Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2021.201
Dmitry Danilov
The article is devoted to the analysis of the evolution, nature and content of Russia-EU political relations, formally established by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994. The paradigm of building a united Europe and a common European security space in line with overcoming post-bipolar confrontation and the emergence of post-Soviet Russia as well as the European Union, established in 1992, as new actors in international arena became the basis for their cooperative relations, which was built towards strategic partnership. It was strengthened at the turn of the 2000s, including on the basis of mutual strategies of relations, when Russia’s “European choice” was declared and the EU’s “new dynamics” in security and defense dimension were initiated. However, the NATO-centric model of European security and the policy of expanding Euro-Atlantic institutions to the East created a potential for conflict, and Russia-EU cooperation entered a phase of a latent crisis, especially as a result of differing interests in the so-called common neighborhood. Attempts at a new strategic start by the adoption of Russia-EU Roadmaps on the four common spaces and by planning the negotiations on a new basic agreement failed to overcome fundamental disagreements and contradictions. The Ukrainian conflict became the culmination of the Russian-European crisis and fundamentally changed the direction and content of Russia — EU relations. The defining of the future strategy of relations is becoming increasingly acute, which is considered in the article as a challenge of strategic choice for the parties. The author substantiates the prospect of overcoming the “new normality”, which is boils down to maintaining a controlled mutual deterrence, although it does not exclude the option of terminating the Russia-EU legal relations (“breakesit”).
{"title":"Russia-EU political relations: Evolution and prospects","authors":"Dmitry Danilov","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2021.201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2021.201","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the analysis of the evolution, nature and content of Russia-EU political relations, formally established by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994. The paradigm of building a united Europe and a common European security space in line with overcoming post-bipolar confrontation and the emergence of post-Soviet Russia as well as the European Union, established in 1992, as new actors in international arena became the basis for their cooperative relations, which was built towards strategic partnership. It was strengthened at the turn of the 2000s, including on the basis of mutual strategies of relations, when Russia’s “European choice” was declared and the EU’s “new dynamics” in security and defense dimension were initiated. However, the NATO-centric model of European security and the policy of expanding Euro-Atlantic institutions to the East created a potential for conflict, and Russia-EU cooperation entered a phase of a latent crisis, especially as a result of differing interests in the so-called common neighborhood. Attempts at a new strategic start by the adoption of Russia-EU Roadmaps on the four common spaces and by planning the negotiations on a new basic agreement failed to overcome fundamental disagreements and contradictions. The Ukrainian conflict became the culmination of the Russian-European crisis and fundamentally changed the direction and content of Russia — EU relations. The defining of the future strategy of relations is becoming increasingly acute, which is considered in the article as a challenge of strategic choice for the parties. The author substantiates the prospect of overcoming the “new normality”, which is boils down to maintaining a controlled mutual deterrence, although it does not exclude the option of terminating the Russia-EU legal relations (“breakesit”).","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"37 18","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113974431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2022.105
Ruslan Kostiuk
The article analyzes approaches of France’s leading left forces towards Russia (USSR) from beginning of the 20th century to the present. At beginning of the twentieth century, almost all parts of the French left expressed hatred of the Russian monarchy and, at the same time, solidarity with the struggle of democratic and socialist forces in Russia for freedom and a republic. The question of the attitude to Soviet Russia played a central role in the historic split of the SFIO in 1920 and in the future for decades to come; “the Soviet question” was the line of the watershed between the two leading French left-wing parties, SFIO (SP) and FCP. If the communists from the very creation of the Party took a position of total solidarity with Soviet internal and foreign policy, the socialists, speaking for the development of equal and friendly relations with the Soviet Union, criticized domestic political realities of the Soviet Union and Moscow’s foreign policy. The collapse of the USSR led to serious changes in the perception of Russia in French leftist circles of France. The French left was characterized by an ambiguous attitude towards Boris Yeltsin’s policies. As before, the French left is expressing its sympathy for the Russian people. However, in general, most of the French left movement at present negatively evaluates the socio-economic and domestic political evolution of Russia, as well as Moscow’s foreign policy in the first two decades of the 21st century. First, this applies to positions of the socialists and the Greens. The Communist Party opposes the dignity to the insulating pressure on Moscow. For their part, politicians and power related to left populist and left patriotic direction see Russia as a strategic ally in the struggle for more equitable international relations.
{"title":"The French left and Russia: History and modernity","authors":"Ruslan Kostiuk","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2022.105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2022.105","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes approaches of France’s leading left forces towards Russia (USSR) from beginning of the 20th century to the present. At beginning of the twentieth century, almost all parts of the French left expressed hatred of the Russian monarchy and, at the same time, solidarity with the struggle of democratic and socialist forces in Russia for freedom and a republic. The question of the attitude to Soviet Russia played a central role in the historic split of the SFIO in 1920 and in the future for decades to come; “the Soviet question” was the line of the watershed between the two leading French left-wing parties, SFIO (SP) and FCP. If the communists from the very creation of the Party took a position of total solidarity with Soviet internal and foreign policy, the socialists, speaking for the development of equal and friendly relations with the Soviet Union, criticized domestic political realities of the Soviet Union and Moscow’s foreign policy. The collapse of the USSR led to serious changes in the perception of Russia in French leftist circles of France. The French left was characterized by an ambiguous attitude towards Boris Yeltsin’s policies. As before, the French left is expressing its sympathy for the Russian people. However, in general, most of the French left movement at present negatively evaluates the socio-economic and domestic political evolution of Russia, as well as Moscow’s foreign policy in the first two decades of the 21st century. First, this applies to positions of the socialists and the Greens. The Communist Party opposes the dignity to the insulating pressure on Moscow. For their part, politicians and power related to left populist and left patriotic direction see Russia as a strategic ally in the struggle for more equitable international relations.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134218609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2021.406
A. Pogorelskaya
The article examines the peculiarities of EU normative power application in its development policy towards the countries of the Global South. Despite the controversial results of seventy years of efforts by the European Economic Community and then the European Union to promote development, the international situation and the difficulties inside the EU are making the EU intensify its development policy and look for more effective tools. The author tries to identify the reasons for the transformation of approaches in the EU development policy by taking into account the influence of both external and internal factors affecting the EU’s ability to exercise its normative power. It is concluded that, firstly, the internal factors including the EU enlargements, solidarity crisis and Brexit are currently changing the EU’s ability to serve as a normative power in its development policy. Secondly, the EU has not found any alternatives to development policy in solving both global and its own difficulties in normative and geopolitical aspects. Thirdly, the EU is still looking for more effective tools to both facilitate development and exercise its normative power. The practical significance of the research is to create a basis for elaborating and upgrading Russian development policy approaches since it is very limited, but it could be beneficial for Russia in the world arena.
{"title":"The EU normative power in development policy","authors":"A. Pogorelskaya","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2021.406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2021.406","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the peculiarities of EU normative power application in its development policy towards the countries of the Global South. Despite the controversial results of seventy years of efforts by the European Economic Community and then the European Union to promote development, the international situation and the difficulties inside the EU are making the EU intensify its development policy and look for more effective tools. The author tries to identify the reasons for the transformation of approaches in the EU development policy by taking into account the influence of both external and internal factors affecting the EU’s ability to exercise its normative power. It is concluded that, firstly, the internal factors including the EU enlargements, solidarity crisis and Brexit are currently changing the EU’s ability to serve as a normative power in its development policy. Secondly, the EU has not found any alternatives to development policy in solving both global and its own difficulties in normative and geopolitical aspects. Thirdly, the EU is still looking for more effective tools to both facilitate development and exercise its normative power. The practical significance of the research is to create a basis for elaborating and upgrading Russian development policy approaches since it is very limited, but it could be beneficial for Russia in the world arena.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115627164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/SPBU06.2021.105
Oliver Meier
The recent debate in Germany about nuclear sharing confirmed the broad support among decision-makers for continued involvement in the political dimension of NATO’s sharing arrangements, i. e., participation in the Alliance’s nuclear consultative bodies. At the same time, German decision-makers hold divergent views on continued participation in the operational and technical aspects of nuclear sharing. Russia’s arsenal of approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons is of great concern to Germany and many in Berlin are worried that Russia is systematically expanding its nuclear arsenal. German decision-makers and the government support NATO’s dual-track policy of deterring and engaging Russia. German policy-makers’ arguments on the added military value of forward-deployed US nuclear weapons remain vague and there are few specific ideas about what type of arms control would be best suited to reduce the role and number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. There are four frameworks in which tactical nuclear weapons could be discussed with Russia, namely the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), other multilateral fora, the Russian — US bilateral dialogue on strategic stability, and the NATO — Russia Council. If Russia is serious about reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons in Europe, it should accept the reciprocity paradigm and drop some worn-out demands and positions that have little relevance for political debates around arms control in Berlin and elsewhere.
{"title":"Debating the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe: What Germany expects from Russia","authors":"Oliver Meier","doi":"10.21638/SPBU06.2021.105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/SPBU06.2021.105","url":null,"abstract":"The recent debate in Germany about nuclear sharing confirmed the broad support among decision-makers for continued involvement in the political dimension of NATO’s sharing arrangements, i. e., participation in the Alliance’s nuclear consultative bodies. At the same time, German decision-makers hold divergent views on continued participation in the operational and technical aspects of nuclear sharing. Russia’s arsenal of approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons is of great concern to Germany and many in Berlin are worried that Russia is systematically expanding its nuclear arsenal. German decision-makers and the government support NATO’s dual-track policy of deterring and engaging Russia. German policy-makers’ arguments on the added military value of forward-deployed US nuclear weapons remain vague and there are few specific ideas about what type of arms control would be best suited to reduce the role and number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. There are four frameworks in which tactical nuclear weapons could be discussed with Russia, namely the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), other multilateral fora, the Russian — US bilateral dialogue on strategic stability, and the NATO — Russia Council. If Russia is serious about reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons in Europe, it should accept the reciprocity paradigm and drop some worn-out demands and positions that have little relevance for political debates around arms control in Berlin and elsewhere.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116441657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.106
Российская Федерация
It is impossible to cope with the system challenges without the effective interaction between state and society.
应对制度挑战离不开国家与社会的有效互动。
{"title":"The emergence of the resilient subject: crisis interaction between state and society","authors":"Российская Федерация","doi":"10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.106","url":null,"abstract":"It is impossible to cope with the system challenges without the effective interaction between state and society.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127191401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2022.405
R. Bolgov
The article reflects the results of a study of public political discourse about the conflict in the Donbass, formed by Twitter institutional actors (permanent missions to the UN) and political figures (representatives, their deputies, etc.) of countries — permanent members of the UN Security Council. Chronological scope of the study: from January 2015 (escalation of the armed conflict in the Donbass, starting with the shelling of the stop near Volnovakha and the aggravation of the fighting for the Donetsk airport) to the present (2021). By analyzing the messages in Twitter, some trends in the development of discourse have been revealed. We prove the hypothesis about the existence of two divergent variants of discourse, which in different ways characterize the participants in the conflict in the South-East of Ukraine. To confirm the hypothesis, we use a technique for analyzing political discourse, which includes two levels of analysis: the identification of key conceptual metaphors in both discourse options (positively or negatively characterizing the parties of the conflict) and the identification of the semantic opposition “we — they” realized within the metaphors. We identify the metaphorical images of the conflict parties as a whole and the concepts used, and then the conceptual metaphors they create. We conclude that in both variants of discourse, most conceptual metaphors are based on negative concepts that designate the opposite side of the conflict, and that the discussion is characterized by increased emotional tension.
{"title":"Twitter discourse of diplomatic missions to the UN on the conflict in Donbas (2015–2021)","authors":"R. Bolgov","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2022.405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2022.405","url":null,"abstract":"The article reflects the results of a study of public political discourse about the conflict in the Donbass, formed by Twitter institutional actors (permanent missions to the UN) and political figures (representatives, their deputies, etc.) of countries — permanent members of the UN Security Council. Chronological scope of the study: from January 2015 (escalation of the armed conflict in the Donbass, starting with the shelling of the stop near Volnovakha and the aggravation of the fighting for the Donetsk airport) to the present (2021). By analyzing the messages in Twitter, some trends in the development of discourse have been revealed. We prove the hypothesis about the existence of two divergent variants of discourse, which in different ways characterize the participants in the conflict in the South-East of Ukraine. To confirm the hypothesis, we use a technique for analyzing political discourse, which includes two levels of analysis: the identification of key conceptual metaphors in both discourse options (positively or negatively characterizing the parties of the conflict) and the identification of the semantic opposition “we — they” realized within the metaphors. We identify the metaphorical images of the conflict parties as a whole and the concepts used, and then the conceptual metaphors they create. We conclude that in both variants of discourse, most conceptual metaphors are based on negative concepts that designate the opposite side of the conflict, and that the discussion is characterized by increased emotional tension.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129662347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2021.403
Natalia Nemirova
The article is devoted to the study of Russian-American relations through the prism of public opinion of both countries. Foreign political views of citizens are an important element of international politics in the modern information society; they directly affect the development of international relations, providing an opportunity to legitimize and moralize foreign policy decisions of world leaders. Based on open secondary data from opinion polls, the article traces the history of the development of Russian-American relations in the post-Soviet period. The author proves that the formation of anti-Americanism ideas underlying the current reversion of consciousness to the Cold War era was formed by the early 2000s. The personality of President Vladimir Putin and his foreign policy strategy have become decisive for Russian-American relations, but at the same time, negative identification in the system of images of “friends and enemies” of Russians and Americans is realized by value-based foreign policy ideas, rather than by opportunistic situational value judgments. The media produces the existing crisis agenda, influencing the emotional, rather than meaningful response in citizens’ opinions. The events of 2014 triggered the current long-term crisis in Russian-American relations, a characteristic feature of which was the disparity (asymmetry) of mutual perceptions, which intensified after 2018. This period is also characterized by an increase in the ambivalence and turbulence of public opinion, primitivizing its model to the expression of the bloc consciousness “for — against”, “friend — enemy”. For Russians, their stance on the Ukrainian question alongside sanctions remain the key indicators in the perception of America. For Americans, such indicators are the strengthening of totalitarianism in Russia and interference in American elections. There are no short- and medium-term prospects for improving Russian-American relations in the current period.
{"title":"Russian-American relations in the public opinion of Russia and the USA","authors":"Natalia Nemirova","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2021.403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2021.403","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the study of Russian-American relations through the prism of public opinion of both countries. Foreign political views of citizens are an important element of international politics in the modern information society; they directly affect the development of international relations, providing an opportunity to legitimize and moralize foreign policy decisions of world leaders. Based on open secondary data from opinion polls, the article traces the history of the development of Russian-American relations in the post-Soviet period. The author proves that the formation of anti-Americanism ideas underlying the current reversion of consciousness to the Cold War era was formed by the early 2000s. The personality of President Vladimir Putin and his foreign policy strategy have become decisive for Russian-American relations, but at the same time, negative identification in the system of images of “friends and enemies” of Russians and Americans is realized by value-based foreign policy ideas, rather than by opportunistic situational value judgments. The media produces the existing crisis agenda, influencing the emotional, rather than meaningful response in citizens’ opinions. The events of 2014 triggered the current long-term crisis in Russian-American relations, a characteristic feature of which was the disparity (asymmetry) of mutual perceptions, which intensified after 2018. This period is also characterized by an increase in the ambivalence and turbulence of public opinion, primitivizing its model to the expression of the bloc consciousness “for — against”, “friend — enemy”. For Russians, their stance on the Ukrainian question alongside sanctions remain the key indicators in the perception of America. For Americans, such indicators are the strengthening of totalitarianism in Russia and interference in American elections. There are no short- and medium-term prospects for improving Russian-American relations in the current period.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121046391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2023.205
S. Sebekin
The article is devoted to the consideration of the main changes taking place in the system of ensuring international information security after the start of a special military operation in Ukraine. An attempt is made to predict the challenges and risks that the IIS system will face in the future. The priority transformations are connected with the negotiation process within the UN, which, in the context of increasing political antagonism between the key subjects of the dialogue, is becoming increasingly politicized and is beginning to experience some difficulties. It is assumed that in the conditions of the new political reality, the issue of “comprehensive” counteraction to international cybercrime will remain unresolved. There is some fragmentation of the international information security system itself, which is experiencing centrifugal tendencies in terms of promoting alternative approaches to solving key issues in this sphere. Finally, it can be expected that the United States, in interaction with Russia, will more actively engage in a proactive strategy of so-called defend forward, which should be implemented through the concept of persistent engagement. The preliminary conclusions demonstrated by the actions in Ukraine regarding the role and place of cyber attacks directly within the framework of the armed conflict are also considered. It is assumed that in the near future cyber attacks will not be considered as a means of achieving real strategic effects on the battlefield, where conventional weapons play a dominant role. An attempt is made to give some recommendations on maintaining a certain dynamic of the development of the IIS system.
{"title":"How will the conflict in Ukraine affect the system of international information security?","authors":"S. Sebekin","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2023.205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2023.205","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the consideration of the main changes taking place in the system of ensuring international information security after the start of a special military operation in Ukraine. An attempt is made to predict the challenges and risks that the IIS system will face in the future. The priority transformations are connected with the negotiation process within the UN, which, in the context of increasing political antagonism between the key subjects of the dialogue, is becoming increasingly politicized and is beginning to experience some difficulties. It is assumed that in the conditions of the new political reality, the issue of “comprehensive” counteraction to international cybercrime will remain unresolved. There is some fragmentation of the international information security system itself, which is experiencing centrifugal tendencies in terms of promoting alternative approaches to solving key issues in this sphere. Finally, it can be expected that the United States, in interaction with Russia, will more actively engage in a proactive strategy of so-called defend forward, which should be implemented through the concept of persistent engagement. The preliminary conclusions demonstrated by the actions in Ukraine regarding the role and place of cyber attacks directly within the framework of the armed conflict are also considered. It is assumed that in the near future cyber attacks will not be considered as a means of achieving real strategic effects on the battlefield, where conventional weapons play a dominant role. An attempt is made to give some recommendations on maintaining a certain dynamic of the development of the IIS system.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"25 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126562049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/spbu06.2022.104
Galina N. Kaninskaya
This article analyzes reasons for the rise of the “green wave” in France at the national and European elections, as well as the electoral strategy of the party “Europe. Ecology — the Greens” during the presidency of E. Macron. The research purpose is to identify the relationship between national and European strategies in the development of this French party. This dichotomy already emerges from the peculiar spelling of the party’s name through a period and a hyphen between three words, which should indicate two constituent bases of the party that made an application for the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in France in the spring of 2022. The author uses such methods such as general scientific logical methods, comparative analysis, and a systematic approach, but primarily relies on a traditional historical methodology that includes the historical-genetic method and criticism of sources. The author comes to the following conclusions. First, the French “greens” have much more firmly established their positions in the European Parliament, thanks to the initiatives of which many programs on environmental problems are being implemented on a European scale. Second, well-known French environmental activists often head various commissions in the European Parliament for the development and adoption of laws in the field of “green economy”. Third, the ambivalence of the “Europe. Ecology — the Greens” and fluctuations in its strategic course along the line of “center-left/extreme left” impede the development of a clear national strategy. Sympathy for the “greens” among the common people is hampered by their too left-liberal slogans about tolerance towards immigrants and issues of national security, as well as in such important societal issues as childbearing with the help of in vitro fertilization and surrogacy.
{"title":"“Europe. Ecology — the Greens”: Strategy of national and European identity","authors":"Galina N. Kaninskaya","doi":"10.21638/spbu06.2022.104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2022.104","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes reasons for the rise of the “green wave” in France at the national and European elections, as well as the electoral strategy of the party “Europe. Ecology — the Greens” during the presidency of E. Macron. The research purpose is to identify the relationship between national and European strategies in the development of this French party. This dichotomy already emerges from the peculiar spelling of the party’s name through a period and a hyphen between three words, which should indicate two constituent bases of the party that made an application for the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in France in the spring of 2022. The author uses such methods such as general scientific logical methods, comparative analysis, and a systematic approach, but primarily relies on a traditional historical methodology that includes the historical-genetic method and criticism of sources. The author comes to the following conclusions. First, the French “greens” have much more firmly established their positions in the European Parliament, thanks to the initiatives of which many programs on environmental problems are being implemented on a European scale. Second, well-known French environmental activists often head various commissions in the European Parliament for the development and adoption of laws in the field of “green economy”. Third, the ambivalence of the “Europe. Ecology — the Greens” and fluctuations in its strategic course along the line of “center-left/extreme left” impede the development of a clear national strategy. Sympathy for the “greens” among the common people is hampered by their too left-liberal slogans about tolerance towards immigrants and issues of national security, as well as in such important societal issues as childbearing with the help of in vitro fertilization and surrogacy.","PeriodicalId":336122,"journal":{"name":"Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International relations","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127922421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu06.2019.206
A. G. Levaggi
From the ‘August’ crisis in 2008 to the high-scale intervention in the Syrian Civil War there had been increasing tensions between Russia and West that changed the global geopolitical scenario. The bulk of the literature has focused mostly on the bilateral relations between the U.S. and the Russian Federation, and its strategic implications in conflictive regional orders such as the Post-Soviet Space, Middle East and the Black Sea region. By looking at the international impact of regional conflicts in Central Eurasia, this paper seeks to shed light on the strategic triangle in the Western Hemisphere which brings Latin America, next to Washington and Moscow. By using a systemic framework, this article argues that rising tension between US and Russia affects not only the strategic calculations of Latin American chancelleries but also the type of Moscow’s regional strategy which would be more prone to emphasize geopolitical over economic factors, affecting negatively the degree of Russian influence in the region. To assess these arguments, I present two types of empirical elements. On the one hand, I present data about UN General Assembly voting in the 1991–2015 period which shows that there had been a decline in the voting agreement between Latin America and Russia in the last decade, while the region has improved its engagement with the US. On the other hand, I analyze briefly how Argentina, Mexico and Brazil vote in the specific cases of the Georgian and Ukrainian conflicts at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council.
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