Pub Date : 1995-03-01DOI: 10.1080/10417949509372972
C. Smith
This study examines Vice President Dan Quayle's call for a reassertion of family values in the context of the presidential campaign of 1992. The study begins by establishing the milieu of the campaign and the derivation of it's rhetorical strategy from Vice President Agnew. The study concludes that Quayle was effective in re‐ordering the political agenda, and consolidating the support of the right by playing on dialectical tensions grounded in values. But his appeals were undercut with the general audience because of his lack of credibility as an epideictic speaker and Americans’ suspicions about politicians issuing moral advice.
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Pub Date : 1995-03-01DOI: 10.1080/10417949509372967
C. Johnstone
Ethical analysis of Ronald Reagan's rhetorical practice enables us to bring order to our recent political history. His 1984 campaign for re‐election is especially fitting as a vehicle for this analysis because Reagan is fundamentally a campaigner and because the campaign centered on normative issues. Appropriate ethical standards are grounded in the values and procedures of democratic decision making. When appraised by these standards—rules of disclosure, argument, confrontation, and public competence—the Reagan campaign is found deficient in upholding principles that undergird the political system within which he operated, and upon which the election process depends for its legitimacy and efficacy.
{"title":"Reagan, rhetoric, and the public philosophy: Ethics and politics in the 1984 campaign","authors":"C. Johnstone","doi":"10.1080/10417949509372967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10417949509372967","url":null,"abstract":"Ethical analysis of Ronald Reagan's rhetorical practice enables us to bring order to our recent political history. His 1984 campaign for re‐election is especially fitting as a vehicle for this analysis because Reagan is fundamentally a campaigner and because the campaign centered on normative issues. Appropriate ethical standards are grounded in the values and procedures of democratic decision making. When appraised by these standards—rules of disclosure, argument, confrontation, and public competence—the Reagan campaign is found deficient in upholding principles that undergird the political system within which he operated, and upon which the election process depends for its legitimacy and efficacy.","PeriodicalId":212800,"journal":{"name":"Southern Journal of Communication","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116690171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1995-03-01DOI: 10.1080/10417949509372973
Richard W. Leeman
Three orators’ speeches are analyzed for their use of relational, locational and directional types of spatial metaphors. Frances Harper utilized all three types in her call for elemental justice. Mordecai Johnson blended directional with locational metaphors to recreate the African‐American's journey. Louis Lomax employed literal space as evidence for his metaphorical generalizations about racial pride and responsibility. The essay concludes by examining the potential importance of understanding symbolic space for critics of African‐American discourse.
{"title":"Spatial metaphors in African‐American discourse","authors":"Richard W. Leeman","doi":"10.1080/10417949509372973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10417949509372973","url":null,"abstract":"Three orators’ speeches are analyzed for their use of relational, locational and directional types of spatial metaphors. Frances Harper utilized all three types in her call for elemental justice. Mordecai Johnson blended directional with locational metaphors to recreate the African‐American's journey. Louis Lomax employed literal space as evidence for his metaphorical generalizations about racial pride and responsibility. The essay concludes by examining the potential importance of understanding symbolic space for critics of African‐American discourse.","PeriodicalId":212800,"journal":{"name":"Southern Journal of Communication","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124614705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-12-01DOI: 10.1080/10417949409372959
Per Fjelstad
Historians and critics have long assessed the political import of Marbury v. Madison, an 1803 Supreme Court decision that declared part of a Congressional act unconstitutional. Critics explain the decision as part of an evolution in constitutional law and as a lively political drama. This essay identifies inferences by which the written opinion poses judgments about the function of law. The opinion delimits law to decisions about personal rights; it radicalizes its field of concern by reversing its argumentative momentum; it develops a progression of dichotomies that ask readers to stand in for the viability of a contractual political order. These ways of constructing the issue ask readers to affirm a formative myth of national identity.
历史学家和批评人士长期以来一直在评估马布里诉麦迪逊案(Marbury v. Madison)的政治意义。1803年，最高法院的一项裁决宣布，一项国会法案的部分内容违宪。批评人士解释说，这一决定是宪法演变的一部分，是一出生动的政治戏剧。本文确定了书面意见对法律功能作出判断所依据的推论。该意见将法律限定为有关个人权利的决定;它通过扭转其辩论势头使其所关注的领域激进化;它发展了一系列的二分法，要求读者代表契约政治秩序的可行性。这些建构问题的方式要求读者肯定一种形成性的民族认同神话。
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Pub Date : 1994-12-01DOI: 10.1080/10417949409372962
Trevor Parry‐Giles
This essay explores the constitutive and ideological power of the Supreme Court nomination process. It maintains that this process has evolved in the twentieth century into a rhetorical ritual whereby the American community publicly enacts and configures collective commitments to civil liberties, the law, and constitutional democracy. As such, the ideological power of the Supreme Court nomination process is manifest in the rhetorical negotiation and debate concerning nominees and their placement within the symbolically constructed scope of acceptable judicial philosophy. Specifically, this essay examines the power of the debates concerning Herbert Hoovers nomination of John J. Parker to the Supreme Court in 1930 to constrict the symbolic influence of “property rights” and to expand the importance of “human rights” as specific commitments definitive of American jurisprudence.
本文探讨了最高法院提名程序的构成和意识形态力量。它坚持认为，这一过程在20世纪已经演变成一种修辞仪式，美国社会借此公开制定和配置对公民自由、法律和宪政民主的集体承诺。因此，最高法院提名过程的意识形态力量体现在关于被提名人的修辞谈判和辩论中，以及他们在可接受的司法哲学的象征性构建范围内的位置。具体而言，本文考察了1930年赫伯特·胡佛提名约翰·j·帕克(John J. Parker)为最高法院大法官的辩论的力量，以限制“财产权”的象征性影响，并扩大“人权”作为美国法学中明确的具体承诺的重要性。
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Pub Date : 1994-12-01DOI: 10.1080/10417949409372961
M. Hasian
Traditional liberal theories of jurisprudence consider the “rule of law” as a collection of rules and principles created without the help of rhetoric. From this perspective the judicial system is ideally a neutral forum wherein experts interpret rather than create the law. This essay claims that this orthodox view of the relationship between law and rhetoric needs extensive revision, and argues the need for a critical legal rhetoric that examines the ways in which the law is constituted and enacted beyond the domain of Supreme Court decision making. By illustrating how the rights talk found in appellate decisions can serve as sword, shield, and menace, this essay invites critics to consider seriously the participatory role that ordinary citizens take in the creation of their own legal culture. The author contends that in the case of reproductive rights, extra‐judicial public arguments provided part of the fragmentary materials that called into question the rule of law which allowed for the compulsory ster...
{"title":"Critical legal rhetorics: The theory and practice of law in a postmodern world","authors":"M. Hasian","doi":"10.1080/10417949409372961","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10417949409372961","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional liberal theories of jurisprudence consider the “rule of law” as a collection of rules and principles created without the help of rhetoric. From this perspective the judicial system is ideally a neutral forum wherein experts interpret rather than create the law. This essay claims that this orthodox view of the relationship between law and rhetoric needs extensive revision, and argues the need for a critical legal rhetoric that examines the ways in which the law is constituted and enacted beyond the domain of Supreme Court decision making. By illustrating how the rights talk found in appellate decisions can serve as sword, shield, and menace, this essay invites critics to consider seriously the participatory role that ordinary citizens take in the creation of their own legal culture. The author contends that in the case of reproductive rights, extra‐judicial public arguments provided part of the fragmentary materials that called into question the rule of law which allowed for the compulsory ster...","PeriodicalId":212800,"journal":{"name":"Southern Journal of Communication","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126102688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-12-01DOI: 10.1080/10417949409372958
W. Lewis
This essay continues the challenge to the image of law as neutral adjudication by arguing that, while authoritative judicial discourse in the modern liberal state has presented itself as realistic discourse that argues to singular conclusions, it is better to see it as a profoundly rhetorical enterprise that writes legal decisions as romances in which Law is the heroic central character. Focusing on the first flag burning case Texas v. Johnson, the essay examines the decision as argument and as romance. It concludes by suggesting that the case (and legal decisions in general) would benefit from a sense of law at once more rhetorically sensitive, communal, and tragic.
{"title":"Of innocence, exclusion, and the burning of flags: The romantic realism of the law","authors":"W. Lewis","doi":"10.1080/10417949409372958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10417949409372958","url":null,"abstract":"This essay continues the challenge to the image of law as neutral adjudication by arguing that, while authoritative judicial discourse in the modern liberal state has presented itself as realistic discourse that argues to singular conclusions, it is better to see it as a profoundly rhetorical enterprise that writes legal decisions as romances in which Law is the heroic central character. Focusing on the first flag burning case Texas v. Johnson, the essay examines the decision as argument and as romance. It concludes by suggesting that the case (and legal decisions in general) would benefit from a sense of law at once more rhetorically sensitive, communal, and tragic.","PeriodicalId":212800,"journal":{"name":"Southern Journal of Communication","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126902017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-12-01DOI: 10.1080/10417949409372964
H. Hohmann
In the model of legal interpretation and judicial legitimacy which emerges from Publius’ replies to Brutus and his fellow Anti‐federalists, legal interpretation is seen not as an application of formal hermeneutic methods to ascertain exclusively the empirical semantic meaning of rules, or the historical psychological intentions of legislators, but as a rhetorical process in which controversial arguments provide a basis for the judicial determination of a legal meaning which results in a normatively justifiable application of the law. The formal derivation of law from the legislative process, and of judicial decisions from the common meaning of the law, can only provide a prima facie legitimation which must be able to withstand critical arguments related to the ultimate norms which provide the substantive justification for government and law. To guard against judicial arbitrariness in deciding among the claims of conflicting visions of justice and the public good, the first stage of the rhetorical process ...
{"title":"Judicial legitimacy and legal interpretation in the debate between Brutus and Publius","authors":"H. Hohmann","doi":"10.1080/10417949409372964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10417949409372964","url":null,"abstract":"In the model of legal interpretation and judicial legitimacy which emerges from Publius’ replies to Brutus and his fellow Anti‐federalists, legal interpretation is seen not as an application of formal hermeneutic methods to ascertain exclusively the empirical semantic meaning of rules, or the historical psychological intentions of legislators, but as a rhetorical process in which controversial arguments provide a basis for the judicial determination of a legal meaning which results in a normatively justifiable application of the law. The formal derivation of law from the legislative process, and of judicial decisions from the common meaning of the law, can only provide a prima facie legitimation which must be able to withstand critical arguments related to the ultimate norms which provide the substantive justification for government and law. To guard against judicial arbitrariness in deciding among the claims of conflicting visions of justice and the public good, the first stage of the rhetorical process ...","PeriodicalId":212800,"journal":{"name":"Southern Journal of Communication","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127021022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-12-01DOI: 10.1080/10417949409372960
S. O’Rourke
Working from the assumption that John Quincy Adams brought to his address in United States v. Amistad (1841) the precepts of rhetoric he had taught at Harvard, this essay offers a reading of the speech that is grounded in neo‐classical rhetoric and informed by our current understanding of rhetoric's constitutive function. The reading reveals that Adams used the precepts of neo‐classical rhetoric to cultivate a “higher law” in American jurisprudence and, in so doing, sketched a rhetoric of American law.
约翰·昆西·亚当斯(John Quincy Adams)在1841年美国诉阿米斯塔德案(United States v. Amistad, 1841)的演讲中引用了他在哈佛大学教授的修辞学戒律，本文以新古典修辞学为基础，根据我们目前对修辞学构成功能的理解，提供了对这篇演讲的解读。亚当斯运用新古典修辞学的戒律来培养美国法学中的“高级法”，从而勾勒出美国法律修辞学的轮廓。
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Pub Date : 1994-11-01DOI: 10.1080/10417949409372950
Roger C. Aden
Field of Dreams provides “cultural therapy” for individuals concerned about the ongoing transformation from the industrial age to the technological age. The therapy, the creation of a place metaphor similar to the Garden of Eden, illuminates the benefits of self‐sacrifice and producerism valued by American culture prior to the industrial age. By sacrificing for others, the film suggests, individuals can transcend time and find their home on earth. The implications of this therapy, culturally and theoretically, suggest that place metaphors are perhaps the best symbolic approach to coping with cultural transformations.
{"title":"Back to the garden: Therapeutic place metaphor in field of dreams","authors":"Roger C. Aden","doi":"10.1080/10417949409372950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10417949409372950","url":null,"abstract":"Field of Dreams provides “cultural therapy” for individuals concerned about the ongoing transformation from the industrial age to the technological age. The therapy, the creation of a place metaphor similar to the Garden of Eden, illuminates the benefits of self‐sacrifice and producerism valued by American culture prior to the industrial age. By sacrificing for others, the film suggests, individuals can transcend time and find their home on earth. The implications of this therapy, culturally and theoretically, suggest that place metaphors are perhaps the best symbolic approach to coping with cultural transformations.","PeriodicalId":212800,"journal":{"name":"Southern Journal of Communication","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126047922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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