Psychological review最新文献

Evidence is steadily mounting that attribute-based models offer a more accurate description of intertemporal choices than traditional alternative-based models. Among the attribute-based models, the tradeoff model offers the broadest coverage of research findings, but at the cost of considerable complexity: There now are various instantiations of the model dealing with partially overlapping universes of choice options and preference patterns. Moreover, there are reports of preference patterns in intertemporal decisions about monetary losses that contradict all attribute-based models proposed so far. Taking stock of these core challenges, and all other evidence, we develop an account of intertemporal choice, the unified tradeoff model, that is simpler, yet more comprehensive, than all currently available versions of the tradeoff model taken together. It borrows extensively from its predecessors, but it introduces a new element, time bias, that enables it to accommodate an extraordinarily broad range of preference patterns, and also generate new predictions that contradict all existing models of intertemporal choice. We report four studies that test and confirm its predictions regarding delay, interval, sign, and magnitude dependence in choices between single-dated outcomes, and a fifth study that tests and confirms its predictions regarding the relation between delay preference in choices that only involve single-dated payments and duration preference in choices that also involve sequences of payments. Having subjected the unified tradeoff model to an elevated risk of disconfirmation, we discuss its parsimony and scope in relation to yet other phenomena, most notably, preference patterns in consumption decisions, the final frontier for attribute-based models. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The ecological approach to psychology has been a main antecedent of embodied and situated approaches to cognition. The concept of affordances in particular has gained currency throughout psychological science. Yet, contemporary ecological psychology has seemed inaccessible to outsiders and protective of its legacy. Indeed, some prominent ecological psychologists have presented their approach as a "package deal"-a principled and unified perspective on perception and action. Looking at the history of the field, however, we argue that ecological psychology has developed in rich and pluriform ways. Aiming to open the field to critical engagement and productive exchange, we identify three major strands of thought within ecological psychology, each of which emerged in the 20 years after Gibson's death: physical, biological, and social ecological psychology. Each of these strands develop ecological ideas in quite different directions, making different use of some of its central concepts, adopting different explanatory principles, and embodying different philosophical worldviews. Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology. Given the diversity of the strands, we extend this plea to within ecological psychology itself; the field is better off aiming for a productive pluralism in which the different strands are in dialogue with each other. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Research on saccadic and pursuit eye movements led to great advances in our understanding of sensorimotor processing and human behavior. However, studies often have focused on isolated saccadic and pursuit eye movements measured with respect to different sensory information (static vs. dynamic targets). Here, we leveraged interindividual differences across a carefully balanced combination of different tasks to demonstrate that critical links in the control of oculomotor behavior were previously missed. We observed correlations in eye movement behavior across tasks, but only when compared with the same sensory information (e.g., pursuit gain and accuracy of saccades to moving targets). Within the same task, the coordination of saccadic and pursuit eye movements was tailored to the strengths of the individual: observers with more accurate saccades to moving targets rely on them more to catch up with moving targets. Our results have profound implications for the theoretical understanding of sensorimotor processing for oculomotor control. They necessitate a reevaluation of previous data used to map brain circuits for saccadic and pursuit eye movements measured with different types of relevant sensory information. Additionally, they underscore the importance of moving beyond average observations to embrace individual differences as a rich source of information. These individual differences not only reveal the strengths and weaknesses of observers. When combined across different tasks, they allow insights about why observers behave differently in a given task. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Work on the "double empathy problem" (DEP) is rapidly growing in academic and applied settings (e.g., clinical practice). It is most popular in research on conditions, like autism, which are characterized by social cognitive difficulties. Drawing from this literature, we propose that, while research on the DEP has the potential to improve understanding of both typical and atypical social processes, it represents a striking example of a weak derivation chain in psychological science. The DEP is poorly conceptualized, and we find that it is being conflated with many other constructs (i.e., reflecting the "jingle-jangle" fallacy). We provide examples to show how this underlies serious problems with translating theoretical claims into empirical predictions and evidence. To start tackling these problems, we propose that DEP research needs reconsideration, particularly through a better synthesis with the cognitive neuroscience literature on social interaction. Overall, we argue for a strengthening of the derivation chain pertaining to the DEP, toward more robust research on (a)typical social cognition. Until then, we caution against the translation of DEP research into applied settings. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Cognitive science is a study of human universals. This assumption, which we will refer to as the Newtonian principle (NP), explicitly or implicitly pervades the theory, methods, and prose of most cognitive research. This is despite at least half a century of sustained critique by cross-cultural and anthropologically oriented researchers and glaring counterexamples such as the study of literacy. We argue that a key reason for this intransigence is that the NP solves the boundary problem of cognitive science. Since studying the idiosyncratic cognitive features of an individual is not a generalizable scientific enterprise, what scale of generalization in cognitive science is legitimate and interesting? The NP solution is a priori-only findings generalizing to all humans are legitimate. This approach is clearly flawed; however, critiques of the NP fail to provide any alternative solution. In fact, some anti-NP branches of research have abandoned generalizability altogether. Sailing between the scylla and charybdis of NP and hermeneutics, we propose an explicit, alternative solution to the boundary problem. Namely, building on many previous efforts, we combine cultural-evolutionary theory with a newly defined principle of articulation. This framework requires work on any given cognitive feature to explicitly hypothesize the universal or group-specific environments in which it emerges. Doing so shifts the question of legitimate generalizability from flawed, a priori assumptions to being a target of explicit claims and theorizing. Moreover, the articulation framework allows us to integrate existing findings across research traditions and motivates a range of future directions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Implicit leadership theories (ILTs) are people's lay theories, definitions, or conceptualizations of leadership. In adults, they determine what actions we perceive as leadership, influence to whom we grant leadership status, and shape our own behaviors when we want to be seen as leader. Naturally, there has been an enduring interest in how these ILTs develop in children. Current theorizing on the development of leadership conceptualizations in children aligns with a stepwise progression mirroring Piaget's stage-based approach to cognitive development. However, contemporary approaches to cognitive development, such as Siegler's overlapping waves theory (OWT), acknowledge that children's development is linked to cognitive success and failure. This article integrates the findings from empirical studies into children's leadership conceptualizations and reinterprets them against OWT. This reinterpretation resolves findings that align poorly with a stepwise approach and demonstrates a strong fit with OWT. As such, children's leadership conceptualizations develop by generating and testing cognitive approaches-physical-spatiotemporal, functional, socioemotional, and humanitarian-and instead of progressing through these in order and according to age, they display variation and selection, that with experience and exposure, lay down selective combinations, which often engage multiple dimensions simultaneously. Consequently, the development of children's understanding of leaders is nonlinear, can be multidimensional, and is based on trial and error largely in response to their experiences. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications for future research and practice. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The Rescorla-Wagner rule remains the most popular tool to describe human behavior in reinforcement learning tasks. Nevertheless, it cannot fit human learning in complex environments. Previous work proposed several hierarchical extensions of this learning rule. However, it remains unclear when a flat (nonhierarchical) versus a hierarchical strategy is adaptive, or when it is implemented by humans. To address this question, current work applies a nested modeling approach to evaluate multiple models in multiple reinforcement learning environments both computationally (which approach performs best) and empirically (which approach fits human data best). We consider 10 empirical data sets (N = 407) divided over three reinforcement learning environments. Our results demonstrate that different environments are best solved with different learning strategies; and that humans adaptively select the learning strategy that allows best performance. Specifically, while flat learning fitted best in less complex stable learning environments, humans employed more hierarchically complex models in more complex environments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Most of us have experienced moments when we could not recall some piece of information but felt that it was just out of reach. Research in metamemory has established that such judgments are often accurate; but what adaptive purpose do they serve? Here, we present an optimal model of how metacognitive monitoring (feeling of knowing) could dynamically inform metacognitive control of memory (the direction of retrieval efforts). In two experiments, we find that, consistent with the optimal model, people report having a stronger memory for targets they are likely to recall and direct their search efforts accordingly, cutting off the search when it is unlikely to succeed and prioritizing the search for stronger memories. Our results suggest that metamemory is indeed adaptive and motivate the development of process-level theories that account for the dynamic interplay between monitoring and control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

People often form polarized beliefs, imbuing objects (e.g., themselves or others) with unambiguously positive or negative qualities. In clinical settings, this is referred to as dichotomous thinking or "splitting" and is a feature of several psychiatric disorders. Here, we introduce a Bayesian model of splitting that parameterizes a tendency to rigidly categorize objects as either entirely "Bad" or "Good," rather than to flexibly learn dispositions along a continuous scale. Distinct from the previous descriptive theories, the model makes quantitative predictions about how dichotomous beliefs emerge and are updated in light of new information. Specifically, the model addresses how splitting is context-dependent, yet exhibits stability across time. A key model feature is that phases of devaluation and/or idealization are consolidated by rationally attributing counter-evidence to external factors. For example, when another person is idealized, their less-than-perfect behavior is attributed to unfavorable external circumstances. However, sufficient counter-evidence can trigger switches of polarity, producing bistable dynamics. We show that the model can be fitted to empirical data, to measure individual susceptibility to relational instability. For example, we find that a latent categorical belief that others are "Good" accounts for less changeable, and more certain, character impressions of benevolent as opposed to malevolent others among healthy participants. By comparison, character impressions made by participants with borderline personality disorder reveal significantly higher and more symmetric splitting. The generative framework proposed invites applications for modeling oscillatory relational and affective dynamics in psychotherapeutic contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

For over 35 years, the violation-of-expectation paradigm has been used to study the development of expectations in the first 3 years of life. A wide range of expectations has been examined, including physical, psychological, sociomoral, biological, numerical, statistical, probabilistic, and linguistic expectations. Surprisingly, despite the paradigm's widespread use and the many seminal findings it has contributed to psychological science, so far no one has tried to provide a detailed and in-depth conceptual overview of the paradigm. Here, we attempted to do just that. We first focus on the rationale of the paradigm and discuss how it has evolved over time. We then show how improved descriptions of infants' looking behavior, together with the addition of a rich panoply of brain and behavioral measures, have helped deepen our understanding of infants' responses to violations. Next, we review the paradigm's strengths and limitations. Finally, we end with a discussion of challenges that have been leveled against the paradigm over the years. Through it all, our goal was twofold. First, we sought to provide psychologists and other scientists interested in the paradigm with an informed and constructive analysis of its theoretical origins and development. Second, we wanted to take stock of what the paradigm has revealed to date about how infants reason about events, and about how surprise at unexpected events, in or out of the laboratory, can lead to learning, by prompting infants to revise their working model of the world. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).