Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences最新文献

Ever since Tulving's influential 1985 article 'Memory and consciousness', it has become traditional to think of autonoetic consciousness as necessary for episodic memory. This paper questions this claim. Specifically, it argues that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and that, even if it was valid, it would still not be necessary for episodic memory. The paper ends with a proposal to go back to a functional/computational characterization of episodic memory in which its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of the retrieval process and, as a result, open to empirical scrutiny. The proposal also dovetails with recent taxonomies of memory that are independent of conscious awareness and suggests strategies to evaluate within- and between-individual variability in the conscious experience of episodic memories in human and non-human agents. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

The predictive processing framework posits that one of the main functions of the brain is to anticipate the incoming information. Internal models facilitate interactions with the world by predicting future states against which actual evidence is compared. The difference between predicted and actual states, the prediction error (PE), signals novel information. However, how PE affects cognitive processing downstream is not fully understood: one such aspect pertains to how PE influences episodic memories, and whether those effect on memory differ across the lifespan. We examine the relationship between PE and episodic memory in children, young and older adults. We use a novel paradigm whereby rich visual narratives are used to build action schemas that enable probing different mnemonic aspects. To create different levels of PE, we manipulate the story endings to be either expected, neutral or unexpected with respect to the unfolded action. We show that (i) expected endings are better encoded than neutral endings and (ii) unexpected endings improve the encoding of mismatching events and other aspects of the narrative. These effects are differentially modulated across the lifespan with PE-driven encoding being more prominent in children and young adults and with schema integration playing a larger role on memory encoding in older adults. These results highlight the role of predictions by enriching past experiences and informing future anticipations.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

In this article, we explore various arguments against the traditional distinction between episodic and semantic memory based on the metaphysical phenomenon of transitional gradation. Transitional gradation occurs when two candidate kinds A and B grade into one another along a continuum according to their characteristic properties. We review two kinds of arguments-from the gradual semanticization of episodic memories as they are consolidated, and from the composition of episodic memories during storage and recall from semantic memories-that predict the proliferation of such transitional forms. We further explain why the distinction cannot be saved from the challenges of transitional gradation by appealing to distinct underlying memory structures and applying our perspective to the impasse over research into 'episodic-like' memory in non-human animals. On the whole, we recommend replacing the distinction with a dynamic life cycle of memory in which a variety of transitional forms will proliferate, and illustrate the utility of this perspective by tying together recent trends in animal episodic memory research and recommending productive future directions. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Tulving's introduction of episodic memory and the metaphor of mental time travel has immensely enriched our understanding of human cognition. However, his focus on human psychology, with limited consideration of evolutionary perspectives, led to the entrenched notion that mental time travel is uniquely human. We contend that adopting a phylogenetic perspective offers a deeper insight into cognition, revealing it as a continuous evolutionary process. Adherence to the uniqueness of pre-defined psychological concepts obstructs a more complete understanding. We offer a concise natural history to elucidate how events that occurred hundreds of millions of years ago have been pivotal for our ability to mentally time travel. We discuss how the human brain, utilizing parts with ancient origins in a networked manner, enables mental time travel. This underscores that episodic memories and mental time travel are not isolated mental constructs but integral to our perception and representation of the world. We conclude by examining recent evidence of neuroanatomical correlates found only in great apes, which show great variability, indicating the ongoing evolution of mental time travel in humans.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Tulving's concept of mental time travel (MTT), and the related distinction of episodic and semantic memory, have been highly influential contributions to memory research, resulting in a wealth of findings and a deeper understanding of the neurocognitive correlates of memory and future thinking. Many models have conceptualized episodic and semantic representations as existing on a continuum that can help to account for various hybrid forms. Nevertheless, in most theories, MTT remains distinctly associated with episodic representations. In this article, we review existing models of memory and future thinking, and critically evaluate whether episodic representations are distinct from other types of explicit representations, including whether MTT as a neurocognitive capacity is uniquely episodic. We conclude by proposing a new framework, the Multidimensional Model of Mental Representations (MMMR), which can parsimoniously account for the range of past, present and future representations the human mind is capable of creating. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Episodic memories are experienced as belonging to a self that persists in time. We review evidence concerning the nature of human episodic memory and of the sense of self and how these emerge during development, proposing that the younger child experiences a persistent self that supports a subjective experience of remembering. We then explore recent research in cognitive architectures for robotics that has investigated the possibility of forms of synthetic episodic and autobiographical memory. We show that recent advances in generative modeling can support an understanding of the emergence of self and of episodic memory, and that cognitive architectures which include a language capacity are showing progress towards the construction of a narrative self with autobiographical memory capabilities for robots. We conclude by considering the prospects for a more complete model of mental time travel in robotics and the implications of this modeling work for understanding human episodic memory and the self in time. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

One apparent feature of mental time travel is the ability to recursively embed temporal perspectives across different times: humans can remember how we anticipated the future and anticipate how we will remember the past. This recursive structure of mental time travel might be formalized in terms of a 'grammar' that is reflective of but more general than linguistic notions of absolute and relative tense. Here, I provide a foundation for this grammatical framework, emphasizing a bounded (rather than unbounded) recursive function that supports mental time travel to a limited temporal depth and to actual and possible scenarios. Anticipated counterfactual thinking, for instance, entails three levels of mental time travel to a possible scenario ('in the future, I will reflect on how my past self could have taken a different future action') and is centrally implicated in complex human decision-making. This perspective calls for further research into the mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny of recursive mental time travel, and revives the question of links with other recursive forms of thinking such as theory of mind. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Many recent artificial intelligence (AI) systems take inspiration from biological episodic memory. Here, we ask how these 'episodic-inspired' AI systems might inform our understanding of biological episodic memory. We discuss work showing that these systems implement some key features of episodic memory while differing in important respects and appear to enjoy behavioural advantages in the domains of strategic decision-making, fast learning, navigation, exploration and acting over temporal distance. We propose that these systems could be used to evaluate competing theories of episodic memory's operations and function. However, further work is needed to validate them as models of episodic memory and isolate the contributions of their memory systems to their behaviour. More immediately, we propose that these systems have a role to play in directing episodic memory research by highlighting novel or neglected hypotheses as pursuit-worthy. In this vein, we propose that the evidence reviewed here highlights two pursuit-worthy hypotheses about episodic memory's function: that it plays a role in planning that is independent of future-oriented simulation, and that it is adaptive in virtue of its contributions to fast learning in novel, sparse-reward environments. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Mental time travel is often presented as a singular mechanism, but theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that it is composed of component processes. What are these components? Three hypotheses about the major components of mental time travel are commonly considered: (i) remembering and imagining might, respectively, rely on different processes, (ii) past- and future-directed forms of mental time travel might, respectively, rely on different processes, and (iii) the creation of episodic representations and the determination of their temporal orientation might, respectively, rely on different processes. Here, we flesh out the last of these proposals. First, we argue for 'representational continuism': the view that different forms of mental travel are continuous with regard to their core representational contents. Next, we propose an updated account of episodic recombination (the mechanism generating these episodic contents) and review evidence in its support. On this view, episodic recombination is a natural kind best viewed as a form of compositional computation. Finally, we argue that episodic recombination should be distinguished from mechanisms determining the temporal orientation of episodic representations. Thus, we suggest that mental travel is a singular capacity, while mental time travel has at least two major components: episodic representations and their temporal orientation. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

Prior research has used innovative paradigms to show that some non-human animal species demonstrate behavioural choices (i.e. foraging for a food item at a specific location, and at a time that guarantees it has not yet decayed), reflecting episodic-like or 'WWW' memory (memory for 'what' happened, 'where' and 'when'). These results raised the question of whether similar approaches could be used to examine memory in young children in order to reduce verbal demands. The present research examines the extent to which children's WWW memory aligns with memory-based choices in 3- to 5-year-olds (n = 95; study 1) and in 7- to 11-year-olds and adults (n = 168; study 2). Results indicate that preschoolers' struggle with choice-based tasks probably reflects difficulty integrating their WWW memory with an understanding that certain items decay over time. Moreover, a convergence between verbal recall measures and choice-based measures is observable in 7-year-olds and beyond, reflecting a stronger integration of memory signals, understanding of state transformation, and decision-making. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.