Pub Date : 2007-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82183
M. Schermer
A central issue in the ethical debate on psychopharmacological enhancers concerns the distinction between therapy and enhancement. Although from a theoretical point of view it is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between treatment (of disease) on the one hand, and enhancement (of normal functioning) on the other, in medical practice and policy debates the counter-positioning of therapy to enhancement is clearly at work. Especially pharmaceutical companies have an interest in occupying the ‘grey area’ between normal and abnorm al, treatment and enhancement. This article discusses the dynamics of the treatment-enhancement distinction, and argues that practices that could be labelled ‘enhancement’ can also be understood in terms of medicalisation and ‘d isease mongering’. The argument is supported by results from a qualitative empirical study into the experiences and opinions of adults diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADH D). Patients are ambivalent about how to understand ADH D: as a disease, a disorder or a normal variation. Intervention with psychopharmacological means can a lso be understood in d ifferent ways . From an insider perspective it is conceived of as a ‘norm alising’ of functioning, w hereas from an outsider perspective it can be understood as med icalisation of underperformance, or indeed as performance enhancement. This draws attention to new moral issues which are important but under-recognised in the enhancement debate, and which are related to medicalisation.
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Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82199
F. Russo
Causal analysis in the social sciences takes advantage of a variety of methods and of a multi-fold source of information and evidence. The first developments of quantitative causal analysis in the social sciences are due to Quetelet (1869) and Durkheim (1895 and 1897) in demography and sociology respectively. Significant improvements are due to Blalock (1964) and Duncan (1975). Since then causal analysis has shown noteworthy progress in the formal methods of analysis, e.g., structural equation models, covariance structure models, multilevel models, and contingency tables. By means of these different methodologies, social scientists try to infer causal relations between variables of interest with reasonable confidence. Data comes from a variety of different sources: surveys, census, experiments, interviews, etc. Analogously, evidence of causal relations can come from different sources: previous studies, background knowledge, knowledge of mechanisms or of probabilistic relations, etc. This pluralistic methodology and source of information raises the question of whether we should accordingly have a pluralistic metaphysics and epistemology. This paper focuses on epistemology and argues that a pluralistic methodology and evidence do not entail a pluralistic epistemology. It will be shown that causal models employ a single rationale of testing, based on the notion of variation. This view of causality profoundly breaks down with the received view, an heritage of Hume, that sees in regularity and/or invariance the key notions for causality. For instance, the rationale of variation clearly emerges in the interpretation of structural equation models: given a system of equations, parameters quantify the variation of the dependent variable due to the variation in the independent variable(s). Regularity and invariance thus become constraints to impose on the variation in order ensure that the model correctly specify the data generating process and that it does not confuse accidental and spurious relations with causal ones. Further, I argue that this monistic epistemology is also involved in alternative philosophical theories of causation, for instance, in probabilistic theories of causality, mechanist and counterfactual accounts, agency-manipulability theories and in the epistemic theory. The philosophical gain in adopting the rationale of variation is at least threefold. First, causality is not merely lodged in a psychological habit of observing regular successions of events. Agreed, we do experience such regular sequences but it is not because of regularity that we interpret them causally. Instead, this is because certain variational relations hold. Second, causality is not reduced to statistics either. Further, to claim that variation is a precondition for regularity and invariance has the advantage of not confusing the rationale of causality with the conditions that allow to interpret variations causally. Third, the adoption of the rationale of variation
{"title":"The Rationale of Variation in Methodological and Evidential Pluralism","authors":"F. Russo","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82199","url":null,"abstract":"Causal analysis in the social sciences takes advantage of a variety of methods and of a multi-fold source of information and evidence. The first developments of quantitative causal analysis in the social sciences are due to Quetelet (1869) and Durkheim (1895 and 1897) in demography and sociology respectively. Significant improvements are due to Blalock (1964) and Duncan (1975). Since then causal analysis has shown noteworthy progress in the formal methods of analysis, e.g., structural equation models, covariance structure models, multilevel models, and contingency tables. By means of these different methodologies, social scientists try to infer causal relations between variables of interest with reasonable confidence. Data comes from a variety of different sources: surveys, census, experiments, interviews, etc. Analogously, evidence of causal relations can come from different sources: previous studies, background knowledge, knowledge of mechanisms or of probabilistic relations, etc. This pluralistic methodology and source of information raises the question of whether we should accordingly have a pluralistic metaphysics and epistemology. This paper focuses on epistemology and argues that a pluralistic methodology and evidence do not entail a pluralistic epistemology. It will be shown that causal models employ a single rationale of testing, based on the notion of variation. This view of causality profoundly breaks down with the received view, an heritage of Hume, that sees in regularity and/or invariance the key notions for causality. For instance, the rationale of variation clearly emerges in the interpretation of structural equation models: given a system of equations, parameters quantify the variation of the dependent variable due to the variation in the independent variable(s). Regularity and invariance thus become constraints to impose on the variation in order ensure that the model correctly specify the data generating process and that it does not confuse accidental and spurious relations with causal ones. Further, I argue that this monistic epistemology is also involved in alternative philosophical theories of causation, for instance, in probabilistic theories of causality, mechanist and counterfactual accounts, agency-manipulability theories and in the epistemic theory. The philosophical gain in adopting the rationale of variation is at least threefold. First, causality is not merely lodged in a psychological habit of observing regular successions of events. Agreed, we do experience such regular sequences but it is not because of regularity that we interpret them causally. Instead, this is because certain variational relations hold. Second, causality is not reduced to statistics either. Further, to claim that variation is a precondition for regularity and invariance has the advantage of not confusing the rationale of causality with the conditions that allow to interpret variations causally. Third, the adoption of the rationale of variation ","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73225189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82189
D. Pritchard
Two key intuitions regarding knowledge are explored: that knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement and that knowledge excludes luck. It is claimed that a proper understanding of how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge leads to some surprising results, not just as regards the theory of knowledge more generally but also as regards the epistemology of testimonial belief. In particular, it is argued that this conception of knowledge motivates a new kind of proposalquasi-reductionismthat can accommodate the motivations behind both reductionist and anti-reductionist accounts of the epistemology of testimony. 0. Here are two intuitions that many have regarding knowledge, and which inform much of our theorising about knowledge. The firstwhat I will call the achievement intuitionis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement of some sort. The secondwhat I will call the antiluck intuitionis that knowledge is incompatible with luck. It is tempting to think that these intuitions are just two sides of the same coin, or at least that once the intuitions are suitably fleshed out then we will come to see that the one intuition is simply an entailment of the other. For example, one might hold that achievements by their nature exclude luck in the relevant way and thus that the anti-luck intuition is simply a consequence of the achievement intuition. As I will show, however, this natural way of thinking about these two intuitions is mistaken, and this has important ramifications not only for our understanding of knowledge but also for our understanding of specifically testimonial knowledge. Indeed, I will claim that the intuition that knowledge is a type of cognitive achievement, while containing (like all intuitions) an important truth, is in fact wrong. As we will see, gaining an understanding of how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge will lead us to adopt a very
{"title":"A Defence of Quasi-reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony","authors":"D. Pritchard","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82189","url":null,"abstract":"Two key intuitions regarding knowledge are explored: that knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement and that knowledge excludes luck. It is claimed that a proper understanding of how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge leads to some surprising results, not just as regards the theory of knowledge more generally but also as regards the epistemology of testimonial belief. In particular, it is argued that this conception of knowledge motivates a new kind of proposalquasi-reductionismthat can accommodate the motivations behind both reductionist and anti-reductionist accounts of the epistemology of testimony. 0. Here are two intuitions that many have regarding knowledge, and which inform much of our theorising about knowledge. The firstwhat I will call the achievement intuitionis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement of some sort. The secondwhat I will call the antiluck intuitionis that knowledge is incompatible with luck. It is tempting to think that these intuitions are just two sides of the same coin, or at least that once the intuitions are suitably fleshed out then we will come to see that the one intuition is simply an entailment of the other. For example, one might hold that achievements by their nature exclude luck in the relevant way and thus that the anti-luck intuition is simply a consequence of the achievement intuition. As I will show, however, this natural way of thinking about these two intuitions is mistaken, and this has important ramifications not only for our understanding of knowledge but also for our understanding of specifically testimonial knowledge. Indeed, I will claim that the intuition that knowledge is a type of cognitive achievement, while containing (like all intuitions) an important truth, is in fact wrong. As we will see, gaining an understanding of how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge will lead us to adopt a very","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85947031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82196
Raffaella Campaner
Ever since Wesley Salmon’s theory, the mechanical approach to causality has found an increasing number of supporters who have developed it in different directions. Mechanical views such as those advanced by Stuart Glennan, Jim Bogen and Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver have met with broad consensus in recent years. This paper analyses the main features of these mechanical positions and some of the major problems they still face, referring to the latest debate on mechanisms, causal explanation and the relationship between mechanisms and counterfactuals. I shall claim that the mechanical approach can be recognised as having a fundamental explanatory power, whereas the counterfactual approach, recently developed mainly by Jim Woodw ard and essentially linked to the notion of intervention, has an important heuristic role. Claiming that mechanisms are by no means to be seen as parasitic on counterfactuals or less fundamental than them – as it has been recently suggested –, and that yet counterfactuals can play a part in a conceptual analysis of causation, I shall look for hin ts in support of the peaceful coexistence of the two. 1. The causal structure of the world: processes and interactions, entities and activities In the last couple of decades philosophy of science has seen the elaboration of several mechanical accounts. While terminology and emphasis differ, all the theories overlap in believing that mechanisms are complex systems present in nature. Wesley Salmon’s philosophical work is unanimously regarded as the compulsory locus for anyone interested in the notion of mechanism since the eighties. As is well-known, Salmon has developed a “process theory” of causation, centred on the notions of causal process, causal RAFAELLA CAMPAN ER 16 1 Apart from Craver (2001:69-70). production and causal propagation. In short, causal processes are defined as spatio-temporally continuous processes which exhibit consistency of structure over time, and are capable of transmitting a modification of their structure from the point at which it is performed onwards, without additional interventions. The production of causal influence is accounted for by appealing to causal forks, characterised in statistical terms. Once produced, causal influence is propagated continuously through processes. Interacting processes constitute a mechanical, objective and probabilistic network, underlying phenomena and responsible for their occurrence. Salmon’s conception of causality goes hand in hand with his theory of causal explanation, which comprises two levels: we first need to identify the properties which are statistically relevant with respect to the occurrence of the event to be explained; we then account for them in terms of the net of causal processes underlying the event. A further distinction Salmon makes, not recalled by later authors, is that between etiological and constitutive causation. When we aim at explaining a given event E, we may look at E as occu
{"title":"Mechanisms and Counterfactuals: a Different Glimpse of the (Secret?) Connexion","authors":"Raffaella Campaner","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82196","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82196","url":null,"abstract":"Ever since Wesley Salmon’s theory, the mechanical approach to causality has found an increasing number of supporters who have developed it in different directions. Mechanical views such as those advanced by Stuart Glennan, Jim Bogen and Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver have met with broad consensus in recent years. This paper analyses the main features of these mechanical positions and some of the major problems they still face, referring to the latest debate on mechanisms, causal explanation and the relationship between mechanisms and counterfactuals. I shall claim that the mechanical approach can be recognised as having a fundamental explanatory power, whereas the counterfactual approach, recently developed mainly by Jim Woodw ard and essentially linked to the notion of intervention, has an important heuristic role. Claiming that mechanisms are by no means to be seen as parasitic on counterfactuals or less fundamental than them – as it has been recently suggested –, and that yet counterfactuals can play a part in a conceptual analysis of causation, I shall look for hin ts in support of the peaceful coexistence of the two. 1. The causal structure of the world: processes and interactions, entities and activities In the last couple of decades philosophy of science has seen the elaboration of several mechanical accounts. While terminology and emphasis differ, all the theories overlap in believing that mechanisms are complex systems present in nature. Wesley Salmon’s philosophical work is unanimously regarded as the compulsory locus for anyone interested in the notion of mechanism since the eighties. As is well-known, Salmon has developed a “process theory” of causation, centred on the notions of causal process, causal RAFAELLA CAMPAN ER 16 1 Apart from Craver (2001:69-70). production and causal propagation. In short, causal processes are defined as spatio-temporally continuous processes which exhibit consistency of structure over time, and are capable of transmitting a modification of their structure from the point at which it is performed onwards, without additional interventions. The production of causal influence is accounted for by appealing to causal forks, characterised in statistical terms. Once produced, causal influence is propagated continuously through processes. Interacting processes constitute a mechanical, objective and probabilistic network, underlying phenomena and responsible for their occurrence. Salmon’s conception of causality goes hand in hand with his theory of causal explanation, which comprises two levels: we first need to identify the properties which are statistically relevant with respect to the occurrence of the event to be explained; we then account for them in terms of the net of causal processes underlying the event. A further distinction Salmon makes, not recalled by later authors, is that between etiological and constitutive causation. When we aim at explaining a given event E, we may look at E as occu","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80110981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82190
Sanford C. Goldberg
Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of ep istemically inferen tial, evidence-based belief. 1. Reasons, Evidence, and Inference Holmes is trying to determine who committed the murder. His evidence consists of E1, E2, and E3. It occurs to him that he would have these pieces of evidence only if Mustard did it. He concludes that Mustard committed the murder. Here, the basis of Holmes’ conclusion is (a) his belief that his evidence consists of E1, E2, and E3, (b) his belief that he would have these pieces of evidence only if Mustard committed the murder, (c) whatever it is that supports these beliefs, and (d) whatever it is that bears on Holmes’ entitlement to draw the relevant inference from (a) and (b) to the conclusion that Mustard committed the murder. Smith is suffering from some condition that she would like diagnosed. The doctor notes the manifesting symptoms, S1, S2, and S3. On the basis of observing these symptoms, and having good reason to think that a patient manifests S1, S2, and S3 only if she is suffering from disease D, the doctor diagnoses Smith as suffering from D. Here, the basis of the doctor’s diagnosis is (e) his belief that Smith manifests S1, S2, and S3, (f) his belief that one manifests S1, S2, and S3 only if one is suffering from disease D, (g) whatever it is that supports these beliefs, and (h) whatever it is that bears on the doctor’s entitlement to draw the SANFORD C. GOLDBERG 30 relevant inference from (e) and (f) to the conclusion that Smith suffers from D. My description of these two cases is meant to bring out what I regard as an obvious parallel – one that goes to the heart of the epistemic account of inferential, evidence-based belief. In both case, the materials relevant to an epistemic assessment of the conclusion/diagnosis are the same. They consist of (i) the belief(s) that constitute(s) the subject’s evidence, (ii) the belief(s) that constitute(s) the generalization that links this evidence to the target conclusion/diagnosis, (iii) the epistemic support for all of these beliefs, and (iv) the subject’s entitlement to make the transition from these beliefs to the target conclusion/diagnosis itself. If the evidence-involving inference through which the subject acquired the belief is the only source of support for the belief in question, then (i)(iv) are the only materials that are relevant to the epistemic assessment of the belief: these exhaust the belief’s epistemic support. I will call beliefs of this sort Evidence-based beliefs, or E-beliefs for short. E-beliefs are only as epistemically good as the evidence on which they are based, the generalization(s) applied to that evidence, and the subject-drawn inference(s) to the E-belief itself. We can capture the foregoing idea in terms of the notion of supervenience, as follows: (Spv) The epistemic goodne
{"title":"Testimony as Evidence","authors":"Sanford C. Goldberg","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82190","url":null,"abstract":"Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of ep istemically inferen tial, evidence-based belief. 1. Reasons, Evidence, and Inference Holmes is trying to determine who committed the murder. His evidence consists of E1, E2, and E3. It occurs to him that he would have these pieces of evidence only if Mustard did it. He concludes that Mustard committed the murder. Here, the basis of Holmes’ conclusion is (a) his belief that his evidence consists of E1, E2, and E3, (b) his belief that he would have these pieces of evidence only if Mustard committed the murder, (c) whatever it is that supports these beliefs, and (d) whatever it is that bears on Holmes’ entitlement to draw the relevant inference from (a) and (b) to the conclusion that Mustard committed the murder. Smith is suffering from some condition that she would like diagnosed. The doctor notes the manifesting symptoms, S1, S2, and S3. On the basis of observing these symptoms, and having good reason to think that a patient manifests S1, S2, and S3 only if she is suffering from disease D, the doctor diagnoses Smith as suffering from D. Here, the basis of the doctor’s diagnosis is (e) his belief that Smith manifests S1, S2, and S3, (f) his belief that one manifests S1, S2, and S3 only if one is suffering from disease D, (g) whatever it is that supports these beliefs, and (h) whatever it is that bears on the doctor’s entitlement to draw the SANFORD C. GOLDBERG 30 relevant inference from (e) and (f) to the conclusion that Smith suffers from D. My description of these two cases is meant to bring out what I regard as an obvious parallel – one that goes to the heart of the epistemic account of inferential, evidence-based belief. In both case, the materials relevant to an epistemic assessment of the conclusion/diagnosis are the same. They consist of (i) the belief(s) that constitute(s) the subject’s evidence, (ii) the belief(s) that constitute(s) the generalization that links this evidence to the target conclusion/diagnosis, (iii) the epistemic support for all of these beliefs, and (iv) the subject’s entitlement to make the transition from these beliefs to the target conclusion/diagnosis itself. If the evidence-involving inference through which the subject acquired the belief is the only source of support for the belief in question, then (i)(iv) are the only materials that are relevant to the epistemic assessment of the belief: these exhaust the belief’s epistemic support. I will call beliefs of this sort Evidence-based beliefs, or E-beliefs for short. E-beliefs are only as epistemically good as the evidence on which they are based, the generalization(s) applied to that evidence, and the subject-drawn inference(s) to the E-belief itself. We can capture the foregoing idea in terms of the notion of supervenience, as follows: (Spv) The epistemic goodne","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79221118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82188
D. O’Brien
Spoken and written testimony pervades much of our life. I hear the announcement that the train is delayed, I read that Philip Roth has published another novel, and one’s partner can tell you that she loves you. A good deal of our knowledge would appear to be testimonial knowledge – perhaps most. Curiously, though, until fairly recently philosophers did not often concern themselves with this way of acquiring knowledge, and it was thought that one should be suspicious of beliefs acquired in this way. To know something one must be able to reason it through for oneself, or perceive it oneself, and not just acquire it secondhand from someone else. Here is Locke expressing this “individualist” approach to knowledge.
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Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82198
Jon Williamson
It is tempting to analyse causality in terms of just one of the indicators of causal relationships, e.g., mechanisms, probabilistic dependencies or independencies, counterfactual conditionals or agency considerations. While such an analysis will surely shed light on some aspect of our concept of cause, it will fail to capture the whole, rather multifarious, notion. So one might instead plump for pluralism: a different analysis for a different occasion. But we do not seem to have lots of different concepts of cause - just one eclectic notion. The resolution of this conundrum, I think, requires us to accept that our causal beliefs are generated by a wide variety of indicators, but to deny that this variety of indicators yields a variety of concepts of cause. This focus on the relation between evidence and causal beliefs leads to what I call *epistemic* causality. Under this view, certain causal beliefs are appropriate or rational on the basis of observed evidence; our notion of cause can be understood purely in terms of these rational beliefs. Causality, then, is a feature of our epistemic representation of the world, rather than of the world itself. This yields one, multifaceted notion of cause.
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Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82200
Leen De Vreese
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Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82191
D. O’Brien
Testimonial knowledge sometimes depends on internalist epistemic conditions, those that thinkers are able to reflect upon. In the testimony literature the only internalist conditions that are considered are those concerning a hearer’s knowledge of a speaker’s reliability. I argue, however, that the relevant sense of “internal” should not be seen as referring to just the hearer’s point of view, but rather to the points of view of both the hearer and the speaker. There are certain cases of testimonial knowledge transmission that depend on the speaker’s knowledge of his audience. These include cases of “engineered knowledge” in which a speaker deviously manipulates a hearer’s beliefs. Such knowledge is therefore internalist because it depends on factors that are internal to the point of view of the speaker, and not merely on externalist factors such as the reliability of the speakers’ and hearers’
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Pub Date : 2006-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82195
Leen De Vreese
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