Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-192-194
F. Mirzayeva
{"title":"Organized violence and elite political culture in Nigeria","authors":"F. Mirzayeva","doi":"10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-192-194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-192-194","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":34887,"journal":{"name":"Puti k miru i bezopasnosti","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67686735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-24-42
S. Badanjak
Since its first release in the form of the PA-X Peace Agreements Database, the initial project undertaken by the University of Edinburgh’s Political Settlements Research Programme has seen four more data releases. Multiple data and visualisation projects stemmed from PA-X. The article provides an update to the initial introduction to the PA-X data and discusses the key lessons learned from the processes of data collection, analysis, and visualisation. This assessment is undertaken in two key areas: first, with regard to the process of “building” a dataset and database; second, with regard to the substantive findings and trends gleaned from the PA-X data on peace agreements and peace processes. The place and impact of this database in the context of peace and conflict studies are also assessed. Data resources pertaining to this field of inquiry are explored, with the focus on the ways in which the PA-X data can be used in conjunction with other datasets on peace and conflict. Finally, the future development of PA-X is addressed. It is argued that keeping up with the direction of the research literature in the field requires that the data on peace processes and peace agreement are better disaggregated, in terms of actors and groups signing deals, and in terms of spatial and temporal coverage of the signed peace deals.
{"title":"The PA-X Peace Agreement Database: reflections on documenting the practice of peacemaking","authors":"S. Badanjak","doi":"10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-24-42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-24-42","url":null,"abstract":"Since its first release in the form of the PA-X Peace Agreements Database, the initial project undertaken by the University of Edinburgh’s Political Settlements Research Programme has seen four more data releases. Multiple data and visualisation projects stemmed from PA-X. The article provides an update to the initial introduction to the PA-X data and discusses the key lessons learned from the processes of data collection, analysis, and visualisation. This assessment is undertaken in two key areas: first, with regard to the process of “building” a dataset and database; second, with regard to the substantive findings and trends gleaned from the PA-X data on peace agreements and peace processes. The place and impact of this database in the context of peace and conflict studies are also assessed. Data resources pertaining to this field of inquiry are explored, with the focus on the ways in which the PA-X data can be used in conjunction with other datasets on peace and conflict. Finally, the future development of PA-X is addressed. It is argued that keeping up with the direction of the research literature in the field requires that the data on peace processes and peace agreement are better disaggregated, in terms of actors and groups signing deals, and in terms of spatial and temporal coverage of the signed peace deals.","PeriodicalId":34887,"journal":{"name":"Puti k miru i bezopasnosti","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67686866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-133-150
N. Sokov
The article analyzes the dynamics, causes and implications of the collapse of the Open Skies Treaty in the broader context of gradual dismantlement of the network of arms control and confidence building regimes created at the end of the Cold War. The central focus is on the explanation of the declining U.S. support for the treaty since the 2010s and the eventual withdrawal addressed against the background of the evolution of the U.S. approach to arms control during the first two decades of the 21st century. While policies changed from one president to another, a sequence of U.S. administrations shared growing loss of interest in arms control and unwillingness to invest in generating domestic support for existing and new agreements. The weakening of arms control became preferable to limitations on the U.S.’ own programs and forces, in line with the belief that the United States was sufficiently advanced to remain ahead of any possible competitors, including Russia. While arms control issues are more effectively addressed through detailed, difficult negotiations and compromises, the evolving U.S. approach to perceived treaty violations by Russia amounted to an ultimatum to Moscow to admit violations and fix them the way the U.S. wants them to be fixed. Russia’s decision to follow suit by withdrawing from the treaty, while not immediate or preordained, is explained as driven both by political motives and, in cost-benefit terms, by concerns that the United States would keep access to data on Russia collected under the treaty through the U.S. NATO allies. The prospects for modest upgrade of the arms control agenda under the Biden administration are also addressed.
{"title":"The U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty","authors":"N. Sokov","doi":"10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-133-150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-133-150","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the dynamics, causes and implications of the collapse of the Open Skies Treaty in the broader context of gradual dismantlement of the network of arms control and confidence building regimes created at the end of the Cold War. The central focus is on the explanation of the declining U.S. support for the treaty since the 2010s and the eventual withdrawal addressed against the background of the evolution of the U.S. approach to arms control during the first two decades of the 21st century. While policies changed from one president to another, a sequence of U.S. administrations shared growing loss of interest in arms control and unwillingness to invest in generating domestic support for existing and new agreements. The weakening of arms control became preferable to limitations on the U.S.’ own programs and forces, in line with the belief that the United States was sufficiently advanced to remain ahead of any possible competitors, including Russia. While arms control issues are more effectively addressed through detailed, difficult negotiations and compromises, the evolving U.S. approach to perceived treaty violations by Russia amounted to an ultimatum to Moscow to admit violations and fix them the way the U.S. wants them to be fixed. Russia’s decision to follow suit by withdrawing from the treaty, while not immediate or preordained, is explained as driven both by political motives and, in cost-benefit terms, by concerns that the United States would keep access to data on Russia collected under the treaty through the U.S. NATO allies. The prospects for modest upgrade of the arms control agenda under the Biden administration are also addressed.","PeriodicalId":34887,"journal":{"name":"Puti k miru i bezopasnosti","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67686420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-57-79
A. Tokarev
The article outlines and discusses the universal mathematical model created by the author and allowing to predict scenarios for post-Soviet secessions and, more broadly, to forecast secession potentials of any complex subnational regional units. The objects of forecasting are de facto states and different kinds of polities with failed statehood, analyzed through the prism of the “parent state – secession – patron state” triangle. The main research method is quantification of secession factors, which enables a researcher to measure the impacts of objective and subjective conditions on the course and results of secessions through the use of specific variables and indicators. As described in mathematical terms, the model has two extremes: “ideal secession” and “ideal anti-secession”.
{"title":"Forecasting secessions though mathematical modeling","authors":"A. Tokarev","doi":"10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-57-79","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-57-79","url":null,"abstract":"The article outlines and discusses the universal mathematical model created by the author and allowing to predict scenarios for post-Soviet secessions and, more broadly, to forecast secession potentials of any complex subnational regional units. The objects of forecasting are de facto states and different kinds of polities with failed statehood, analyzed through the prism of the “parent state – secession – patron state” triangle. The main research method is quantification of secession factors, which enables a researcher to measure the impacts of objective and subjective conditions on the course and results of secessions through the use of specific variables and indicators. As described in mathematical terms, the model has two extremes: “ideal secession” and “ideal anti-secession”.","PeriodicalId":34887,"journal":{"name":"Puti k miru i bezopasnosti","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67686937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-151-161
D. Stefanovich
The article is devoted to the Treaty on Open Skies that remains one of the few instruments for multilateral and collective security in Europe and North America. The treaty may cease to exist, due to accumulating contradictions about the its implementation among the participating states, the destructive approach to arms control by President Trump's administration, and general degradation of relations between Russia and the West. This article examines Russian approaches to managing the current situation (which is close to a dead end) and finding possible ways out of it. Special attention is paid to the informal consequences of maintaining or destroying the Open Skies regime. Some prospects for future collaborative airborne monitoring regimes are also discussed.
{"title":"The Open Skies Treaty: the Russian views on related problems and possible solutions","authors":"D. Stefanovich","doi":"10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-151-161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-151-161","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the Treaty on Open Skies that remains one of the few instruments for multilateral and collective security in Europe and North America. The treaty may cease to exist, due to accumulating contradictions about the its implementation among the participating states, the destructive approach to arms control by President Trump's administration, and general degradation of relations between Russia and the West. This article examines Russian approaches to managing the current situation (which is close to a dead end) and finding possible ways out of it. Special attention is paid to the informal consequences of maintaining or destroying the Open Skies regime. Some prospects for future collaborative airborne monitoring regimes are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":34887,"journal":{"name":"Puti k miru i bezopasnosti","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67686777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-195-196
P. Seccia
{"title":"Libya’s predicament","authors":"P. Seccia","doi":"10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-195-196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-195-196","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":34887,"journal":{"name":"Puti k miru i bezopasnosti","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67686797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-29-43
I. Danilin
The “technological war” between the United States and China that started in 2017–2018 raises a number of questions about the future role of technological development as a factor in relations between superpowers. Analysis shows that for the United States this conflict is caused by changing balance of risks and benefits of the liberal model of globalization due to the rise of China`s power and growing geopolitical tensions between the two nations. In this context, emerging, especially digital, technologies appear to be a new battlefield between superpowers. Within the realist framework, actors consider emerging technologies as a key factor for strengthening their global postures. This, among other things, contributes to securitized technological agenda and strengthens its geopolitical dimension. Neo-technonationalism has become the platform that integrates different processes and goals into new U.S. policy. Although historically neo-technonationalism took its roots in Asia, the evolving market situation prompted the United States to rethink existing approaches and to upgrade the techno-nationalist dimension of its policy. Considering similar policies of China and the EU (i. e. the European digital sovereignty policy), this trend shapes new realities of technological “blocs”, the struggle for expansion of technological platforms, and technological conflicts. Taking into account prospective development needs of the global economy and future specification of mutual interest areas, as new digital technologies mature, the ground for normalizing the dialogue between the superpowers will emerge. However, at least in the U.S.–China case, this issue will be complicated by geopolitical contradictions that leave little room for any serious compromise.
{"title":"The U.S.-China technological war through the prism of techno-nationalism","authors":"I. Danilin","doi":"10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-29-43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-29-43","url":null,"abstract":"The “technological war” between the United States and China that started in 2017–2018 raises a number of questions about the future role of technological development as a factor in relations between superpowers. Analysis shows that for the United States this conflict is caused by changing balance of risks and benefits of the liberal model of globalization due to the rise of China`s power and growing geopolitical tensions between the two nations. In this context, emerging, especially digital, technologies appear to be a new battlefield between superpowers. Within the realist framework, actors consider emerging technologies as a key factor for strengthening their global postures. This, among other things, contributes to securitized technological agenda and strengthens its geopolitical dimension. Neo-technonationalism has become the platform that integrates different processes and goals into new U.S. policy. Although historically neo-technonationalism took its roots in Asia, the evolving market situation prompted the United States to rethink existing approaches and to upgrade the techno-nationalist dimension of its policy. Considering similar policies of China and the EU (i. e. the European digital sovereignty policy), this trend shapes new realities of technological “blocs”, the struggle for expansion of technological platforms, and technological conflicts. Taking into account prospective development needs of the global economy and future specification of mutual interest areas, as new digital technologies mature, the ground for normalizing the dialogue between the superpowers will emerge. However, at least in the U.S.–China case, this issue will be complicated by geopolitical contradictions that leave little room for any serious compromise.","PeriodicalId":34887,"journal":{"name":"Puti k miru i bezopasnosti","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67686508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-139-152
S. Sebekin
The article assesses the feasibility of control over proliferation of cyber weapons, by analogy with the control over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Russian and U.S. approaches to this issue are considered and compared. While Russia’s stance for a long time proceeded from the idea that the regime of control over proliferation of cyber weapons is needed, the United States have denied the feasibility and validity of this approach. The author argues that, at present, the control over proliferation of cyber weapons and the establishment of a special international regime (by analogy with weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons non-proliferation regimes) is hardly feasible for a number of both technical and political reasons. They include the wide availability of cyber weapons, the scalability effect, and difficulties in identifying cyber weapons. Instead, a special regime of control over the non-use of cyber weapons is proposed. This regime could include, among other things, a ban on cyber attacks against certain targets, introduction of “red lines”, and creation of a unified database of vulnerabilities and malware.
{"title":"Is the regime of control over proliferation of cyber weapons feasible? The Russian and U.S. approaches","authors":"S. Sebekin","doi":"10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-139-152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-139-152","url":null,"abstract":"The article assesses the feasibility of control over proliferation of cyber weapons, by analogy with the control over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Russian and U.S. approaches to this issue are considered and compared. While Russia’s stance for a long time proceeded from the idea that the regime of control over proliferation of cyber weapons is needed, the United States have denied the feasibility and validity of this approach. The author argues that, at present, the control over proliferation of cyber weapons and the establishment of a special international regime (by analogy with weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons non-proliferation regimes) is hardly feasible for a number of both technical and political reasons. They include the wide availability of cyber weapons, the scalability effect, and difficulties in identifying cyber weapons. Instead, a special regime of control over the non-use of cyber weapons is proposed. This regime could include, among other things, a ban on cyber attacks against certain targets, introduction of “red lines”, and creation of a unified database of vulnerabilities and malware.","PeriodicalId":34887,"journal":{"name":"Puti k miru i bezopasnosti","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67686636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-43-56
T. Morgan
This article provides an overview of the purpose, development and future of the Global Peace Index (GPI), a composite indicator of peacefulness at the national level. It explains why the concept of negative peace is well suited to being captured by a composite index, for both theoretical and statistical reasons. It examines how the GPI fits within the field of peace and conflict studies and how its methodological soundness has been assessed. This is done by looking at the history and structure of the GPI and showing how it relates to other definitions and indicators of peacefulness. The article then analyzes how the index is constructed with respect to its weighting, aggregation, and robustness. Some of the criticisms of the index are also explored, as well as the main proposed directions for the GPI evolution over the coming decade. Three main advantages of the index are identified as the ones that best reflect its novel input in peace and conflict studies. First, a composite indicator of peace helps to provide a more compelling narrative around the dynamics of peace between countries, to generate more interest in the peace and conflict field and to promote the concept of peace as a crucial driver of development. Second, the aggregation of multiple indicators of violence allows for the construction of a continuous measure of peacefulness with a less skewed distribution that can serve as the baseline for seeing which factors in other areas are correlated with peacefulness. Third, this composite measure of peacefulness highlights areas where data on aspects of negative peace are missing, incomplete, or not comparable across countries and drives the creation of new and novel indicators to fill these data gaps.
{"title":"Peace as a composite indicator: the goals and future of the Global Peace Index","authors":"T. Morgan","doi":"10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-43-56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-2-43-56","url":null,"abstract":"This article provides an overview of the purpose, development and future of the Global Peace Index (GPI), a composite indicator of peacefulness at the national level. It explains why the concept of negative peace is well suited to being captured by a composite index, for both theoretical and statistical reasons. It examines how the GPI fits within the field of peace and conflict studies and how its methodological soundness has been assessed. This is done by looking at the history and structure of the GPI and showing how it relates to other definitions and indicators of peacefulness. The article then analyzes how the index is constructed with respect to its weighting, aggregation, and robustness. Some of the criticisms of the index are also explored, as well as the main proposed directions for the GPI evolution over the coming decade. Three main advantages of the index are identified as the ones that best reflect its novel input in peace and conflict studies. First, a composite indicator of peace helps to provide a more compelling narrative around the dynamics of peace between countries, to generate more interest in the peace and conflict field and to promote the concept of peace as a crucial driver of development. Second, the aggregation of multiple indicators of violence allows for the construction of a continuous measure of peacefulness with a less skewed distribution that can serve as the baseline for seeing which factors in other areas are correlated with peacefulness. Third, this composite measure of peacefulness highlights areas where data on aspects of negative peace are missing, incomplete, or not comparable across countries and drives the creation of new and novel indicators to fill these data gaps.","PeriodicalId":34887,"journal":{"name":"Puti k miru i bezopasnosti","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67686877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}