Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1461086
Alexander R. Arifianto
ABSTRACT This article asks whether campus preaching organizations such as the Indonesian Muslim Students Islamic Union (KAMMI) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) serve as potential breeding grounds for radicalism or, alternatively, do they serve as institutions that promote political moderation and prevent radical action among young university-age Muslims. Utilizing insights from inclusion-moderation thesis, it concludes the answer to these questions depends on whether these groups are willing to accept Indonesia’s democratic political system. These determine the tactics the groups chose to promote their agenda to potential recruits. While KAMMI is willing to moderate its strategies, HTI is unwilling to do so and continues to promote its agenda through secretive means, although it formally rejects radicalism and extremism.
{"title":"Islamic Campus Preaching Organizations in Indonesia: Promoters of Moderation or Radicalism?","authors":"Alexander R. Arifianto","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1461086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1461086","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article asks whether campus preaching organizations such as the Indonesian Muslim Students Islamic Union (KAMMI) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) serve as potential breeding grounds for radicalism or, alternatively, do they serve as institutions that promote political moderation and prevent radical action among young university-age Muslims. Utilizing insights from inclusion-moderation thesis, it concludes the answer to these questions depends on whether these groups are willing to accept Indonesia’s democratic political system. These determine the tactics the groups chose to promote their agenda to potential recruits. While KAMMI is willing to moderate its strategies, HTI is unwilling to do so and continues to promote its agenda through secretive means, although it formally rejects radicalism and extremism.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"162 1","pages":"323 - 342"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74311979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1455185
Shalaka Thakur, R. Venugopal
ABSTRACT The reconstruction of stable political order after violent conflict is a central concern of peacebuilding theory and practice. While much of the literature on this subject is based on cases where there has been state collapse or international intervention, this article draws on a case study from India’s northeast, where a long-standing separatist insurgency has given way to a stable and protracted ceasefire. Drawing on fieldwork from Ukhrul district in the India–Myanmar border, the article studies the parallel military structures and civilian governance institutions and the nature of their interaction. In doing so, it evaluates the consequences of the ceasefire political equilibrium in terms of the larger project of conflict resolution and a permanent political resolution.
{"title":"Parallel governance and political order in contested territory: Evidence from the Indo-Naga ceasefire","authors":"Shalaka Thakur, R. Venugopal","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1455185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1455185","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The reconstruction of stable political order after violent conflict is a central concern of peacebuilding theory and practice. While much of the literature on this subject is based on cases where there has been state collapse or international intervention, this article draws on a case study from India’s northeast, where a long-standing separatist insurgency has given way to a stable and protracted ceasefire. Drawing on fieldwork from Ukhrul district in the India–Myanmar border, the article studies the parallel military structures and civilian governance institutions and the nature of their interaction. In doing so, it evaluates the consequences of the ceasefire political equilibrium in terms of the larger project of conflict resolution and a permanent political resolution.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"28 1","pages":"285 - 303"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14799855.2018.1455185","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72530811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1463991
A. Korolev
ABSTRACT The deterioration of Russia-US relations as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis and growing tensions in US-China relations have given rise to the perception that China–-Russia relations are an actual or incipient alliance. However, the alliance elements in China-Russia relations have never been systematically defined and empirically assessed, which makes assessing alliance dynamics in these important bilateral relations difficult. This article develops and applies a set of empirical criteria for an alliance to define how closely the post-Cold War China-Russia military relations have approached the alliance condition. It demonstrates that China and Russia have created strong institutional foundations for an alliance, and now only minor steps are necessary for a formal and functioning military alliance to materialize. However, the occurrence of such steps is not yet guaranteed.
{"title":"On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military Cooperation","authors":"A. Korolev","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1463991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1463991","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The deterioration of Russia-US relations as a consequence of the Ukraine crisis and growing tensions in US-China relations have given rise to the perception that China–-Russia relations are an actual or incipient alliance. However, the alliance elements in China-Russia relations have never been systematically defined and empirically assessed, which makes assessing alliance dynamics in these important bilateral relations difficult. This article develops and applies a set of empirical criteria for an alliance to define how closely the post-Cold War China-Russia military relations have approached the alliance condition. It demonstrates that China and Russia have created strong institutional foundations for an alliance, and now only minor steps are necessary for a formal and functioning military alliance to materialize. However, the occurrence of such steps is not yet guaranteed.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"233 - 252"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79368716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1443915
James Johnson
ABSTRACT This article argues that current passive and static conceptualizations of Chinese approaches to nuclear and conventional deterrence are no longer appropriate. Recent evidence indicates that these postures are far more integrated, flexible, and dynamic than Beijing’s official rhetoric suggests, and that during the past decade a de facto shift toward a limited nuclear war-fighting posture has already taken place. By applying an International Relations (IR) structural-realist lens to conceptualize a relatively under-researched discourse that relates to recent indications that China is contemplating the deployment of nuclear weapons for war-fighting (or victory-denial) purposes. A radical doctrinal shift of this kind (or even the perception of one) could presage a paradigm shift in China’s long-standing nuclear posture and the nuclear balance in Asia.
{"title":"Chinese Evolving Approaches to Nuclear “War-Fighting”: An Emerging Intense US–China Security Dilemma and Threats to Crisis Stability in the Asia Pacific","authors":"James Johnson","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1443915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1443915","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article argues that current passive and static conceptualizations of Chinese approaches to nuclear and conventional deterrence are no longer appropriate. Recent evidence indicates that these postures are far more integrated, flexible, and dynamic than Beijing’s official rhetoric suggests, and that during the past decade a de facto shift toward a limited nuclear war-fighting posture has already taken place. By applying an International Relations (IR) structural-realist lens to conceptualize a relatively under-researched discourse that relates to recent indications that China is contemplating the deployment of nuclear weapons for war-fighting (or victory-denial) purposes. A radical doctrinal shift of this kind (or even the perception of one) could presage a paradigm shift in China’s long-standing nuclear posture and the nuclear balance in Asia.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"31 8 1","pages":"215 - 232"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80172268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-08-17DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1651717
Kacie Miura, J. Weiss
ABSTRACT Although China tends to be an important topic in election campaigns, the consequences of this rhetoric have not been systematically examined. We highlight the process by which China uses campaign rhetoric to make inferences about the intentions of new leaders in the US, Taiwan, and Japan. We identify two key criteria – consistency and change – that guide Chinese assessments. In turn, three patterns define Chinese policy toward new administrations: proactive engagement when campaign rhetoric is consistent with other indicators of policy change; reactive engagement when rhetoric is consistent with continuity; and a wait and see approach when rhetoric is inconsistent with the candidate’s past actions and the reputation of close advisors. Our findings push back against arguments linking leadership transitions to international conflict. Rather than testing the resolve of new leaders with military probes, foreign states can use information overheard during elections to gauge their counterparts’ intentions and ensure stability immediately after elections.
{"title":"Campaign rhetoric and Chinese reactions to new leaders","authors":"Kacie Miura, J. Weiss","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1651717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1651717","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Although China tends to be an important topic in election campaigns, the consequences of this rhetoric have not been systematically examined. We highlight the process by which China uses campaign rhetoric to make inferences about the intentions of new leaders in the US, Taiwan, and Japan. We identify two key criteria – consistency and change – that guide Chinese assessments. In turn, three patterns define Chinese policy toward new administrations: proactive engagement when campaign rhetoric is consistent with other indicators of policy change; reactive engagement when rhetoric is consistent with continuity; and a wait and see approach when rhetoric is inconsistent with the candidate’s past actions and the reputation of close advisors. Our findings push back against arguments linking leadership transitions to international conflict. Rather than testing the resolve of new leaders with military probes, foreign states can use information overheard during elections to gauge their counterparts’ intentions and ensure stability immediately after elections.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"15 1","pages":"201 - 220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86700400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-30DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1620207
F. O'Donnell
ABSTRACT This review article considers three significant volumes recently published in the field of Southern Asian security studies. These consist of Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism, by Toby Dalton and George Perkovich; Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland (eds.), Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories; and Mooed Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia. In the wake of the 2019 India–Pakistan Pulwama militarized crisis, each book focuses on a distinct element of the Southern Asian security milieu that is crucial to understanding drivers of regional insecurity and potential pathways toward greater stability. However, collectively, they leave room for greater exploration for the effects of emerging trends in this regional strategic competition. These include the evolving regional preferences and actions of China, the potential for Pakistan-based terrorist groups to become independent actors throughout a Southern Asian crisis, and the growing prominence of precision-strike standoff weapons in the strategic planning of China, India, and Pakistan. Still, these three volumes prove indispensable for understanding the contemporary political and security dynamics of Southern Asia.
{"title":"Review Essay: Stabilizing Nuclear Southern Asia","authors":"F. O'Donnell","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1620207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1620207","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This review article considers three significant volumes recently published in the field of Southern Asian security studies. These consist of Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism, by Toby Dalton and George Perkovich; Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland (eds.), Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories; and Mooed Yusuf, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia. In the wake of the 2019 India–Pakistan Pulwama militarized crisis, each book focuses on a distinct element of the Southern Asian security milieu that is crucial to understanding drivers of regional insecurity and potential pathways toward greater stability. However, collectively, they leave room for greater exploration for the effects of emerging trends in this regional strategic competition. These include the evolving regional preferences and actions of China, the potential for Pakistan-based terrorist groups to become independent actors throughout a Southern Asian crisis, and the growing prominence of precision-strike standoff weapons in the strategic planning of China, India, and Pakistan. Still, these three volumes prove indispensable for understanding the contemporary political and security dynamics of Southern Asia.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"5 1","pages":"127 - 139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84509018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-16DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1607304
Noriyuki Katagiri
ABSTRACT I use IR theories to investigate Japanese foreign policy between 2012 and 2017. I make two arguments. First, I argue that the best theoretical combination to explain Japanese foreign policy under Abe is one of defensive realism and liberalism, with focus on the economic aspects of regional partnerships. Japan has followed a traditional realist approach in security policy, but he has adopted a more activist and broader economic vision in his approach. Second, this analysis reflects Japan’s expansive search of strategic allies in Southeast Asia and beyond; behind the security rivalry and economic partnership with China is the emergence of a geographically wider security architecture coupled with robust economic networks in Southeast Asia and South Asia. In effect, the Abe government has increased ties with India through trade and investment, and reinvigorated the existing diplomatic effort with Southeast and South Asia in a comprehensive package of security and economic initiative.
{"title":"Shinzo Abe's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Japan's recent achievement and future direction","authors":"Noriyuki Katagiri","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1607304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1607304","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I use IR theories to investigate Japanese foreign policy between 2012 and 2017. I make two arguments. First, I argue that the best theoretical combination to explain Japanese foreign policy under Abe is one of defensive realism and liberalism, with focus on the economic aspects of regional partnerships. Japan has followed a traditional realist approach in security policy, but he has adopted a more activist and broader economic vision in his approach. Second, this analysis reflects Japan’s expansive search of strategic allies in Southeast Asia and beyond; behind the security rivalry and economic partnership with China is the emergence of a geographically wider security architecture coupled with robust economic networks in Southeast Asia and South Asia. In effect, the Abe government has increased ties with India through trade and investment, and reinvigorated the existing diplomatic effort with Southeast and South Asia in a comprehensive package of security and economic initiative.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"10 1","pages":"179 - 200"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90038907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-04DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1437723
A. Chubb
ABSTRACT English-language analysis of Chinese foreign policy has often cited nationalist public opinion as a key driver of Beijing’s recent assertive maritime conduct. Yet these important conjectures have not been systematically tested. How can we know whether public opinion has been driving an authoritarian state’s foreign policy? What are some cases in which concern about popular nationalism may have influenced Beijing’s behavior in disputed maritime spaces? To answer these questions, this article constructs a methodological framework for assessing the likely impact of public opinion on particular instances of state action. Applying this to five cases typical of China’s on-water policy in the South and East China Seas since 2007 indicates that popular nationalism has had little to do with China’s assertive turn on its maritime periphery.
{"title":"Assessing public opinion’s influence on foreign policy: the case of China’s assertive maritime behavior","authors":"A. Chubb","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1437723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1437723","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT English-language analysis of Chinese foreign policy has often cited nationalist public opinion as a key driver of Beijing’s recent assertive maritime conduct. Yet these important conjectures have not been systematically tested. How can we know whether public opinion has been driving an authoritarian state’s foreign policy? What are some cases in which concern about popular nationalism may have influenced Beijing’s behavior in disputed maritime spaces? To answer these questions, this article constructs a methodological framework for assessing the likely impact of public opinion on particular instances of state action. Applying this to five cases typical of China’s on-water policy in the South and East China Seas since 2007 indicates that popular nationalism has had little to do with China’s assertive turn on its maritime periphery.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"4 1","pages":"159 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89274995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-04DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1594782
H. Takeuchi
ABSTRACT Xi Jinping has concentrated his power since he acceded to the Chinese presidency. Where will Xi bring China? In this review essay I discuss four single-authored books – one in English and three in Japanese – to explore security implications of Xi’s reform and foreign policies. In her recent book, Elizabeth Economy is critical of Xi, arguing that he is turning away from Deng Xiaoping’s reform and internationalist policies. The three Japanese China specialists concur, and further highlight the interconnectedness of domestic politics and international relations. In sum, the four books show that Xi has struggled to commit to the state-owned enterprise reform and to cooperative foreign policy due to Chinese domestic politics, and as a result, has threatened regional security in the Asia-Pacific.
三位日本中国问题专家对此表示赞同，并进一步强调了国内政治与国际关系的相互联系。
{"title":"Domestic politics of Chinese foreign policy: where will Xi Jinping bring China?","authors":"H. Takeuchi","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1594782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1594782","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Xi Jinping has concentrated his power since he acceded to the Chinese presidency. Where will Xi bring China? In this review essay I discuss four single-authored books – one in English and three in Japanese – to explore security implications of Xi’s reform and foreign policies. In her recent book, Elizabeth Economy is critical of Xi, arguing that he is turning away from Deng Xiaoping’s reform and internationalist policies. The three Japanese China specialists concur, and further highlight the interconnectedness of domestic politics and international relations. In sum, the four books show that Xi has struggled to commit to the state-owned enterprise reform and to cooperative foreign policy due to Chinese domestic politics, and as a result, has threatened regional security in the Asia-Pacific.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"205 - 213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89620496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-05-04DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2018.1439017
P. Kallender, C. Hughes
ABSTRACT Japan’s security discourse – despite accelerating shifts in its security stance over the last two decades, and more recently, under the Abe administration – remains dominated by views of essential continuity and maintenance of the “Yoshida Doctrine.” The case of Japan’s militarization of space is used to create a framework for systematically dismantling default assumptions about the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine. The militarization of space serves as a driver of broader trends in Japan’s security policy manifested in the procurement of dual-use assets in launch systems, communications and intelligence satellites, and counterspace capabilities necessary for active internal and external balancing with the US–Japan alliance; the strengthening domestically of security policymaking institutions; and the jettisoning of anti-militaristic norms. Japan’s increasingly assertive military stance, bolstering of the US–Japan alliance and cessation of hedging, facing down of China’s rise, and departure from the Yoshida Doctrine as grand strategy are thus revealed as hiding in plain sight.
{"title":"Hiding in Plain Sight? Japan’s Militarization of Space and Challenges to the Yoshida Doctrine","authors":"P. Kallender, C. Hughes","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2018.1439017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1439017","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Japan’s security discourse – despite accelerating shifts in its security stance over the last two decades, and more recently, under the Abe administration – remains dominated by views of essential continuity and maintenance of the “Yoshida Doctrine.” The case of Japan’s militarization of space is used to create a framework for systematically dismantling default assumptions about the durability of the Yoshida Doctrine. The militarization of space serves as a driver of broader trends in Japan’s security policy manifested in the procurement of dual-use assets in launch systems, communications and intelligence satellites, and counterspace capabilities necessary for active internal and external balancing with the US–Japan alliance; the strengthening domestically of security policymaking institutions; and the jettisoning of anti-militaristic norms. Japan’s increasingly assertive military stance, bolstering of the US–Japan alliance and cessation of hedging, facing down of China’s rise, and departure from the Yoshida Doctrine as grand strategy are thus revealed as hiding in plain sight.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"180 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77113916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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