Pub Date : 2012-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82147
E. Weber, M. Dyck
What happens if one applies the “evaluation methodology” of Theo Kuipers to inconsistent theories? What happens if one applies the “problem solving methodology” of Larry Laudan to inconsistent theories? We argue that in both cases something unacceptable happens. We show that application of Kuipers‟ methodology to inconsistent theories leads to a methodological stalemate: inconsistent theories are incomparable to consistent ones. Then we show that according to Laudan‟s methodology inconsistent theories are always better than consistent ones. Finally, we offer partial solutions to these problems.
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Pub Date : 2010-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82159
Christian de Ronde
{"title":"Metaphysical Issues in the Philosophical Foundation of Quantum Mechanics","authors":"Christian de Ronde","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82159","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72558959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82161
M. Bitbol
Instead of either formulating new metaphysical images (as realists would do) or rejecting any metaphysical attempt (as empiricists would do), the case of quantum mechanics might well require from us a complete redefinition of the nature and task of metaphysics. The sought redefinition can be performed in the spirit of Kant, according to whom metaphysics is the discipline of the boundaries of human knowledge. This can be called a “reflective” conception of metaphysics. In this paper, each one of the most popular “interpretations” of quantum mechanics is shown to be naturally associated with a variety of Kant-like reflective metaphysics. Then, the two major “paradoxes” of quantum mechanics (the measurement problem and the EPR correlations) are reformulated by way of this reflective attitude, and they are thereby “dissolved”. Along with this perspective, quantum mechanics becomes one of the most elegant and understandable theories of the history of physics in addition of being one of the most efficient. The only point that must be clarified is why it looks culturally so difficult to accept a reflective and non-ontological standpoint on physical theories.
{"title":"Reflective Metaphysics: Understanding Quantum Mechanics from a Kantian Standpoint","authors":"M. Bitbol","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82161","url":null,"abstract":"Instead of either formulating new metaphysical images (as realists would do) or rejecting any metaphysical attempt (as empiricists would do), the case of quantum mechanics might well require from us a complete redefinition of the nature and task of metaphysics. The sought redefinition can be performed in the spirit of Kant, according to whom metaphysics is the discipline of the boundaries of human knowledge. This can be called a “reflective” conception of metaphysics. In this paper, each one of the most popular “interpretations” of quantum mechanics is shown to be naturally associated with a variety of Kant-like reflective metaphysics. Then, the two major “paradoxes” of quantum mechanics (the measurement problem and the EPR correlations) are reformulated by way of this reflective attitude, and they are thereby “dissolved”. Along with this perspective, quantum mechanics becomes one of the most elegant and understandable theories of the history of physics in addition of being one of the most efficient. The only point that must be clarified is why it looks culturally so difficult to accept a reflective and non-ontological standpoint on physical theories.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90429621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82164
A. Grinbaum
I argue for an attitude of epistemological modesty against the claims that physical theories, e.g. quantum mechanics, favor any ontological statements on the nature of reality.
我主张一种认识论上的谦虚态度，反对物理理论，例如量子力学，支持任何关于现实本质的本体论陈述的主张。
{"title":"On Epistemological Modesty","authors":"A. Grinbaum","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82164","url":null,"abstract":"I argue for an attitude of epistemological modesty against the claims that physical theories, e.g. quantum mechanics, favor any ontological statements on the nature of reality.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81937712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82162
Christian de Ronde
In this paper we discuss the relation of quantum theory to the problem of metaphysics. Based on metaphysical and anti-metaphysical stances, we put forward an ‘interpretational map’ of quantum mechanics in general and of the modal interpretation in particular. Thus, within the modal interpretation, we distinguish between: Modal Interpretations (which start from) the Mathematical Formalism (MIMF) and Modal Interpretations (which start from) Metaphysical Principles (MIMP). Finally, we argue for a middle path in between metaphysical principles and the formal conditions imposed on quantum mechanics.
{"title":"For and Against Metaphysics in the Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechancis","authors":"Christian de Ronde","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82162","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we discuss the relation of quantum theory to the problem of metaphysics. Based on metaphysical and anti-metaphysical stances, we put forward an ‘interpretational map’ of quantum mechanics in general and of the modal interpretation in particular. Thus, within the modal interpretation, we distinguish between: Modal Interpretations (which start from) the Mathematical Formalism (MIMF) and Modal Interpretations (which start from) Metaphysical Principles (MIMP). Finally, we argue for a middle path in between metaphysical principles and the formal conditions imposed on quantum mechanics.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82087160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82160
Diederik Aerts
We elaborate on a new interpretation of quantum mechanics which we introduced recently. The main hypothesis of this new interpretation is that quantum particles are entities interacting with matter conceptually, which means that pieces of matter function as interfaces for the conceptual content carried by the quantum particles. We explain how our interpretation was inspired by our earlier analysis of non-locality as non-spatiality and a specific interpretation of quantum potentiality, which we illustrate by means of the example of two interconnected vessels of water. We show by means of this example that philosophical realism is not in contradiction with the recent findings with respect to Leggett's inequalities and their violations. We explain our recent work on using the quantum formalism to model human concepts and their combinations and how this has given rise to the foundational ideas of our new quantum interpretation. We analyze the equivalence of meaning in the realm of human concepts and coherence in the realm of quantum particles, and how the duality of abstract and concrete leads naturally to a Heisenberg uncertainty relation. We illustrate the role played by interference and entanglement and show how the new interpretation explains the problems related to identity and individuality in quantum mechanics. We put forward a possible scenario for the emergence of the reality of macroscopic objects.
{"title":"A Potentiality and Conceptuality Interpretation of Quantum Physics","authors":"Diederik Aerts","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82160","url":null,"abstract":"We elaborate on a new interpretation of quantum mechanics which we introduced recently. The main hypothesis of this new interpretation is that quantum particles are entities interacting with matter conceptually, which means that pieces of matter function as interfaces for the conceptual content carried by the quantum particles. We explain how our interpretation was inspired by our earlier analysis of non-locality as non-spatiality and a specific interpretation of quantum potentiality, which we illustrate by means of the example of two interconnected vessels of water. We show by means of this example that philosophical realism is not in contradiction with the recent findings with respect to Leggett's inequalities and their violations. We explain our recent work on using the quantum formalism to model human concepts and their combinations and how this has given rise to the foundational ideas of our new quantum interpretation. We analyze the equivalence of meaning in the realm of human concepts and coherence in the realm of quantum particles, and how the duality of abstract and concrete leads naturally to a Heisenberg uncertainty relation. We illustrate the role played by interference and entanglement and show how the new interpretation explains the problems related to identity and individuality in quantum mechanics. We put forward a possible scenario for the emergence of the reality of macroscopic objects.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73492887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82163
D. Dieks
The thesis of this article is simple: even if it is accepted that quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory, this provides us with no special reason to believe in “chances” in the sense of objectively existing factors that are responsible for the relative frequencies we encounter in experiments. More in general, quantum mechanics gives us no special reason to believe in the actual existence of modalities. We may intuitively be inclined to believe in chances as a kind of causes, just as in classical mechanics we are inclined to think of forces as causal powers that produce accelerations. It might even be the case that intuitions of this kind can be developed into a coherent metaphysical scheme (something which has yet to be done, I think). But as I shall argue, a sober Humean perspective on quantum mechanics is certainly possible as well, and has much to recommend it. In short, the thesis of the present paper is that for a Humean, quantum mechanics introduces no reasons to abandon his position.
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Pub Date : 2008-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82168
David DE SAEGER
{"title":"The Imperial Examinations and Epistemological Obstacles","authors":"David DE SAEGER","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82168","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74704582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82171
J. Wieland
What is the Probl em of Universals? In this paper we take up t he cla ssic question and proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consider t hree problem solv ing settings and define the notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Unive rsa l s. Mo re specifically, we single out two accounts of the problem which are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose modifications of those two accounts which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we spell out two interesting ramifications.
{"title":"What Problem of Universals?","authors":"J. Wieland","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82171","url":null,"abstract":"What is the Probl em of Universals? In this paper we take up t he cla ssic question and proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consider t hree problem solv ing settings and define the notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Unive rsa l s. Mo re specifically, we single out two accounts of the problem which are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose modifications of those two accounts which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we spell out two interesting ramifications.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72445233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82166
S. Ducheyne
As it stands, Needham’s Grand Question is simply too general and ill-posed to be answered in a meaningful way. In this paper it is argued that Needham’s Grand Question, to wit Why did science emerge in the West and not in China?, can only be fruitfully pursued, (1) on the condition that one explicates the assumptions and conceptions involved in an informative and motivated way, and (2) on the condition that the question is concretized and fine-tuned by means of and in terms of a series of specific questions. In this paper, I attempt to reformulate Needham’s Grand Question on the basis of a minimal conception of modern science. Next I will split up the Grand Question into a series of more specific, controllable and arguably more fruitful questions. * The author is Postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation (FWOFlanders) and is indebted to Erik Weber and the anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions.
{"title":"Towards a Fruitful Formulation of Needham’s Grand Question","authors":"S. Ducheyne","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82166","url":null,"abstract":"As it stands, Needham’s Grand Question is simply too general and ill-posed to be answered in a meaningful way. In this paper it is argued that Needham’s Grand Question, to wit Why did science emerge in the West and not in China?, can only be fruitfully pursued, (1) on the condition that one explicates the assumptions and conceptions involved in an informative and motivated way, and (2) on the condition that the question is concretized and fine-tuned by means of and in terms of a series of specific questions. In this paper, I attempt to reformulate Needham’s Grand Question on the basis of a minimal conception of modern science. Next I will split up the Grand Question into a series of more specific, controllable and arguably more fruitful questions. * The author is Postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation (FWOFlanders) and is indebted to Erik Weber and the anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83908541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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