The concept of enhypostaton was introduced into theological discourse during the sixth-century Christological debates, and aimed to elucidate the orthodox doctrine of the unity of two natures in the singular hypostasis of Christ. In spite of the fact that the conceptual content of the term is recognized by contemporary scholarship as pertaining to the core of Christology, the notion of enhypostaton is often described as obscure and not clearly defined. The coining of the term is often ascribed to Leontius of Byzantium, whereas in fact he only followed and developed solutions already introduced into Christological discourse by John the Grammarian. The article aims to clarify the notion by offering a philosophical account of the meaning and theoretical origins of “enhypostaton,” as introduced by John the Grammarian in the context of his discussion of substance as en-hypostatical being. Enhypostaton emerges as the proper way of describing the ontological complements of a particular entity. This seems to be a significant development in the philosophical explanation of substance.
{"title":"A Reconstruction of John the Grammarian’s Account of Substance in Terms of Enhypostaton","authors":"Anna Zhyrkova","doi":"10.5840/forphil20172213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/forphil20172213","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of enhypostaton was introduced into theological discourse during the sixth-century Christological debates, and aimed to elucidate the orthodox doctrine of the unity of two natures in the singular hypostasis of Christ. In spite of the fact that the conceptual content of the term is recognized by contemporary scholarship as pertaining to the core of Christology, the notion of enhypostaton is often described as obscure and not clearly defined. The coining of the term is often ascribed to Leontius of Byzantium, whereas in fact he only followed and developed solutions already introduced into Christological discourse by John the Grammarian. The article aims to clarify the notion by offering a philosophical account of the meaning and theoretical origins of “enhypostaton,” as introduced by John the Grammarian in the context of his discussion of substance as en-hypostatical being. Enhypostaton emerges as the proper way of describing the ontological complements of a particular entity. This seems to be a significant development in the philosophical explanation of substance.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43788482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
My aim in this essay is to advance the state of scholarly discussion on the harms of genocide. The most obvious harms inflicted by every genocide are readily evident: the physical harm inflicted upon the victims of genocide and the moral harm that the perpetrators of genocide inflict upon themselves. Instead, I will focus on a kind of harm inflicted upon those who are neither victims nor perpetrators, on those who are outside observers, so to speak. My thesis will be that when a whole community or culture is eliminated, or even deeply wounded, the world loses an avenue for insight into the human condition. My argument is as follows. In order to understand human nature, and that which promotes its flourishing, we must certainly study individual human beings. But since human beings as rational and linguistic animals are in part constituted by the communities in which they live, the study of human nature should also involve the study of communities and cultures—both those that are well ordered and those that are not. No one community or culture has expressed all that can be said about the human way of existing and flourishing. And given that the unity and wholeness of human nature can only be glimpsed in a variety of communities and cultures, then part of the harm of genocide consists in the removal of a valuable avenue for human beings to better understand themselves.
{"title":"On the Harm of Genocide","authors":"P. Kucharski","doi":"10.5840/FORPHIL20172212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/FORPHIL20172212","url":null,"abstract":"My aim in this essay is to advance the state of scholarly discussion on the harms of genocide. The most obvious harms inflicted by every genocide are readily evident: the physical harm inflicted upon the victims of genocide and the moral harm that the perpetrators of genocide inflict upon themselves. Instead, I will focus on a kind of harm inflicted upon those who are neither victims nor perpetrators, on those who are outside observers, so to speak. My thesis will be that when a whole community or culture is eliminated, or even deeply wounded, the world loses an avenue for insight into the human condition. My argument is as follows. In order to understand human nature, and that which promotes its flourishing, we must certainly study individual human beings. But since human beings as rational and linguistic animals are in part constituted by the communities in which they live, the study of human nature should also involve the study of communities and cultures—both those that are well ordered and those that are not. No one community or culture has expressed all that can be said about the human way of existing and flourishing. And given that the unity and wholeness of human nature can only be glimpsed in a variety of communities and cultures, then part of the harm of genocide consists in the removal of a valuable avenue for human beings to better understand themselves.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42148427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses the issues surrounding voluntary action control in terms of two models that have emerged in empirical research into how our human conscious capabilities govern and control voluntary motor actions. A characterization of two aspects of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, enables us to ask whether effect anticipations need be accessible to consciousness, or whether they can also have an effect on conscious control at an unconscious stage. A review of empirical studies points to the fact that willed actions are influenced by effect anticipations both when they are conscious and when they remain inaccessible to the conscious mind. This suggests that the effects of conscious voluntary actions—in line with the ideomotor principle proposed by William James—are anticipated during the generation of responses. I propose that the integration of perceptual and motor codes arises during action planning. The features of anticipated effects appear to be optionally connected with the features of the actions selected to bring about these effects in the world.
{"title":"Effect Anticipation and the Experience of Voluntary Action Control","authors":"J. Bremer","doi":"10.5840/FORPHIL20172215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/FORPHIL20172215","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the issues surrounding voluntary action control in terms of two models that have emerged in empirical research into how our human conscious capabilities govern and control voluntary motor actions. A characterization of two aspects of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, enables us to ask whether effect anticipations need be accessible to consciousness, or whether they can also have an effect on conscious control at an unconscious stage. A review of empirical studies points to the fact that willed actions are influenced by effect anticipations both when they are conscious and when they remain inaccessible to the conscious mind. This suggests that the effects of conscious voluntary actions—in line with the ideomotor principle proposed by William James—are anticipated during the generation of responses. I propose that the integration of perceptual and motor codes arises during action planning. The features of anticipated effects appear to be optionally connected with the features of the actions selected to bring about these effects in the world.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47386836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.09
M. Sultana
In this paper I shall attempt to articulate the relation between self-consciousness and time consciousness. I shall show that the primary meaning of time entails a self-conscious being, and that time and change are related, but in an analogous way. Different forms of life are qualitatively different in that only self-conscious beings can experience the flow of time. In making this claim, I shall discuss Husserl’s distinction between pre-reflective or tacit self-awareness (inner-consciousness) and reflective self-consciousness (inner perception), and I shall show that this view is similar to Augustine’s distinction between nosse and cogitare and Aquinas’ distinction between ‘habitual’ and ‘actual’ self-knowledge. It will also be intimated that simultaneity is associated with empathy.
{"title":"What is Time Like?","authors":"M. Sultana","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.09","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I shall attempt to articulate the relation between self-consciousness and time consciousness. I shall show that the primary meaning of time entails a self-conscious being, and that time and change are related, but in an analogous way. Different forms of life are qualitatively different in that only self-conscious beings can experience the flow of time. In making this claim, I shall discuss Husserl’s distinction between pre-reflective or tacit self-awareness (inner-consciousness) and reflective self-consciousness (inner perception), and I shall show that this view is similar to Augustine’s distinction between nosse and cogitare and Aquinas’ distinction between ‘habitual’ and ‘actual’ self-knowledge. It will also be intimated that simultaneity is associated with empathy.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1970-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69962301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Note about Forum Philosophicum","authors":"Forum Philosophicum","doi":"10.5840/forphil20131818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/forphil20131818","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1970-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71077641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.01
J. Bremer, M. Flasiński
The views on the Turing test of the four influential thinkers who belong to the tradition of analytic philosophy, namely Ludwig Wittgenstein, Noam Chomsky, Hilary Putnam and John R. Searle, are discussed in the paper. Based on various philosophical/linguistic beliefs, they differ in their assessment of both the significance and the suitability of the imitation game for the development of cognitive science and Artificial Intelligence models. At the same time, they share the rejection of treating TT as the test for the “thinking of machines”. It seems to result from the caring for the proper use of language which is the fundamental methodological commitment of analytic philosophy.
{"title":"The Turing Test, or a Misuse of Language when Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines","authors":"J. Bremer, M. Flasiński","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.01","url":null,"abstract":"The views on the Turing test of the four influential thinkers who belong to the tradition of analytic philosophy, namely Ludwig Wittgenstein, Noam Chomsky, Hilary Putnam and John R. Searle, are discussed in the paper. Based on various philosophical/linguistic beliefs, they differ in their assessment of both the significance and the suitability of the imitation game for the development of cognitive science and Artificial Intelligence models. At the same time, they share the rejection of treating TT as the test for the “thinking of machines”. It seems to result from the caring for the proper use of language which is the fundamental methodological commitment of analytic philosophy.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1970-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69962374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.10
C. Hancock
This is a review of the book "A Companion to Polish Christian Philosophy of the 20th and 21st Centuries", edited by Piotr S. Mazur, Piotr Duchlinski, Pawel Skrzydlewski. Krakow: Ignatianum University Press, 2020, written by Curtis Hancock (Rockhurst University).
{"title":"A Companion to Polish Christian Philosophy of the 20th and 21st Centuries, eds. Piotr S. Mazur, Piotr Duchlinski, Pawel Skrzydlewski","authors":"C. Hancock","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.10","url":null,"abstract":"This is a review of the book \"A Companion to Polish Christian Philosophy of the 20th and 21st Centuries\", edited by Piotr S. Mazur, Piotr Duchlinski, Pawel Skrzydlewski. Krakow: Ignatianum University Press, 2020, written by Curtis Hancock (Rockhurst University).","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1970-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69962336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.04
Andrzej Serafin
Heidegger’s thinking, according to his own testimony, is rooted in two traditions of philosophy: Platonic-Aristotelian ontology and Husserl’s phenomenology. Heidegger’s claim that the original understanding of Being is lost and has to be rediscovered conjoins the phenomenological claim that there is a certain mode of seeing that enables a revelatory philosophical insight. I would like to show how Heidegger combines both these claims in his supposition that the original philosophical conceptuality, as developed by Plato and Aristotle, was lost but can be retrieved by means of applying the phenomenological method to the interpretation of texts. Furthermore, I would like to interpret this retrieval in the context of Heidegger’s project of “overcoming metaphysics” and Nietzsche’s suggestion that “Plato was essentially a pantheist, yet in the guise of a dualist”.
{"title":"Barely visible","authors":"Andrzej Serafin","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.04","url":null,"abstract":"Heidegger’s thinking, according to his own testimony, is rooted in two traditions of philosophy: Platonic-Aristotelian ontology and Husserl’s phenomenology. Heidegger’s claim that the original understanding of Being is lost and has to be rediscovered conjoins the phenomenological claim that there is a certain mode of seeing that enables a revelatory philosophical insight. I would like to show how Heidegger combines both these claims in his supposition that the original philosophical conceptuality, as developed by Plato and Aristotle, was lost but can be retrieved by means of applying the phenomenological method to the interpretation of texts. Furthermore, I would like to interpret this retrieval in the context of Heidegger’s project of “overcoming metaphysics” and Nietzsche’s suggestion that “Plato was essentially a pantheist, yet in the guise of a dualist”.","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1970-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69962623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1970-01-01DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.05
Krzysztof Ziarek
This essay examines the notion of “poetical rescue” in Heidegger, which derives from Heidegger’s commentary on Hölderlin’s lines from “Patmos,” “Yet where danger is, grows also that which rescues.” Heidegger’s remarks on the two-faced essence of technology draw on these lines, characterizing the enframing as both the danger and the possibility of saving. The turn from danger to rescue depends on the possibility of a poetic revealing, which has been overshadowed, even disallowed, by the dominant revealing in modernity—namely, das Gestell. To free the possibility of the poetic revealing and the rescue spreading from it, humans, as Heidegger remarks, need to learn to become mortals. To be mortal means here being “capable of death as death”—that is, becoming attentive to the nothingness pulsing in every moment. The rescue Heidegger explores is thus the freeing of the experience proper to being mortal in the midst of a revealing that orders all that exists into the ready availability of a standing-reserve
{"title":"The (Techno-)Poetical Rescue","authors":"Krzysztof Ziarek","doi":"10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2021.2602.05","url":null,"abstract":"This essay examines the notion of “poetical rescue” in Heidegger, which derives from Heidegger’s commentary on Hölderlin’s lines from “Patmos,” “Yet where danger is, grows also that which rescues.” Heidegger’s remarks on the two-faced essence of technology draw on these lines, characterizing the enframing as both the danger and the possibility of saving. The turn from danger to rescue depends on the possibility of a poetic revealing, which has been overshadowed, even disallowed, by the dominant revealing in modernity—namely, das Gestell. To free the possibility of the poetic revealing and the rescue spreading from it, humans, as Heidegger remarks, need to learn to become mortals. To be mortal means here being “capable of death as death”—that is, becoming attentive to the nothingness pulsing in every moment. The rescue Heidegger explores is thus the freeing of the experience proper to being mortal in the midst of a revealing that orders all that exists into the ready availability of a standing-reserve","PeriodicalId":34385,"journal":{"name":"Forum Philosophicum","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1970-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69962666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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