Governments around the world are attempting to support individuals’ incomes, rescue distressed businesses, and preserve employer-employee relationships damaged in the coronavirus pandemic by adopting fiscal stimulus programs of unprecedented scale. Although the bulk of this spending will involve direct payments to individuals or some type of direct lending or loan guarantees to businesses, large sums will (and should) take the form of government purchases of equity in distressed firms — either by direct purchase or by exercising warrants attached to rescue loans. We discuss why we think these equity injections will be necessary, but only in a limited number of cases; how they should be structured; when investments should be made and, almost as important, exited. We summarize (and tabulate) both the modest recent history of governments rescuing non-financial firms with equity injections and the voluminous research examining the efficacy of governments rescuing failing banks using equity investments. We highlight the dangers that would likely arise if governments permanently retain and vote the equity stakes purchased during the current crisis. Where equity investments must be made, we argue that these should: (1) be effective, in being large enough to be decisive; (2) be passive after the initial injection, when some financial restrictions should be imposed; (3) be temporary and preferably self-liquidating through open-market sales or redemptions; (4) provide taxpayers an upside claim if and when the rescued firm recovers; (5) be restricted to exchange-listed companies in all but extreme cases; and (6) be timely, as speed is crucial. In most cases, the default instrument to employ should be either non-voting preferred stock or warrants that convert into immediately marketable common shares, and we present a numerical example of how a preferred stock-with-warrants equity investment could pay off handsomely for taxpayers if rescued companies recover even partially.
{"title":"Government Equity Investments in Coronavirus Bailouts: Why, How, When?","authors":"W. Megginson, Veljko Fotak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3561282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561282","url":null,"abstract":"Governments around the world are attempting to support individuals’ incomes, rescue distressed businesses, and preserve employer-employee relationships damaged in the coronavirus pandemic by adopting fiscal stimulus programs of unprecedented scale. Although the bulk of this spending will involve direct payments to individuals or some type of direct lending or loan guarantees to businesses, large sums will (and should) take the form of government purchases of equity in distressed firms — either by direct purchase or by exercising warrants attached to rescue loans. We discuss why we think these equity injections will be necessary, but only in a limited number of cases; how they should be structured; when investments should be made and, almost as important, exited. We summarize (and tabulate) both the modest recent history of governments rescuing non-financial firms with equity injections and the voluminous research examining the efficacy of governments rescuing failing banks using equity investments. We highlight the dangers that would likely arise if governments permanently retain and vote the equity stakes purchased during the current crisis. Where equity investments must be made, we argue that these should: (1) be effective, in being large enough to be decisive; (2) be passive after the initial injection, when some financial restrictions should be imposed; (3) be temporary and preferably self-liquidating through open-market sales or redemptions; (4) provide taxpayers an upside claim if and when the rescued firm recovers; (5) be restricted to exchange-listed companies in all but extreme cases; and (6) be timely, as speed is crucial. In most cases, the default instrument to employ should be either non-voting preferred stock or warrants that convert into immediately marketable common shares, and we present a numerical example of how a preferred stock-with-warrants equity investment could pay off handsomely for taxpayers if rescued companies recover even partially.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121979572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
COVID-19 has been declared as a pandemic by WHO. To control the spread of infection, many states have implemented some form of lock-down, ranging from partial to full lock-downs on basis of geographical boundaries. Lock-downs are intended to break social contact, which determines the rate of transmission. In the SIR model, the general population is broken down into Susceptible, Infected and Recovered. Here, we propose a partitioning technique to reduce the transmission rate further, reducing the rate of growth of active cases. This allows for providing better medical care to the patients, reducing cumulative deaths. We are not arguing the effectiveness of complete lock down, but proposing a mechanism for the pre and post complete lock down. We will be proving that the partitioning approach reduces the probability of a person being affected by COVID-19 compared to the scenario of post complete lock-down of areas with high population density. Complete lock-downs also result in problems of food scarcity, predatory pricing, law and order problems, and business losses. A partitioning based approach mitigates quite a few of these problems. Implementing a partial lock down might appear as resource exhausting on the state, but the economy does not come to a stand still. This is an adaptive approach where the populace is partitioned based on infected density, allowing a specific partition of the population freedom to continue their day to day work.
{"title":"Minimizing the Effect of COVID-19 Pandemic Through an Adaptive Staggered Approach to Lock-Downs","authors":"Jibitesh Prasad, T. Mohapatra","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3567786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3567786","url":null,"abstract":"COVID-19 has been declared as a pandemic by WHO. To control the spread of infection, many states have implemented some form of lock-down, ranging from partial to full lock-downs on basis of geographical boundaries. Lock-downs are intended to break social contact, which determines the rate of transmission. In the SIR model, the general population is broken down into Susceptible, Infected and Recovered. Here, we propose a partitioning technique to reduce the transmission rate further, reducing the rate of growth of active cases. This allows for providing better medical care to the patients, reducing cumulative deaths. We are not arguing the effectiveness of complete lock down, but proposing a mechanism for the pre and post complete lock down. We will be proving that the partitioning approach reduces the probability of a person being affected by COVID-19 compared to the scenario of post complete lock-down of areas with high population density. Complete lock-downs also result in problems of food scarcity, predatory pricing, law and order problems, and business losses. A partitioning based approach mitigates quite a few of these problems. Implementing a partial lock down might appear as resource exhausting on the state, but the economy does not come to a stand still. This is an adaptive approach where the populace is partitioned based on infected density, allowing a specific partition of the population freedom to continue their day to day work.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122598914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The value in 2018 of vehicles and equipment for consumer and business customers in Canada financed by the asset-based finance (ABF) industry was an estimated $416 billion. The ABF industry supports a broad network of dealers, manufacturers, distributors, vendors and brokers, and their customers throughout the country. ABF is offered by banks, credit unions, insurance companies, government financial institutions, manufacturer finance companies, and independent finance companies. Several of these entities are regulated with consequent access to existing Bank of Canada programs for emergency lending. This paper focuses on those entities – both regulated and unregulated – that may not have such access, and yet are critical to the functioning of the economy. ABF entities ran into deep trouble during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and required an emergency liquidity program from the federal government that took months to devise and implement. The primary source of funding of the ABF sector was, and is, the asset-backed commercial paper and securitization markets, often with bank back-up or standby lines, purchased by private pools of investment capital – insurance companies, pension plans, hedge funds, banks and others. The 2008-2009 experience revealed that a complete loss of liquidity could occur within a few weeks, even days. Government was needed to step into the shoes of absent private-sector investors. Given the ABF industry’s relative success and low delinquencies, this Commentary recommends that, during periods of extraordinary financial market turmoil, the federal government activate a large-scale securitization program that would fund ABF intermediaries who finance customers based on real assets. The government would purchase asset-backed securities backed by a pool of assets and their receivables, receiving the same protection and profit that a private sector investor would receive. Once liquidity is restored and private investor confidence returned, the commercial markets would again resume their normal functioning and government could withdraw its scaled-up temporary emergency funding program. The 2009 Federal Budget established the Canadian Secured Credit Facility, a $12 billion fund administered by The Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) to purchase term asset-based securities (ABS) backed by loans and leases on vehicles and equipment. Since then, under successor programs, the BDC has continued to purchase ABS albeit on a smaller scale. With more than 10 years of experience, the BDC understands the policies and rules for such funding. Existing BDC programs could, therefore, be scaled up in a severe downturn, with experienced people in place for effective, prudent and efficient funding. In a profoundly disrupted market, the policy objective should be to restore liquidity to allow the financial services sector to continue offering financing to credit-worthy consumers and businesses in support of the Canadian economy, and that
{"title":"Filling the Gap: Emergency Funding Programs and Asset-Based Finance in Times of Economic Crisis","authors":"David Powell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3566535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3566535","url":null,"abstract":"The value in 2018 of vehicles and equipment for consumer and business customers in Canada financed by the asset-based finance (ABF) industry was an estimated $416 billion. The ABF industry supports a broad network of dealers, manufacturers, distributors, vendors and brokers, and their customers throughout the country. ABF is offered by banks, credit unions, insurance companies, government financial institutions, manufacturer finance companies, and independent finance companies. Several of these entities are regulated with consequent access to existing Bank of Canada programs for emergency lending. This paper focuses on those entities – both regulated and unregulated – that may not have such access, and yet are critical to the functioning of the economy. ABF entities ran into deep trouble during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and required an emergency liquidity program from the federal government that took months to devise and implement. The primary source of funding of the ABF sector was, and is, the asset-backed commercial paper and securitization markets, often with bank back-up or standby lines, purchased by private pools of investment capital – insurance companies, pension plans, hedge funds, banks and others. The 2008-2009 experience revealed that a complete loss of liquidity could occur within a few weeks, even days. Government was needed to step into the shoes of absent private-sector investors. Given the ABF industry’s relative success and low delinquencies, this Commentary recommends that, during periods of extraordinary financial market turmoil, the federal government activate a large-scale securitization program that would fund ABF intermediaries who finance customers based on real assets. The government would purchase asset-backed securities backed by a pool of assets and their receivables, receiving the same protection and profit that a private sector investor would receive. Once liquidity is restored and private investor confidence returned, the commercial markets would again resume their normal functioning and government could withdraw its scaled-up temporary emergency funding program. The 2009 Federal Budget established the Canadian Secured Credit Facility, a $12 billion fund administered by The Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) to purchase term asset-based securities (ABS) backed by loans and leases on vehicles and equipment. Since then, under successor programs, the BDC has continued to purchase ABS albeit on a smaller scale. With more than 10 years of experience, the BDC understands the policies and rules for such funding. Existing BDC programs could, therefore, be scaled up in a severe downturn, with experienced people in place for effective, prudent and efficient funding. In a profoundly disrupted market, the policy objective should be to restore liquidity to allow the financial services sector to continue offering financing to credit-worthy consumers and businesses in support of the Canadian economy, and that ","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134128399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is known that poverty and HIV rates are highly correlated so that sample estimations of applying poverty to inspect HIV is subjective and biased. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of different factors collectively on the rates of HIV across 37 countries and regions around the world. Due to the limitation of finding completely accurate and continuous data for one country chronologically, the data for each individual country is from the year 2000. This paper provides an empirical evaluation of Education, Healthcare is and Unemployment rates and examines whether a correlation is presented among the three independent factors. Data shows a statistically significant relationship between Health care and Unemployment and the HIV-Infected rate. It is surprising that the Education factor had the inverse impact than anticipated and the reason is noteworthy and thought-provoking, suggesting the potential faults in HIV-Education programs. The statistical value of the Education factor presents the failure of allocating educating resources and positively educating people about HIV.
{"title":"The Relationship between Economics Factors & HIV-Infected Population around the World","authors":"Xinye Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3562752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3562752","url":null,"abstract":"It is known that poverty and HIV rates are highly correlated so that sample estimations of applying poverty to inspect HIV is subjective and biased. Thus, the aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of different factors collectively on the rates of HIV across 37 countries and regions around the world. Due to the limitation of finding completely accurate and continuous data for one country chronologically, the data for each individual country is from the year 2000. This paper provides an empirical evaluation of Education, Healthcare is and Unemployment rates and examines whether a correlation is presented among the three independent factors. Data shows a statistically significant relationship between Health care and Unemployment and the HIV-Infected rate. It is surprising that the Education factor had the inverse impact than anticipated and the reason is noteworthy and thought-provoking, suggesting the potential faults in HIV-Education programs. The statistical value of the Education factor presents the failure of allocating educating resources and positively educating people about HIV.<br>","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"96 5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128953687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Nye, Cheryl Litman, M. Bryukhanov, Sergiy Polyachenko
Does education promote support for liberal economic views? We show in a large cross-section of countries that in almost all cases those with higher educational attainment are more pro-market and less sympathetic to economic regulation than those who have less formal education. This is true in countries with high support for markets and in those with high distrust of markets and strong support for government regulation. Fixed-effect models show that respondents’ education is negatively related to support for state economic activities. When considering Russian micro data, we observe that whether we confine ourselves to older people educated in the Soviet period or compare the results to a sample from the post-Soviet generation, we consistently find that those with more education are relatively less supportive of market regulation. Different models also show that parental education is a positive predictor of pro-market values
{"title":"The Universal Link between Higher Education and Pro-Market Values","authors":"J. Nye, Cheryl Litman, M. Bryukhanov, Sergiy Polyachenko","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3560072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3560072","url":null,"abstract":"Does education promote support for liberal economic views? We show in a large cross-section of countries that in almost all cases those with higher educational attainment are more pro-market and less sympathetic to economic regulation than those who have less formal education. This is true in countries with high support for markets and in those with high distrust of markets and strong support for government regulation. Fixed-effect models show that respondents’ education is negatively related to support for state economic activities. When considering Russian micro data, we observe that whether we confine ourselves to older people educated in the Soviet period or compare the results to a sample from the post-Soviet generation, we consistently find that those with more education are relatively less supportive of market regulation. Different models also show that parental education is a positive predictor of pro-market values","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"2004 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127320374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marta Andhov, R. Caranta, Tim Stoffel, Jolien Grandia, W. Janssen, Roxana Vornicu, Jason J. Czarnezki, Adam Gromnica, Kristin Tallbo, Olga Martín-Ortega, L. Mélon, Åsa Edman, Pauline Göthberg, Peter Nohrstedt, A. Wiesbrock
Public procurement amounts to about 16 per cent of the EU Member States’ GDP. A major contribution to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals is possible by enhancing sustainable procurement practices. The 2014 EU Public Procurement Directives (Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU) have largely clarified the scope for permissible sustainable procurement decisions, but the adoption of Sustainable Public Procurement (SPP) is still limited. The rules could be more permissive and thoroughly take into account all the different aspects of sustainability. Even more urgent and essential is to push for behavioural and organisational changes in the ways contracting authorities perform their buying functions to maximise positive, sustainable impacts. It is critical to change procurement management practices so that the sustainability demanded in contracts is properly verified along the entire supply chain and remedial actions are taken where non-compliance is detected. Solution: We make three main proposals: 1. That the EU invest significantly in the professionalisation of contracting officials, procurement strategists and financial auditors by (a) encouraging the institution of SPP knowledge centres at the EU, national and regional levels following the model already provided by various Central Purchasing Bodies; (b) creating a network of knowledge centres working closely together in developing and disseminating best practices on SPP, including through training materials, and in collecting information and data on the adoption of SPP and the difficulties encountered in applying the relevant EU rules, and (c) providing financial and technical assistance targeted to specific SPP formation for ground-level contracting officials. 2. That the EU make it mandatory for contracting authorities to map and monitor their supply chains for risks of breaches of environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights. That the EU take those breaches seriously, mandating the exclusion from award procedures of those found in violation and appropriate remedial actions in case of violations during contract performance. That the EU make it easier for contracting authorities to know about economic operators that have breached environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights. 3. That the EU make the legislative environment more ‘SPP friendly’. Contracting authorities must be allowed to require suppliers to have effective sustainability policies in place. A shift is needed from enabling the Member States to pursue SPP to requiring them to buy sustainably by increasing the amount of mandatory sectoral legislation and by requiring contracting authority to take into account the life-cycle costs associated with their purchases. Non-solution: Simply relying on the goodwill of individual procurement officers or policy makers without providing training and networking opportunities on SPP and information and c
{"title":"Sustainability Through Public Procurement: The Way Forward – Reform Proposals","authors":"Marta Andhov, R. Caranta, Tim Stoffel, Jolien Grandia, W. Janssen, Roxana Vornicu, Jason J. Czarnezki, Adam Gromnica, Kristin Tallbo, Olga Martín-Ortega, L. Mélon, Åsa Edman, Pauline Göthberg, Peter Nohrstedt, A. Wiesbrock","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3559393","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3559393","url":null,"abstract":"Public procurement amounts to about 16 per cent of the EU Member States’ GDP. A major contribution to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals is possible by enhancing sustainable procurement practices. The 2014 EU Public Procurement Directives (Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU) have largely clarified the scope for permissible sustainable procurement decisions, but the adoption of Sustainable Public Procurement (SPP) is still limited. The rules could be more permissive and thoroughly take into account all the different aspects of sustainability. Even more urgent and essential is to push for behavioural and organisational changes in the ways contracting authorities perform their buying functions to maximise positive, sustainable impacts. It is critical to change procurement management practices so that the sustainability demanded in contracts is properly verified along the entire supply chain and remedial actions are taken where non-compliance is detected. \u0000 \u0000Solution: We make three main proposals: \u0000 \u00001. That the EU invest significantly in the professionalisation of contracting officials, procurement strategists and financial auditors by (a) encouraging the institution of SPP knowledge centres at the EU, national and regional levels following the model already provided by various Central Purchasing Bodies; (b) creating a network of knowledge centres working closely together in developing and disseminating best practices on SPP, including through training materials, and in collecting information and data on the adoption of SPP and the difficulties encountered in applying the relevant EU rules, and (c) providing financial and technical assistance targeted to specific SPP formation for ground-level contracting officials. \u0000 \u00002. That the EU make it mandatory for contracting authorities to map and monitor their supply chains for risks of breaches of environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights. That the EU take those breaches seriously, mandating the exclusion from award procedures of those found in violation and appropriate remedial actions in case of violations during contract performance. That the EU make it easier for contracting authorities to know about economic operators that have breached environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights. \u0000 \u00003. That the EU make the legislative environment more ‘SPP friendly’. Contracting authorities must be allowed to require suppliers to have effective sustainability policies in place. A shift is needed from enabling the Member States to pursue SPP to requiring them to buy sustainably by increasing the amount of mandatory sectoral legislation and by requiring contracting authority to take into account the life-cycle costs associated with their purchases. \u0000 \u0000Non-solution: Simply relying on the goodwill of individual procurement officers or policy makers without providing training and networking opportunities on SPP and information and c","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123962027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abdullah A. Al-Bahrani, Darshak Patel, Jamie Weathers
In recent decades, we have seen an increase in both the complexity of financial markets and the expectation of individual responsibility with financial decision-making. Policies supporting financial literacy education are promoted as one method toward decreasing reliance on social safety nets. The assumption being that low levels of financial literacy translate to lower economic outcomes and thus an increased probability of dependence on social programs. We use the 2018 National Financial Capabilities Study to examine the relationship between high school mandated financial literacy education and social program participation and find no evidence of a relationship.
{"title":"Can Financial Literacy Education Reduce the Use of Medicaid and SNAP?","authors":"Abdullah A. Al-Bahrani, Darshak Patel, Jamie Weathers","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3563343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3563343","url":null,"abstract":"In recent decades, we have seen an increase in both the complexity of financial markets and the expectation of individual responsibility with financial decision-making. Policies supporting financial literacy education are promoted as one method toward decreasing reliance on social safety nets. The assumption being that low levels of financial literacy translate to lower economic outcomes and thus an increased probability of dependence on social programs. We use the 2018 National Financial Capabilities Study to examine the relationship between high school mandated financial literacy education and social program participation and find no evidence of a relationship.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116812630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russian Abstract: В соответствии с действующим законодательством, при контроле и оплате медицинской помощи оценка результатов лечения осуществляется выборочно и на отдельных этапах. Используемые инструменты контроля качества медицинской помощи направлены на контроль процессов и их своевременность, а не на результаты. Система оплаты медицинской помощи учитывает лишь ее объемы, а не достижение значимого для пациента результата лечения. Таким образом, в современной системе здравоохранения Российской Федерации отсутствуют стимулы и механизмы повышения мотивации медицинских работников к повышению качества оказываемой медицинской помощи, что неизбежно отрицательно сказывается на результатах лечения. В работе проведен анализ зарубежного опыта по внедрению концепции ценностно-ориентированного здравоохранения и предложены подходы по внедрению концепции в условия системы здравоохранения Российской Федерации.
English Abstract: In accordance with applicable law, in the control and payment of medical care, treatment outcomes are evaluated selectively. The tools used to control the quality of medical care are aimed at monitoring processes and their timeliness, and not at the results (outcomes). The system of payment for medical care takes into account only its volumes, and not the achievement of a significant outcome for the patient. Thus, in the modern healthcare system of the Russian Federation there are no incentives and mechanisms to increase the motivation of medical workers to improve the quality of medical care, which inevitably negatively affects the results of treatment. The paper analyzes foreign experience in introducing the concept of value-based healthcare and suggests approaches to introduce the concept into the conditions of the healthcare system of the Russian Federation.
{"title":"Оценка долгосрочных изменений (сценариев) в системе здравоохранения в условиях современного технологического развития и ценностно-ориентированных подходов (Assessment of Long-Term Changes (Scenarios) in the Healthcare System in the Context of Modern Technological Development and Value-Oriented Appro","authors":"Vitaly Omelyanovsky, V. Fedyaeva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3596080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3596080","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> В соответствии с действующим законодательством, при контроле и оплате медицинской помощи оценка результатов лечения осуществляется выборочно и на отдельных этапах. Используемые инструменты контроля качества медицинской помощи направлены на контроль процессов и их своевременность, а не на результаты. Система оплаты медицинской помощи учитывает лишь ее объемы, а не достижение значимого для пациента результата лечения. Таким образом, в современной системе здравоохранения Российской Федерации отсутствуют стимулы и механизмы повышения мотивации медицинских работников к повышению качества оказываемой медицинской помощи, что неизбежно отрицательно сказывается на результатах лечения.<br>В работе проведен анализ зарубежного опыта по внедрению концепции ценностно-ориентированного здравоохранения и предложены подходы по внедрению концепции в условия системы здравоохранения Российской Федерации.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> In accordance with applicable law, in the control and payment of medical care, treatment outcomes are evaluated selectively. The tools used to control the quality of medical care are aimed at monitoring processes and their timeliness, and not at the results (outcomes). The system of payment for medical care takes into account only its volumes, and not the achievement of a significant outcome for the patient. Thus, in the modern healthcare system of the Russian Federation there are no incentives and mechanisms to increase the motivation of medical workers to improve the quality of medical care, which inevitably negatively affects the results of treatment. The paper analyzes foreign experience in introducing the concept of value-based healthcare and suggests approaches to introduce the concept into the conditions of the healthcare system of the Russian Federation.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"211 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132576939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Persons who are eligible for a defined benefit social security pension may defer their pension and receive, through accruals, an extra pension or possibly a lump sum, on termination of deferral. In certain cases, partners of the deferrer may inherit such benefits. For such a scheme, the concept of actuarial fairness to a category of pensioners is defined. A scheme that is actuarially fair will not be cost neutral to the pension provider unless the discount rate is the same for both parties. In addition to this asymmetry, adverse selection will impact upon both actuarial fairness and cost to the provider. Expressions are derived for the cost penalty to the provider for attempting to achieve actuarial fairness both with and without an acknowledgement of adverse selection. Similarly, when the objective is to achieve cost neutrality for the provider, expressions for the cost to the deferrer are obtained. Some numerical examples are given in the case of the UK state pension scheme. Under present rules it is shown that there are significant departures from actuarial fairness, particularly for those who achieved state pension age before 6 April 2016 and those with partners eligible to inherit benefits. Even when a pension provider attempts to achieve either actuarial fairness or cost neutrality, if adverse selection is ignored, then significant departures from both are quite possible.
{"title":"Pension Deferral With Reference to Actuarial Fairness, Cost Neutrality, and Adverse Selection; a UK Perspective","authors":"J. Dagpunar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3726919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3726919","url":null,"abstract":"Persons who are eligible for a defined benefit social security pension may defer their pension and receive, through accruals, an extra pension or possibly a lump sum, on termination of deferral. In certain cases, partners of the deferrer may inherit such benefits. For such a scheme, the concept of actuarial fairness to a category of pensioners is defined. A scheme that is actuarially fair will not be cost neutral to the pension provider unless the discount rate is the same for both parties. In addition to this asymmetry, adverse selection will impact upon both actuarial fairness and cost to the provider. Expressions are derived for the cost penalty to the provider for attempting to achieve actuarial fairness both with and without an acknowledgement of adverse selection. Similarly, when the objective is to achieve cost neutrality for the provider, expressions for the cost to the deferrer are obtained. Some numerical examples are given in the case of the UK state pension scheme. Under present rules it is shown that there are significant departures from actuarial fairness, particularly for those who achieved state pension age before 6 April 2016 and those with partners eligible to inherit benefits. Even when a pension provider attempts to achieve either actuarial fairness or cost neutrality, if adverse selection is ignored, then significant departures from both are quite possible.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"183 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133377051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using primary evidence for 146 Indian manufacturing firms, I examine single and dual lobbying strategies for trade policy influence, and the factors driving firm's choice of these strategies. Firms can adopt a single strategy, by lobbying collectively as a group (Join Hands), or lobbying individually as a firm (Walk Alone). Firms can also adopt a dual strategy, that is, a combination of collective and individual lobbying. The choice of strategy is affected by sector concentration and by tradeoffs between lobbying intensity for sector‐wide and firm‐specific outcomes. The following findings are new for India: First, majority of Indian firms (more than 64% in the sample) use a dual strategy, suggesting the importance to better understand what drives dual strategies. Second, the likelihood of adopting a dual lobbying is higher in sectors that are characterized by low concentration (dispersion is higher), indicating a strong competition effect over free‐riding. Third, relative to the single strategy of collective lobbying, Indian manufacturing firms are likely to join hands while walking alone when targeting firm‐specific outcomes, but prefer to walk alone (single strategy of individual lobbying) when there are tradeoffs between different outcomes, to react quickly. Finally, the availability of resources and firm's perceived effectiveness of its lobbying are significant drivers for the strategy choice.
{"title":"Join Hands or Walk Alone? Evidence on Lobbying for Trade Policy in India","authors":"Amrita Saha","doi":"10.1111/ecpo.12141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12141","url":null,"abstract":"Using primary evidence for 146 Indian manufacturing firms, I examine single and dual lobbying strategies for trade policy influence, and the factors driving firm's choice of these strategies. Firms can adopt a single strategy, by lobbying collectively as a group (Join Hands), or lobbying individually as a firm (Walk Alone). Firms can also adopt a dual strategy, that is, a combination of collective and individual lobbying. The choice of strategy is affected by sector concentration and by tradeoffs between lobbying intensity for sector‐wide and firm‐specific outcomes. The following findings are new for India: First, majority of Indian firms (more than 64% in the sample) use a dual strategy, suggesting the importance to better understand what drives dual strategies. Second, the likelihood of adopting a dual lobbying is higher in sectors that are characterized by low concentration (dispersion is higher), indicating a strong competition effect over free‐riding. Third, relative to the single strategy of collective lobbying, Indian manufacturing firms are likely to join hands while walking alone when targeting firm‐specific outcomes, but prefer to walk alone (single strategy of individual lobbying) when there are tradeoffs between different outcomes, to react quickly. Finally, the availability of resources and firm's perceived effectiveness of its lobbying are significant drivers for the strategy choice.","PeriodicalId":360236,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy: Government Expenditures & Related Policies eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117751923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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