Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82197
Francis Longworth
Counterfactual theories of causation have had difficulty in delivering the intuitively correct verdicts for cases of causation involving preemption, without generating further counterexamples. Hall (2004) has offered a pluralistic theory of causatio n, accor ding to which there are two concepts of causation: counterfactual dependence and production. Hall’s theory does deliver the correct verdicts for many of the problematic kinds of preemption. It also dea ls succ essfully with cases of causation by omission, which ha ve proved stubborn counterexamples to physical process theories of causation. Hall’s theory therefore appears to be a significant improvement on extant univocal theories of causation, both physical and counterfactual. In this paper I present a serie s of countere xamples to Hall’s theory. I also describe cases in which our causal judgments appear to be sensitive to moral considerations. It does not seem likely that conventional theories of causation, which attempt to situate causation in an ob jective metaphysical pictu re of the world, will ever accord with our intuitions in such cases. Finally, the notion of responsibility is considered, but rejected as an illuminating primitive for analyzing causation.
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Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82192
Elizabeth Fricker
Burge proposes the “Acceptance Principle”, which states that it is apriori that a hearer may properly accept what she is told in the absence of defeaters, since any giver of testimony is a rational agent, and as such one can presume she is a “source of truth”. It is claimed that Burge’s Principle is not intuitively compelling, so that a suasive, not merely an explanatory justification for it is needed; and that the considerations advanced by him are too weak to constitute a pers uasive case for the Principle. I t is further arg ued that Burge’s apriorist, neo-Kantian approach to testimony is mi staken, and that testim ony is best understood by examining the detailed context of the human socio-lin guistic institutions of languag e, including the speech act of telling. Normally socially skilled human ad ults have a background of relevant knowledge about human nature and social roles, which they deploy in assessing the likely veracity of particular acts of testimony, and its epistemology is to be understood by focussing on this.
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Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82193
R. Audi
This paper explores the possibility that testimony is an a priori source, even if not a basic source, of rational support for certain kinds of cognitions, particularly for a kind of acceptance that it is natural to call presumption. The inquiry is conducted in the light of two impor tant distinctions and the relation between them. One distinction is between belief and acceptance, the other between justification and rationality. Cognitive acceptance is also distinguished from behavioral acceptance, and their normative status is shown to be governed by quite different principles. A major focus in the paper is the question of how the epistemic authority of testimony for cognitive acceptance of its content may depend on normative elements implicit in the kind of language learning and social coordination that are normal for at least the majority of human beings. The importance of testimony in the development of human knowledge is clear. But there remains disagreement about its epistemic significance, particularly concerning its ability to confer non-inferential justification or the status of non-inferential knowledge on testimony-based beliefs. I have argued that it can do both, but is nonetheless not on a par with such basic sources of justification and knowledge as perception and reflection. A source need not be basic, however, to be a priori, and a
{"title":"Testimony as an a Priori Basis of Acceptance: Problems and Prospects","authors":"R. Audi","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82193","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the possibility that testimony is an a priori source, even if not a basic source, of rational support for certain kinds of cognitions, particularly for a kind of acceptance that it is natural to call presumption. The inquiry is conducted in the light of two impor tant distinctions and the relation between them. One distinction is between belief and acceptance, the other between justification and rationality. Cognitive acceptance is also distinguished from behavioral acceptance, and their normative status is shown to be governed by quite different principles. A major focus in the paper is the question of how the epistemic authority of testimony for cognitive acceptance of its content may depend on normative elements implicit in the kind of language learning and social coordination that are normal for at least the majority of human beings. The importance of testimony in the development of human knowledge is clear. But there remains disagreement about its epistemic significance, particularly concerning its ability to confer non-inferential justification or the status of non-inferential knowledge on testimony-based beliefs. I have argued that it can do both, but is nonetheless not on a par with such basic sources of justification and knowledge as perception and reflection. A source need not be basic, however, to be a priori, and a","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"64 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88368850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82194
P. Graham
Orthodoxy in epistemology maintains that some sources of belief, e.g. perception and introspection, generate knowledge, while others, e.g. testimony and m emory, preserve knowledge. An exam ple from Jennifer Lackey – the Schoolteacher case – purports to show that testimony can generate knowledge. It is argued that Lackey’s case fails to subvert the orthodox view, for the case does not involve the generation of knowledge by testimony. A modified version of the case does. Lackey’s example illustrates the orthodox view; the revised case refutes it. The theoretical explanation of knowledge from testimony as information transmission explains how testimony transfers knowledge and why it can generate knowledge. It also revea ls the real difference between so-called “generative” and so-called “preservative” sources. The former extract information; the latter transmit information. Perception provides knowledge of the world, introspection knowledge of our selves, and mindreading knowledge of other minds. Reasoning extends knowledge beyond things we already know. Perception, introspection, mindreading, and reasoning are all ways of generating new knowledge, generating knowledge of events, facts, and states of affairs not known before. Memory differs. Memory preserves knowledge of things we already know. If I knew something at an earlier time, say on the basis of perception, and then I remember it now, then I know it now, but only because I knew it before. Testimony (the process of forming beliefs on the basis of understanding what other people say) looks like memory. If someone else knows something and tells me what they know, and I accept what they say, then I come to know it too. But I only acquire knowledge from accepting what they say if they know it already. Testimony, like memory, doesn’t generate knowledge where there was no knowledge before; testimony preserves knowledge.
{"title":"Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?","authors":"P. Graham","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82194","url":null,"abstract":"Orthodoxy in epistemology maintains that some sources of belief, e.g. perception and introspection, generate knowledge, while others, e.g. testimony and m emory, preserve knowledge. An exam ple from Jennifer Lackey – the Schoolteacher case – purports to show that testimony can generate knowledge. It is argued that Lackey’s case fails to subvert the orthodox view, for the case does not involve the generation of knowledge by testimony. A modified version of the case does. Lackey’s example illustrates the orthodox view; the revised case refutes it. The theoretical explanation of knowledge from testimony as information transmission explains how testimony transfers knowledge and why it can generate knowledge. It also revea ls the real difference between so-called “generative” and so-called “preservative” sources. The former extract information; the latter transmit information. Perception provides knowledge of the world, introspection knowledge of our selves, and mindreading knowledge of other minds. Reasoning extends knowledge beyond things we already know. Perception, introspection, mindreading, and reasoning are all ways of generating new knowledge, generating knowledge of events, facts, and states of affairs not known before. Memory differs. Memory preserves knowledge of things we already know. If I knew something at an earlier time, say on the basis of perception, and then I remember it now, then I know it now, but only because I knew it before. Testimony (the process of forming beliefs on the basis of understanding what other people say) looks like memory. If someone else knows something and tells me what they know, and I accept what they say, then I come to know it too. But I only acquire knowledge from accepting what they say if they know it already. Testimony, like memory, doesn’t generate knowledge where there was no knowledge before; testimony preserves knowledge.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86236396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82203
E. Schliesser
I call attention to Berkeley’s treatment of a Newtonian indispensability argument against his own m ain position. I argue that the presence of this argument marks a significant moment in the history of philosophy and science: Newton’s achievements could serve as a separate and authoritative source of justification within philosophy. This marks the presence of a new kind of naturalism. A long the way, I argue against the claim tha t there is no explicit opposition or distinction between “philosophy” and “science” until the nineteenth century. Finally, I argue for the conceptual unity between Berkeley’s
{"title":"On the origin of modern naturalism: the significance of Berkeley’s response to a Newtonian indispensibility argument","authors":"E. Schliesser","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82203","url":null,"abstract":"I call attention to Berkeley’s treatment of a Newtonian indispensability argument against his own m ain position. I argue that the presence of this argument marks a significant moment in the history of philosophy and science: Newton’s achievements could serve as a separate and authoritative source of justification within philosophy. This marks the presence of a new kind of naturalism. A long the way, I argue against the claim tha t there is no explicit opposition or distinction between “philosophy” and “science” until the nineteenth century. Finally, I argue for the conceptual unity between Berkeley’s","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85975201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82202
P. Machamer, J. Mcguire, J. Sytsma
In this essay, we discuss how Descartes arrive s a t his mature vi ew of material caus ation. Descartes’ position changes over time in some very radical ways. The last section spells out his final position as to how causation works in the world of material objects. When considering Descartes’ causal theories, it is useful to distinguish between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ causation. The vertical perspective addresses God’s relation to creation. God is essential being, and every being other than God depends upon God in order to exist and to continue in existence .Thus, from the vertical perspective, the act of creating and fact of coming into existence are co-extensive notions. This metaphy sical/theological framework is the basis of Descartes’ commitment to three interrelated notions: that genuine causes and effects occur simultaneously; that causing is appropriately the case only when the cause is acting; and the view that God is the efficient, total, and continuous cause of everything that exists and every action that occurs. So from the vertical perspective, things are nothing without God’s continuous creation, and there is a problem in articulating how they are said to have independent being and causal efficacy. It is in terms of these commitments that Descartes’ views on horizontal, or material, causation must be approached. We will make apparent the radical extent to which his account of intra-worldly causation abandons his earlier and more traditional views about material causation. To this end we discuss Desca rtes’ jou rney to his mature position by emphasizing the gr owing epistemic limitations of his philosophy, which culminate in wh at we call his epistemic stance.
{"title":"Knowing causes: Descartes on the world of matter","authors":"P. Machamer, J. Mcguire, J. Sytsma","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82202","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, we discuss how Descartes arrive s a t his mature vi ew of material caus ation. Descartes’ position changes over time in some very radical ways. The last section spells out his final position as to how causation works in the world of material objects. When considering Descartes’ causal theories, it is useful to distinguish between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ causation. The vertical perspective addresses God’s relation to creation. God is essential being, and every being other than God depends upon God in order to exist and to continue in existence .Thus, from the vertical perspective, the act of creating and fact of coming into existence are co-extensive notions. This metaphy sical/theological framework is the basis of Descartes’ commitment to three interrelated notions: that genuine causes and effects occur simultaneously; that causing is appropriately the case only when the cause is acting; and the view that God is the efficient, total, and continuous cause of everything that exists and every action that occurs. So from the vertical perspective, things are nothing without God’s continuous creation, and there is a problem in articulating how they are said to have independent being and causal efficacy. It is in terms of these commitments that Descartes’ views on horizontal, or material, causation must be approached. We will make apparent the radical extent to which his account of intra-worldly causation abandons his earlier and more traditional views about material causation. To this end we discuss Desca rtes’ jou rney to his mature position by emphasizing the gr owing epistemic limitations of his philosophy, which culminate in wh at we call his epistemic stance.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77129786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82207
Linda Van Speybroeck
{"title":"Modularity. Understanding the Development and Evolution of Natural Complex Systems. Werner Callebaut & Diego Rasskin-Gutman (eds.)","authors":"Linda Van Speybroeck","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82207","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75625254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2005-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82206
S. Ducheyne
In this essay, I pro vide a Baconian reading of Newton’s Principia. I argue that Newton scientific practice (especially in the Principia) was influenced by Bacon’s methodised idea of induction. My focus will be on Newton’s argument of universal gravitation.
{"title":"Bacon’s idea and Newton’s practice of induction","authors":"S. Ducheyne","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82206","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I pro vide a Baconian reading of Newton’s Principia. I argue that Newton scientific practice (especially in the Principia) was influenced by Bacon’s methodised idea of induction. My focus will be on Newton’s argument of universal gravitation.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80729463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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