Pub Date : 2005-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82211
J. Collier, K. Talmont-kaminski
structure, to be admired in its elegance; it is used for various purposes, and these purposes are always in some practical context. Barwise and Perry never mention pragmatics directly, however they do distinguish between meaning and interpretation. It is useful to compare this to Kaplan’s (1979) approach. On Kaplan’s approach we can retain traditional formal semantics for the content. The real problem is in identifying the full content of a particular utterance of ‘Julia is here now’, given all of the pragmatic factors. Formalist (typically model-theoretic) approaches to both semantics and pragmatics depend on the assumption that the primary function of language is representation. The presupposition is contained in the very use of model theory itself, in which the only consideration for truth is satisfaction. This can be seen in how Kaplan distinguishes between character and content. The character is the standard use of the terms in the statement, whereas the statement’s content is the proposition it expresses in its context of utterance. The character is a function from terms and contexts to contents, and the content is a function from contents (propositions) to truth-values. In both cases what matters are just the logical entailments: as in all formal approaches. In the Julia case, for example, we have a constant and two variables, one for ‘here’ and the other for ‘now’. The possible range of the ‘here’ variable would be places, and the possible range of ‘now’ variables would be times. This approach should not be unfamiliar to anyone working in theoretical linguistics, in which “Montague grammars” have wide currency. The problem we pointed out in section 2 is that ‘here’ need not refer to a place at all, so we must expand the range of the ‘here’ variable. It might be argued that our example makes unconventional use of the word ‘here’. This may be correct, but as we will discuss later, we do not think that this can be a satisfactory response. For now we continue with the explication of Kaplan’s view. Kaplan pointed out that on his account there are at least two distinct types of logical necessity: analyticity and metaphysical necessity. The two forms can come in all possible combinations. He gives the following example of an analytic but metaphysically contingent sentence: ‘I am here now’. This sentence is a variant on our Julia example, except that all referring terms are indexical. Because of the characters of the terms involved, the sentence is true whenever it is uttered (barring the possibility that unconventional meanings have been assigned). Yet the sentence is clearly not necessarily true, since I can conceive of circumstances under which I might not have been here now, for example, if I had been called to a meeting. The analyticity of ‘I am here now’ together with its metaphysical contingency depends on the fact that its components are indexicals: their interpretation depends on the context of utterance. On Kaplan’s approach, the semant
{"title":"Pragmatist Pragmatics: the Functional Context of Utterances","authors":"J. Collier, K. Talmont-kaminski","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82211","url":null,"abstract":"structure, to be admired in its elegance; it is used for various purposes, and these purposes are always in some practical context. Barwise and Perry never mention pragmatics directly, however they do distinguish between meaning and interpretation. It is useful to compare this to Kaplan’s (1979) approach. On Kaplan’s approach we can retain traditional formal semantics for the content. The real problem is in identifying the full content of a particular utterance of ‘Julia is here now’, given all of the pragmatic factors. Formalist (typically model-theoretic) approaches to both semantics and pragmatics depend on the assumption that the primary function of language is representation. The presupposition is contained in the very use of model theory itself, in which the only consideration for truth is satisfaction. This can be seen in how Kaplan distinguishes between character and content. The character is the standard use of the terms in the statement, whereas the statement’s content is the proposition it expresses in its context of utterance. The character is a function from terms and contexts to contents, and the content is a function from contents (propositions) to truth-values. In both cases what matters are just the logical entailments: as in all formal approaches. In the Julia case, for example, we have a constant and two variables, one for ‘here’ and the other for ‘now’. The possible range of the ‘here’ variable would be places, and the possible range of ‘now’ variables would be times. This approach should not be unfamiliar to anyone working in theoretical linguistics, in which “Montague grammars” have wide currency. The problem we pointed out in section 2 is that ‘here’ need not refer to a place at all, so we must expand the range of the ‘here’ variable. It might be argued that our example makes unconventional use of the word ‘here’. This may be correct, but as we will discuss later, we do not think that this can be a satisfactory response. For now we continue with the explication of Kaplan’s view. Kaplan pointed out that on his account there are at least two distinct types of logical necessity: analyticity and metaphysical necessity. The two forms can come in all possible combinations. He gives the following example of an analytic but metaphysically contingent sentence: ‘I am here now’. This sentence is a variant on our Julia example, except that all referring terms are indexical. Because of the characters of the terms involved, the sentence is true whenever it is uttered (barring the possibility that unconventional meanings have been assigned). Yet the sentence is clearly not necessarily true, since I can conceive of circumstances under which I might not have been here now, for example, if I had been called to a meeting. The analyticity of ‘I am here now’ together with its metaphysical contingency depends on the fact that its components are indexicals: their interpretation depends on the context of utterance. On Kaplan’s approach, the semant","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85688049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82204
Catherine Wilson
In this essay, I argu e that Descartes considered his theory that the body is an inn ervated machine – in which the soul is situated – to be his most original contribution to philosophy. His ambition to prove the imm ortality of the soul was very poorly realized, a predictable outcome, insofar as his aims were ethical, not theological. His dualism accordingly requires reassessment.
{"title":"What is the importance of Descartes’s meditation six?","authors":"Catherine Wilson","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82204","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I argu e that Descartes considered his theory that the body is an inn ervated machine – in which the soul is situated – to be his most original contribution to philosophy. His ambition to prove the imm ortality of the soul was very poorly realized, a predictable outcome, insofar as his aims were ethical, not theological. His dualism accordingly requires reassessment.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86571886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82210
J. Peregrin
{"title":"Brandom and Davidsom: What Do We Need to Account for Thinking and Agency?","authors":"J. Peregrin","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82210","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89945440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82212
A. Grobler
{"title":"Law Truth and Presupposition","authors":"A. Grobler","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82212","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77903224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82209
R. Harnish
The utterance of a se ntence in a context is not sufficient for the performance of a speech act. Theories of speech acts can be o rganized in ter ms of what must be added. Roughly Austinian theories add rules (or conventions) which govern an utterance in the performance of a speech act, and are shared by hearers in communication. Roughly Gricean theories add the expression of intentional states of speakers, and their recognition in communication by hearers. Gricean and Austinian theories have their respective strengths and weaknesses. Recently, Alston has proposed an inte resting variant in the Austinan tradition, a theory which emphasizes the “normative stance” taken by a speaker with respect to t he utterance of the sentence. Alst on thinks that this notion can replace the expression of intentional states of the Gricean tradition. At least three explications of such a normative stance have been offered, including Alston's. Only one of these is promising and it is possible to argue that on that construal, expressing an inte ntional state in uttering something and taking a normative stance i n ut tering something, are equivalent notions. The really hard work is determining what undertaking a comm itment or resp onsibility amounts to. That we must leave to another occasion.
{"title":"Commitments and Speech Acts","authors":"R. Harnish","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82209","url":null,"abstract":"The utterance of a se ntence in a context is not sufficient for the performance of a speech act. Theories of speech acts can be o rganized in ter ms of what must be added. Roughly Austinian theories add rules (or conventions) which govern an utterance in the performance of a speech act, and are shared by hearers in communication. Roughly Gricean theories add the expression of intentional states of speakers, and their recognition in communication by hearers. Gricean and Austinian theories have their respective strengths and weaknesses. Recently, Alston has proposed an inte resting variant in the Austinan tradition, a theory which emphasizes the “normative stance” taken by a speaker with respect to t he utterance of the sentence. Alst on thinks that this notion can replace the expression of intentional states of the Gricean tradition. At least three explications of such a normative stance have been offered, including Alston's. Only one of these is promising and it is possible to argue that on that construal, expressing an inte ntional state in uttering something and taking a normative stance i n ut tering something, are equivalent notions. The really hard work is determining what undertaking a comm itment or resp onsibility amounts to. That we must leave to another occasion.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87419319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82232
Maarten Van Dyck
Maybe this is one of the reasons this particular thought experiment has not received much detailed attention in the philosophical literature on thought experiments up to date. As I want to argue in this paper, this neglect is to be regretted, as one of the philosophical accounts of the function of thought experiments can provide the clue to a most fruitful understanding of Heisenberg’s thought experiment. In this way the philosophical discussion on thought experiments ∗The author is Research Assistant of the Fund for Scientific Research — Flanders (Belgium).
{"title":"The Roles of One Thought Experiment in Interpreting Quantum Mechanics. Werner Heisenberg Meets Thomas Kuhn.","authors":"Maarten Van Dyck","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82232","url":null,"abstract":"Maybe this is one of the reasons this particular thought experiment has not received much detailed attention in the philosophical literature on thought experiments up to date. As I want to argue in this paper, this neglect is to be regretted, as one of the philosophical accounts of the function of thought experiments can provide the clue to a most fruitful understanding of Heisenberg’s thought experiment. In this way the philosophical discussion on thought experiments ∗The author is Research Assistant of the Fund for Scientific Research — Flanders (Belgium).","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89539141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82241
Maarten Van Dyck
{"title":"The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003. Hans Radder (ed.)","authors":"Maarten Van Dyck","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82241","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81773552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2003-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82237
J. Domingues
This article discusses the concepts of collective subjectivity and collective causality (as a property of social systems) as an alternative to methodological individualism, structuralism and functionalism. It resumes Aristotelian issues in a realist framework and applies, by way of example, its main concepts to criticize ,and suggest a distinct view of 'capabilities' and 'freedom' in connection with collective subjectivity.
{"title":"Collective Subjectivity and Collective Causality.","authors":"J. Domingues","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82237","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses the concepts of collective subjectivity and collective causality (as a property of social systems) as an alternative to methodological individualism, structuralism and functionalism. It resumes Aristotelian issues in a realist framework and applies, by way of example, its main concepts to criticize ,and suggest a distinct view of 'capabilities' and 'freedom' in connection with collective subjectivity.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86323658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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