To investigate whether rent‐seeking discourages productivity, we consider a third‐market model, in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm engage in both Research and Development (R&D) and output competition. We show that the relationship between rent‐seeking and productivity depends on two forces. On the one hand, rent‐seeking increases the marginal benefit of R&D and encourages productivity. On the other hand, a lower production cost due to R&D enables the government to extract the rent from the firm to a greater extent and discourages the productivity. Which force is dominant depends on the level of corruption or, as an alternative interpretation, the weight the government attaches to political contributions. Unlike the monotonic relationship proposed by the literature, we find a non‐monotonic relationship between rent‐seeking and productivity.
{"title":"Rent‐Seeking, R&D, and Productivity","authors":"Yu-Bong Lai","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12243","url":null,"abstract":"To investigate whether rent‐seeking discourages productivity, we consider a third‐market model, in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm engage in both Research and Development (R&D) and output competition. We show that the relationship between rent‐seeking and productivity depends on two forces. On the one hand, rent‐seeking increases the marginal benefit of R&D and encourages productivity. On the other hand, a lower production cost due to R&D enables the government to extract the rent from the firm to a greater extent and discourages the productivity. Which force is dominant depends on the level of corruption or, as an alternative interpretation, the weight the government attaches to political contributions. Unlike the monotonic relationship proposed by the literature, we find a non‐monotonic relationship between rent‐seeking and productivity.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"392 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132496038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we study score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids. A supplieris score is the di§erence between his quality and price bids. The supplier with the highest score wins and gets paid his own price bid. The procureris payo§ is the di§erence between the winneris quality and the procureris payments to the suppliers. Equilibrium quality and price bids are solved without Orst obtaining the corresponding equilibrium scores. We Ond that quality bids, the suppliersipayo§s and the procureris payo§ do not depend on whether price bids are made contingent on quality bids. Compared to a benchmark of winner-pay quality bids, in which the losing suppliersi quality bidding costs are reimbursed by the procurer, all-pay quality bids tend to reduce quality provision and suppliersipayo§s, but they tend to increase the total surplus and the procureris payo§.
{"title":"All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions","authors":"D. Kovenock, Jingfeng Lu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3523943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3523943","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids. A supplieris score is the di§erence between his quality and price bids. The supplier with the highest score wins and gets paid his own price bid. The procureris payo§ is the di§erence between the winneris quality and the procureris payments to the suppliers. Equilibrium quality and price bids are solved without Orst obtaining the corresponding equilibrium scores. We Ond that quality bids, the suppliersipayo§s and the procureris payo§ do not depend on whether price bids are made contingent on quality bids. Compared to a benchmark of winner-pay quality bids, in which the losing suppliersi quality bidding costs are reimbursed by the procurer, all-pay quality bids tend to reduce quality provision and suppliersipayo§s, but they tend to increase the total surplus and the procureris payo§.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126083595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The proliferation of social cash transfers (SCTs) across much of Africa has resulted from interactions between international organisations – including both UN and related organisations, the donor agencies of governments in the global North, and international non-government organisations – and national governments. SCTs were central to the social protection agenda taken up by almost every international organisation since about 2000. In this paper we employ Tania Li’s framework on how development ideas travel, to understand the political economic context for the rising enthusiasm for SCTs, the ideational contestation over these, and the strategies of governmentality deployed to ‘render technical’ problems of poverty and vulnerability. Crucially, we show how international organisations developed diverse approaches to SCTs in terms of who should get what, how and why. Through a close analysis of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), we show that this process of policy transfer was shaped by the internal workings of the ‘aidworld’. In part because SCTs were subject to contestation within and between organisations, organisations tended to render political choices as technical ones. DFID was unusual in acknowledging that the process of introducing SCTs in any particular country was a political one, but even DFID viewed SCTs as a largely technical issue, limiting its efficacy in most African countries.
{"title":"Who Should Get What, How and Why? DFID and the Transnational Politics of Social Cash Transfers","authors":"S. Hickey, J. Seekings","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3523037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3523037","url":null,"abstract":"The proliferation of social cash transfers (SCTs) across much of Africa has resulted from interactions between international organisations – including both UN and related organisations, the donor agencies of governments in the global North, and international non-government organisations – and national governments. SCTs were central to the social protection agenda taken up by almost every international organisation since about 2000. In this paper we employ Tania Li’s framework on how development ideas travel, to understand the political economic context for the rising enthusiasm for SCTs, the ideational contestation over these, and the strategies of governmentality deployed to ‘render technical’ problems of poverty and vulnerability. Crucially, we show how international organisations developed diverse approaches to SCTs in terms of who should get what, how and why. Through a close analysis of the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), we show that this process of policy transfer was shaped by the internal workings of the ‘aidworld’. In part because SCTs were subject to contestation within and between organisations, organisations tended to render political choices as technical ones. DFID was unusual in acknowledging that the process of introducing SCTs in any particular country was a political one, but even DFID viewed SCTs as a largely technical issue, limiting its efficacy in most African countries.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"169 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114009534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A major theory from social psychology claims that external threats can strengthen group identities and cooperation. This paper exploits the Russian invasion in Ukraine 2014 as a sudden increase in the perceived military threat for eastern European Union member states, in particular for the Baltic countries bordering Russia directly. Comparing low versus high-threat member states in a difference-in-differences design, I find a sizeable positive effect on EU identity. It is associated with higher trust in EU institutions and support for common EU policies. Different perceptions of the invasion cause a polarization of preferences between the majority and ethnic Russian minorities.
{"title":"External Threat, Group Identity, and Support for Common Policies - The Effect of the Russian Invasion in Ukraine on European Union Identity","authors":"Kai Gehring","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3511287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3511287","url":null,"abstract":"A major theory from social psychology claims that external threats can strengthen group identities and cooperation. This paper exploits the Russian invasion in Ukraine 2014 as a sudden increase in the perceived military threat for eastern European Union member states, in particular for the Baltic countries bordering Russia directly. Comparing low versus high-threat member states in a difference-in-differences design, I find a sizeable positive effect on EU identity. It is associated with higher trust in EU institutions and support for common EU policies. Different perceptions of the invasion cause a polarization of preferences between the majority and ethnic Russian minorities.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122279210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the key aspects of the legal infrastructure design of special economic zones (SEZs), with reference to the best practice of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR) under “One Country, Two Systems” and the Basic Law. It discusses some recent initiatives of the Hong Kong SAR in respect of innovations in dispute resolution mechanisms and creative use of modern technology to illustrate how SEZs can respond to contemporary challenges and opportunities. In particular, this article discusses the Guangdong–Hong Kong– Macao Greater Bay Area, which sheds light on a new model of collaboration and partnership between SEZs, and explores the possibility and potential for SEZs to serve as the building blocks for the eventual establishment of a new paradigm of greater special economic region.
{"title":"From Special Economic Zones to Greater Special Economic Region – Hong Kong Special Administrative Region as a Model for Legal Infrastructure Design","authors":"Teresa Cheng","doi":"10.18356/759ea4c6-en","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18356/759ea4c6-en","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the key aspects of the legal infrastructure design of special economic zones (SEZs), with reference to the best practice of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR) under “One Country, Two Systems” and the Basic Law. It discusses some recent initiatives of the Hong Kong SAR in respect of innovations in dispute resolution mechanisms and creative use of modern technology to illustrate how SEZs can respond to contemporary challenges and opportunities. In particular, this article discusses the Guangdong–Hong Kong– Macao Greater Bay Area, which sheds light on a new model of collaboration and partnership between SEZs, and explores the possibility and potential for SEZs to serve as the building blocks for the eventual establishment of a new paradigm of greater special economic region.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116752245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a life-cycle model with human capital investment during working life through training and provides a novel empirical test of human capital theory. We exploit a sizable pension reform across adjacent cohorts in a regression discontinuity setting and find that an increase in working life increases training. We discuss and test further predictions regarding the relation between initial schooling, training, and the reform effect, showing that only individuals with a college degree increase human capital investment. Our results speak to a large class of human capital models as well as policies extending or shortening working life.
{"title":"Working Life and Human Capital Investment: Causal Evidence from Pension Reform","authors":"Niklas Gohl, P. Haan, Elisa Kurz, Felix Weinhardt","doi":"10.5282/UBM/EPUB.70102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5282/UBM/EPUB.70102","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a life-cycle model with human capital investment during working life through training and provides a novel empirical test of human capital theory. We exploit a sizable pension reform across adjacent cohorts in a regression discontinuity setting and find that an increase in working life increases training. We discuss and test further predictions regarding the relation between initial schooling, training, and the reform effect, showing that only individuals with a college degree increase human capital investment. Our results speak to a large class of human capital models as well as policies extending or shortening working life.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"168 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131788189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public-private partnership (PPP) is a form of government procurement where a private entity (firm) provides upfront funding to construct a major public infrastructure project. After the project is completed, the firm collects payments from end consumers who use the project to recoup the construction cost and generate a profit. Due to the enormous expense of infrastructure projects, the government and the firm often entertain intense negotiations on the subject of the construction and compensation details. However, existing literature has not studied the impact of negotiations on the outcome of the final PPP agreement. We solve for the Nash bargaining outcome between the government and the firm under PPP, and compare it to the traditional procurement where the government provides upfront funding for the project from its operating budget. The firm wants to maximize profit while the goal of the government is to maximize social welfare which typically includes consumer surplus and public revenue. We find that when public revenue accounts for a large proportion of the government's objective function, PPP can lead to a win-win situation for the government and the firm, compared to traditional procurement. In contrast, when the government's goal is to mainly maximize consumer surplus, PPP can result in a lose-lose outcome. However, in this case, the government can utilize subsidies (provided to either the firm or the end consumers) to attain a desired bargaining outcome under PPP. Our results are useful for informing policy makers of instances when PPP is better than traditional procurement and when government subsidies should be provided.
{"title":"Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure: A Nash Bargaining Analysis","authors":"Shi-Ming Cui, Zhuo Feng, Yiwen Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3502954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3502954","url":null,"abstract":"Public-private partnership (PPP) is a form of government procurement where a private entity (firm) provides upfront funding to construct a major public infrastructure project. After the project is completed, the firm collects payments from end consumers who use the project to recoup the construction cost and generate a profit. Due to the enormous expense of infrastructure projects, the government and the firm often entertain intense negotiations on the subject of the construction and compensation details. However, existing literature has not studied the impact of negotiations on the outcome of the final PPP agreement. We solve for the Nash bargaining outcome between the government and the firm under PPP, and compare it to the traditional procurement where the government provides upfront funding for the project from its operating budget. The firm wants to maximize profit while the goal of the government is to maximize social welfare which typically includes consumer surplus and public revenue. We find that when public revenue accounts for a large proportion of the government's objective function, PPP can lead to a win-win situation for the government and the firm, compared to traditional procurement. In contrast, when the government's goal is to mainly maximize consumer surplus, PPP can result in a lose-lose outcome. However, in this case, the government can utilize subsidies (provided to either the firm or the end consumers) to attain a desired bargaining outcome under PPP. Our results are useful for informing policy makers of instances when PPP is better than traditional procurement and when government subsidies should be provided.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"292 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121478665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Avitabile, J. Cunha, Ricardo Meilman Lomaz Cohn
This paper studies the medium-term impact of early-life welfare transfers on children's learning. It studies children who were exposed to the randomized controlled trial of the Mexico's Food Support Program (the Programa de Apoyo Alimentario, PAL), in which households were assigned to receive cash, in-kind food transfers, or nothing (a control). The children are matched with administrative data on primary school standardized tests, which were taken four to 10 years after the experiment began. The findings show that in-kind transfers did not impact test scores, while cash transfers led to a significant and meaningful decrease in test scores. An analysis of the mechanisms driving these results reveals that both transfers led to an increase in child labor, which is likely detrimental to learning. In-kind food transfers, however, induced a greater consumption of several key micronutrients that are vital for brain development, which likely attenuated the negative impacts of child labor on learning.
本文研究了早期生活福利转移对儿童学习的中期影响。它研究了参加墨西哥食品支持计划(Program de Apoyo Alimentario, PAL)随机对照试验的儿童，在该计划中，家庭被分配接受现金、实物食品转移，或者什么都不接受(对照组)。这些孩子与小学标准化测试的管理数据相匹配，这些数据是在实验开始后4到10年进行的。研究结果表明，实物转移对考试成绩没有影响，而现金转移导致考试成绩显著下降。对导致这些结果的机制的分析表明，这两种转移都导致了童工的增加，这可能不利于学习。然而，实物食物转移导致了对大脑发育至关重要的几种关键微量营养素的更多消耗，这可能减轻了童工对学习的负面影响。
{"title":"The Medium Term Impacts of Cash and In-Kind Food Transfers on Learning","authors":"C. Avitabile, J. Cunha, Ricardo Meilman Lomaz Cohn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3501896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3501896","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the medium-term impact of early-life welfare transfers on children's learning. It studies children who were exposed to the randomized controlled trial of the Mexico's Food Support Program (the Programa de Apoyo Alimentario, PAL), in which households were assigned to receive cash, in-kind food transfers, or nothing (a control). The children are matched with administrative data on primary school standardized tests, which were taken four to 10 years after the experiment began. The findings show that in-kind transfers did not impact test scores, while cash transfers led to a significant and meaningful decrease in test scores. An analysis of the mechanisms driving these results reveals that both transfers led to an increase in child labor, which is likely detrimental to learning. In-kind food transfers, however, induced a greater consumption of several key micronutrients that are vital for brain development, which likely attenuated the negative impacts of child labor on learning.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115504493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-24DOI: 10.20294/jgbt.2019.15.2.37
Peizhi Wang, Iqbal Arslan
Purpose – The paper aims to identify synergies between the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) from the perspective of sustainable infrastructure development.
Design/Methodology/Approach – The paper analyzes the long-run empirical relationship between infrastructure investment and trade performance. The study also deals with assessment on the basis of panel OLS, Random Effect, and GMM techniques toward the achievement of the SDGs in the period 2008- 2017.
Findings – The paper concluded that infrastructure investment in BRI countries has a positive impact on trade performance, and it promotes trade in Asian countries. It also draws attention to the fact that the joint work of these two global initiatives (BRI and Agenda 2030) could achieve aims in the future.
Research Implications – The outcome of this research can be observed as tentative, and further work is more desirable.
{"title":"Trade Performance via Infrastructure Investment: Evidence from Synergies among the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)","authors":"Peizhi Wang, Iqbal Arslan","doi":"10.20294/jgbt.2019.15.2.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20294/jgbt.2019.15.2.37","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose – The paper aims to identify synergies between the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) from the perspective of sustainable infrastructure development. <br><br>Design/Methodology/Approach – The paper analyzes the long-run empirical relationship between infrastructure investment and trade performance. The study also deals with assessment on the basis of panel OLS, Random Effect, and GMM techniques toward the achievement of the SDGs in the period 2008- 2017.<br><br> Findings – The paper concluded that infrastructure investment in BRI countries has a positive impact on trade performance, and it promotes trade in Asian countries. It also draws attention to the fact that the joint work of these two global initiatives (BRI and Agenda 2030) could achieve aims in the future. <br><br>Research Implications – The outcome of this research can be observed as tentative, and further work is more desirable.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121273208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Private infrastructure funds have contributed to about 10% of global infrastructure investment in the last decade, managing $483 billion assets at the end of October 2019 according to Preqin. Given the marked expansion in private funds investing in infrastructure, this paper undertakes a detailed analysis of the key performance drivers. We use two sets of data: fund-level cross-sectional reported performance and fund-level performance over time of the internal rate of return (IRR), the public market equivalent (PME) and the total value to paid-in (TVPI) based on fund cash flow data. We find that private infrastructure funds show a different performance pattern to private equity funds. Most notably, funds show negative current persistence across follow-on funds. Investors should use a range of performance metrics as those are driven by different cross-sectional factors. Moreover, individual performance is only to 10% explained by the performance of similar funds. Funds that overshoot their target value deliver a worse performance. Finally, more risky funds based on their fund style do not necessarily deliver higher returns. Overall, the private infrastructure fund sector is still in its infancy and conventional wisdom from general private equity fund research does not necessarily apply to infrastructure funds.
{"title":"Performance and Persistence in Private Infrastructure Funds","authors":"M. Haran, D. Lo, Stanimira Milcheva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3491297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3491297","url":null,"abstract":"Private infrastructure funds have contributed to about 10% of global infrastructure investment in the last decade, managing $483 billion assets at the end of October 2019 according to Preqin. Given the marked expansion in private funds investing in infrastructure, this paper undertakes a detailed analysis of the key performance drivers. We use two sets of data: fund-level cross-sectional reported performance and fund-level performance over time of the internal rate of return (IRR), the public market equivalent (PME) and the total value to paid-in (TVPI) based on fund cash flow data. We find that private infrastructure funds show a different performance pattern to private equity funds. Most notably, funds show negative current persistence across follow-on funds. Investors should use a range of performance metrics as those are driven by different cross-sectional factors. Moreover, individual performance is only to 10% explained by the performance of similar funds. Funds that overshoot their target value deliver a worse performance. Finally, more risky funds based on their fund style do not necessarily deliver higher returns. Overall, the private infrastructure fund sector is still in its infancy and conventional wisdom from general private equity fund research does not necessarily apply to infrastructure funds.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115887809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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