Global Environmental Change最新文献

The unprecedented low-carbon energy transition has heightened concerns about the security of critical metals (CMs) supplies that are essential for clean energy technologies. As the world's largest consumer and importer, China’s CMs supply may face significant challenges due to geopolitical uncertainties, price volatility, and other dynamics. Here, we introduce a risk-modeling framework to holistically gauge the multifaceted supply risks for 30 CMs embedded in clean energy technology spanning from 2008 to 2020. Our analysis indicates that approximately one-third of CMs supplies grapple with elevated risk, and half of these CMs are associated with electric vehicle manufacturing. These risks stem mainly from significant disruption potential (e.g., lithium and palladium) and substantial import reliance (e.g., nickel and niobium). Although China's overall CMs supply risk has remained relatively stable, the nation has grown increasingly susceptible to disruptions, especially with the surge in clean energy initiatives and associated price hikes. Our detailed analysis of the risk comparison reveals that China's supply risk for nine metals (e.g., copper and chromium) exceeds that of other countries that consume large amounts of CMs. Therefore, by adopting focused strategies related to metals, both governments and industries could benefit from global partnerships, strategic stockpiling, early warning mechanisms and sustainable supply chain management, paving the way for a smooth low-carbon energy transition for China.

A recent “warming-and-wetting” trend over China’s drylands has raised widespread attention in the scientific community. Based on the observations and model projections of temperature and precipitation, this study shows that the warming and regional wetting trend in China’s drylands is becoming stronger. Over the past 60 years, the temperature in China's drylands has increased at a rate of 0.34 °C/10a, much higher than that in China (0.29 °C/10a) and globally (0.22 °C/10a). The wetting trend has been primarily apparent in the western part since the 1980s, particularly in the mountainous areas. In the northeast edge of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, the wetting rate exceeded 30 mm/10a. The possible cause of the increase of precipitation in China's drylands may be the higher convective precipitation, also concentrating in the mountainous areas. Model projections show weak and strong warming in the future under the RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenarios, respectively. Precipitation will increase slightly in the mid-21st century and then decrease slowly until the end of the 21st century under the RCP2.6 scenario. In comparison, under the RCP8.5 scenario, it will increase by 15–25% at the end of the 21st century.

We explore how extreme event experience relates to climate policy support in the U.S. We add three important yet uncommon elements to this field: we verify self-reports of extreme event experience with actual weather data; we use a willingness-to-pay measure to assess behavioral intention; and we analyze which types of extreme events have stronger impacts on WTP. People who self-report extreme weather events are willing to pay approximately $112/year more for climate mitigation policy than those who do not; people for whom those self-reports match recorded data are willing to pay $106 or $71 more (controlling for climate beliefs and political ideology and depending on how unverified reporters are treated). Wildfires have the strongest influence on WTP. Though our results show that political ideology correlates more strongly with policy support than does extreme event experience, extreme event experience exhibits a robust correlation with policy support, and could result in a minimum of billions of dollars of support annually for clean-energy policy alone.

There is a growing literature on the cultural capacities influencing communities’ adaptation to environmental and social change, including the temporal frameworks they draw on for timely action. This paper focuses on seasonal cultures, and how they enable communities on the Coromandel Peninsula to interpret and adapt practical timings to disrupted patterns of seasonal rhythms. The paper develops and applies a conceptual framework of seasonal cultures as perceived rhythmic patterns practiced by communities as cultural repertoires for action, emphasising the ways cultures evolve as patterns are contested and change. This concept steered critical, mixed-method ethnographic study with communities on the peninsula over two years. The research found that Coromandel communities’ cultures make seasonal change visible as long-term shifts and asynchrony between rhythmic patterns, which they linked to climatic change, environmental degradation, colonisation and globalisation, and shifting relations between society and the environment. As seasonal patterns fail to hold, communities deploy a combination of strategies for re-configuring seasonal rhythms through their practices: (i) maintaining established, institutionalised schemas of activity while coping with seasonal variability; (ii) season-proofing activities from environmental rhythms; or (iii) re-learning and recalibrating cultures to mutable configurations of rhythms in a highly modified environment.

While the ocean has long been portrayed as a victim of climate change, threatened by ocean warming and acidification, it is now increasingly framed as a key solution to the climate crisis. In particular, the promising carbon sequestration potential of the ocean is being emphasised. In this paper, we seek to historicise the practices, discourses and actors that have constructed the ocean as a climate change solution space. We conceptualise the debate about the mitigation potential of the ocean as a contested site of governance, where varying actors form alliances and different sociotechnical narratives about climate action play out. Using an innovative quali-quantitative methodology which combines scientometrics with document analysis, observational fieldwork, and interviews, we outline three historical phases in the history of ocean carbon sequestration that follow recurring cycles of hype, controversy and disappointment. We argue that the most recent hype around ocean carbon sequestration was not triggered by a technological breakthrough or a reduction in scientific uncertainty, but by new socio-technical configurations and coalitions. We conclude by showing that how climate change solutions are put on the agenda and become legitimised is both a scientific and political process, linked to how science frames the climate crisis, and ultimately, its governance.

Transboundary water decision-making takes place in a power-loaded environment. Apart from conflicts or cooperation-based outcomes, partial or complete status quo is also possible outcome in transboundary water interactions. Literature in the last two decades has primarily focused on conflicts and/or cooperation only, with a limited understanding of the status quo and its various forms. Drawing from the work of Bacharach and Baratz and other power scholars from sociology, international relations, and public policy, this article presents tactics for non-decision making and non-action, leading to a status quo. Specifically, we address the question: how can non-decision making and non-action shape the status quo in transboundary waters? Conceptually, based on various strands of literature, we develop a typology of status quo comprised of (1) renunciation; (2) abstention; (3) non-participation; and (4) non-action and showing that the status quo is a significant intermediary (at times temporally extended) outcome in transboundary water interaction. Like conflicts and cooperation, we posit that the status quo is often purposefully maintained due to the political, social, cultural, economic, and biophysical aspects of the river basins. We illustrate this by the example of three transboundary river basins: Brahmaputra, Maritsa, and Euphrates-Tigris. Our empirical analysis also identified an additional type of status quo, ‘non-significant deliberation’ in a multi-track diplomacy setting. This tactic refers to not purposefully allowing informal negotiations to transform or influence the highest level of political deliberation (i.e., track-1 diplomacy).

While research on marine carbon dioxide removal (mCDR) expands apace, significant unknowns persist regarding the risks and benefits of individual mCDR options. This paper analyses the assumptions and expectations that animate expert understandings of mCDR, with a focus on issues that are central to the responsible governance of this emerging field of climate action. Drawing upon interviews with experts involved in mCDR research projects both academic and entrepreneurial, we highlight four thematic tensions that orient their thinking but are often unstated or left implicit in scientific and technical assessments: (1) the relevance of ‘naturalness’ as a criterion of evaluation for mCDR approaches; (2) the perceived need to accelerate research and development activities via alternative paradigms of evidence-building; (3) a framing of mCDR as a form of waste management that will, in turn, generate new (and currently poorly understood) forms of environmental pollutants; and (4) a commitment to inclusive governance mixed with difficulty in identifying specific stakeholders or constituencies in mCDR interventions. Although expert consensus on these four issues is unlikely, we suggest ways of ensuring that consideration of these themes enriches debate on the responsible development of novel mCDR capabilities.

“Vulnerable populations” are experiencing a (re)emphasis in climate change adaptation research and practice even though the concept has long been contested. Adaptation planning is increasingly expected to restore past inequalities and address systemic injustices. Yet, we know little about the role local environmental agencies, bureaucrats, and policy practitioners (can) play in addressing “vulnerable populations”. Drawing from qualitative empirical research in Atlanta, Georgia, the United States, and Jinhua, Zhejiang in China, the local problem recognition about “vulnerable populations” and adaptation decision-making was examined. The findings reveal severe limitations in the way “vulnerable populations” are approached, with certain groups being politically contested and being considered difficult to be prioritized. In both cases, accidental forms of adaptation stand out, which mainly focus on blue-green infrastructure interventions and neighborhood revitalization programs, some of which recreated “vulnerable populations”. The findings hint to vulnerability being more deeply rooted in external conditions to the individual, which requires different policy interventions. The article presents a novel understanding by conceptualizing “vulnerable populations” as an instance of vulnerable political institutions. There’s a need to explore the nature of our political systems, how much inequality we allow and which redistribution mechanisms the state has for addressing interdependent dimensions of inequality. To make “vulnerable populations” finally a front and center concern begs us to radically engage the outside of the conventional adaptation box. Inequality studies offers synergies with adaptation justice discourses and different policy instruments that address the root causes of vulnerability.