This account measures all movable goods that are sold, given away, or otherwise transferred from U.S. to foreign ownership. Excluded are: (1) Transfers of goods under U.S. military agency sales contracts, whether physically exported from the United States or sold from U.S. installations abroad (part of line 3); (2) transfers of goods by U.S. nonmilitary agencies from U.S. installations abroad (part of line 10); and (3) transfers of goods under U.S. military grant programs (part of line 16). The basic data are Census Bureau trade statistics. Exports in the Census Bureau statistics are,.in general, valued f.a.s. (free alongside ship) U.S. port of export and reflect selling price, f.o.b. (free on board) interior point of shipment (or cost if not sold), plus packaging costs, inland freight, and insurance to place of export. These statistics record the physical movement of goods out of the United States, rather than change of ownership, and differ in other aspects from the definition of merchandise exports stated above. Adjustments to the Census Bureau statistics are also made for timing, coverage, and valuation in order to bring them more into conformity with concepts used in the international accounts. Timing adjustments are made to Census Bureau statistics for transfers that occur in periods other than the periods in which they are reported. Coverage adjustments are made for Virgin Islands exports to foreign countries, gift parcel post exports, electrical energy exports to Canada and Mexico, sales of vessels, U.S. exports to the Panama Canal Zone,
{"title":"Explanatory notes","authors":"Line 2.—Merchandise","doi":"10.18356/09beaaed-en","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18356/09beaaed-en","url":null,"abstract":"This account measures all movable goods that are sold, given away, or otherwise transferred from U.S. to foreign ownership. Excluded are: (1) Transfers of goods under U.S. military agency sales contracts, whether physically exported from the United States or sold from U.S. installations abroad (part of line 3); (2) transfers of goods by U.S. nonmilitary agencies from U.S. installations abroad (part of line 10); and (3) transfers of goods under U.S. military grant programs (part of line 16). The basic data are Census Bureau trade statistics. Exports in the Census Bureau statistics are,.in general, valued f.a.s. (free alongside ship) U.S. port of export and reflect selling price, f.o.b. (free on board) interior point of shipment (or cost if not sold), plus packaging costs, inland freight, and insurance to place of export. These statistics record the physical movement of goods out of the United States, rather than change of ownership, and differ in other aspects from the definition of merchandise exports stated above. Adjustments to the Census Bureau statistics are also made for timing, coverage, and valuation in order to bring them more into conformity with concepts used in the international accounts. Timing adjustments are made to Census Bureau statistics for transfers that occur in periods other than the periods in which they are reported. Coverage adjustments are made for Virgin Islands exports to foreign countries, gift parcel post exports, electrical energy exports to Canada and Mexico, sales of vessels, U.S. exports to the Panama Canal Zone,","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"59 1","pages":"519 - 526"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80520141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416982
China and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations agreed a framework for a code of conduct in the area, in May 2017. The reality, however, was that Beijing further strengthened its military bases in the South China Sea, on the features it had physically expanded after 2012. At the same time, it continued to engage in coercive behaviour there. For the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA, securing greater control of South China Sea features and surrounding waters was evidently a strategic priority, despite the unease that Beijing’s actions were creating in Southeast Asia and beyond. In July, following Hanoi’s refusal to yield to Chinese demands to halt drilling by a Spanish oil company on Vanguard Bank, an area that Vietnam claimed was within its exclusive economic zone, Beijing reportedly threatened to use force against a Vietnamese-occupied feature. In August, China deployed a flotilla of fishing vessels, accompanied by PLAN and coastguard ships, close to Pagasa, the largest feature occupied by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands. While Southeast Asian governments emphasised the importance of diplomacy in managing regional maritime tensions, in these circumstances several states have continued their efforts to develop military capabilities that could help to deter potential future Chinese aggression. In February, Vietnam commissioned the last two of six Project 636.1 (improved Kilo-class) submarines supplied by Russia. At the commissioning ceremony, Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Phúc praised the Vietnamese Navy’s willingness to defend ‘every inch’ of national territory including territorial waters. Later in the year, Vietnam received a third Russian Gepard 3.9-class frigate, with another due by year’s end. Reflecting Hanoi’s increasing sense of vulnerability to Chinese pressure, Minister of National Defence Ngo Xuan Lich visited Washington DC in August, where he met US Secretary of Defense James Mattis; the two sides reached an agreement on increased bilateral naval engagement and information-sharing, and more importantly that a US aircraft carrier would visit Vietnam during 2018, the first such visit since the Vietnamese communists’ victory in 1975. In the Asia-Pacific region, the influences on defence policy, military spending and equipment procurement, and on the development of armed forces’ capabilities, were as wide-ranging as ever in 2017. However, the most important were pervasive and persistent insecurity; economic circumstances that allowed for a relatively high – and in some cases increasing – allocation of national resources to the armed forces; and domestic political circumstances, which often helped to support ambitious defence programmes. The most important factors driving the region’s sense of insecurity were evident at the 16th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. In June 2017, this annual event again brought together in Singapore defence ministers and other senior representatives of AsiaPacific defence establishments. Se
{"title":"Chapter Six: Asia","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416982","url":null,"abstract":"China and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations agreed a framework for a code of conduct in the area, in May 2017. The reality, however, was that Beijing further strengthened its military bases in the South China Sea, on the features it had physically expanded after 2012. At the same time, it continued to engage in coercive behaviour there. For the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA, securing greater control of South China Sea features and surrounding waters was evidently a strategic priority, despite the unease that Beijing’s actions were creating in Southeast Asia and beyond. In July, following Hanoi’s refusal to yield to Chinese demands to halt drilling by a Spanish oil company on Vanguard Bank, an area that Vietnam claimed was within its exclusive economic zone, Beijing reportedly threatened to use force against a Vietnamese-occupied feature. In August, China deployed a flotilla of fishing vessels, accompanied by PLAN and coastguard ships, close to Pagasa, the largest feature occupied by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands. While Southeast Asian governments emphasised the importance of diplomacy in managing regional maritime tensions, in these circumstances several states have continued their efforts to develop military capabilities that could help to deter potential future Chinese aggression. In February, Vietnam commissioned the last two of six Project 636.1 (improved Kilo-class) submarines supplied by Russia. At the commissioning ceremony, Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Phúc praised the Vietnamese Navy’s willingness to defend ‘every inch’ of national territory including territorial waters. Later in the year, Vietnam received a third Russian Gepard 3.9-class frigate, with another due by year’s end. Reflecting Hanoi’s increasing sense of vulnerability to Chinese pressure, Minister of National Defence Ngo Xuan Lich visited Washington DC in August, where he met US Secretary of Defense James Mattis; the two sides reached an agreement on increased bilateral naval engagement and information-sharing, and more importantly that a US aircraft carrier would visit Vietnam during 2018, the first such visit since the Vietnamese communists’ victory in 1975. In the Asia-Pacific region, the influences on defence policy, military spending and equipment procurement, and on the development of armed forces’ capabilities, were as wide-ranging as ever in 2017. However, the most important were pervasive and persistent insecurity; economic circumstances that allowed for a relatively high – and in some cases increasing – allocation of national resources to the armed forces; and domestic political circumstances, which often helped to support ambitious defence programmes. The most important factors driving the region’s sense of insecurity were evident at the 16th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. In June 2017, this annual event again brought together in Singapore defence ministers and other senior representatives of AsiaPacific defence establishments. Se","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"79 1","pages":"219 - 314"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85381915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416986
Conflict and instability across parts of sub-Saharan Africa still constitute significant challenges to regional governments. A problem for regional states is that the requirement to deal with current threats risks absorbing the attention of defence establishments, possibly forestalling the defence-reform processes that might make responses to continental security threats more efficient. International involvement in these reform processes is important in terms of funding and organisational support. Meanwhile, the fact that some of the continent’s security challenges are transnational in cause and effect means that international attention remains focused on the continent. This focus is not just in terms of generating diplomatic support and helping to enable conflict and dispute resolution; it involves continuing material assistance to African nations and regional multilateral institutions, as they look to develop domestic capacity to tackle these crises. The move to develop such local capacity has been under way for some time, driven in large part by regional states and organisations such as the African Union (AU). However, defence spending across the region declined in real terms between 2016 and 2017. The risk is that this downward trend could affect more than just the money available for reforms and modernisation plans. Given the draws on government finances required by other sectors, and in light of the greater activism that some states have demonstrated in recent years, it could also affect their broader will and capacity to act.
{"title":"Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan Africa","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416986","url":null,"abstract":"Conflict and instability across parts of sub-Saharan Africa still constitute significant challenges to regional governments. A problem for regional states is that the requirement to deal with current threats risks absorbing the attention of defence establishments, possibly forestalling the defence-reform processes that might make responses to continental security threats more efficient. International involvement in these reform processes is important in terms of funding and organisational support. Meanwhile, the fact that some of the continent’s security challenges are transnational in cause and effect means that international attention remains focused on the continent. This focus is not just in terms of generating diplomatic support and helping to enable conflict and dispute resolution; it involves continuing material assistance to African nations and regional multilateral institutions, as they look to develop domestic capacity to tackle these crises. The move to develop such local capacity has been under way for some time, driven in large part by regional states and organisations such as the African Union (AU). However, defence spending across the region declined in real terms between 2016 and 2017. The risk is that this downward trend could affect more than just the money available for reforms and modernisation plans. Given the draws on government finances required by other sectors, and in light of the greater activism that some states have demonstrated in recent years, it could also affect their broader will and capacity to act.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"21 1","pages":"429 - 498"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78856221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416979
On 20 January 2017, Donald Trump became the 45th President of the United States. The administration quickly moved to take action on the issues Trump had emphasised in his campaign, including tackling perceived disparities over burden-sharing within the transatlantic alliance. In the campaign, Trump had questioned the relevance of NATO. During a May 2017 speech in Brussels, the president returned to the theme, chiding the Alliance’s European members for not spending enough on defence. Meanwhile, issues including ongoing investigations into ties with Russia during the 2016 presidential campaign, White House staff turnover, and delays in naming senior and mid-level national-security officials all played a part in a troubled start for the administration. That said, some coherence in national-security policy had begun to emerge by late August. In addition to Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the shuffling of key players (Lt.-Gen. H.R. McMaster for Michael Flynn as National Security Advisor; John F. Kelly for Reince Priebus as White House Chief of Staff) provided for experienced advice regarding national-security priorities and introduced greater process into the administration’s national-security decision-making. Nonetheless, the president’s proclivity to comment on policy matters on social media, at times contradicting existing policy (such as on the issue of transgender service members), played a part in unsettling his own appointees, not to mention allies and partners. In addition, key positions in the departments of defense and state (and elsewhere) were only slowly being filled, with the result that career civil servants, and military officers in the case of the Department of Defense (DoD), still occupied many of these posts. Although debates within the administration persist regarding what should be expected of the United States’ allies, Trump has moderated his criticism and increasingly adopted policies similar to those of past administrations. The European Reassurance Initiative continues, with a funding increase under the Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 budget, and in June 2017 Trump delivered a speech in Warsaw assuring Poland of US support. A key milestone came on 21 August 2017, when the president announced his decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan, although their role in the country is expected to be less expansive than in the past: ‘We are not nation building again’, said Trump, ‘we are killing terrorists’. Afghanistan is only one of the security challenges facing the US, its allies and partners. As Mattis noted in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2017, these fall into four main areas: ‘filling in the holes from trade-offs made during 16 years of war ... the worsening security environment, contested operations in multiple domains, and the rapid pace of technological change’. Mattis also stressed that it is a ‘more volatile security environment than any I have experie
2017年1月20日，唐纳德·特朗普成为美国第45任总统。奥巴马政府迅速就特朗普在竞选中强调的问题采取行动，包括解决跨大西洋联盟内部在负担分担方面的明显差异。在竞选期间，特朗普曾质疑北约的重要性。2017年5月，在布鲁塞尔的一次演讲中，总统回到了这个主题，指责北约的欧洲成员国在国防上的支出不够。与此同时，包括2016年总统竞选期间正在进行的对美俄关系的调查、白宫工作人员的更替以及推迟任命高级和中级国家安全官员在内的问题，都是特朗普政府开局不顺的原因之一。也就是说，到8月下旬，国家安全政策的一致性已经开始显现。除了国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯(James Mattis)和国务卿雷克斯·蒂勒森(Rex Tillerson)，关键人物(中将)的洗牌。h·r·麦克马斯特提名迈克尔·弗林担任国家安全顾问;约翰·f·凯利(John F. Kelly)为雷恩斯·普利巴斯(Reince Priebus)担任白宫幕僚长提供了有关国家安全优先事项的经验丰富的建议，并为政府的国家安全决策引入了更大的流程。尽管如此，总统倾向于在社交媒体上评论政策问题，有时与现有政策相矛盾(比如在跨性别军人问题上)，这在一定程度上让他自己任命的官员感到不安，更不用说盟友和合作伙伴了。此外，国防部和国务院(以及其他部门)的关键职位的填补速度很慢，结果是职业公务员和国防部(DoD)的军官仍然占据着许多这些职位。尽管特朗普政府内部仍在就对美国盟友的期望进行辩论，但特朗普已经缓和了批评，并越来越多地采取与往届政府类似的政策。“欧洲再保证倡议”(European Reassurance Initiative)仍在继续，2018财年预算增加了资金。2017年6月，特朗普在华沙发表讲话，向波兰保证美国的支持。2017年8月21日是一个关键的里程碑，当时总统宣布他决定向阿富汗派遣更多的军队，尽管他们在该国的作用预计不会像过去那样广泛:“我们不是在重建国家，”特朗普说，“我们是在杀死恐怖分子。”阿富汗只是美国及其盟友和伙伴面临的安全挑战之一。正如马蒂斯2017年6月在参议院军事委员会作证时所指出的那样，这些措施主要分为四个方面:“填补16年战争期间做出的权衡所带来的漏洞……日益恶化的安全环境，多领域的竞争行动，以及技术变革的快速步伐。马蒂斯还强调，这是一个“比我40年服役期间经历的任何安全环境都更不稳定的环境”。
{"title":"Chapter Three: North America","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416979","url":null,"abstract":"On 20 January 2017, Donald Trump became the 45th President of the United States. The administration quickly moved to take action on the issues Trump had emphasised in his campaign, including tackling perceived disparities over burden-sharing within the transatlantic alliance. In the campaign, Trump had questioned the relevance of NATO. During a May 2017 speech in Brussels, the president returned to the theme, chiding the Alliance’s European members for not spending enough on defence. Meanwhile, issues including ongoing investigations into ties with Russia during the 2016 presidential campaign, White House staff turnover, and delays in naming senior and mid-level national-security officials all played a part in a troubled start for the administration. That said, some coherence in national-security policy had begun to emerge by late August. In addition to Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the shuffling of key players (Lt.-Gen. H.R. McMaster for Michael Flynn as National Security Advisor; John F. Kelly for Reince Priebus as White House Chief of Staff) provided for experienced advice regarding national-security priorities and introduced greater process into the administration’s national-security decision-making. Nonetheless, the president’s proclivity to comment on policy matters on social media, at times contradicting existing policy (such as on the issue of transgender service members), played a part in unsettling his own appointees, not to mention allies and partners. In addition, key positions in the departments of defense and state (and elsewhere) were only slowly being filled, with the result that career civil servants, and military officers in the case of the Department of Defense (DoD), still occupied many of these posts. Although debates within the administration persist regarding what should be expected of the United States’ allies, Trump has moderated his criticism and increasingly adopted policies similar to those of past administrations. The European Reassurance Initiative continues, with a funding increase under the Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 budget, and in June 2017 Trump delivered a speech in Warsaw assuring Poland of US support. A key milestone came on 21 August 2017, when the president announced his decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan, although their role in the country is expected to be less expansive than in the past: ‘We are not nation building again’, said Trump, ‘we are killing terrorists’. Afghanistan is only one of the security challenges facing the US, its allies and partners. As Mattis noted in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2017, these fall into four main areas: ‘filling in the holes from trade-offs made during 16 years of war ... the worsening security environment, contested operations in multiple domains, and the rapid pace of technological change’. Mattis also stressed that it is a ‘more volatile security environment than any I have experie","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"34 1","pages":"27 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79750530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416983
{"title":"Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416983","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416983","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"150 1","pages":"315 - 374"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77421575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416969
a Under NATO defence-spending de nition; b Includes US Foreign Military Assistance Note: US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2017, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence-spending levels, but also due to exchange-rate uctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The use of average exchange rates reduces these uctuations, but the effects of such movements can be signi cant in a number of cases.
{"title":"Chapter Two: Comparative defence statistics","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416969","url":null,"abstract":"a Under NATO defence-spending de nition; b Includes US Foreign Military Assistance Note: US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2017, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence-spending levels, but also due to exchange-rate uctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The use of average exchange rates reduces these uctuations, but the effects of such movements can be signi cant in a number of cases.","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"73 1","pages":"19 - 26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79776363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416990
{"title":"List of abbreviations for data sections","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416990","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"118 1","pages":"517 - 518"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87482875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416987
{"title":"Chapter Ten: Country comparisons and defence data","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416987","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"2 1","pages":"499 - 508"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88094687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2018.1416966
{"title":"Chapter One: Chinese and Russian air-launched weapons: a test for Western air dominance","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/04597222.2018.1416966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2018.1416966","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35165,"journal":{"name":"The Military Balance","volume":"80 1","pages":"18 - 7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80032268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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