Samuel Murray,Gino Marttelo Carmona Díaz,Laura Sofía Vega-Plazas,William Jiménez-Leal,Santiago Amaya
Loyalty is considered central to people's moral life, yet little is known about how people think about what it means to be loyal. We used a prototype approach to understand how loyalty is represented in Colombia and the United States and how these representations mediate attributions of loyalty and moral judgments of loyalty violations. Across seven studies (N = 1,984), we found cross-cultural similarities in the associative meaning of loyalty (Study 1) but found differences in the centrality of features associated with loyalty (Study 2) and the latent structure of loyalty representations (Study 3). Colombians represent loyalty in terms of more general moral characteristics, while U.S. participants represent loyalty in terms of interpersonal commitment, both in contrast with current approaches to loyalty. By comparing representations of loyalty and honesty, we establish that differences in loyalty conceptualizations reflect a different way of thinking about loyalty rather than morality more generally (Study 4). Further, Colombians attributed greater loyalty to individuals with general moral characteristics compared to participants from the U.S. sample (Study 5) and were more likely to classify nonloyal values as loyalty-related (Study 6). While the centrality of prototypical features predicts categorizing norm violations as loyalty-related, differences in prototypical structure account for differences in the severity of moral judgment for such violations (Study 7), which suggests that loyalty representations have similar functions, even though these representations differ in structural characteristics. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Loyalty from a personal point of view: A cross-cultural prototype study of loyalty.","authors":"Samuel Murray,Gino Marttelo Carmona Díaz,Laura Sofía Vega-Plazas,William Jiménez-Leal,Santiago Amaya","doi":"10.1037/xge0001623","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001623","url":null,"abstract":"Loyalty is considered central to people's moral life, yet little is known about how people think about what it means to be loyal. We used a prototype approach to understand how loyalty is represented in Colombia and the United States and how these representations mediate attributions of loyalty and moral judgments of loyalty violations. Across seven studies (N = 1,984), we found cross-cultural similarities in the associative meaning of loyalty (Study 1) but found differences in the centrality of features associated with loyalty (Study 2) and the latent structure of loyalty representations (Study 3). Colombians represent loyalty in terms of more general moral characteristics, while U.S. participants represent loyalty in terms of interpersonal commitment, both in contrast with current approaches to loyalty. By comparing representations of loyalty and honesty, we establish that differences in loyalty conceptualizations reflect a different way of thinking about loyalty rather than morality more generally (Study 4). Further, Colombians attributed greater loyalty to individuals with general moral characteristics compared to participants from the U.S. sample (Study 5) and were more likely to classify nonloyal values as loyalty-related (Study 6). While the centrality of prototypical features predicts categorizing norm violations as loyalty-related, differences in prototypical structure account for differences in the severity of moral judgment for such violations (Study 7), which suggests that loyalty representations have similar functions, even though these representations differ in structural characteristics. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142486376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M J Schneider,Jordan Rubin-McGregor,Jacob Elder,Brent L Hughes,Diana I Tamir
Simulating other people can shift one's self-concept, an effect known as simulation-induced malleability. How does imagining others shift the self? We propose that the activation of self-knowledge is the key factor by which simulation of others alters one's self-concept. We test this possibility across four studies that each manipulate self-knowledge activation indirectly during simulation and measure the impact on subsequent self-ratings. Results demonstrate that increasing activation of self-knowledge during simulation is associated with increased self-concept change. People experienced greater self-concept change when simulating similar others (Studies 1 and 2). People also generalized simulation-induced changes to aspects of the self-concept that were semantically similar to the simulated content (Study 3). Finally, people who are less likely to recruit self-knowledge (i.e., older adults) during simulation were less susceptible to self-concept change (Study 4). These studies highlight self-knowledge activation as an essential component of the effects of simulation on self-rated change. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Simulation requires activation of self-knowledge to change self-concept.","authors":"M J Schneider,Jordan Rubin-McGregor,Jacob Elder,Brent L Hughes,Diana I Tamir","doi":"10.1037/xge0001663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001663","url":null,"abstract":"Simulating other people can shift one's self-concept, an effect known as simulation-induced malleability. How does imagining others shift the self? We propose that the activation of self-knowledge is the key factor by which simulation of others alters one's self-concept. We test this possibility across four studies that each manipulate self-knowledge activation indirectly during simulation and measure the impact on subsequent self-ratings. Results demonstrate that increasing activation of self-knowledge during simulation is associated with increased self-concept change. People experienced greater self-concept change when simulating similar others (Studies 1 and 2). People also generalized simulation-induced changes to aspects of the self-concept that were semantically similar to the simulated content (Study 3). Finally, people who are less likely to recruit self-knowledge (i.e., older adults) during simulation were less susceptible to self-concept change (Study 4). These studies highlight self-knowledge activation as an essential component of the effects of simulation on self-rated change. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142449331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For contractualist accounts of morality, actions are moral if they correspond to what rational or reasonable agents would agree to do, were they to negotiate explicitly. This, in turn, often depends on each party's bargaining power, which varies with each party's stakes in the potential agreement and available alternatives in case of disagreement. If there is an asymmetry, with one party enjoying higher bargaining power than another, this party can usually get a better deal, as often happens in real negotiations. A strong test of contractualist accounts of morality, then, is whether moral judgments do take bargaining power into account. We explore this in five preregistered experiments (n = 3,025; U.S.-based Prolific participants). We construct scenarios depicting everyday social interactions between two parties in which one of them can perform a mutually beneficial but unpleasant action. We find that the same actions (asking the other to perform the unpleasant action or explicitly refusing to do it) are perceived as less morally appropriate when performed by the party with lower bargaining power, as compared to the party with higher bargaining power. In other words, participants tend to give more moral leeway to parties with better bargaining positions and to hold disadvantaged parties to stricter moral standards. This effect appears to depend only on the relative bargaining power of each party but not on the magnitude of the bargaining power asymmetry between them. We discuss implications for contractualist theories of moral cognition and the emergence and persistence of unfair norms and inequality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Moral judgment is sensitive to bargaining power.","authors":"Arthur Le Pargneux,Fiery Cushman","doi":"10.1037/xge0001678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001678","url":null,"abstract":"For contractualist accounts of morality, actions are moral if they correspond to what rational or reasonable agents would agree to do, were they to negotiate explicitly. This, in turn, often depends on each party's bargaining power, which varies with each party's stakes in the potential agreement and available alternatives in case of disagreement. If there is an asymmetry, with one party enjoying higher bargaining power than another, this party can usually get a better deal, as often happens in real negotiations. A strong test of contractualist accounts of morality, then, is whether moral judgments do take bargaining power into account. We explore this in five preregistered experiments (n = 3,025; U.S.-based Prolific participants). We construct scenarios depicting everyday social interactions between two parties in which one of them can perform a mutually beneficial but unpleasant action. We find that the same actions (asking the other to perform the unpleasant action or explicitly refusing to do it) are perceived as less morally appropriate when performed by the party with lower bargaining power, as compared to the party with higher bargaining power. In other words, participants tend to give more moral leeway to parties with better bargaining positions and to hold disadvantaged parties to stricter moral standards. This effect appears to depend only on the relative bargaining power of each party but not on the magnitude of the bargaining power asymmetry between them. We discuss implications for contractualist theories of moral cognition and the emergence and persistence of unfair norms and inequality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"108 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142449330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Individuals preferentially reciprocate connections with copartisans versus counter-partisans online. However, the mechanisms underlying this partisan bias remain unclear. Do individuals simply prefer viewing politically congenial content, or do they additionally prefer socially connecting with copartisans? Is this driven by preference for in-party ties or distaste for out-party ties? In a Twitter (now called X) field experiment, we created bot accounts varying by partisanship and whether they identified as bots or humans. We randomly assigned Twitter users (N = 3,013) to be followed by one of these accounts. We found evidence for social motivation-users were much more likely to reciprocate links to copartisan relative to counter-partisan accounts when the accounts identified as humans versus bots. We also found evidence for both in-party preference and out-party dispreference-users were as likely to follow back copartisan accounts as they were unlikely to followback counter-partisan accounts, compared to politically neutral accounts. A follow-up survey experiment (N = 990) provides further evidence for distinct roles of issue polarization, out-party animosity, and in-party affinity in moderating follow-back decisions online. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Psychological underpinnings of partisan bias in tie formation on social media.","authors":"Mohsen Mosleh,Cameron Martel,David G Rand","doi":"10.1037/xge0001662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001662","url":null,"abstract":"Individuals preferentially reciprocate connections with copartisans versus counter-partisans online. However, the mechanisms underlying this partisan bias remain unclear. Do individuals simply prefer viewing politically congenial content, or do they additionally prefer socially connecting with copartisans? Is this driven by preference for in-party ties or distaste for out-party ties? In a Twitter (now called X) field experiment, we created bot accounts varying by partisanship and whether they identified as bots or humans. We randomly assigned Twitter users (N = 3,013) to be followed by one of these accounts. We found evidence for social motivation-users were much more likely to reciprocate links to copartisan relative to counter-partisan accounts when the accounts identified as humans versus bots. We also found evidence for both in-party preference and out-party dispreference-users were as likely to follow back copartisan accounts as they were unlikely to followback counter-partisan accounts, compared to politically neutral accounts. A follow-up survey experiment (N = 990) provides further evidence for distinct roles of issue polarization, out-party animosity, and in-party affinity in moderating follow-back decisions online. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142439225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adaptation to the environment is a universal property of perception across all sensory modalities. It can enhance the salience of new events in an ongoing background and helps maintain perceptual constancy in the face of variable sensory input. Several contrastive adaptation effects have been identified using sounds within the categories of human voice and musical instruments. The present study investigated whether such contrast effects can occur between voice and nonvoice stimulus categories. A 10-step continuum between "voice" (/a/, /o/, or /u/ vowels) and "instrument" (bassoon, horn, or viola) sounds was generated for each of the nine possible pairs. In each trial, an adaptor, either a voice or instrument, was played four times and was followed by a target from along the appropriate continuum. When trials with voice and instrumental adaptors were grouped into separate blocks, strong contrastive adaptation effects were observed, with the target more likely to be identified as a voice following instrumental adaptors and vice versa (Experiment 1). The effects were not observed for visual image adaptors (Experiment 2). The effects were somewhat larger when the adaptors and the target were presented to the same than to different ears, but significant adaptation was observed in both conditions, suggesting contributions of central mechanisms, following binaural integration (Experiment 3). The effect accumulated when the same type of adaptor was presented consecutively and persisted following the end of the adaptors (Experiment 4). The discovery of voice-nonvoice contrastive pairs opens the possibility of studying perceptual or neuronal voice selectivity while keeping acoustic features constant. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Contrastive adaptation effects along a voice-nonvoice continuum.","authors":"Zi Gao,Andrew J Oxenham","doi":"10.1037/xge0001672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001672","url":null,"abstract":"Adaptation to the environment is a universal property of perception across all sensory modalities. It can enhance the salience of new events in an ongoing background and helps maintain perceptual constancy in the face of variable sensory input. Several contrastive adaptation effects have been identified using sounds within the categories of human voice and musical instruments. The present study investigated whether such contrast effects can occur between voice and nonvoice stimulus categories. A 10-step continuum between \"voice\" (/a/, /o/, or /u/ vowels) and \"instrument\" (bassoon, horn, or viola) sounds was generated for each of the nine possible pairs. In each trial, an adaptor, either a voice or instrument, was played four times and was followed by a target from along the appropriate continuum. When trials with voice and instrumental adaptors were grouped into separate blocks, strong contrastive adaptation effects were observed, with the target more likely to be identified as a voice following instrumental adaptors and vice versa (Experiment 1). The effects were not observed for visual image adaptors (Experiment 2). The effects were somewhat larger when the adaptors and the target were presented to the same than to different ears, but significant adaptation was observed in both conditions, suggesting contributions of central mechanisms, following binaural integration (Experiment 3). The effect accumulated when the same type of adaptor was presented consecutively and persisted following the end of the adaptors (Experiment 4). The discovery of voice-nonvoice contrastive pairs opens the possibility of studying perceptual or neuronal voice selectivity while keeping acoustic features constant. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142439226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research examines the effect of self-concept clarity (i.e., having self-beliefs that are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and stable) on moral behavior. Seven preregistered studies (N = 3,373) document that low (vs. high) self-concept clarity decreases moral behavior (e.g., donation, volunteering, tax compliance, honesty in an incentivized game). This effect occurs because low self-concept clarity increases moral disengagement, leading people to behave in morally questionable manners without damaging their self-concept. As evidence for this proposed underlying mechanism, we show that the effect of self-concept clarity on moral behavior is mediated by state moral disengagement and attenuates (a) among people with low trait moral disengagement, (b) among people with high trait moral identity internalization, and (c) in the presence of an honor pledge cueing moral engagement. We then show that the effect holds only when a prosocial act is congruent with personal values. Overall, these findings contribute to the literature on self-concept and moral self-regulation and have implications for how to promote morality and curb unethical behavior in society. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
本研究探讨了自我概念清晰度（即拥有定义明确、自信、内在一致且稳定的自我信念）对道德行为的影响。七项预先登记的研究（N = 3,373）表明，低（与高）自我概念清晰度会减少道德行为（如捐赠、志愿服务、遵守税法、在激励游戏中诚实）。之所以会产生这种效应，是因为低自我概念清晰度会增加道德疏离感，导致人们在不损害自我概念的情况下做出道德上有问题的行为。作为这一潜在机制的证据，我们证明了自我概念清晰度对道德行为的影响是由状态道德脱离所中介的，并且在以下情况下会减弱：（a）特质道德脱离程度低的人，（b）特质道德认同内化程度高的人，以及（c）在有荣誉承诺提示道德参与的情况下。然后我们证明，只有当亲社会行为与个人价值观一致时，这种效应才会成立。总之，这些研究结果为有关自我概念和道德自我调节的文献做出了贡献，并对如何在社会中促进道德和遏制不道德行为产生了影响。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有）。
{"title":"Unclearly immoral: Low self-concept clarity increases moral disengagement.","authors":"Jiaqian Wang,Maferima Touré-Tillery","doi":"10.1037/xge0001654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001654","url":null,"abstract":"This research examines the effect of self-concept clarity (i.e., having self-beliefs that are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and stable) on moral behavior. Seven preregistered studies (N = 3,373) document that low (vs. high) self-concept clarity decreases moral behavior (e.g., donation, volunteering, tax compliance, honesty in an incentivized game). This effect occurs because low self-concept clarity increases moral disengagement, leading people to behave in morally questionable manners without damaging their self-concept. As evidence for this proposed underlying mechanism, we show that the effect of self-concept clarity on moral behavior is mediated by state moral disengagement and attenuates (a) among people with low trait moral disengagement, (b) among people with high trait moral identity internalization, and (c) in the presence of an honor pledge cueing moral engagement. We then show that the effect holds only when a prosocial act is congruent with personal values. Overall, these findings contribute to the literature on self-concept and moral self-regulation and have implications for how to promote morality and curb unethical behavior in society. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142436386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vannia A Puig,Ruthie Poizner,Katriel Read,Karl K Szpunar
In the course of daily life, various events-such as driving in suboptimal weather conditions, going on a first date, or walking home alone at night-evoke cognitions about what might happen next in the context of ongoing experience. Nonetheless, little is currently known about the phenomenological experience of anticipating events that might occur next-or what we refer to as simulation of the approximal future. We present novel evidence from a retrospective survey, a diary study, and an experimental laboratory study indicating that people commonly experience simulations of the approximal future, and that simulations of the approximal future can be reliably distinguished, in terms of their valence and function, from simulations of future events that are expected to occur in spatiotemporal contexts that are distinct from ongoing experience. Simulation of the approximal future represents an understudied mental experience that carries important implications for understanding the nature of constructive perceptual and memory-based processes as they pertain to event cognition, threat detection, individual differences, and psychopathology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
在日常生活中，各种事件--如在不理想的天气条件下开车、第一次约会或晚上独自走回家--都会唤起人们对正在进行的体验中下一步可能发生的事情的认知。然而，目前人们对预测接下来可能发生的事件的现象学体验--或者说我们所说的对近似未来的模拟--知之甚少。我们从一项回顾性调查、一项日记研究和一项实验室实验研究中提出了新的证据，表明人们通常会经历近似未来的模拟，而且近似未来的模拟在其价值和功能方面，可以可靠地与对未来事件的模拟区分开来，这些未来事件预计会在不同于当前经验的时空背景下发生。对近似未来的模拟代表了一种未被充分研究的心理体验，它对理解基于建构性知觉和记忆的过程的性质具有重要意义，因为它们与事件认知、威胁检测、个体差异和心理病理学有关。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA，保留所有权利）。
{"title":"Mental simulation of the approximal future: Imagining what might happen next.","authors":"Vannia A Puig,Ruthie Poizner,Katriel Read,Karl K Szpunar","doi":"10.1037/xge0001667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001667","url":null,"abstract":"In the course of daily life, various events-such as driving in suboptimal weather conditions, going on a first date, or walking home alone at night-evoke cognitions about what might happen next in the context of ongoing experience. Nonetheless, little is currently known about the phenomenological experience of anticipating events that might occur next-or what we refer to as simulation of the approximal future. We present novel evidence from a retrospective survey, a diary study, and an experimental laboratory study indicating that people commonly experience simulations of the approximal future, and that simulations of the approximal future can be reliably distinguished, in terms of their valence and function, from simulations of future events that are expected to occur in spatiotemporal contexts that are distinct from ongoing experience. Simulation of the approximal future represents an understudied mental experience that carries important implications for understanding the nature of constructive perceptual and memory-based processes as they pertain to event cognition, threat detection, individual differences, and psychopathology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bayes factor analysis becomes increasingly popular, among other reasons, because it allows to provide evidence for the null hypothesis, which is not easily possible with the traditional frequentist approach. A conceivable strategy that apparently takes favorable aspects of both approaches on board is to use traditional frequentist analyses first and to support theoretically interesting nil effects by Bayesian analyses thereafter. Here, we asked whether such a selective application of Bayesian analyses to only nonsignificant effects of foregoing frequentist analyses creates bias. In two simulation studies, we observed that such selective application of Bayesian analyses, in fact, severely overestimates evidence in favor of the null hypotheses, when a true population effect exists. While this bias can be attenuated by using more informative priors in the Bayesian analyses, we recommend to not apply such selective combination of analytical approaches, but instead to use either frequentist or Bayesian analyses consistently. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
贝叶斯因子分析之所以越来越受欢迎，除其他原因外，还因为它可以为零假设提供证据，而传统的频数主义方法则很难做到这一点。一种可以想象的策略显然兼顾了两种方法的有利方面，即首先使用传统的频数分析，然后通过贝叶斯分析来支持理论上有趣的零效应。在此，我们提出这样一个问题：选择性地将贝叶斯分析应用于非显著效应，而不使用频数分析，是否会产生偏差？在两项模拟研究中，我们观察到，当存在真正的群体效应时，这种选择性应用贝叶斯分析实际上会严重高估有利于零假设的证据。虽然这种偏差可以通过在贝叶斯分析中使用信息量更大的先验来减弱，但我们建议不要有选择性地结合使用这种分析方法，而应一致地使用频数分析或贝叶斯分析。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有）。
{"title":"A cautionary note against selective applications of the Bayes factor.","authors":"Marcel R Schreiner,Wilfried Kunde","doi":"10.1037/xge0001666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001666","url":null,"abstract":"Bayes factor analysis becomes increasingly popular, among other reasons, because it allows to provide evidence for the null hypothesis, which is not easily possible with the traditional frequentist approach. A conceivable strategy that apparently takes favorable aspects of both approaches on board is to use traditional frequentist analyses first and to support theoretically interesting nil effects by Bayesian analyses thereafter. Here, we asked whether such a selective application of Bayesian analyses to only nonsignificant effects of foregoing frequentist analyses creates bias. In two simulation studies, we observed that such selective application of Bayesian analyses, in fact, severely overestimates evidence in favor of the null hypotheses, when a true population effect exists. While this bias can be attenuated by using more informative priors in the Bayesian analyses, we recommend to not apply such selective combination of analytical approaches, but instead to use either frequentist or Bayesian analyses consistently. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Li He,Yoed N Kenett,Kaixiang Zhuang,Jiangzhou Sun,Qunlin Chen,Jiang Qiu
Semantic memory offers a rich repository of raw materials (e.g., various concepts and connections between concepts) for creative thinking, represented as a semantic network. Similar to other networks, the semantic network exhibits a modular structure characterized by modules with dense internal connections and sparse connections between them. This organizational principle facilitates the routine storage and retrieval of information but may impede creativity. The present study investigated the effect of hub concepts with varying connection patterns on creative thinking from the perspective of a modular structured semantic network. By analyzing a large-scale semantic network, connector hubs (C-hubs) and provincial hubs (P-hubs) were identified based on their intra- and intermodule connections. These hubs were used as cue words in the alternative uses task, a widely used measure of creative thinking. Across four experiments, behavioral and neural evidence indicated that C-hubs facilitate the generation of more novel and remote ideas compared to P-hubs. However, this effect is predominantly observed in the early stage of the creative thinking process, involving changes in brain activation and functional connectivity in core regions of the default mode network and the frontoparietal network, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, angular gyrus, and precuneus. Neural findings suggest that the superior performance of C-hubs relies on stronger interactions between automatic spreading activation, controlled semantic retrieval, and attentional regulation of salient information. These results provide insight into how concepts with varying semantic connection patterns facilitate and constrain different stages of the creative thinking process through the modular structure of semantic network. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
语义记忆为创造性思维提供了丰富的原材料库（如各种概念和概念之间的联系），表现为语义网络。与其他网络类似，语义网络呈现模块化结构，其特点是模块内部联系密集，模块之间的联系稀疏。这种组织原则有利于信息的常规存储和检索，但可能会阻碍创造力的发挥。本研究从模块化结构语义网络的角度，研究了具有不同连接模式的枢纽概念对创造性思维的影响。通过分析大规模语义网络，根据模块内和模块间的连接，确定了连接器枢纽（C-枢纽）和省枢纽（P-枢纽）。这些枢纽在另类使用任务中被用作提示词，这是一种广泛用于衡量创造性思维的方法。在四项实验中，行为和神经证据表明，与 P 中枢相比，C 中枢有助于产生更多新颖和遥远的想法。不过，这种效应主要出现在创造性思维过程的早期阶段，涉及默认模式网络和前顶叶网络核心区域（包括背外侧前额叶皮层、角回和楔前区）的大脑激活和功能连接变化。神经研究结果表明，C-枢纽的卓越表现依赖于自动扩散激活、受控语义检索和对突出信息的注意调节之间更强的相互作用。这些结果让我们深入了解了具有不同语义连接模式的概念是如何通过语义网络的模块化结构促进和制约创造性思维过程的不同阶段的。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有）。
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Research practices used by social scientists to understand and dismantle the psychological foundations that uphold racist hierarchies can backfire when they rely on racecraft. Racecraft ideology assumes the reality of race(s), an assumption that shapes study designs and inferences to the detriment of theoretical and practical goals. I showcase how racecraft manifests in studies seeking to quantify how perceptions of sociopolitical stimuli differ across racialized perceivers (e.g., black, white, latinx). The typical analysis for quantifying perceptions focuses on comparing group averages, which assumes the existence of discrete "races" whose perceptions can be sufficiently summarized by averages. Across three studies, I used variance component analyses on racism ratings of anti-immigrant tweets from differently racialized perceivers (N = 1,211) to show there was much larger disagreement than agreement within race categories, even when there were average differences in perceptions across race categories. This analysis shows how analytic practices can bolster different assumptions about the nature of race, some of which reify the illusion that race categories are stable cohesive groups. Researchers can improve their analytic inferences and avoid producing race-reifying caricatures of peoples' perceptions by adding variance mapping to their toolkits and attending to racialization as a dynamic process-needed improvements within the psychological study of race and racism, group-based beliefs, and antiracist research endeavors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
社会科学家为了解和瓦解维护种族主义等级制度的心理基础而采取的研究做法，如果依赖于种族思想，就会适得其反。种族意识形态假定了种族的真实性，这种假定影响了研究设计和推论，从而损害了理论和实践目标。我将展示种族法如何体现在寻求量化不同种族感知者（如黑人、白人、拉丁裔）对社会政治刺激的感知差异的研究中。量化感知的典型分析侧重于比较群体平均值，这就假定存在离散的 "种族"，其感知可以用平均值充分概括。在三项研究中，我对来自不同种族的感知者（N = 1,211）的反移民推文的种族主义评分进行了方差分析，结果显示，即使不同种族类别的感知存在平均差异，种族类别内的分歧也远远大于一致。这项分析表明了分析实践如何支持对种族本质的不同假设，其中一些假设还强化了种族类别是稳定的内聚群体的假象。研究人员可以改进他们的分析推论，通过在工具包中添加方差图，并将种族化作为一个动态过程来关注，避免产生种族化的人们认知漫画--这是对种族和种族主义的心理学研究、基于群体的信念以及反种族主义研究工作所需要的改进。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA，保留所有权利）。
{"title":"Analytic racecraft: Race-based averages create illusory group differences in perceptions of racism.","authors":"Joel E Martinez","doi":"10.1037/xge0001673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001673","url":null,"abstract":"Research practices used by social scientists to understand and dismantle the psychological foundations that uphold racist hierarchies can backfire when they rely on racecraft. Racecraft ideology assumes the reality of race(s), an assumption that shapes study designs and inferences to the detriment of theoretical and practical goals. I showcase how racecraft manifests in studies seeking to quantify how perceptions of sociopolitical stimuli differ across racialized perceivers (e.g., black, white, latinx). The typical analysis for quantifying perceptions focuses on comparing group averages, which assumes the existence of discrete \"races\" whose perceptions can be sufficiently summarized by averages. Across three studies, I used variance component analyses on racism ratings of anti-immigrant tweets from differently racialized perceivers (N = 1,211) to show there was much larger disagreement than agreement within race categories, even when there were average differences in perceptions across race categories. This analysis shows how analytic practices can bolster different assumptions about the nature of race, some of which reify the illusion that race categories are stable cohesive groups. Researchers can improve their analytic inferences and avoid producing race-reifying caricatures of peoples' perceptions by adding variance mapping to their toolkits and attending to racialization as a dynamic process-needed improvements within the psychological study of race and racism, group-based beliefs, and antiracist research endeavors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":15698,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology: General","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142386315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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