinct low-level or high-level feature, using different task requirements. We also controlled for other general visual abilities when examining how low-level and high-level ensemble abilities relate to each other. Confirmatory factor analyses showed a perfect correlation between the two factors, suggesting a single ability. There was a unique relationship between these two factors beyond the influence of object recognition and perceptual speed. Additional results from 117 of the same participants also ruled out the role of working memory. This study provides strong evidence of a general ensemble judgment ability across a wide range of features at the latent level and characterizes its relationship to other visual abilities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141331078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite significantly increasing research efforts, the psychological effects of reading fiction remain under debate. We present two preregistered meta-analyses synthesizing cognitive effects and correlates of reading fiction. In Meta-Analysis 1 (371 effect sizes/70 experiments), reading fiction led to significant small-sized cognitive benefits, g = 0.14, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.06, 0.21]. This effect of fiction reading was moderated by the comparison group (effects were greater when reading fiction was compared with watching fiction or reading nothing than when reading fiction was compared with reading nonfiction) and the outcome variable (significant effects emerged for empathy and mentalizing only). In Meta-Analysis 2 (559 effect sizes/114 studies reporting correlations), lifetime exposure to print fiction was linked with significant small-sized cognitive benefits, r = .16, 95% CI [0.13, 0.19]. This effect was moderated by outcome variable (effects were greatest for verbal abilities, followed by general cognitive abilities and empathy/mentalizing/outgroup judgments), fictionality of the print material (greater effects were found for fiction than nonfiction), publication status (published work exhibited greater effects than unpublished work), type of assessment measure (larger effects emerged when neither the outcome nor print exposure were assessed via self-report, than when either the outcome or print exposure were assessed via self-report), participant group (community samples showed greater effects than student samples), study design (greater effects were found for correlational than for experimental designs), and percentage of female participants (via a negative relationship with cognitive benefits). Together, these meta-analyses provide robust evidence for a small-sized positive relationship between reading fiction and cognitive benefits. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Cognitive effects and correlates of reading fiction: Two preregistered multilevel meta-analyses.","authors":"Lena Wimmer, Gregory Currie, Stacie Friend, Jörg Wittwer, Heather J Ferguson","doi":"10.1037/xge0001583","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001583","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Despite significantly increasing research efforts, the psychological effects of reading fiction remain under debate. We present two preregistered meta-analyses synthesizing cognitive effects and correlates of reading fiction. In Meta-Analysis 1 (371 effect sizes/70 experiments), reading fiction led to significant small-sized cognitive benefits, <i>g</i> = 0.14, 95% confidence interval (CI) [0.06, 0.21]. This effect of fiction reading was moderated by the comparison group (effects were greater when reading fiction was compared with watching fiction or reading nothing than when reading fiction was compared with reading nonfiction) and the outcome variable (significant effects emerged for empathy and mentalizing only). In Meta-Analysis 2 (559 effect sizes/114 studies reporting correlations), lifetime exposure to print fiction was linked with significant small-sized cognitive benefits, <i>r</i> = .16, 95% CI [0.13, 0.19]. This effect was moderated by outcome variable (effects were greatest for verbal abilities, followed by general cognitive abilities and empathy/mentalizing/outgroup judgments), fictionality of the print material (greater effects were found for fiction than nonfiction), publication status (published work exhibited greater effects than unpublished work), type of assessment measure (larger effects emerged when neither the outcome nor print exposure were assessed via self-report, than when either the outcome or print exposure were assessed via self-report), participant group (community samples showed greater effects than student samples), study design (greater effects were found for correlational than for experimental designs), and percentage of female participants (via a negative relationship with cognitive benefits). Together, these meta-analyses provide robust evidence for a small-sized positive relationship between reading fiction and cognitive benefits. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140848894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01Epub Date: 2024-04-18DOI: 10.1037/xge0001579
Mohamed A Hussein, S Christian Wheeler
A fast-growing body of research finds that receptiveness to opposing political views carries reputational benefits. A different body of research finds that opposing political views and the people who hold them are seen as repugnant. How could it be that people receptive to opposing political ideas are viewed positively when the political opponents they are receptive to are seen negatively? In seven main (N = 5,286) and nine supplemental studies (N = 3,983 participants in online studies; N = 124,493 observations in field data), we reconcile this tension by arguing that the identity of the person one is receptive to determines whether receptiveness carries reputational benefits or costs. When the information source belongs to the opposing party, receptiveness to opposing political views often carries reputational costs. We find these reputational costs across both strong and weak signals of receptiveness, eight different political and social issues, and multiple types of prototypical out-party sources. We argue that these costs arise because members of the opposing party are frequently stereotyped as immoral, and thus receptiveness to their ideas is seen negatively. As a boundary condition, we find that the costs of receptiveness are pronounced for sources who are prototypical of the out-party and attenuate (or even reverse) for sources who are nonprototypical. These findings resolve a seeming contradiction between two distinct literatures in psychology, contribute to a rapidly expanding literature on the interpersonal consequences of receptiveness, and lay the groundwork for understanding novel barriers to, and ultimately solutions for, the lack of cross-party openness and political polarization. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Reputational costs of receptiveness: When and why being receptive to opposing political views backfires.","authors":"Mohamed A Hussein, S Christian Wheeler","doi":"10.1037/xge0001579","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001579","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A fast-growing body of research finds that receptiveness to opposing political views carries reputational benefits. A different body of research finds that opposing political views and the people who hold them are seen as repugnant. How could it be that people receptive to opposing political ideas are viewed positively when the political opponents they are receptive to are seen negatively? In seven main (<i>N</i> = 5,286) and nine supplemental studies (<i>N</i> = 3,983 participants in online studies; <i>N</i> = 124,493 observations in field data), we reconcile this tension by arguing that the identity of the person one is receptive to determines whether receptiveness carries reputational benefits or costs. When the information source belongs to the opposing party, receptiveness to opposing political views often carries reputational costs. We find these reputational costs across both strong and weak signals of receptiveness, eight different political and social issues, and multiple types of prototypical out-party sources. We argue that these costs arise because members of the opposing party are frequently stereotyped as immoral, and thus receptiveness to their ideas is seen negatively. As a boundary condition, we find that the costs of receptiveness are pronounced for sources who are prototypical of the out-party and attenuate (or even reverse) for sources who are nonprototypical. These findings resolve a seeming contradiction between two distinct literatures in psychology, contribute to a rapidly expanding literature on the interpersonal consequences of receptiveness, and lay the groundwork for understanding novel barriers to, and ultimately solutions for, the lack of cross-party openness and political polarization. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140848916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01Epub Date: 2024-05-02DOI: 10.1037/xge0001570
Marius C Vollberg, Mina Cikara
People generally empathize with others and find harm aversive. Yet aggression, for example, between groups, abounds. How do people learn to overcome this aversion in order to aggress? Many models of learning emphasize outcome prediction errors-deviations from expected outcomes in the environment-but aggression may also be fueled by affective prediction errors (affective PEs)-deviations from how we expect to feel. Across five preregistered online experiments that hold outcome prediction errors constant (N = 4,607), participants choosing aggressive or nonaggressive actions aggressed more against disliked group members and often escalated or persisted in taking actions that felt better than expected (positive affective PE), especially when those actions were aggressive. Crucially, inducing incidental empathy toward the group of the target rendered affective PE signals sensitive to group identification-participants escalated aggression that felt better than expected relatively less toward liked versus disliked group members. That said, affective PEs did not always add explanatory power beyond levels of postoutcome affect alone; we discuss the importance and implications of these results. In summary, we reveal affective PE integration as a candidate algorithm facilitating exceptions to harm aversion in intergroup conflict. More broadly, we highlight for affective science and decision-making researchers the necessity of appropriately testing separable components of affective signals in predicting subsequent behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
人们通常会同情他人,认为伤害是厌恶的。然而,群体之间的攻击行为却比比皆是。人们是如何学会克服这种厌恶感以进行攻击的呢?许多学习模型都强调结果预测错误--与环境中预期结果的偏差,但攻击行为也可能是由情感预测错误(affective PEs)--与我们预期感受的偏差--助长的。在保持结果预测误差不变的五个预先注册的在线实验中(N = 4,607),选择攻击性或非攻击性行动的参与者对不喜欢的群体成员进行了更多的攻击,并经常升级或坚持采取感觉比预期更好的行动(积极情感PE),尤其是当这些行动具有攻击性时。最重要的是,诱发对目标群体的偶发移情使情感性 PE 信号对群体认同变得敏感--相对于不喜欢的群体成员,参与者对喜欢的群体成员采取的感觉比预期更好的攻击升级相对较少。尽管如此,情感PE并不总能在结果后情感水平之外增加解释力;我们将讨论这些结果的重要性和意义。总之,我们揭示了情感PE整合是促进群体间冲突中伤害厌恶例外的一种候选算法。更广泛地说,我们为情感科学和决策研究人员强调了在预测后续行为时适当测试情感信号的可分离成分的必要性。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"Affective prediction errors in persistence and escalation of aggression.","authors":"Marius C Vollberg, Mina Cikara","doi":"10.1037/xge0001570","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001570","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>People generally empathize with others and find harm aversive. Yet aggression, for example, between groups, abounds. How do people learn to overcome this aversion in order to aggress? Many models of learning emphasize outcome prediction errors-deviations from expected outcomes in the environment-but aggression may also be fueled by affective prediction errors (affective PEs)-deviations from how we expect to feel. Across five preregistered online experiments that hold outcome prediction errors constant (<i>N</i> = 4,607), participants choosing aggressive or nonaggressive actions aggressed more against disliked group members and often escalated or persisted in taking actions that felt better than expected (positive affective PE), especially when those actions were aggressive. Crucially, inducing incidental empathy toward the group of the target rendered affective PE signals sensitive to group identification-participants escalated aggression that felt better than expected relatively less toward liked versus disliked group members. That said, affective PEs did not always add explanatory power beyond levels of postoutcome affect alone; we discuss the importance and implications of these results. In summary, we reveal affective PE integration as a candidate algorithm facilitating exceptions to harm aversion in intergroup conflict. More broadly, we highlight for affective science and decision-making researchers the necessity of appropriately testing separable components of affective signals in predicting subsequent behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140863982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F Gregory Ashby, Heidi A Zetzer, Collie W Conoley, Alan D Pickering
Agency is the sense that one has control over one's own actions and the consequences of those actions. Despite the critical role that agency plays in the human condition, little is known about its neural basis. A novel theory proposes that increases in agency disinhibit the dopamine system and thereby increase the number of tonically active dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area. The theory, called ADDS (Agency Disinhibits the Dopamine System), proposes a specific neural network that mediates these effects. ADDS accurately predicts a variety of relevant neuroscience results, and makes many novel predictions, including that increases in an agency will (a) increase motivation, (b) improve executive function, (c) facilitate procedural learning, but only in the presence of immediate trial-by-trial feedback, (d) have little or no effect on learning-related effects of stimulus repetition or on standard eyeblink conditioning, (e) facilitate the development of automatic behaviors, but have little or no effect on the production of behaviors that are already automatized, (f) amplify the cognitive benefits of positive mood, and (g) reduce pain. The implications of this new theory are considered for several purely psychological theories that assign prominent roles to agency, including self-efficacy theory, hope theory, and goal-focused positive psychotherapy. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Just do it: A neuropsychological theory of agency, cognition, mood, and dopamine.","authors":"F Gregory Ashby, Heidi A Zetzer, Collie W Conoley, Alan D Pickering","doi":"10.1037/xge0001587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001587","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Agency is the sense that one has control over one's own actions and the consequences of those actions. Despite the critical role that agency plays in the human condition, little is known about its neural basis. A novel theory proposes that increases in agency disinhibit the dopamine system and thereby increase the number of tonically active dopamine neurons in the ventral tegmental area. The theory, called ADDS (Agency Disinhibits the Dopamine System), proposes a specific neural network that mediates these effects. ADDS accurately predicts a variety of relevant neuroscience results, and makes many novel predictions, including that increases in an agency will (a) increase motivation, (b) improve executive function, (c) facilitate procedural learning, but only in the presence of immediate trial-by-trial feedback, (d) have little or no effect on learning-related effects of stimulus repetition or on standard eyeblink conditioning, (e) facilitate the development of automatic behaviors, but have little or no effect on the production of behaviors that are already automatized, (f) amplify the cognitive benefits of positive mood, and (g) reduce pain. The implications of this new theory are considered for several purely psychological theories that assign prominent roles to agency, including self-efficacy theory, hope theory, and goal-focused positive psychotherapy. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141331079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01Epub Date: 2024-05-02DOI: 10.1037/xge0001586
Daniel Pearson, Amy Chong, Julie Y L Chow, Kelly G Garner, Jan Theeuwes, Mike E Le Pelley
Our prior experiences shape the way that we prioritize information from the environment for further processing, analysis, and action. We show in three experiments that this process of attentional prioritization is critically modulated by the degree of uncertainty in these previous experiences. Participants completed a visual search task in which they made a saccade to a target to earn a monetary reward. The color of a color-singleton distractor in the search array signaled the reward outcome(s) that were available, with different degrees of variance (uncertainty). Participants were never required to look at the colored distractor, and doing so would slow their response to the target. Nevertheless, across all experiments, participants were more likely to look at distractors associated with high outcome variance versus low outcome variance. This pattern was observed when all distractors had equal expected value (Experiment 1), when the difference in variance was opposed by a difference in expected value (i.e., the high-variance distractor had a low expected value, and vice versa: Experiment 2), and when high- and low-variance distractors were paired with the maximum-value outcome on an equal proportion of trials (Experiment 3). Our findings demonstrate that experience of prediction error plays a fundamental role in guiding "attentional exploration," wherein priority is driven by the potential for a stimulus to reduce future uncertainty through a process of learning, as opposed to maximizing current information gain. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Uncertainty-modulated attentional capture: Outcome variance increases attentional priority.","authors":"Daniel Pearson, Amy Chong, Julie Y L Chow, Kelly G Garner, Jan Theeuwes, Mike E Le Pelley","doi":"10.1037/xge0001586","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001586","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Our prior experiences shape the way that we prioritize information from the environment for further processing, analysis, and action. We show in three experiments that this process of attentional prioritization is critically modulated by the degree of uncertainty in these previous experiences. Participants completed a visual search task in which they made a saccade to a target to earn a monetary reward. The color of a color-singleton distractor in the search array signaled the reward outcome(s) that were available, with different degrees of variance (uncertainty). Participants were never required to look at the colored distractor, and doing so would slow their response to the target. Nevertheless, across all experiments, participants were more likely to look at distractors associated with high outcome variance versus low outcome variance. This pattern was observed when all distractors had equal expected value (Experiment 1), when the difference in variance was opposed by a difference in expected value (i.e., the high-variance distractor had a low expected value, and vice versa: Experiment 2), and when high- and low-variance distractors were paired with the maximum-value outcome on an equal proportion of trials (Experiment 3). Our findings demonstrate that experience of prediction error plays a fundamental role in guiding \"attentional exploration,\" wherein priority is driven by the potential for a stimulus to reduce future uncertainty through a process of learning, as opposed to maximizing current information gain. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140855187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01Epub Date: 2024-04-25DOI: 10.1037/xge0001585
Giada Viviani, Antonino Visalli, Maria Montefinese, Antonino Vallesi, Ettore Ambrosini
Cognitive control has been theorized operating through two distinct mechanisms, proactive and reactive control, as posited by the dual mechanism of control model. Despite its potential to explain cognitive control variability, the supporting evidence for this model remains inconclusive. Prior studies frequently employed the Stroop task to assess this model, manipulating the proportion congruency (PC) at the list-wide and/or item-specific levels to target proactive and reactive control, respectively. However, these manipulations have been questioned as they may invoke low-level associative learning instead of control-driven mechanisms. Although solutions have been proposed to address these concerns, they still have limitations and impracticalities. In pursuit of a clearer understanding of this issue, we manipulated proactive and reactive control simultaneously to more directly investigate their separability. We conducted two experiments using a peripheral and a perifoveal spatial Stroop task version, respectively, and we adopted state-of-the-art methodologies, leveraging trial-level multilevel modeling analytical approaches, to effectively estimate the Stroop effect and its control-related modulations while controlling for confounding factors. Notably, we manipulated both list-wide and item-specific PCs at the trial level, allowing for a fine-grained analysis. Our results provide compelling evidence for the existence of a list-wide, PC-dependent proactive control mechanism, influencing Stroop performance independently of reactive control and confounding factors. Additionally, an item-specific PC-dependent reactive control effect was found to influence Stroop performance only in interaction with proactive control. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the interplay between proactive and reactive control mechanisms, shedding light on the intricate nature of cognitive control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
认知控制被认为是通过两种不同的机制运作的,即主动控制和被动控制,正如控制的双重机制模型所假设的那样。尽管该模型具有解释认知控制变异的潜力,但其支持证据仍不确定。之前的研究经常使用 Stroop 任务来评估这一模型,在整个列表和/或特定项目的水平上操纵比例一致性(PC),以分别针对主动和被动控制。然而,这些操作受到了质疑,因为它们可能会调用低水平的联想学习,而不是控制驱动机制。虽然已经有人提出了解决这些问题的方案,但它们仍然存在局限性和不实用性。为了更清楚地了解这一问题,我们同时操纵了主动控制和被动控制,以更直接地研究它们之间的可分离性。我们采用了最先进的方法,利用试验水平多层次建模分析方法,在控制混杂因素的同时,有效地估计了Stroop效应及其控制相关的调节。值得注意的是,我们在试验水平上操纵了整个列表和特定项目的 PCs,从而实现了精细分析。我们的研究结果提供了令人信服的证据,证明存在着一种依赖于全列表 PC 的主动控制机制,这种机制对 Stroop 表现的影响不受反应控制和干扰因素的影响。此外,我们还发现,特定项目的 PC 依赖性反应控制效应只有在与主动控制相互作用时才会影响 Stroop 表现。这些发现有助于更好地理解主动和被动控制机制之间的相互作用,揭示认知控制的复杂本质。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"Tango of control: The interplay between proactive and reactive control.","authors":"Giada Viviani, Antonino Visalli, Maria Montefinese, Antonino Vallesi, Ettore Ambrosini","doi":"10.1037/xge0001585","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001585","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Cognitive control has been theorized operating through two distinct mechanisms, proactive and reactive control, as posited by the dual mechanism of control model. Despite its potential to explain cognitive control variability, the supporting evidence for this model remains inconclusive. Prior studies frequently employed the Stroop task to assess this model, manipulating the proportion congruency (PC) at the list-wide and/or item-specific levels to target proactive and reactive control, respectively. However, these manipulations have been questioned as they may invoke low-level associative learning instead of control-driven mechanisms. Although solutions have been proposed to address these concerns, they still have limitations and impracticalities. In pursuit of a clearer understanding of this issue, we manipulated proactive and reactive control simultaneously to more directly investigate their separability. We conducted two experiments using a peripheral and a perifoveal spatial Stroop task version, respectively, and we adopted state-of-the-art methodologies, leveraging trial-level multilevel modeling analytical approaches, to effectively estimate the Stroop effect and its control-related modulations while controlling for confounding factors. Notably, we manipulated both list-wide and item-specific PCs at the trial level, allowing for a fine-grained analysis. Our results provide compelling evidence for the existence of a list-wide, PC-dependent proactive control mechanism, influencing Stroop performance independently of reactive control and confounding factors. Additionally, an item-specific PC-dependent reactive control effect was found to influence Stroop performance only in interaction with proactive control. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the interplay between proactive and reactive control mechanisms, shedding light on the intricate nature of cognitive control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140857272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-01Epub Date: 2024-04-25DOI: 10.1037/xge0001580
Ullrich Wagner, E Tory Higgins, Nikolai Axmacher, Gerald Echterhoff
After communicators have tuned a message about a target person's behaviors to their audience's attitude, their recall of the target's behaviors is often evaluatively consistent with their audience's attitude. This audience-congruent recall bias has been explained as the result of the communicators' creation of a shared reality with the audience, which helps communicators to achieve epistemic needs for confident judgments and knowledge. Drawing on the "Relevance Of A Representation" (ROAR) model of cognitive accessibility from motivational truth relevance, we argue that shared reality increases the accessibility of information consistent (vs. inconsistent) with the audience's attitude. We tested this prediction with a novel reaction time task in three experiments employing the saying-is-believing paradigm. Faster reactions to audience-consistent (vs. audience-inconsistent) information were found for trait information but not for behavioral information. Thus, an audience-congruent accessibility bias emerged at the level at which impressions and judgments of other persons are typically organized. Consistent with a shared-reality account, the audience-consistent accessibility bias correlated with experienced shared reality with the audience about the target person and with epistemic trust in the audience. These findings support the view that the creation of shared reality with an audience triggers a basic cognitive mechanism that facilitates the retrieval of audience-congruent (vs. audience-incongruent) trait information about a target person. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
当传播者根据受众的态度调整了关于目标人物行为的信息后,他们对目标人物行为的回忆往往在评价上与受众的态度一致。这种与受众一致的回忆偏差被解释为传播者与受众共同创造现实的结果,这有助于传播者实现自信判断和知识的认识论需求。根据 "表象相关性"(ROAR)模型,我们认为,共同现实会增加与受众态度一致(或不一致)的信息的可及性。我们在三个采用 "说即信 "范式的实验中,通过新颖的反应时间任务对这一预测进行了检验。结果发现,对于特质信息,与受众一致(与受众不一致)的信息反应更快,而对于行为信息则不然。因此,在通常组织对他人的印象和判断的层面上,出现了与受众一致的可及性偏差。与共享现实观点一致的是,受众一致的可及性偏差与受众对目标人物的共享现实经验以及对受众的认识信任相关。这些研究结果支持这样一种观点,即与受众建立共享现实会触发一种基本认知机制,从而促进检索与受众一致(相对于与受众不一致)的目标人物特征信息。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"Biased memory retrieval in the service of shared reality with an audience: The role of cognitive accessibility.","authors":"Ullrich Wagner, E Tory Higgins, Nikolai Axmacher, Gerald Echterhoff","doi":"10.1037/xge0001580","DOIUrl":"10.1037/xge0001580","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>After communicators have tuned a message about a target person's behaviors to their audience's attitude, their recall of the target's behaviors is often evaluatively consistent with their audience's attitude. This audience-congruent recall bias has been explained as the result of the communicators' creation of a shared reality with the audience, which helps communicators to achieve epistemic needs for confident judgments and knowledge. Drawing on the \"Relevance Of A Representation\" (ROAR) model of cognitive accessibility from motivational truth relevance, we argue that shared reality increases the accessibility of information consistent (vs. inconsistent) with the audience's attitude. We tested this prediction with a novel reaction time task in three experiments employing the saying-is-believing paradigm. Faster reactions to audience-consistent (vs. audience-inconsistent) information were found for trait information but not for behavioral information. Thus, an audience-congruent accessibility bias emerged at the level at which impressions and judgments of other persons are typically organized. Consistent with a shared-reality account, the audience-consistent accessibility bias correlated with experienced shared reality with the audience about the target person and with epistemic trust in the audience. These findings support the view that the creation of shared reality with an audience triggers a basic cognitive mechanism that facilitates the retrieval of audience-congruent (vs. audience-incongruent) trait information about a target person. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140862897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}