Psychological review最新文献

Sensory perception is widely considered an inference process that reflects the best guess of a stimulus feature based on uncertain sensory information. Here we challenge this reductionist view and propose that perception is rather a holistic inference process that operates not only at the feature but jointly across all levels of the representational hierarchy. We test this hypothesis in the context of a commonly used psychophysical matching task in which subjects are asked to report their perceived orientation of a test stimulus by adjusting a probe stimulus (method-of-adjustment). We introduce a holistic matching model that assumes that subjects' reports reflect an optimal match between the test and probe stimulus, both in terms of their inferred feature (orientation) and also their higher level representation (orientation category). Validation against several existing data sets demonstrates that the model accurately and comprehensively predicts subjects' response behavior and outperforms previous models both qualitatively and quantitatively. Moreover, the model generalizes to other feature domains and offers an alternative account for categorical color perception. Our results suggest that categorical effects in sensory perception are ubiquitous and can be parsimoniously explained as optimal behavior based on holistic sensory representations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Evidence is steadily mounting that attribute-based models offer a more accurate description of intertemporal choices than traditional alternative-based models. Among the attribute-based models, the tradeoff model offers the broadest coverage of research findings, but at the cost of considerable complexity: There now are various instantiations of the model dealing with partially overlapping universes of choice options and preference patterns. Moreover, there are reports of preference patterns in intertemporal decisions about monetary losses that contradict all attribute-based models proposed so far. Taking stock of these core challenges, and all other evidence, we develop an account of intertemporal choice, the unified tradeoff model, that is simpler, yet more comprehensive, than all currently available versions of the tradeoff model taken together. It borrows extensively from its predecessors, but it introduces a new element, time bias, that enables it to accommodate an extraordinarily broad range of preference patterns, and also generate new predictions that contradict all existing models of intertemporal choice. We report four studies that test and confirm its predictions regarding delay, interval, sign, and magnitude dependence in choices between single-dated outcomes, and a fifth study that tests and confirms its predictions regarding the relation between delay preference in choices that only involve single-dated payments and duration preference in choices that also involve sequences of payments. Having subjected the unified tradeoff model to an elevated risk of disconfirmation, we discuss its parsimony and scope in relation to yet other phenomena, most notably, preference patterns in consumption decisions, the final frontier for attribute-based models. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Pavlovian conditioning is widely used to study the substrates of learning and memory in the mammalian brain. In a standard protocol, subjects are exposed to pairings of a conditioned stimulus (CS; e.g., a tone) with an unconditioned stimulus (US; e.g., an electric shock). Subsequent presentations of the CS elicit a range of behaviors that relate to the US (e.g., freezing) showing that animals learned the CS-US relation. However, it is still unclear how neuronal activity pertaining to the CS comes to excite a representation of the US, and thereby, conditioned responses. The current analysis of this problem, based on neurophysiological evidence, views Pavlovian conditioning as a process of facilitating the disinhibition, rather than the excitation, of neuronal responses representing the US. Conversely, Pavlovian extinction is viewed as a process of relearning to inhibit neuronal responses representing the US. We propose a mathematical equation that confirms the predictions made by this novel perspective on Pavlovian conditioning when applied to conditioning phenomena that fall beyond classic associative learning theories. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition. The concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science. Yet, contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy. Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a "package deal"-a principled and unified perspective on perception and action. Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways. Aiming to open the field to critical engagement and productive exchange, we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson's death: physical, biological, and social ecological psychology. Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, adopting different explanatory principles, and embodying different philosophical worldviews. Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology. Given the diversity of the strands, we extend this plea to within ecological psychology itself; the field is better off aiming for a productive pluralism in which the different strands are in dialogue with each other. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Research on saccadic and pursuit eye movements led to great advances in our understanding of sensorimotor processing and human behavior. However, studies often have focused on isolated saccadic and pursuit eye movements measured with respect to different sensory information (static vs. dynamic targets). Here, we leveraged interindividual differences across a carefully balanced combination of different tasks to demonstrate that critical links in the control of oculomotor behavior were previously missed. We observed correlations in eye movement behavior across tasks, but only when compared with the same sensory information (e.g., pursuit gain and accuracy of saccades to moving targets). Within the same task, the coordination of saccadic and pursuit eye movements was tailored to the strengths of the individual: observers with more accurate saccades to moving targets rely on them more to catch up with moving targets. Our results have profound implications for the theoretical understanding of sensorimotor processing for oculomotor control. They necessitate a reevaluation of previous data used to map brain circuits for saccadic and pursuit eye movements measured with different types of relevant sensory information. Additionally, they underscore the importance of moving beyond average observations to embrace individual differences as a rich source of information. These individual differences not only reveal the strengths and weaknesses of observers. When combined across different tasks, they allow insights about why observers behave differently in a given task. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

A central goal of research into language acquisition is explaining how, when learners generalize to new cases, they appropriately restrict their generalizations (e.g., to avoid producing ungrammatical utterances such as *the clown laughed the man; "*" indicates an ungrammatical form). The past 30 years have seen an unresolved debate between statistical preemption and entrenchment as explanations. Under preemption, the use of a verb in a particular construction (e.g., *the clown laughed the man) is probabilistically blocked by hearing that other verb constructions with similar meanings only (e.g., the clown made the man laugh). Under entrenchment, such errors (e.g., *the clown laughed the man) are probabilistically blocked by hearing any utterance that includes the relevant verb (e.g., by the clown made the man laugh and the man laughed). Across five artificial-language-learning studies, we designed a training regime such that learners received evidence for the (by the relevant hypothesis) ungrammaticality of a particular unattested verb/noun + particle combination (e.g., *chila + kem; *squeako + kem) via either preemption only or entrenchment only. Across all five studies, participants in the preemption condition (as per our preregistered prediction) rated unattested verb/noun + particle combinations as less acceptable for restricted verbs/nouns, which appeared during training, than for unrestricted, novel-at-test verbs/nouns, which did not appear during training, that is, strong evidence for preemption. Participants in the entrenchment condition showed no evidence for such an effect (and in 3/5 experiments, positive evidence for the null). We conclude that a successful model of learning linguistic restrictions must instantiate competition between different forms only where they express the same (or similar) meanings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Science and religion are influential social forces, and their interplay has been subject to many public and scholarly debates. The present article addresses how people mentally conceptualize the relationship between science and religion and how these conceptualizations can be systematized. To that end, we provide a comprehensive, integrative review of the pertinent literature. Moreover, we discuss how cognitive (in particular, epistemic beliefs) and motivational factors (in particular, epistemic needs, identity, and moral beliefs), as well as personality and contextual factors (e.g., rearing practices and cross-cultural exposure), are related to these mental conceptualizations. And finally, we provide a flowchart detailing the psychological processes leading to these mental conceptualizations. A comprehensive understanding of how individuals perceive the science-religion relationship is interesting in and of itself and practically relevant for managing societal challenges, such as science denial. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Work on the "double empathy problem" (DEP) is rapidly growing in academic and applied settings (e.g., clinical practice). It is most popular in research on conditions, like autism, which are characterized by social cognitive difficulties. Drawing from this literature, we propose that, while research on the DEP has the potential to improve understanding of both typical and atypical social processes, it represents a striking example of a weak derivation chain in psychological science. The DEP is poorly conceptualized, and we find that it is being conflated with many other constructs (i.e., reflecting the "jingle-jangle" fallacy). We provide examples to show how this underlies serious problems with translating theoretical claims into empirical predictions and evidence. To start tackling these problems, we propose that DEP research needs reconsideration, particularly through a better synthesis with the cognitive neuroscience literature on social interaction. Overall, we argue for a strengthening of the derivation chain pertaining to the DEP, toward more robust research on (a)typical social cognition. Until then, we caution against the translation of DEP research into applied settings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Cognitive science is a study of human universals. This assumption, which we will refer to as the Newtonian principle (NP), explicitly or implicitly pervades the theory, methods, and prose of most cognitive research. This is despite at least half a century of sustained critique by cross-cultural and anthropologically oriented researchers and glaring counterexamples such as the study of literacy. We argue that a key reason for this intransigence is that the NP solves the boundary problem of cognitive science. Since studying the idiosyncratic cognitive features of an individual is not a generalizable scientific enterprise, what scale of generalization in cognitive science is legitimate and interesting? The NP solution is a priori-only findings generalizing to all humans are legitimate. This approach is clearly flawed; however, critiques of the NP fail to provide any alternative solution. In fact, some anti-NP branches of research have abandoned generalizability altogether. Sailing between the scylla and charybdis of NP and hermeneutics, we propose an explicit, alternative solution to the boundary problem. Namely, building on many previous efforts, we combine cultural-evolutionary theory with a newly defined principle of articulation. This framework requires work on any given cognitive feature to explicitly hypothesize the universal or group-specific environments in which it emerges. Doing so shifts the question of legitimate generalizability from flawed, a priori assumptions to being a target of explicit claims and theorizing. Moreover, the articulation framework allows us to integrate existing findings across research traditions and motivates a range of future directions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).