Claudia Escobar Vega, Jon Billsberry, John Molineux, Kevin B Lowe
Implicit leadership theories (ILTs) are people's lay theories, definitions, or conceptualizations of leadership. In adults, they determine what actions we perceive as leadership, influence to whom we grant leadership status, and shape our own behaviors when we want to be seen as leader. Naturally, there has been an enduring interest in how these ILTs develop in children. Current theorizing on the development of leadership conceptualizations in children aligns with a stepwise progression mirroring Piaget's stage-based approach to cognitive development. However, contemporary approaches to cognitive development, such as Siegler's overlapping waves theory (OWT), acknowledge that children's development is linked to cognitive success and failure. This article integrates the findings from empirical studies into children's leadership conceptualizations and reinterprets them against OWT. This reinterpretation resolves findings that align poorly with a stepwise approach and demonstrates a strong fit with OWT. As such, children's leadership conceptualizations develop by generating and testing cognitive approaches-physical-spatiotemporal, functional, socioemotional, and humanitarian-and instead of progressing through these in order and according to age, they display variation and selection, that with experience and exposure, lay down selective combinations, which often engage multiple dimensions simultaneously. Consequently, the development of children's understanding of leaders is nonlinear, can be multidimensional, and is based on trial and error largely in response to their experiences. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications for future research and practice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
隐性领导理论(ILT)是人们对领导力的非专业理论、定义或概念。对于成年人来说,它们决定了我们将哪些行为视为领导力,影响了我们赋予哪些人领导地位,并塑造了我们自己希望被视为领导者的行为。自然而然地,人们对儿童如何发展这些领导力综合训练也产生了持久的兴趣。目前关于儿童领导力概念化发展的理论与皮亚杰认知发展的阶段性方法一致。然而,当代的认知发展方法,如西格勒的重叠波理论(OWT),承认儿童的发展与认知的成功和失败有关。本文将实证研究的结果整合到儿童领导力概念中,并根据重叠波理论对其进行重新解释。这种重新诠释解决了与循序渐进方法不相符的研究结果,并证明了其与开放性思维的高度契合。因此,儿童的领导力概念化是通过产生和测试认知方法--物理-时空、功能、社会情感和人道主义--来发展的,而不是按照顺序和年龄来发展的,儿童的领导力概念化显示了变化和选择,随着经验和接触的增加,形成了选择性的组合,这些组合往往同时涉及多个维度。因此,儿童对领导者的理解是非线性的,可以是多维度的,而且主要是根据他们的经验在不断尝试和犯错的基础上形成的。文章最后讨论了对未来研究和实践的影响。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"The development of implicit leadership theories during childhood: A reconceptualization through the lens of overlapping waves theory.","authors":"Claudia Escobar Vega, Jon Billsberry, John Molineux, Kevin B Lowe","doi":"10.1037/rev0000484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000484","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Implicit leadership theories (ILTs) are people's lay theories, definitions, or conceptualizations of leadership. In adults, they determine what actions we perceive as leadership, influence to whom we grant leadership status, and shape our own behaviors when we want to be seen as leader. Naturally, there has been an enduring interest in how these ILTs develop in children. Current theorizing on the development of leadership conceptualizations in children aligns with a stepwise progression mirroring Piaget's stage-based approach to cognitive development. However, contemporary approaches to cognitive development, such as Siegler's overlapping waves theory (OWT), acknowledge that children's development is linked to cognitive success and failure. This article integrates the findings from empirical studies into children's leadership conceptualizations and reinterprets them against OWT. This reinterpretation resolves findings that align poorly with a stepwise approach and demonstrates a strong fit with OWT. As such, children's leadership conceptualizations develop by generating and testing cognitive approaches-physical-spatiotemporal, functional, socioemotional, and humanitarian-and instead of progressing through these in order and according to age, they display variation and selection, that with experience and exposure, lay down selective combinations, which often engage multiple dimensions simultaneously. Consequently, the development of children's understanding of leaders is nonlinear, can be multidimensional, and is based on trial and error largely in response to their experiences. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications for future research and practice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140896272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Samuel J. Cheyette, Shengyi Wu, Steven T Piantadosi
Humans and other animals are able to perceive and represent a number of objects present in a scene, a core cognitive ability thought to underlie the development of mathematics. However, the perceptual mechanisms that underpin this capacity remain poorly understood. Here, we show that our visual sense of number derives from a visual system designed to efficiently encode the location of objects in scenes. Using a mathematical model, we demonstrate that an efficient but information-limited encoding of objects' locations can explain many key aspects of number psychophysics, including subitizing, Weber's law, underestimation, and effects of exposure time. In two experiments (N = 100 each), we find that this model of visual encoding captures human performance in both a change-localization task and a number estimation task. In a third experiment (N = 100), we find that individual differences in change-localization performance are highly predictive of differences in number estimation, both in terms of overall performance and inferred model parameters, with participants having numerically indistinguishable inferred information capacities across tasks. Our results therefore indicate that key psychophysical features of numerical cognition do not arise from separate modules or capacities specific to number, but rather as by-products of lower level constraints on perception. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Limited information-processing capacity in vision explains number psychophysics.","authors":"Samuel J. Cheyette, Shengyi Wu, Steven T Piantadosi","doi":"10.1037/rev0000478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000478","url":null,"abstract":"Humans and other animals are able to perceive and represent a number of objects present in a scene, a core cognitive ability thought to underlie the development of mathematics. However, the perceptual mechanisms that underpin this capacity remain poorly understood. Here, we show that our visual sense of number derives from a visual system designed to efficiently encode the location of objects in scenes. Using a mathematical model, we demonstrate that an efficient but information-limited encoding of objects' locations can explain many key aspects of number psychophysics, including subitizing, Weber's law, underestimation, and effects of exposure time. In two experiments (N = 100 each), we find that this model of visual encoding captures human performance in both a change-localization task and a number estimation task. In a third experiment (N = 100), we find that individual differences in change-localization performance are highly predictive of differences in number estimation, both in terms of overall performance and inferred model parameters, with participants having numerically indistinguishable inferred information capacities across tasks. Our results therefore indicate that key psychophysical features of numerical cognition do not arise from separate modules or capacities specific to number, but rather as by-products of lower level constraints on perception. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140676478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paul M. Krueger, Frederick Callaway, Sayan Gul, Thomas L Griffiths, Falk Lieder
Perfectly rational decision making is almost always out of reach for people because their computational resources are limited. Instead, people may rely on computationally frugal heuristics that usually yield good outcomes. Although previous research has identified many such heuristics, discovering good heuristics and predicting when they will be used remains challenging. Here, we present a theoretical framework that allows us to use methods from machine learning to automatically derive the best heuristic to use in any given situation by considering how to make the best use of limited cognitive resources. To demonstrate the generalizability and accuracy of our method, we compare the heuristics it discovers against those used by people across a wide range of multi-attribute risky choice environments in a behavioral experiment that is an order of magnitude larger than any previous experiments of its type. Our method rediscovered known heuristics, identifying them as rational strategies for specific environments, and discovered novel heuristics that had been previously overlooked. Our results show that people adapt their decision strategies to the structure of the environment and generally make good use of their limited cognitive resources, although their strategy choices do not always fully exploit the structure of the environment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
由于计算资源有限,人们几乎总是无法做出完全理性的决策。取而代之的是,人们可能会依赖于通常能产生良好结果的计算节俭启发式方法。尽管之前的研究已经发现了很多这样的启发式方法,但发现好的启发式方法并预测它们何时会被使用仍然具有挑战性。在这里,我们提出了一个理论框架,通过考虑如何充分利用有限的认知资源,我们可以利用机器学习的方法自动得出在任何给定情况下使用的最佳启发式。为了证明我们的方法的通用性和准确性,我们将其发现的启发式方法与人们在广泛的多属性风险选择环境中使用的启发式方法进行了比较。我们的方法重新发现了已知的启发式策略,将其确定为特定环境下的合理策略,并发现了之前被忽视的新型启发式策略。我们的研究结果表明,尽管人们的决策策略选择并不总是能够充分利用环境结构,但他们的决策策略能够适应环境结构,并且通常能够很好地利用有限的认知资源。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"Identifying resource-rational heuristics for risky choice.","authors":"Paul M. Krueger, Frederick Callaway, Sayan Gul, Thomas L Griffiths, Falk Lieder","doi":"10.1037/rev0000456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000456","url":null,"abstract":"Perfectly rational decision making is almost always out of reach for people because their computational resources are limited. Instead, people may rely on computationally frugal heuristics that usually yield good outcomes. Although previous research has identified many such heuristics, discovering good heuristics and predicting when they will be used remains challenging. Here, we present a theoretical framework that allows us to use methods from machine learning to automatically derive the best heuristic to use in any given situation by considering how to make the best use of limited cognitive resources. To demonstrate the generalizability and accuracy of our method, we compare the heuristics it discovers against those used by people across a wide range of multi-attribute risky choice environments in a behavioral experiment that is an order of magnitude larger than any previous experiments of its type. Our method rediscovered known heuristics, identifying them as rational strategies for specific environments, and discovered novel heuristics that had been previously overlooked. Our results show that people adapt their decision strategies to the structure of the environment and generally make good use of their limited cognitive resources, although their strategy choices do not always fully exploit the structure of the environment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140689792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although the Bayesian paradigm is an important benchmark in studies of human inference, the extent to which it provides a useful framework to account for human behavior remains debated. We document systematic departures from Bayesian inference under correct beliefs, even on average, in the estimates by experimental subjects of the probability of a binary event following observations of successive realizations of the event. In particular, we find underreaction of subjects' estimates to the evidence ("conservatism") after only a few observations and at the same time overreaction after longer sequences of observations. This is not explained by an incorrect prior nor by many common models of Bayesian inference. We uncover the autocorrelation in estimates, which suggests that subjects carry imprecise representations of the decision situations, with noise in beliefs propagating over successive trials. But even taking into account these internal imprecisions and assuming various incorrect beliefs, we find that subjects' updates are inconsistent with the rules of Bayesian inference. We show how subjects instead considerably economize on the attention that they pay to the information relevant to the decision, and on the degree of control that they exert over their precise response, while giving responses fairly adapted to the task. A "noisy-counting" model of probability estimation reproduces the several patterns we exhibit in subjects' behavior. In sum, human subjects in our task perform reasonably well while greatly minimizing the amount of information that they pay attention to. Our results emphasize that investigating this economy of attention is crucial in understanding human decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
尽管贝叶斯范式是人类推理研究中的一个重要基准,但它在多大程度上为人类行为提供了一个有用的解释框架仍存在争议。我们记录了实验对象在观察二元事件的连续实现后对该事件概率的估计,即使是平均值,也系统性地偏离了正确信念下的贝叶斯推断。特别是,我们发现受试者的估计值在仅有几次观察后就对证据反应不足("保守主义"),同时在较长的观察序列后反应过度。这既不能用不正确的先验来解释,也不能用许多常见的贝叶斯推理模型来解释。我们发现了估计值中的自相关性,这表明受试者对决策情境的表征并不精确,信念中的噪声在连续试验中传播。但是,即使考虑到这些内部不精确性并假设各种不正确的信念,我们还是发现受试者的更新与贝叶斯推理规则不一致。我们展示了受试者是如何在相当程度上节约对决策相关信息的关注,以及对精确反应的控制程度,同时给出相当适应任务的反应的。概率估计的 "噪声计数 "模型再现了我们在受试者行为中发现的几种模式。总之,人类受试者在我们的任务中表现相当出色,同时大大减少了他们所关注的信息量。我们的研究结果强调,研究这种注意力的经济性对于理解人类决策至关重要。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved)。
{"title":"Imprecise probabilistic inference from sequential data.","authors":"Arthur Prat-Carrabin, Michael Woodford","doi":"10.1037/rev0000469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000469","url":null,"abstract":"Although the Bayesian paradigm is an important benchmark in studies of human inference, the extent to which it provides a useful framework to account for human behavior remains debated. We document systematic departures from Bayesian inference under correct beliefs, even on average, in the estimates by experimental subjects of the probability of a binary event following observations of successive realizations of the event. In particular, we find underreaction of subjects' estimates to the evidence (\"conservatism\") after only a few observations and at the same time overreaction after longer sequences of observations. This is not explained by an incorrect prior nor by many common models of Bayesian inference. We uncover the autocorrelation in estimates, which suggests that subjects carry imprecise representations of the decision situations, with noise in beliefs propagating over successive trials. But even taking into account these internal imprecisions and assuming various incorrect beliefs, we find that subjects' updates are inconsistent with the rules of Bayesian inference. We show how subjects instead considerably economize on the attention that they pay to the information relevant to the decision, and on the degree of control that they exert over their precise response, while giving responses fairly adapted to the task. A \"noisy-counting\" model of probability estimation reproduces the several patterns we exhibit in subjects' behavior. In sum, human subjects in our task perform reasonably well while greatly minimizing the amount of information that they pay attention to. Our results emphasize that investigating this economy of attention is crucial in understanding human decisions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140687784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Supplemental Material for Limited Information-Processing Capacity in Vision Explains Number Psychophysics","authors":"","doi":"10.1037/rev0000478.supp","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000478.supp","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140687395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Rescorla-Wagner rule remains the most popular tool to describe human behavior in reinforcement learning tasks. Nevertheless, it cannot fit human learning in complex environments. Previous work proposed several hierarchical extensions of this learning rule. However, it remains unclear when a flat (nonhierarchical) versus a hierarchical strategy is adaptive, or when it is implemented by humans. To address this question, current work applies a nested modeling approach to evaluate multiple models in multiple reinforcement learning environments both computationally (which approach performs best) and empirically (which approach fits human data best). We consider 10 empirical data sets (N = 407) divided over three reinforcement learning environments. Our results demonstrate that different environments are best solved with different learning strategies; and that humans adaptively select the learning strategy that allows best performance. Specifically, while flat learning fitted best in less complex stable learning environments, humans employed more hierarchically complex models in more complex environments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Humans adaptively select different computational strategies in different learning environments.","authors":"Pieter Verbeke, Tom Verguts","doi":"10.1037/rev0000474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000474","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Rescorla-Wagner rule remains the most popular tool to describe human behavior in reinforcement learning tasks. Nevertheless, it cannot fit human learning in complex environments. Previous work proposed several hierarchical extensions of this learning rule. However, it remains unclear when a flat (nonhierarchical) versus a hierarchical strategy is adaptive, or when it is implemented by humans. To address this question, current work applies a nested modeling approach to evaluate multiple models in multiple reinforcement learning environments both computationally (which approach performs best) and empirically (which approach fits human data best). We consider 10 empirical data sets (<i>N</i> = 407) divided over three reinforcement learning environments. Our results demonstrate that different environments are best solved with different learning strategies; and that humans adaptively select the learning strategy that allows best performance. Specifically, while flat learning fitted best in less complex stable learning environments, humans employed more hierarchically complex models in more complex environments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140864238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Few contemporary psychologists would probably object to the notion that cognitive processes contribute to behavioral plasticity (learning) and are intimately linked to brain function. However, growing evidence suggests that behavioral plasticity is present in organisms lacking neurons (i.e., aneural organisms). This possibility would imply that at least some cognitive processes might have preceded the evolution of nervous systems. Evidence of learning in aneural organisms is reviewed within a mechanistic framework emphasizing four levels of analysis: psychological, neurobiological, neurochemical, and cell-molecular. Learning phenomena ranging from habituation to conditioning have been reported in some aneural organisms, and some key examples are reviewed with attention to evidence of underlying mechanisms. Species comparisons are framed in terms of the central evolutionary concepts of homology and homoplasy. This evidence raises the question of what new behavioral capacities were supported by the evolution of neurons that were not possible before. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
认知过程有助于行为可塑性(学习)并与大脑功能密切相关,当代心理学家可能很少会反对这一观点。然而,越来越多的证据表明,行为可塑性存在于缺乏神经元的生物体(即无神经生物体)中。这种可能性意味着至少某些认知过程可能早于神经系统的进化。本文在一个强调四个层次分析的机理框架内回顾了无神经生物的学习证据:心理、神经生物学、神经化学和细胞分子。据报道,一些无神经生物体内存在从习惯化到条件反射的学习现象,本研究对一些关键实例进行了综述,并关注了潜在机制的证据。物种比较以同源性和同源性这一核心进化概念为框架。这些证据提出了一个问题:神经元的进化支持了哪些以前不可能实现的新行为能力?(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"Behavioral plasticity in aneural organisms.","authors":"M. Papini","doi":"10.1037/rev0000483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000483","url":null,"abstract":"Few contemporary psychologists would probably object to the notion that cognitive processes contribute to behavioral plasticity (learning) and are intimately linked to brain function. However, growing evidence suggests that behavioral plasticity is present in organisms lacking neurons (i.e., aneural organisms). This possibility would imply that at least some cognitive processes might have preceded the evolution of nervous systems. Evidence of learning in aneural organisms is reviewed within a mechanistic framework emphasizing four levels of analysis: psychological, neurobiological, neurochemical, and cell-molecular. Learning phenomena ranging from habituation to conditioning have been reported in some aneural organisms, and some key examples are reviewed with attention to evidence of underlying mechanisms. Species comparisons are framed in terms of the central evolutionary concepts of homology and homoplasy. This evidence raises the question of what new behavioral capacities were supported by the evolution of neurons that were not possible before. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140713883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Supplemental Material for Humans Adaptively Select Different Computational Strategies in Different Learning Environments","authors":"","doi":"10.1037/rev0000474.supp","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000474.supp","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140730177","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do we punish negligence? Some current accounts raise the possibility that it can be explained by the kinds of processes that lead us to punish ordinary harmful acts, such as outcome bias, character inference, or antecedent deliberative choices. Although they capture many important cases, these explanations fail to account for others. We argue that, in addition to these phenomena, there is something unique to the punishment of negligence itself: People hold others directly responsible for the basic fact of failing to bring to mind information that would help them to avoid important risks. In other words, we propose that at its heart negligence is a failure of thought. Drawing on the current literature in moral psychology, we suggest that people find it natural to punish such failures, even when they do not arise from conscious, volitional choice. This raises a question: Why punish somebody for a mental event they did not exercise deliberative control over? Drawing on the literature on how thoughts come to mind, we argue that punishing a person for such failures will help prevent their future occurrence, even without the involvement of volitional choice. This provides new insight on the structure and function of our tendency to punish negligent actions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
我们为什么要惩罚过失?目前的一些观点认为,我们可以用那些导致我们惩罚普通有害行为的过程来解释过失,如结果偏差、性格推断或先行审议选择。尽管这些解释捕捉到了许多重要案例,但却无法解释其他案例。我们认为,除了这些现象之外,惩罚过失本身也有其独特之处:人们会要求他人直接对其未能提供有助于他们规避重要风险的信息这一基本事实负责。换句话说,我们认为过失的核心是思想上的失败。借鉴当前的道德心理学文献,我们认为,人们会自然而然地惩罚这种失误,即使它们并非源于有意识的、自愿的选择。这就提出了一个问题:为什么要惩罚一个没有经过深思熟虑控制的心理事件呢?借鉴有关思想如何进入大脑的文献,我们认为,即使没有意志选择的参与,对这种失败进行惩罚也有助于防止它们在未来发生。这对我们惩罚过失行为的倾向的结构和功能提供了新的见解。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
{"title":"One thought too few: An adaptive rationale for punishing negligence.","authors":"Arun Sarin, F. Cushman","doi":"10.1037/rev0000476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000476","url":null,"abstract":"Why do we punish negligence? Some current accounts raise the possibility that it can be explained by the kinds of processes that lead us to punish ordinary harmful acts, such as outcome bias, character inference, or antecedent deliberative choices. Although they capture many important cases, these explanations fail to account for others. We argue that, in addition to these phenomena, there is something unique to the punishment of negligence itself: People hold others directly responsible for the basic fact of failing to bring to mind information that would help them to avoid important risks. In other words, we propose that at its heart negligence is a failure of thought. Drawing on the current literature in moral psychology, we suggest that people find it natural to punish such failures, even when they do not arise from conscious, volitional choice. This raises a question: Why punish somebody for a mental event they did not exercise deliberative control over? Drawing on the literature on how thoughts come to mind, we argue that punishing a person for such failures will help prevent their future occurrence, even without the involvement of volitional choice. This provides new insight on the structure and function of our tendency to punish negligent actions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140773310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-01Epub Date: 2023-09-21DOI: 10.1037/rev0000441
Frederick Callaway, Thomas L Griffiths, Kenneth A Norman, Qiong Zhang
Most of us have experienced moments when we could not recall some piece of information but felt that it was just out of reach. Research in metamemory has established that such judgments are often accurate; but what adaptive purpose do they serve? Here, we present an optimal model of how metacognitive monitoring (feeling of knowing) could dynamically inform metacognitive control of memory (the direction of retrieval efforts). In two experiments, we find that, consistent with the optimal model, people report having a stronger memory for targets they are likely to recall and direct their search efforts accordingly, cutting off the search when it is unlikely to succeed and prioritizing the search for stronger memories. Our results suggest that metamemory is indeed adaptive and motivate the development of process-level theories that account for the dynamic interplay between monitoring and control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
{"title":"Optimal metacognitive control of memory recall.","authors":"Frederick Callaway, Thomas L Griffiths, Kenneth A Norman, Qiong Zhang","doi":"10.1037/rev0000441","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000441","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Most of us have experienced moments when we could not recall some piece of information but felt that it was just out of reach. Research in metamemory has established that such judgments are often accurate; but what adaptive purpose do they serve? Here, we present an optimal model of how metacognitive monitoring (feeling of knowing) could dynamically inform metacognitive control of memory (the direction of retrieval efforts). In two experiments, we find that, consistent with the optimal model, people report having a stronger memory for targets they are likely to recall and direct their search efforts accordingly, cutting off the search when it is unlikely to succeed and prioritizing the search for stronger memories. Our results suggest that metamemory is indeed adaptive and motivate the development of process-level theories that account for the dynamic interplay between monitoring and control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41140966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}