Pub Date : 2022-06-30DOI: 10.37769/2077-6608-2022-37-9
A. Sukhno, V. Gulin
The article proposes to consider Hegel's “Science of Logic” as a project, where the most important thing is not to describe the “laws of thinking”, but rather to propose a more precise definition of the theoretical level at which thinking itself becomes the subject of its own description. Thus, on the one hand, Hegel reveals the paradox that lies at the basis of the logic as a philosophical discipline, and on the other, seeks to show the possibility of the existence of the logic in the extreme conditions of this paradox. Within the framework of this approach, logic is inseparable from the theory of knowledge — it is assumed that the configuration or “form” of thinking cannot be “neutral” with respect to its content. Therefore, according to Hegel, in reality there is not the logic of isolated operations occurring in the mind, but the logic of “the object itself”, which shows and directly embodies itself in these operations. At this level, there is no gap between the thinking consciousness and objects of the external world separated from it. We are talking about a special — “pre-ontological” — dimension, where the subject's sensory experience is not yet launched and distinguished, and a subject of the thinking process and thinking itself form a single whole. Such a dimension is developed in the historical experience of philosophical thought, starting from Antiquity, and is captured by Hegel under the name of “Ultimate knowledge”. The article raises the question of why this dimension repeatedly eludes us, acquiring a “semi-mystical” status in the minds of Hegel's interpreters, and yet how it is still possible to infiltrate into it.
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Pub Date : 2022-06-30DOI: 10.37769/2077-6608-2022-37-3
V. Makarenko
The article presents a fragment of the concept developed by the author in recent years [Makarenko V. P., 2018]. It discusses the problems of liberation of mind and conscience from the legacy of the Soviet era, the resuscitation of obscurantism in Russia against the background of the contrast between culture and the state along with the main characteristics of the twentieth century and constants of Russian history. The author also reviews the Old Testament concept of holy war, transformation of war in Christianity, Russian and Soviet state mind, the civilizing dictatorship of the empire in the past and present, the evolution of government philosophy to a system of total lies, modern forms of its embodiment, including collaborationism, and the influence of these factors on the functioning of power in the country.
本文介绍了作者近年来发展的概念的一部分[Makarenko V. P.， 2018]。它从苏联时代的遗产中讨论了思想和良心的解放问题，在文化与国家的对比背景下，随着20世纪的主要特征和俄罗斯历史的不变，蒙昧主义在俄罗斯的复苏。作者还回顾了旧约中的圣战概念、基督教中的战争转变、俄罗斯和苏联的国家思想、帝国过去和现在的文明独裁统治、政府哲学向完全谎言体系的演变、其体现的现代形式，包括合作主义，以及这些因素对国家权力运作的影响。
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Pub Date : 2022-06-30DOI: 10.37769/2077-6608-2022-37-4
P. Tishchenko
The problem of the logic of understanding history is discussed. We propose a model of understanding history as a conversation, which the person thinking about history has with interlocutors (sources) of previous epochs. The epoch is interpreted as a special way of problematizing human's understanding of him (her) self and the world around. At the same time, three gifts — attention, recognition and name — underlie the connection of the historian in conversation with interlocutors (sources) from other eras. They are not given in advance but are results of a struggle for the recognition. In choosing his (her) interlocutor (source), the historian chooses him (her) self. By giving this interlocutor (the source) the opportunity to be heard, the historian, at the same time, receives a gift from the source — the opportunity to express what would otherwise remain unspoken in the historian's own mind. The logic of conversation, designated as transduction, is not the connection through the identification of the beginning and the end of the discourse, which is appropriate and necessary within the speech of each of the conversationalists, but the connection of the beginnings of these discordant discourses among themselves.
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Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-4
S. Neretina
The problem of personality in philosophy has been significant since the emergence of Christianity. In Soviet Russia, this problem has been actualized since the 2nd half of the twentieth century, since the Thaw, when the books of Russian religious philosophers became known. We were the original heirs of Christian ontology and ethics, which assumed that a personal appeal to God on You (Tu) testified to a change of places in the interior of being itself, which becomes intimate, close, because the infinite God, being in a person, makes him the same infinite person. The Latin term "persona" is translated as "mask" (personality). V.V. Vinogradov in the "History of Words" says that the word "personality", associated with Latin and Greek meanings (persona, prosopon), was not used massively in the Old Russian language until the XVII century, and in the XVII and XVIII centuries it began to denote only the official position of a person. It is impossible to associate this meaning of the face with what was in antiquity and the Middle Ages. This is a homonym. Reflecting on Greek literature, S. S. Averintsev wrote that the term "creativity" is poorly applicable to the Greek philosophers: "poyesis" is a matter understood as an invention. The Greeks invented an objectified type of communication-through-literature, i.e. dialogue, consciously separated from life communication. Dialogue as an invention revealed the fundamental undialogical nature of Greek literature, and Socrates is the ideal of a radically undialogical person who cannot be internally hurt by the word of the interlocutor. Therefore, for Averintsev, a personality is a mind free from a "dialogical situation", it is a mask, an individual understood as an eidos. It is the mask — "immobile-clear, fully revealed and appeared" — that is the semantic limit of a continuously emerging face. By opening the "mask", the Greeks emphasized the importance of individuality. V. S. Bybler, criticizing Averintsev, argues that dialogue is not a construction, it is an internal dispute of the philosopher taking place in his own soul. He is in the thought itself, pushing its definitions to the limit and reaching the border of other possible definitions, concepts, understandings. According to Bybler, the thought itself is dialogical, communicating with itself within itself and forming a gap between itself and the other "I". At the same time, Bibler defines his philosophy as the philosophy of an eternally borderline culture. Dialogue is a tense collaboration between an author who worked in a past culture and a reader who lives in a modern culture. Personality for the Bibler is the ultimate embodiment of the individual — the reverse course of Averintsev. M. Ya. Gefter and V. V. Bibikhin worked out this problem 20 years later. Gefter, based on the unmotivated appearance of homo sapiens and the unexplained appearance of speech, emphasized that speech destroyed the limit of understanding between people. This is also connected wi
自基督教出现以来，哲学中的人格问题一直很重要。在苏俄，这个问题从20世纪下半叶，从解冻时期开始就已经实现了，那时俄罗斯宗教哲学家的著作开始为人所知。我们是基督教本体论和伦理学的最初继承者，这种本体论和伦理学认为，在你(Tu)上对上帝的个人呼吁证明了存在本身内部的位置变化，这种变化变得亲密，接近，因为无限的上帝，在一个人里面，使他成为同一个无限的人。拉丁词“persona”被翻译成“面具”(人格)。V.V. Vinogradov在《词语的历史》中说，“人格”这个词，与拉丁语和希腊语的意思(persona, prosopon)有关，直到十七世纪才在古俄语中大量使用，在十七世纪和十八世纪，它开始只表示一个人的官方地位。我们不可能把脸的这个含义与古代和中世纪联系起来。这是一个谐音。在反思希腊文学时，s·s·阿维林采夫(S. S. Averintsev)写道，“创造力”一词不适用于希腊哲学家:“poyesis”是一种被理解为发明的事物。希腊人发明了一种客观化的交流方式——通过文学，即对话，有意识地与生活交流分离。对话作为一种发明揭示了希腊文学基本的非对话性质，苏格拉底是一个完全非对话的人的理想，他不会被对话者的话伤害到内心。因此，对于阿维林采夫来说，人格是一种从“对话情境”中解脱出来的心灵，是一种面具，是一个被理解为形象的个体。面具——“不动的、清晰的、完全显露和显现的”——是不断出现的面孔的语义限制。通过打开“面具”，希腊人强调了个性的重要性。S. Bybler对Averintsev进行了批判，认为对话不是一种建构，而是发生在哲学家灵魂深处的内部争论。他在思想本身中，把思想的定义推到极限，到达其他可能的定义、概念和理解的边界。根据Bybler的观点，思想本身是对话的，它在自身内部与自身沟通，并在自身与另一个“我”之间形成一个鸿沟。同时，比伯勒将他的哲学定义为一种永恒边缘文化的哲学。对话是在过去文化中工作的作者和生活在现代文化中的读者之间的紧张合作。《圣经》作者的人格是个体的终极体现——与阿维林特瑟夫相反。丫。Gefter和V. V. Bibikhin在20年后解决了这个问题。Gefter基于智人无动机的出现和无法解释的言语出现，强调言语破坏了人与人之间理解的界限。这也与他对世界的世界概念和人格定义的依赖有关，在他看来，人格不是建立在个人之上的更高形式，而是后来与个性化产生争议的现象。个性是一种选择，是一种通过接近他人来克服自我的形式，是一种情况。Bibikhin不同意Averintsev和Bybler的理论立场，反而更接近Gefter。它不是从个人或个性的发展中产生的，它改变了推理的方面。他提出了一个人(人属)的整体性问题，他最初处理的不是知识，而是存在与非存在。在知识之前，有肯定和否定，在任何讲话之前，肯定和否定都在沉默中发出，并推动人采取行动。一个人(homo)，即不是一个个体或一个人，从一个行为开始;首先，他就是这样一个人。Bibikhin的方法与Averintsev和Bybler的hesychasm思想密切相关，其区别在于他对哲学的理解是永恒的。对他来说，一切已知的就是世界，甚至不包括现代性。个人财产(prosopon)只有上帝才拥有，他是“个人的”和“实体的”，因为他表达了能量。这个充满活力的圣言的行动问题，是世界最重要的见证，是通过人给予的，是通过语言认识的。语言带来了理解的问题，假设人们之间最初存在误解。
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Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-9
Yulia V. Gorbatova
It's not my place to talk about politics, I'm not a political scientist or even a sociologist. My business is logic, theory of argumentation and communication. So I can only speak confidently about how we reason and how we try to convince someone with the help of our reasoning. Let's look at several arguments, which are offered to us, if not by the state itself, then by those who agree with the "special operation" in Ukraine.
{"title":"Where have you been for 8 years?","authors":"Yulia V. Gorbatova","doi":"10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-9","url":null,"abstract":"It's not my place to talk about politics, I'm not a political scientist or even a sociologist. My business is logic, theory of argumentation and communication. So I can only speak confidently about how we reason and how we try to convince someone with the help of our reasoning. Let's look at several arguments, which are offered to us, if not by the state itself, then by those who agree with the \"special operation\" in Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":328399,"journal":{"name":"Vox. Philosophical journal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131298408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-3
S. Neretina
The article, with reference to a selection of materials devoted to the theme of "war" and published in issue 18 in the journal "Vox" for 2015, re-emphasizes the need, no matter how tragic for thought and being, to end the very state of war as "father of all" (Heraclitus). The author emphasizes that human speech is permeated with struggle, which still connects the new and the old states of the world. The point is not in its content, not in the dialogues, oppositions and contradictions expressed in the text. The very organization of speech, its phonetics shows how, in poetry and prose, sounds push apart, merge, even interfere with each other, weakening each other, allowing the pronunciation of the superfluous or not giving the opportunity to pronounce what seems superfluous. However, the mind, memory and reason inherent in man act in different directions, suggest different solutions, expressed primarily and most sharply through feelings. Now, one of them is important for the preservation of the genus sapiens: the emphasis on the anti-militarist concept, since the war has become total, and the consciousness is militaristic. The world has become a war, and concepts have acquired the character of shape-shifting. War has now become an existential problem, the ultimate expression of the existentials of care, fear, abandonment, displacing civilizational and cultural attitudes, putting a person not even before questioning himself, but about the possibility of belonging to the genus sapiens. The point of reconfiguring thinking is to ban war as a state of peace, which will make the 21st century meaningful. For today, any local conflict in fact means an invasion of the world order.
{"title":"Polemic and polemos","authors":"S. Neretina","doi":"10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-3","url":null,"abstract":"The article, with reference to a selection of materials devoted to the theme of \"war\" and published in issue 18 in the journal \"Vox\" for 2015, re-emphasizes the need, no matter how tragic for thought and being, to end the very state of war as \"father of all\" (Heraclitus). The author emphasizes that human speech is permeated with struggle, which still connects the new and the old states of the world. The point is not in its content, not in the dialogues, oppositions and contradictions expressed in the text. The very organization of speech, its phonetics shows how, in poetry and prose, sounds push apart, merge, even interfere with each other, weakening each other, allowing the pronunciation of the superfluous or not giving the opportunity to pronounce what seems superfluous. However, the mind, memory and reason inherent in man act in different directions, suggest different solutions, expressed primarily and most sharply through feelings. Now, one of them is important for the preservation of the genus sapiens: the emphasis on the anti-militarist concept, since the war has become total, and the consciousness is militaristic. The world has become a war, and concepts have acquired the character of shape-shifting. War has now become an existential problem, the ultimate expression of the existentials of care, fear, abandonment, displacing civilizational and cultural attitudes, putting a person not even before questioning himself, but about the possibility of belonging to the genus sapiens. The point of reconfiguring thinking is to ban war as a state of peace, which will make the 21st century meaningful. For today, any local conflict in fact means an invasion of the world order.","PeriodicalId":328399,"journal":{"name":"Vox. Philosophical journal","volume":"204 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120838886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-10
V. Zhulev
The purpose of this article is to analyze the figure of the monarch presented in Dante's “De Monarchia”. The study of Dante's political project will provide us with an opportunity to see the shifts in intellectual environment of the late Middle Ages through the evolution or perhaps return from the theocratic model to the earlier pre-Christial concept of the ruler. The study of Dante's political lexicon will demonstrate the revival of the original meanings starting to challenge and shift the consensus of the political philisophy at the time.
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Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-8
D. Konstan
As is well known, the conversation that is recorded in Plato’s Republic takes place in the home of Kephalos, the father of Polemarchus, who contributes to the discussion, and the orator Lysias. Kephalos was a wealthy metic, who owned an arms factory manned by numerous slaves (metics were not permitted to own land in Athens). In the charming preface to the dialogue, Socrates recounts how he was waylaid by Polemarchus and some others as he was heading back to town from Piraeus, and compelled to accompany him to his place. It is a well-wrought preface, and Plato is said to have revised the opening sentence several times before he was satisfied with it. The first word, κατέβην (“I went down”), while standard usage for heading in the direction of Piraeus, also suggests a kind of catabasis, a descent as though into the cave, as scholars have noted. But why Kephalos’ house? Why there?
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Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-5
In order to be spoken, a tragic monologue which is the quintessence of any great tragedy, always required quite a special moment amidst action, approximately described as ‘stop-time’, ‘falling-out-of-time’ or ‘time-within-time’. This abruption of natural time-durance, formation of some strange lacuna in its usually monolith and constant flow, along with the strengthening of the emotional effect of such dramatic meditation by portraying it against the most depressing, uncomfortable or disastrous convulsions in the world around which seems to literally fall apart and leave the man to his own — was rarely regarded from the outside of dramatic art as a serious philosophical conception, a keystone event to present human self-awareness. Indeed, Plato already compared thinking (as a process) to the inner speech of soul communicating with itself (and thus knowing, noticing itself), and again, the same Plato suggested that to reach the real essence of things (which is the inborn aim of thinking), a human being must find itself on the breaking edge of existence where the material world is cast aside and the other world of godly truths starts to shine through — as it happens to the soldier Er in one of myths quoted in ‘Republic’, who seemingly fell in battle but as he lay neither dead nor alive his soul went to other planes to witness the divine order and then bring the knowledge of it back to people as Er resurrected. But the connection between the matrix of central elements in such enlightening tales (‘catastrophe of usual being’ — ‘transgression to some medium plane’ — ‘learning some all-changing truth there’ — ‘coming back to the world and oneself to speak the learnt to the people’), was never considered akin to that of the core elements of tragic climax. After Plato, Aristotle developed the idea that to think seriously we need a special time free of all else that storms our everyday lives — yet designing the laws of tragedy in ‘Poetics’, he didn’t ever let this intellectual transcendence counter the dramatic strives of actions and passions of its heroes (as well as the forth movement) although it was only one step away to admit their likelihood. The latter Christianity defiled tragedy as the way only to despair, and more to that, a theatrical illusion leading conscience astray. Only modern European thinkers from Pascal to Nietzsche and existentialists (with the significant help from outstanding authors like Shakespeare) brought back the notion of tragic to philosophical bloom again and re-presented the tragedy as one of the highest and most complicated arts devoted to human self-cognizance.
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Pub Date : 2022-03-30DOI: 10.37769/2077-6608-2022-36-1
A. Akhutin
I ventured to think during the war. I wrote several blogs on the topic "War and Intelligence". Everything seems out of place here. War requires action (participation, protection, assistance), and thought wants concentration in peace. I am not engaged in scientific research, I just think about what I can, what I have, and what I carry with me, without referring to sources and reference books. I'm thinking about this very: how does the event of the war relate to the ability — and maybe even the duty — to think. I wrote two posts. They consider intelligence (intellectus) as a kind of responsibility. All knowledge, awareness, concepts, sciences, discursive practices, etc. — are secondary. They make sense in the primary context of responsibility. All intellectual pursuits have meaning and meaning as aspects of the answer to the question that constitutes a human being as human. This is being-in-question.
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