Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2023.103
E. Ananieva
The 2016 referendum did not bring a decisive advantage to either supporters (Bremainers) or opponents (Brexiters) of Britain’s membership in the European Union, which led to their acute confrontation and a prolonged political crisis in the United Kingdom. The aim of the study is to determine the impact and consequences of the struggle of rival forces in the leading parties of Britain — Conservative and Labour — on their course on the main issues of British foreign policy after the parliamentary elections of 2019 and Britain’s exit from the EU. The struggle of the rival forces goes through the lines of inter- and intra-party division, and its methods go beyond the traditions and unwritten rules previously adopted in the political culture of the United Kingdom. The tough struggle on foreign policy issues is closely linked to domestic politics. The victory of the Conservative Party in the 2019 elections ensured the adoption by Parliament of laws strengthening the executive power to the detriment of the legislative and judicial (who sided with the Bremainers). The documents of the government, parliament, parties and media materials analysis is presented of the methods used by Brexiters and Bremainers to weaken each other, complicating relations with the US and the EU, sacrificing bilateral relations with Russia to their narrow-party interests. The confrontation continues, plunging Britain into a new round of political and economic crisis, which calls into question the ambitious goals of “Global Britain”.
{"title":"Political struggle in the UK on the formation of foreign policy in the wake of Brexit","authors":"E. Ananieva","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2023.103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2023.103","url":null,"abstract":"The 2016 referendum did not bring a decisive advantage to either supporters (Bremainers) or opponents (Brexiters) of Britain’s membership in the European Union, which led to their acute confrontation and a prolonged political crisis in the United Kingdom. The aim of the study is to determine the impact and consequences of the struggle of rival forces in the leading parties of Britain — Conservative and Labour — on their course on the main issues of British foreign policy after the parliamentary elections of 2019 and Britain’s exit from the EU. The struggle of the rival forces goes through the lines of inter- and intra-party division, and its methods go beyond the traditions and unwritten rules previously adopted in the political culture of the United Kingdom. The tough struggle on foreign policy issues is closely linked to domestic politics. The victory of the Conservative Party in the 2019 elections ensured the adoption by Parliament of laws strengthening the executive power to the detriment of the legislative and judicial (who sided with the Bremainers). The documents of the government, parliament, parties and media materials analysis is presented of the methods used by Brexiters and Bremainers to weaken each other, complicating relations with the US and the EU, sacrificing bilateral relations with Russia to their narrow-party interests. The confrontation continues, plunging Britain into a new round of political and economic crisis, which calls into question the ambitious goals of “Global Britain”.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"105 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132411565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2022.202
M. Suchkov
Contemporary international relations as well as the life of an individual as we know it would not be possible without the three Industrial revolutions. They have occurred in the course of the last three hundred years of human history and came to be part of a single continuous process of changing technological waves. Each revolution defined how people would live, work, and communicate with one another. Each industrial revolution set the dynamics for international relations and created new political conflicts. The fourth industrial revolution that we are going through today is also accompanied by geopolitical rivalry and develops exponentially, not in a linear projection. It pierces through all layers of human activity and runs the risk of changing the very nature of humans. The character of modern-day technology makes it hard to perceive it through the lens of a mere consumer since technology impacts us as citizens and deals with the three key concepts for people throughout their history: justice, freedom, and power. The author hypothesizes that the three concepts are closely interlinked with the three main megatrends of technology’s influence over politics respectively, — the call for a new social contract, the problem of localization of big data and the associated pursuit of states for digital sovereignty, and the development of artificial intelligence. Therefore, the present work is an attempt to outline some key trajectories in how the new technological wave fractures the three concepts and how all of this impacts international relations.
{"title":"“The geopolitics of technology”: International relations and the fourth industrial revolution","authors":"M. Suchkov","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2022.202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2022.202","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary international relations as well as the life of an individual as we know it would not be possible without the three Industrial revolutions. They have occurred in the course of the last three hundred years of human history and came to be part of a single continuous process of changing technological waves. Each revolution defined how people would live, work, and communicate with one another. Each industrial revolution set the dynamics for international relations and created new political conflicts. The fourth industrial revolution that we are going through today is also accompanied by geopolitical rivalry and develops exponentially, not in a linear projection. It pierces through all layers of human activity and runs the risk of changing the very nature of humans. The character of modern-day technology makes it hard to perceive it through the lens of a mere consumer since technology impacts us as citizens and deals with the three key concepts for people throughout their history: justice, freedom, and power. The author hypothesizes that the three concepts are closely interlinked with the three main megatrends of technology’s influence over politics respectively, — the call for a new social contract, the problem of localization of big data and the associated pursuit of states for digital sovereignty, and the development of artificial intelligence. Therefore, the present work is an attempt to outline some key trajectories in how the new technological wave fractures the three concepts and how all of this impacts international relations.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134152628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.103
Yulia K. Boguslavskaya
In a currently highly competitive international environment, US goals of consolidating and strengthening NATO as well as bringing its present mission in Afghanistan to successful termination gain in significance. The success of these processes enhances the reputation of the United States as a powerful international actor. I checked the hypothesis that facing sharp critique from the United States president for free riding in NATO, those members who fail to meet the target of 2 per cent of GDP in their defense expenditure would choose to increase significantly their contributions to the Alliance’s efforts in Afghanistan. I did not find enough convincing empirical data to prove it. The contributions of allies rather reflect their power potentials and ambitions they pursue by cooperating in NATO framework. US allies remain able to define the scale of their contribution to collective efforts in NATO framework despite the US pressure. Broadening of the Alliance’s purview after the end of the Cold war provided member states with additional alternatives for choosing types of their involvement. My findings generally support the established view on intra-alliance bargaining process in scholarly literature. A wide range of missions in NATO framework and beyond it facilitates coalition formation for the United States with their numerous allies and partners. At the same time, if more major allies further choose to cooperate with Washington outside NATO, it will undermine its effectiveness and global role.
{"title":"The member states’ contributions to NATO’s policy in Afghanistan during Donald Trump presidency","authors":"Yulia K. Boguslavskaya","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.103","url":null,"abstract":"In a currently highly competitive international environment, US goals of consolidating and strengthening NATO as well as bringing its present mission in Afghanistan to successful termination gain in significance. The success of these processes enhances the reputation of the United States as a powerful international actor. I checked the hypothesis that facing sharp critique from the United States president for free riding in NATO, those members who fail to meet the target of 2 per cent of GDP in their defense expenditure would choose to increase significantly their contributions to the Alliance’s efforts in Afghanistan. I did not find enough convincing empirical data to prove it. The contributions of allies rather reflect their power potentials and ambitions they pursue by cooperating in NATO framework. US allies remain able to define the scale of their contribution to collective efforts in NATO framework despite the US pressure. Broadening of the Alliance’s purview after the end of the Cold war provided member states with additional alternatives for choosing types of their involvement. My findings generally support the established view on intra-alliance bargaining process in scholarly literature. A wide range of missions in NATO framework and beyond it facilitates coalition formation for the United States with their numerous allies and partners. At the same time, if more major allies further choose to cooperate with Washington outside NATO, it will undermine its effectiveness and global role.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133948348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2021.409
A. Kubyshkin
{"title":"“The whole world is indebted to Russians”: Soviet-Canadian cooperation during Second World War","authors":"A. Kubyshkin","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2021.409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2021.409","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"363 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127581595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.208
Konstantin A. Golubev
The paper focuses on the specifics of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s rhetoric about the Taliban Movement during the period between 1999 and 2018. Using a morphological approach to analysis of the narratives produced by the Ministry, it is demonstrated that the main characters within those narratives had gone through significant metamorphoses over the studied period, echoing the shifts in Russia’s self-identification and the latter’s perception of the relevant actors, as well as in its policy towards Afghanistan. Thus, Russia no longer seeks the approval of the international community, nor does it speak like a partner of the West. Rather it tends to act alone by taking the initiative of bringing the Afghan warring parties together at the negotiating table in Moscow. Russia’s representation of the Taliban Movement went a full circle from “a real force existing in Afghanistan” to “a criminal force” that has no legitimacy and back to “an integral element of the Afghan society” with whom seeking a peaceful reconciliation is deemed necessary. Its representation of the United States, on the contrary, changed from “ally” to “foe.” Given that the Russian policy towards Afghanistan is heavily dependent on Russia’s relationship with the United States of America, and if the downward spiral of that relationship continues, one should expect it manifest in a more overt Russian support for the Afghan opposition, resulting in an indirect war by proxy between the two powers in Afghanistan.
{"title":"Constructing Narratives about the Taliban by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs","authors":"Konstantin A. Golubev","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.208","url":null,"abstract":"The paper focuses on the specifics of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s rhetoric about the Taliban Movement during the period between 1999 and 2018. Using a morphological approach to analysis of the narratives produced by the Ministry, it is demonstrated that the main characters within those narratives had gone through significant metamorphoses over the studied period, echoing the shifts in Russia’s self-identification and the latter’s perception of the relevant actors, as well as in its policy towards Afghanistan. Thus, Russia no longer seeks the approval of the international community, nor does it speak like a partner of the West. Rather it tends to act alone by taking the initiative of bringing the Afghan warring parties together at the negotiating table in Moscow. Russia’s representation of the Taliban Movement went a full circle from “a real force existing in Afghanistan” to “a criminal force” that has no legitimacy and back to “an integral element of the Afghan society” with whom seeking a peaceful reconciliation is deemed necessary. Its representation of the United States, on the contrary, changed from “ally” to “foe.” Given that the Russian policy towards Afghanistan is heavily dependent on Russia’s relationship with the United States of America, and if the downward spiral of that relationship continues, one should expect it manifest in a more overt Russian support for the Afghan opposition, resulting in an indirect war by proxy between the two powers in Afghanistan.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132912035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2022.306
Y. Hang
The China-Russia relations are facing a changing external environment, including the Indo- Pacific. This article focuses on the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy, which is a new and little-researched theme. It aims to address a central question: what the implications of the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy on the China-Russia relations are. It focuses on the discourse of the EU’s supranational authorities. The qualitative content analysis of that discourse unveils that the nature of this strategy is to enhance the legitimacy and uniqueness of the EU as a global player. It argues that this strategy has important implications for both China and Russia in direct or indirect ways. One main assumption is that the EU’s impact will be more concentrated in low politics than high politics. This article develops two hypotheses. One is that the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy will enhance the West as external pressure to China and Russia in the region, especially on low political issues. The other is that increasing external pressure from the EU and the West in this region highlights the necessity of cooperation between China and Russia. It concludes that while the implications for China and Russia are different respectively, the EU’s ambition as an exogenous factor will compel China and Russia to uplift their bilateral ties.
{"title":"The Eu Indo-Pacific Strategy and the China-Russia relations","authors":"Y. Hang","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2022.306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2022.306","url":null,"abstract":"The China-Russia relations are facing a changing external environment, including the Indo- Pacific. This article focuses on the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy, which is a new and little-researched theme. It aims to address a central question: what the implications of the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy on the China-Russia relations are. It focuses on the discourse of the EU’s supranational authorities. The qualitative content analysis of that discourse unveils that the nature of this strategy is to enhance the legitimacy and uniqueness of the EU as a global player. It argues that this strategy has important implications for both China and Russia in direct or indirect ways. One main assumption is that the EU’s impact will be more concentrated in low politics than high politics. This article develops two hypotheses. One is that the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy will enhance the West as external pressure to China and Russia in the region, especially on low political issues. The other is that increasing external pressure from the EU and the West in this region highlights the necessity of cooperation between China and Russia. It concludes that while the implications for China and Russia are different respectively, the EU’s ambition as an exogenous factor will compel China and Russia to uplift their bilateral ties.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114598589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.107
Sinha Uttam Kumar
The Arctic region has spectacular roots in Indian civilizational thinking and thus represents a familiar region. Shaped by its long association and significant expertise in the Antarctic Treaty System; its first scientific expedition to the Arctic Ocean in 2007 followed by the setting of the Arctic research base in 2008 and subsequently its Permanent Observer status in 2013, India’s dominant narrative remains scientific and polar research. But with summer in the Arctic arriving early and staying longer, accessibility to the vast natural resources and huge investment has significantly altered the geopolitical landscape of the Arctic region. The question of how to develop the resources in a sustainable and peaceful manner competes with the complex science of the Arctic and the unique risks that such commercial ventures pose. India’s reluctance to de-emphasize its scientific interest towards a more calibrated approach that takes into account the politico-strategic-economic dimensions in the Arctic reflects the tension between the exceptionalism and the realism of its polar legacy. The article assesses how the Arctic orientation is changing from a uni-dimensional to a dynamic and multidimensional engagement. The author argues that India’s Arctic approach is essentially binary: while indeed India has a stake in the governance of global commons and to cooperate with the littoral states for effective science policies, it also cares about sustainable resource development without making the Arctic region unstable.
{"title":"India in the Arctic: A multidimensional approach","authors":"Sinha Uttam Kumar","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.107","url":null,"abstract":"The Arctic region has spectacular roots in Indian civilizational thinking and thus represents a familiar region. Shaped by its long association and significant expertise in the Antarctic Treaty System; its first scientific expedition to the Arctic Ocean in 2007 followed by the setting of the Arctic research base in 2008 and subsequently its Permanent Observer status in 2013, India’s dominant narrative remains scientific and polar research. But with summer in the Arctic arriving early and staying longer, accessibility to the vast natural resources and huge investment has significantly altered the geopolitical landscape of the Arctic region. The question of how to develop the resources in a sustainable and peaceful manner competes with the complex science of the Arctic and the unique risks that such commercial ventures pose. India’s reluctance to de-emphasize its scientific interest towards a more calibrated approach that takes into account the politico-strategic-economic dimensions in the Arctic reflects the tension between the exceptionalism and the realism of its polar legacy. The article assesses how the Arctic orientation is changing from a uni-dimensional to a dynamic and multidimensional engagement. The author argues that India’s Arctic approach is essentially binary: while indeed India has a stake in the governance of global commons and to cooperate with the littoral states for effective science policies, it also cares about sustainable resource development without making the Arctic region unstable.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129030485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/SPBU06.2019.406
P. Koshkin
{"title":"The creation of Russia’s new image in the Western press between 2014 and 2019","authors":"P. Koshkin","doi":"10.21638/11701/SPBU06.2019.406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/SPBU06.2019.406","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130448953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.207
Sergio Gabriel Eissa
could be a third way for Argentina’s foreign policy belong to this problem.
可能是阿根廷外交政策属于这个问题的第三条道路。
{"title":"Åland Islands: lessons for the conflict of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas Islands)?","authors":"Sergio Gabriel Eissa","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.207","url":null,"abstract":"could be a third way for Argentina’s foreign policy belong to this problem.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126759769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2022.302
D. Lanko
The article revisits the negotiations on NORDEK, a Nordic Economic Area, held by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in 1968–1970. Finland, which initially took active part in the negotiations, later reversed its position under pressure from the Soviet Union as well as for other reasons. Four remaining Nordic countries refused to pursue a Nordic Economic Area without Finland for multiple reasons, of which one was solidarity with Finland. This article presents multiple game models, of which some reflect the actual outcome of the NORDEK negotiations, i. e., their failure, while others reflect hypothetical outcomes of the negotiations, such as emergence of a NORDEK of four without Finland. Those models allow concluding on the main factors causing Nordic solidarity, for which the NORDEK negotiations were a testing ground, and which had been the defining feature of regional politics in the European North during fifty years following the failure of the negotiations. First, domestic uncertainty about the issue debated by multiple nations contributes to greater solidarity among those nations. Second, majority’s focus on their absolute gains during international negotiations contributes to greater solidarity among negotiating nations. Third, relative equality among negotiating nations does not have any influence on solidarity among them. The latter conclusion supports the theoretical assumption that that organic solidarity (solidarity among different) is as possible as is mechanical solidarity (solidarity of similar).
{"title":"Modelling negotiations on the Nordic Economic Area: Uncertainty and absolute gains as factors of international solidarity","authors":"D. Lanko","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2022.302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2022.302","url":null,"abstract":"The article revisits the negotiations on NORDEK, a Nordic Economic Area, held by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in 1968–1970. Finland, which initially took active part in the negotiations, later reversed its position under pressure from the Soviet Union as well as for other reasons. Four remaining Nordic countries refused to pursue a Nordic Economic Area without Finland for multiple reasons, of which one was solidarity with Finland. This article presents multiple game models, of which some reflect the actual outcome of the NORDEK negotiations, i. e., their failure, while others reflect hypothetical outcomes of the negotiations, such as emergence of a NORDEK of four without Finland. Those models allow concluding on the main factors causing Nordic solidarity, for which the NORDEK negotiations were a testing ground, and which had been the defining feature of regional politics in the European North during fifty years following the failure of the negotiations. First, domestic uncertainty about the issue debated by multiple nations contributes to greater solidarity among those nations. Second, majority’s focus on their absolute gains during international negotiations contributes to greater solidarity among negotiating nations. Third, relative equality among negotiating nations does not have any influence on solidarity among them. The latter conclusion supports the theoretical assumption that that organic solidarity (solidarity among different) is as possible as is mechanical solidarity (solidarity of similar).","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126338977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}