Pub Date : 2008-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82174
Anton Froeyman, L. Vreese
In this paper we try t o b ring some c larification in the r ecent d ebate o n ca usal p luralism. Our first aim is to clarify what it means to have a pluralistic theory of causation and to articulate the criteria by means of which a certain theory of causation can or cannot qualify as a pluralistic theory of causation . W e als o show that there i s curre ntly no theory on the market which meets the se cr iteria, and therefore no full-blown pluralistic theory of causation exists. Because of this, we offer a general strategy by means of which pluralistic theories of causation can be developed.
{"title":"Unravelling the Methodology of Causal Pluralism","authors":"Anton Froeyman, L. Vreese","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82174","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we try t o b ring some c larification in the r ecent d ebate o n ca usal p luralism. Our first aim is to clarify what it means to have a pluralistic theory of causation and to articulate the criteria by means of which a certain theory of causation can or cannot qualify as a pluralistic theory of causation . W e als o show that there i s curre ntly no theory on the market which meets the se cr iteria, and therefore no full-blown pluralistic theory of causation exists. Because of this, we offer a general strategy by means of which pluralistic theories of causation can be developed.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74379181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82167
Bart Dessein
This article addresses the issue how, in traditiona l Chinese society in which Confucianism held a dominant position, philosophy was organized in ‘schools of thought,’ how these schools remained relatively sta ble ‘transmitters of wisdom,’ and how they dealt with ‘science’. More precisely, it is argued that the kind of ‘cosmological Confucianism’ that became the state o rthodoxy of imperial China is a kind of correlative thinking that accepts a cl ose relation between the natural and the political world. In a context in which ‘phi losophers’ increasingly became advisors to the political elite in their performing of their duties of maintaining cosmic order, the ruling elite came to depend on th e advice of these ‘philoso* The author is professor Chinese language and cultu re at Ghent University. He is indebted to Erik Weber for his invitation to contri bute to this issue, and to the anonymous reader for his/her comments and suggestions.
{"title":"Since Heaven has not yet Destroyed this Culture, what Can the Men of Kuang Do to me?”: Cosmological Confucianism and the Development of Science","authors":"Bart Dessein","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82167","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses the issue how, in traditiona l Chinese society in which Confucianism held a dominant position, philosophy was organized in ‘schools of thought,’ how these schools remained relatively sta ble ‘transmitters of wisdom,’ and how they dealt with ‘science’. More precisely, it is argued that the kind of ‘cosmological Confucianism’ that became the state o rthodoxy of imperial China is a kind of correlative thinking that accepts a cl ose relation between the natural and the political world. In a context in which ‘phi losophers’ increasingly became advisors to the political elite in their performing of their duties of maintaining cosmic order, the ruling elite came to depend on th e advice of these ‘philoso* The author is professor Chinese language and cultu re at Ghent University. He is indebted to Erik Weber for his invitation to contri bute to this issue, and to the anonymous reader for his/her comments and suggestions.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"287 15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76580053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82172
M. Keinänen
The goal of formal ontological inquiry is to reveal the categorial str ucture of the mind-independent reality. In the first part of this article, I criticiz e t wo popular ways to study the categorial structure, Strong and Weak Modelling. In the second part of the article (secs. 3-5), I present my positive account. The systematic description of the different kinds of entities ass umed by our commonsense conceptions (Descriptive Metaphysics) forms a starting-point of the study of the categorial structure of t he world. However, it is the task of Revisionary Metaphysics to see k for the best conception of the categorial structure. Revisionary Metaphysics proceeds as testing alternative c onceptions of the categorial structure (different categorial schemes). The main new contribution of the article is to propose certain general principles for the comparison of such alternative conceptions.
{"title":"Revisionary and Descriptive Metaphysics","authors":"M. Keinänen","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82172","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of formal ontological inquiry is to reveal the categorial str ucture of the mind-independent reality. In the first part of this article, I criticiz e t wo popular ways to study the categorial structure, Strong and Weak Modelling. In the second part of the article (secs. 3-5), I present my positive account. The systematic description of the different kinds of entities ass umed by our commonsense conceptions (Descriptive Metaphysics) forms a starting-point of the study of the categorial structure of t he world. However, it is the task of Revisionary Metaphysics to see k for the best conception of the categorial structure. Revisionary Metaphysics proceeds as testing alternative c onceptions of the categorial structure (different categorial schemes). The main new contribution of the article is to propose certain general principles for the comparison of such alternative conceptions.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88748510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82169
Albrecht Heeffer
This paper critically assesses the claim by Gavin Menzies that Regiomontanus knew about the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) through the Shu shū Jiǔ zhāng (SSJZ) written in 1247. Menzies uses this among many others arguments for his controversial theory that a large fleet of Chinese vessels visited Italy in the first half of the 15th century. We first refute that Regiomontanus used the method from the SSJZ. CRT problems appear in earlier European arithmetic and can be solved by the method of the Sun Zi, as did Fibonacci. Secondly, we pro-vide evidence that remainder problems were treated within the European abbaco tradition independently of the CRT method. Finally, we discuss the role of recre-ational mathematics for the oral dissemination of sub-scientific knowledge.
{"title":"Regiomontanus and Chinese Mathematics","authors":"Albrecht Heeffer","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82169","url":null,"abstract":"This paper critically assesses the claim by Gavin Menzies that Regiomontanus knew about the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) through the Shu shū Jiǔ zhāng (SSJZ) written in 1247. Menzies uses this among many others arguments for his controversial theory that a large fleet of Chinese vessels visited Italy in the first half of the 15th century. We first refute that Regiomontanus used the method from the SSJZ. CRT problems appear in earlier European arithmetic and can be solved by the method of the Sun Zi, as did Fibonacci. Secondly, we pro-vide evidence that remainder problems were treated within the European abbaco tradition independently of the CRT method. Finally, we discuss the role of recre-ational mathematics for the oral dissemination of sub-scientific knowledge.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84179460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82173
E. Weber
In this paper I discuss, from a metaphilosophical point of view, the debate between causal realism and causal constructivism. First , I argue that the debate, if it is couche d in the general terms as it is t raditionally done , re sts on a false di lemma. Then I argue that the debate must be disentangled into several more specific debates in order to be interesting.
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Pub Date : 2007-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82182
D. De Ridder
Enhancing brain activity and function is a very ancient practice which is usua lly accom plished by taking illegal drugs. Prescription medication is becoming more commonly used as a means of enhancing mood, and recently, it has become possible to modulate mood by applying magnetic (TMS) or electrica l current to the brain (tDCS, implanted electrodes) or by training the brain to work at predetermined oscillations (neurofeedback). A summary of the available neuromodulation techniques will be p resented associated with data from human subjects implanted with cortical and/or subcutaneous electrodes that demonstrate the potential for electrical neuro-enhancement. 1. The neurobiology of mood and emotion Mood can be defined as a relatively lasting emotional or affective state. Mood and emotion differ in that mood lasts longer than an emotion, is less specific, often less intense, and less likely to be triggered by a particular stimulus or event. Mood can be considered a normal physiological affective state generated by the brain. Mood disorders, a pathological emotional state, are disabling disturbances of mood or emotion. They most likely result from a failure to regulate mood (Johnstone et al, 2007). Major depression, for instance, can be described as a failure to regulate negative emotions. This is similar to fear, a physiological emotional state, and anxiety disorder, a pathological state, where a failure to regulate fear circuits leads to anxiety even though objective information about the outside world may indicate that the situation is not dangerous (LeDoux, 2003). Major depression is usually characterized by persistent mood states such as
增强大脑活动和功能是一种非常古老的做法，通常是通过服用非法药物来实现的。处方药越来越多地被用作改善情绪的手段，最近，通过对大脑施加磁刺激(TMS)或电流(tDCS，植入电极)或通过训练大脑在预定的振荡下工作(神经反馈)来调节情绪已经成为可能。现有神经调节技术的总结将与植入皮层和/或皮下电极的人类受试者的数据相关联，这些数据证明了神经电增强的潜力。1. 情绪可以被定义为一种相对持久的情绪或情感状态。情绪和情绪的不同之处在于，情绪比情绪持续的时间更长，不那么具体，通常不那么强烈，不太可能被特定的刺激或事件触发。情绪可以被认为是大脑产生的一种正常的生理情感状态。情绪障碍是一种病态的情绪状态，是情绪或情绪的致残性紊乱。它们很可能是由于无法调节情绪造成的(Johnstone et al, 2007)。例如，重度抑郁症可以被描述为无法控制负面情绪。这类似于恐惧(一种生理情绪状态)和焦虑障碍(一种病理状态)，在这种状态下，即使有关外部世界的客观信息可能表明情况并不危险，但未能调节恐惧回路也会导致焦虑(LeDoux, 2003)。重度抑郁症通常以持续的情绪状态为特征，如
{"title":"Brain and Nerve Stimulation for Mood Enhancement","authors":"D. De Ridder","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82182","url":null,"abstract":"Enhancing brain activity and function is a very ancient practice which is usua lly accom plished by taking illegal drugs. Prescription medication is becoming more commonly used as a means of enhancing mood, and recently, it has become possible to modulate mood by applying magnetic (TMS) or electrica l current to the brain (tDCS, implanted electrodes) or by training the brain to work at predetermined oscillations (neurofeedback). A summary of the available neuromodulation techniques will be p resented associated with data from human subjects implanted with cortical and/or subcutaneous electrodes that demonstrate the potential for electrical neuro-enhancement. 1. The neurobiology of mood and emotion Mood can be defined as a relatively lasting emotional or affective state. Mood and emotion differ in that mood lasts longer than an emotion, is less specific, often less intense, and less likely to be triggered by a particular stimulus or event. Mood can be considered a normal physiological affective state generated by the brain. Mood disorders, a pathological emotional state, are disabling disturbances of mood or emotion. They most likely result from a failure to regulate mood (Johnstone et al, 2007). Major depression, for instance, can be described as a failure to regulate negative emotions. This is similar to fear, a physiological emotional state, and anxiety disorder, a pathological state, where a failure to regulate fear circuits leads to anxiety even though objective information about the outside world may indicate that the situation is not dangerous (LeDoux, 2003). Major depression is usually characterized by persistent mood states such as","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87299364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82184
B. Brülde
The main question is whether chemically induced mood enhancement is (if successful) likely to make us happier, or whether it may rather have detrimental effects on our long-term happiness. This question is divided into three: (i) What effects are mood-enhancing drugs likely to have on the long-term happiness of the person who takes these drugs? (ii) How would these drugs affect the happiness of the immediate environment of the people who take them, e.g. children or spouses? (iii) What effects would a wide-spread use of mood-enhancing drugs have on society as a whole, and how would this affect the long-term happiness of its citizens? My answers to these questions are very tentative, partly because we know too little about what non-hedonic effects these drugs can be expected to have. It is possible that these drugs would have detrimental effects on some determinants of happiness, however, e.g. marriage and friendship, social and physical activity, rational problem-solving and mental effectiveness, political participation and interpersonal trust. But on the other hand, there are also a number of determinants of happiness that might be positively affected by a wide-spread and frequent use of mood-enhancing drugs.
{"title":"Can Successful Mood Enhancement Make Us Less Happy?","authors":"B. Brülde","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82184","url":null,"abstract":"The main question is whether chemically induced mood enhancement is (if successful) likely to make us happier, or whether it may rather have detrimental effects on our long-term happiness. This question is divided into three: (i) What effects are mood-enhancing drugs likely to have on the long-term happiness of the person who takes these drugs? (ii) How would these drugs affect the happiness of the immediate environment of the people who take them, e.g. children or spouses? (iii) What effects would a wide-spread use of mood-enhancing drugs have on society as a whole, and how would this affect the long-term happiness of its citizens? My answers to these questions are very tentative, partly because we know too little about what non-hedonic effects these drugs can be expected to have. It is possible that these drugs would have detrimental effects on some determinants of happiness, however, e.g. marriage and friendship, social and physical activity, rational problem-solving and mental effectiveness, political participation and interpersonal trust. But on the other hand, there are also a number of determinants of happiness that might be positively affected by a wide-spread and frequent use of mood-enhancing drugs.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79500682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82187
M. Walker
There is evidence from the empirical sciences that ‘happiness’ – understood in the social scientists’ sense of ‘positive affect’– leads to prosocial behaviour: the happiest amongst us are more likely to help others. There is also scientific evidence of a genetic component to positive affect: genetic differences can account for some of the observed variances in positive affect. Let us think of ‘happy-people-pills’ as pharmacological agents, modeled on those with a genetic predisposition for high levels of positive affect, which will promote positive moods and em otions in ‘normally’ happy persons . It is argued that if we want to increase prosocial behaviour then we should (other things being equal) promote the use of happy-people-pills. Since we should inc rease prosocial behaviour, we should (other things being equal) promote the use of happy-people-pills. In a short paper like this, I cannot possibly show that everything else is equal. How ever, I hope to establish at least a prima facie case for policy that permits the creation and distribution of happy-people-pills. Perhaps one of the more surprising results of the explosion of scientific interest in happiness is the discovery of a causally symmetrical relationship between happiness and helping others (prosocial behaviour). That is, the happiest amongst us are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviour, and those who engage in prosocial activities are more likely to be happy. This causal symmetry suggests tantalizing prospects for ethics and policy. On the one hand, if we could encourage people to be more prosocial then the causal symmetry finding suggests people will be happier. On the other hand, if we can use the results of the scientific investigation of happiness to make it easier for people to be happy, then prosocial behaviour should increase. In this paper we will examine the idea that it may be possible to boost happiness by utilizing another surprising result from contemporary happiness research: genetics. Genetics play a large role in the level of individual happiness. I will
{"title":"Happy-people-pills and Prosocial Behaviour","authors":"M. Walker","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82187","url":null,"abstract":"There is evidence from the empirical sciences that ‘happiness’ – understood in the social scientists’ sense of ‘positive affect’– leads to prosocial behaviour: the happiest amongst us are more likely to help others. There is also scientific evidence of a genetic component to positive affect: genetic differences can account for some of the observed variances in positive affect. Let us think of ‘happy-people-pills’ as pharmacological agents, modeled on those with a genetic predisposition for high levels of positive affect, which will promote positive moods and em otions in ‘normally’ happy persons . It is argued that if we want to increase prosocial behaviour then we should (other things being equal) promote the use of happy-people-pills. Since we should inc rease prosocial behaviour, we should (other things being equal) promote the use of happy-people-pills. In a short paper like this, I cannot possibly show that everything else is equal. How ever, I hope to establish at least a prima facie case for policy that permits the creation and distribution of happy-people-pills. Perhaps one of the more surprising results of the explosion of scientific interest in happiness is the discovery of a causally symmetrical relationship between happiness and helping others (prosocial behaviour). That is, the happiest amongst us are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviour, and those who engage in prosocial activities are more likely to be happy. This causal symmetry suggests tantalizing prospects for ethics and policy. On the one hand, if we could encourage people to be more prosocial then the causal symmetry finding suggests people will be happier. On the other hand, if we can use the results of the scientific investigation of happiness to make it easier for people to be happy, then prosocial behaviour should increase. In this paper we will examine the idea that it may be possible to boost happiness by utilizing another surprising result from contemporary happiness research: genetics. Genetics play a large role in the level of individual happiness. I will","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74751588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82186
Rebecca Roache
The conviction that high self-esteem is beneficial both to the individual and to society in general has been perv asive both in acade mia and in po pular culture. If it is in deed beneficial, it is a prime candidate for pharmacological enhancement. There is evidence to suggest, however, that the benefits of high self-esteem to the individual have been exaggerated; and that there are few - if any - social benefits. With this evidence in mind, I consider in what ways high self-esteem is valuable , and suggest how enhancement could play a role in maximizing its valuable aspects.
{"title":"Should We Enhance Self-esteem?","authors":"Rebecca Roache","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82186","url":null,"abstract":"The conviction that high self-esteem is beneficial both to the individual and to society in general has been perv asive both in acade mia and in po pular culture. If it is in deed beneficial, it is a prime candidate for pharmacological enhancement. There is evidence to suggest, however, that the benefits of high self-esteem to the individual have been exaggerated; and that there are few - if any - social benefits. With this evidence in mind, I consider in what ways high self-esteem is valuable , and suggest how enhancement could play a role in maximizing its valuable aspects.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88070353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82185
Valérie DE PRYCKER
{"title":"Critical Remarks on Shortcuts to Happiness: the Relevance of Effort and Pain","authors":"Valérie DE PRYCKER","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82185","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88691302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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