Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82235
Jeroen Van Bouwel
{"title":"Ontology and Methodology in Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: Status Quaestionis.","authors":"Jeroen Van Bouwel","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82235","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89529069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82238
Shaun Le Boutillier
{"title":"Emergence and Analytical Dualism.","authors":"Shaun Le Boutillier","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82238","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91182930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82231
Tim DE MEY
{"title":"The Dual Nature View of Thought Experiments.","authors":"Tim DE MEY","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82231","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"101 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80878300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82234
Farah Foucquaert
{"title":"Personal Identity and its Boundaries: Philosophical Thought Experiments.","authors":"Farah Foucquaert","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82234","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90109359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82229
J. P. Bendegem
It is apparently not an easy task to understand what thought experiments (TEs) could be, what they are, how they function, and so on. There are many, quite different definitions around that seem to be in conflict with one another (as the contributions to this volume will no doubt illustrate). Usually all examples of TEs come from the natural and, more exceptionally, the social sciences: Galileo' s falling bodies experiment, Newton's bucket, Einstein's light ray, Maxwell's Demon, are the prototypical cases. Occasionally, authors talk about mathematical thought experiments (MTEs). There the situation becomes even more complex: first, few authors actually believe that there are such things as MTEs and those that do believe so, put forward nearly contradictory definitions. Nevertheless, the aim of this paper is to suggest that, first, MTEs do exist, second that there is a wide class of such MTEs, and finally, that is necessary. to have MTEs in order to understand a major part of mathematical practice. The core thesis of this paper is this: if it is so that what mathematicians are searching for are proofs within the framework of a mathematical theory, then any consideration that (a) in the case where the
{"title":"Thought Experiments in Mathematics: Anything but Proof.","authors":"J. P. Bendegem","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82229","url":null,"abstract":"It is apparently not an easy task to understand what thought experiments (TEs) could be, what they are, how they function, and so on. There are many, quite different definitions around that seem to be in conflict with one another (as the contributions to this volume will no doubt illustrate). Usually all examples of TEs come from the natural and, more exceptionally, the social sciences: Galileo' s falling bodies experiment, Newton's bucket, Einstein's light ray, Maxwell's Demon, are the prototypical cases. Occasionally, authors talk about mathematical thought experiments (MTEs). There the situation becomes even more complex: first, few authors actually believe that there are such things as MTEs and those that do believe so, put forward nearly contradictory definitions. Nevertheless, the aim of this paper is to suggest that, first, MTEs do exist, second that there is a wide class of such MTEs, and finally, that is necessary. to have MTEs in order to understand a major part of mathematical practice. The core thesis of this paper is this: if it is so that what mathematicians are searching for are proofs within the framework of a mathematical theory, then any consideration that (a) in the case where the","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81644623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82236
J. Pratschke
My aim in this paper is to question the scepticism of critical realist philosophers of science in relation to the use of statistical methods in social science research. By arguing that statistical analysis is inevitably 'deductivist' in nature (Bhaskar, 1998a; Lawson, 1997, 1998, 2001; Pratten, 1999), I believe that critical realists merely reinforce the influence of empiricism!. Moreover, by confining their criticism of statistics to the social sciences, these writers ·adopt an unwarranted antinaturalist stance. In contrast, I will argue that critical realism can help to resolve a number of 'philosophical problems in relation to the specification, assessment and interpretation of statistical models. Social scientists are increasingly aware of these issues (Cliff, 1983; Hayduk, 1987, 1996; Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998; McKim & Turner, 1997; Mulaik, 2001), and it is therefore timely to reconsider how their concerns might be addressed from within the framework of critical realism. I am
{"title":"Realistic Models? Critical Realism and Statistical Models in the Social Sciences.","authors":"J. Pratschke","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82236","url":null,"abstract":"My aim in this paper is to question the scepticism of critical realist philosophers of science in relation to the use of statistical methods in social science research. By arguing that statistical analysis is inevitably 'deductivist' in nature (Bhaskar, 1998a; Lawson, 1997, 1998, 2001; Pratten, 1999), I believe that critical realists merely reinforce the influence of empiricism!. Moreover, by confining their criticism of statistics to the social sciences, these writers ·adopt an unwarranted antinaturalist stance. In contrast, I will argue that critical realism can help to resolve a number of 'philosophical problems in relation to the specification, assessment and interpretation of statistical models. Social scientists are increasingly aware of these issues (Cliff, 1983; Hayduk, 1987, 1996; Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998; McKim & Turner, 1997; Mulaik, 2001), and it is therefore timely to reconsider how their concerns might be addressed from within the framework of critical realism. I am","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74987667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82233
Benoît DE BAERE
{"title":"Thought Experiments Rhetoric and Possible Worlds.","authors":"Benoît DE BAERE","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82233","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84119826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82239
Jeroen Van Bouwel
{"title":"When Unveiling the Epistemic Fallacy Ends with Committing the Ontological Fallacy. On the Contribution of Critical Realism to the Social Scientific Explanatory Practice.","authors":"Jeroen Van Bouwel","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82239","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83866657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82248
Mark Weinstein
From early on, Hilary Putnam's efforts reflected a deeply foundational result, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, that formalized the central intuition that governed much of his thinking. This metamathematical result supports the indeterminacy of the reference relation between theories and their models. 1 As this intuition, captured in many ways, was used to support his many and varied philosophical interests, his concern with formal languages and formal models of, particularly, scientific theories and explanations decreased. 2 In place of metamathematics, Putnam offered various informal and quasi-formal arguments and constructions showing the limits of logical models as a challenge to, among other things, metaphysical realIsm. This yielded his notion of internal realism. 3
{"title":"Exemplifying an Internal Realist Model of Truth.","authors":"Mark Weinstein","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82248","url":null,"abstract":"From early on, Hilary Putnam's efforts reflected a deeply foundational result, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, that formalized the central intuition that governed much of his thinking. This metamathematical result supports the indeterminacy of the reference relation between theories and their models. 1 As this intuition, captured in many ways, was used to support his many and varied philosophical interests, his concern with formal languages and formal models of, particularly, scientific theories and explanations decreased. 2 In place of metamathematics, Putnam offered various informal and quasi-formal arguments and constructions showing the limits of logical models as a challenge to, among other things, metaphysical realIsm. This yielded his notion of internal realism. 3","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"104 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78635533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2002-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82246
P. Gehl
It is a commonplace in the history of the scientific revolution that ancient and medieval notions of reasoning by analogy, which united all of creation in layered realities observable in the puzzle of the world, were swept away by the triumph first of empiricism and skepticism and then of the romantic insistence on the uniqueness of the individual. Recent work shows conclusively that this development was not linear, and that the culture of print so important in the diffusion of early modern science depended on the persistence of moralizing analogy in academies and classrooms and in printing houses and bookshops. This paper offers a look at the persistence of moral, emblematic thought" in the publishing industry of early "modern Europe. I contend that book workers -from authors and editors to typesetters and printers -embraced emblematic thinking as a way of bridging the ethical distance between commerce and science. Their habits of translating moral analogy into print can be seen most" clearly and unambiguously in the ways book folk devised emblematic printer's marks and shop signs to label and advertise their work on the book market. An historical case study, this paper describes practices that bear directly on our present debates over the mechanics and ethics of technological innovation and the challenge technology poses to intellectual freedom, enterprise, and the exchange of information. The paper concludes with a reflection on the ways in which contemporary design reasoning is analogous to traditional emblematic thought. Ancient and medieval notions of reasoning by analogy united all of creation in layered realities observable in the puzzle of the world and described in ebullient, cascading metaphors (Rhodes 2000; Stafford 1999; Gentner and Jeziorski 1994) . A typical medieval treatise on natural history, science, or morals was called a Speculum or mirror, and presupposed that the author and reader would find themselves fully
在科学革命的历史上，通过类比推理的古代和中世纪的观念是司空见惯的，这种观念将所有的创造结合在世界之谜中可观察到的分层现实中，先是被经验主义和怀疑主义的胜利所席卷，然后是对个人独特性的浪漫主义坚持。最近的研究明确表明，这种发展不是线性的，印刷文化在早期现代科学的传播中如此重要，依赖于在学院、教室、印刷厂和书店中持续不断的道德化类比。本文考察了近代欧洲早期出版业中“道德的、象征的”思想的坚持。我认为，图书工作者——从作者、编辑到排字工和印刷工——都把象征性思维作为一种弥合商业与科学之间伦理距离的方式。他们将道德类比转化为印刷品的习惯，在书商设计具有象征意义的印刷标志和商店招牌的方式中，可以最清楚、最明确地看到他们在图书市场上为自己的作品打上标签和广告。作为一个历史案例研究，本文描述了直接影响我们当前关于技术创新的机制和伦理的辩论的实践，以及技术对知识自由、企业和信息交换构成的挑战。文章最后反思了当代设计推理与传统象征思维的相似之处。古代和中世纪通过类比推理的概念将所有的创造结合在分层的现实中，在世界的困惑中可以观察到，并用热情洋溢的、层叠的隐喻来描述(Rhodes 2000;斯塔福德1999;genner and Jeziorski 1994)。典型的中世纪关于自然历史、科学或道德的专著被称为“窥镜”或“镜子”，它的前提是作者和读者能够充分认识自己
{"title":"Moral Analogies in Print: Emblematic Thinking in the Making of Early Modern Books.","authors":"P. Gehl","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82246","url":null,"abstract":"It is a commonplace in the history of the scientific revolution that ancient and medieval notions of reasoning by analogy, which united all of creation in layered realities observable in the puzzle of the world, were swept away by the triumph first of empiricism and skepticism and then of the romantic insistence on the uniqueness of the individual. Recent work shows conclusively that this development was not linear, and that the culture of print so important in the diffusion of early modern science depended on the persistence of moralizing analogy in academies and classrooms and in printing houses and bookshops. This paper offers a look at the persistence of moral, emblematic thought\" in the publishing industry of early \"modern Europe. I contend that book workers -from authors and editors to typesetters and printers -embraced emblematic thinking as a way of bridging the ethical distance between commerce and science. Their habits of translating moral analogy into print can be seen most\" clearly and unambiguously in the ways book folk devised emblematic printer's marks and shop signs to label and advertise their work on the book market. An historical case study, this paper describes practices that bear directly on our present debates over the mechanics and ethics of technological innovation and the challenge technology poses to intellectual freedom, enterprise, and the exchange of information. The paper concludes with a reflection on the ways in which contemporary design reasoning is analogous to traditional emblematic thought. Ancient and medieval notions of reasoning by analogy united all of creation in layered realities observable in the puzzle of the world and described in ebullient, cascading metaphors (Rhodes 2000; Stafford 1999; Gentner and Jeziorski 1994) . A typical medieval treatise on natural history, science, or morals was called a Speculum or mirror, and presupposed that the author and reader would find themselves fully","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89255241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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