Pub Date : 2016-06-06DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82111
Peter J. Lewis
Quantum mechanics arguably provides the best evidence we have for strong emergence. Entangled pairs of particles apparently have properties that fail to supervene on the properties of the particles taken individually. But at the same time, quantum mechanics is a terrible place to look for evidence of strong emergence: the interpretation of the theory is so contested that drawing any metaphysical conclusions from it is risky at best. I run through the standard argument for strong emergence based on entanglement, and show how it rests on shaky assumptions concerning the ontology of the quantum world. In particular, I consider two objections: that the argument involves Bell's theorem, whose premises are often rejected, and that the argument rests on a contested account of parts and wholes. I respond to both objections, showing that, with some important caveats, the argument for emergence based on quantum mechanics remains intact.
{"title":"Quantum mechanics, emergence, and fundamentality","authors":"Peter J. Lewis","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82111","url":null,"abstract":"Quantum mechanics arguably provides the best evidence we have for strong emergence. Entangled pairs of particles apparently have properties that fail to supervene on the properties of the particles taken individually. But at the same time, quantum mechanics is a terrible place to look for evidence of strong emergence: the interpretation of the theory is so contested that drawing any metaphysical conclusions from it is risky at best. I run through the standard argument for strong emergence based on entanglement, and show how it rests on shaky assumptions concerning the ontology of the quantum world. In particular, I consider two objections: that the argument involves Bell's theorem, whose premises are often rejected, and that the argument rests on a contested account of parts and wholes. I respond to both objections, showing that, with some important caveats, the argument for emergence based on quantum mechanics remains intact.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82311040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-04-23DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82114
S. Blundell
The physics of matter in the condensed state is concerned with problems in which the number of constituent particles is vastly greater than can be easily comprehended. The inherent physical limitations of the human mind are fundamental and restrict the way in which we can interact with and learn about the universe. This presents challenges for developing scientific explanations that are met by emergent narratives, concepts and arguments that have a non-trivial relationship to the underlying microphysics. By examining examples within condensed matter physics, and also from cellular automata, I show how such emergent narratives efficiently describe elements of reality.
{"title":"Emergence, causation and storytelling: condensed matter physics and the limitations of the human mind","authors":"S. Blundell","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82114","url":null,"abstract":"The physics of matter in the condensed state is concerned with problems in which the number of constituent particles is vastly greater than can be easily comprehended. The inherent physical limitations of the human mind are fundamental and restrict the way in which we can interact with and learn about the universe. This presents challenges for developing scientific explanations that are met by emergent narratives, concepts and arguments that have a non-trivial relationship to the underlying microphysics. By examining examples within condensed matter physics, and also from cellular automata, I show how such emergent narratives efficiently describe elements of reality.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75738839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82124
J. Marcum
Proponents of the dual-process theory claim that two distinct types of mental faculties or minds are responsible for human cognition. The first is evolutionarily old and not unique to humans but shared with other organisms. Type-1’s key feature is autonomy from cognitive capacities; hence, it does not require working memory. Type-2 is evolutionarily recent and thought to be uniquely human. Its key feature is reflective cognitive-decoupling of Type-1 processes, if warranted; and it requires working memory. Critics, however, argue that one mind is sufficient to account for human cognition and propose a unimodel theory of cognition. The debate over these theories depends upon metaphysical notions concerning the nature of cognitive capacities and processes; and, how to investigate and explain them. In this paper, I explore these notions in terms of analyzing the metaphysical presuppositions of dualism and monism, and then the methodological approaches of holism and reductionism, as well as the ontological categories of organicism and physicalism, which are often unspecified and/or unexamined in the cognition debate. Clarification of these metaphysical notions and consideration of others is important for progressing towards the debate’s resolution. To that end, a plurimodel theory of cognition—based on a metaphysical presupposition and a
{"title":"Metaphysics of the cognition debate: a plurimodel theory of cognition","authors":"J. Marcum","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82124","url":null,"abstract":"Proponents of the dual-process theory claim that two distinct types of mental faculties or minds are responsible for human cognition. The first is evolutionarily old and not unique to humans but shared with other organisms. Type-1’s key feature is autonomy from cognitive capacities; hence, it does not require working memory. Type-2 is evolutionarily recent and thought to be uniquely human. Its key feature is reflective cognitive-decoupling of Type-1 processes, if warranted; and it requires working memory. Critics, however, argue that one mind is sufficient to account for human cognition and propose a unimodel theory of cognition. The debate over these theories depends upon metaphysical notions concerning the nature of cognitive capacities and processes; and, how to investigate and explain them. In this paper, I explore these notions in terms of analyzing the metaphysical presuppositions of dualism and monism, and then the methodological approaches of holism and reductionism, as well as the ontological categories of organicism and physicalism, which are often unspecified and/or unexamined in the cognition debate. Clarification of these metaphysical notions and consideration of others is important for progressing towards the debate’s resolution. To that end, a plurimodel theory of cognition—based on a metaphysical presupposition and a","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87483293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82120
Raoul Gervais
The relation between metaphysics and science has historically been marked by tribulation. It was heavily influenced by contemporary events, most notably the scientific revolution of the early modern period. One important reason the scientific revolution had such an impact is that it changed our ideas of science profoundly, giving it its own methods and fields of enquiry. Gradually, the intimate bond
{"title":"Introductory essay: Metaphysics and science: a fickle relationship","authors":"Raoul Gervais","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82120","url":null,"abstract":"The relation between metaphysics and science has historically been marked by tribulation. It was heavily influenced by contemporary events, most notably the scientific revolution of the early modern period. One important reason the scientific revolution had such an impact is that it changed our ideas of science profoundly, giving it its own methods and fields of enquiry. Gradually, the intimate bond","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87466170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82122
C. Ribeiro
A renewed interest in the old problem of the relationship between science and metaphysics has been fuelled by the ongoing debate between naturalistic metaphysicians and non-naturalistic metaphysicians. However, I maintain that this debate is missing the mark because it is focused on the problem of the credibility (or lack of it) of a metaphysics that is not ‘scientific’, instead of focusing on the presence of metaphysics in science. In order to show that metaphysics pervades all stages of scientific inquiry, and after analysing the distinction between presuppositions and assumptions, I address the complex problem of the relation of metaphysics to truth and to experience. I advocate that there is an indirect relation of metaphysics to experience and that it is possible to choose between rival metaphysical theories. But metaphysics, according to my view, is not present in science merely as a background of presuppositions and assumptions. It is present at every step of the scientific inquiry and also in a later moment: the interpretation of the findings of science and the elaboration of unifying theories.
{"title":"The complementarity of science and metaphysics","authors":"C. Ribeiro","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82122","url":null,"abstract":"A renewed interest in the old problem of the relationship between science and metaphysics has been fuelled by the ongoing debate between naturalistic metaphysicians and non-naturalistic metaphysicians. However, I maintain that this debate is missing the mark because it is focused on the problem of the credibility (or lack of it) of a metaphysics that is not ‘scientific’, instead of focusing on the presence of metaphysics in science. In order to show that metaphysics pervades all stages of scientific inquiry, and after analysing the distinction between presuppositions and assumptions, I address the complex problem of the relation of metaphysics to truth and to experience. I advocate that there is an indirect relation of metaphysics to experience and that it is possible to choose between rival metaphysical theories. But metaphysics, according to my view, is not present in science merely as a background of presuppositions and assumptions. It is present at every step of the scientific inquiry and also in a later moment: the interpretation of the findings of science and the elaboration of unifying theories.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86986645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82121
Cristian Soto
I examine the current state of the debate on the metaphysics of science (MS for short). In 1, I identify some of the main questions belonging to the MS, looking into the relationship between science and metaphysics. In 2, I expound the rise of the old wave in the MS, which endorses the belief that metaphysics is a guide to, or a heuristic for, science and outlines the stronger idea that metaphysics makes science possible. In 3, I examine the maximalist MS. This is a contemporary revival of the old wave, reformulating the claim that metaphysics makes science possible. In 4, I look into the new wave in the MS, which argues that science is a guide to metaphysics and, more radically, that metaphysics is to be motivated by, and restricted to, science. In 5, I briefly introduce my own minimalist MS, which contends that science sets the epistemic, methodological and ontological criteria which should work as desiderata of the MS. I close this chapter in 6 with some concluding remarks.
{"title":"The current state of the metaphysics of science debate","authors":"Cristian Soto","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82121","url":null,"abstract":"I examine the current state of the debate on the metaphysics of science (MS for short). In 1, I identify some of the main questions belonging to the MS, looking into the relationship between science and metaphysics. In 2, I expound the rise of the old wave in the MS, which endorses the belief that metaphysics is a guide to, or a heuristic for, science and outlines the stronger idea that metaphysics makes science possible. In 3, I examine the maximalist MS. This is a contemporary revival of the old wave, reformulating the claim that metaphysics makes science possible. In 4, I look into the new wave in the MS, which argues that science is a guide to metaphysics and, more radically, that metaphysics is to be motivated by, and restricted to, science. In 5, I briefly introduce my own minimalist MS, which contends that science sets the epistemic, methodological and ontological criteria which should work as desiderata of the MS. I close this chapter in 6 with some concluding remarks.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76314165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82123
E. Weber, Inge De Bal
Jonathan Schaffer has argued that a contrastive causal ontology is beneficial in juridical contexts: lawyers and judges should treat the causal relation as a quaternary relation, not as binary one. In this paper we investigate to what extent a contrastive causal ontology is beneficial in genetics and in physics. We conclude that it is beneficial in these scientific domains. We also point out that the nature of the benefit differs in the three context (law, genetics, physics) that we discuss.
{"title":"Contrastive causation in genetics and in physics","authors":"E. Weber, Inge De Bal","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82123","url":null,"abstract":"Jonathan Schaffer has argued that a contrastive causal ontology is beneficial in juridical contexts: lawyers and judges should treat the causal relation as a quaternary relation, not as binary one. In this paper we investigate to what extent a contrastive causal ontology is beneficial in genetics and in physics. We conclude that it is beneficial in these scientific domains. We also point out that the nature of the benefit differs in the three context (law, genetics, physics) that we discuss.","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75618770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82130
Clorinda Donato
This article argues for the inclusion of the Neapolitan Raimondo di Sangro, il Principe di San Severo (1710-1771) among those thinkers whose ideas, lifestyle, writings, networks and intellectual pursuits have been defined as radical. It explores the ways in which a little known Italian Radical Enlightenment thinker formed his ideas both through contact with the writings of proponents of Radical Enlightenment thought not only in England and Holland, but also in Italy and Switzerland where radical networks have been less visible to scholars. By charting the strategies for the spread and exchange of radical thought from Naples to Lausanne through heretofore unknown paths, new avenues for research are opened while the breadth and depth of the Radical Enlightenment are strengthened. “[…] the Honourable Prince’s banned book is full of sentiments and expressions at the very least seriously suspicious of error in Catholic dogma, and too
本文主张将那不勒斯的“桑格罗之王”(Raimondo di Sangro, il Principe di San Severo, 1710-1771)列入那些思想、生活方式、著作、网络和知识追求被定义为激进的思想家之列。这本书探讨了一位鲜为人知的意大利激进启蒙思想家是如何通过接触激进启蒙思想支持者的著作而形成他的思想的，不仅是在英国和荷兰，还有意大利和瑞士，这些地方的激进网络对学者来说不太明显。通过绘制从那不勒斯到洛桑的激进思想传播和交流的策略，通过迄今未知的路径，开辟了新的研究途径，同时加强了激进启蒙运动的广度和深度。“尊敬的王子的这本被禁的书充满了对天主教教义错误的严重怀疑的情绪和表达
{"title":"Esoteric Reason, Occult Science, and Radical Enlightenment: Seamless Pursuits in the Work and Networks of Raimondo Di Sangro, The Prince of San Severo","authors":"Clorinda Donato","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82130","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues for the inclusion of the Neapolitan Raimondo di Sangro, il Principe di San Severo (1710-1771) among those thinkers whose ideas, lifestyle, writings, networks and intellectual pursuits have been defined as radical. It explores the ways in which a little known Italian Radical Enlightenment thinker formed his ideas both through contact with the writings of proponents of Radical Enlightenment thought not only in England and Holland, but also in Italy and Switzerland where radical networks have been less visible to scholars. By charting the strategies for the spread and exchange of radical thought from Naples to Lausanne through heretofore unknown paths, new avenues for research are opened while the breadth and depth of the Radical Enlightenment are strengthened. “[…] the Honourable Prince’s banned book is full of sentiments and expressions at the very least seriously suspicious of error in Catholic dogma, and too","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84585911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82128
J.P.T. Geerlings
Historians have for some time asked themselves whether the Radical Enlightenment refers to a cohesive radical wing of the Enlightenment, or whether it merely groups together a number of highly diverse strands of heterodox thought. At the same time, little attention is being given to the ways in which radical thinkers experienced and helped shape the intellectual contexts within which they operated. Although often viewed as isolated individuals, many heterodox, radical, and marginalized thinkers exhibited a keen concern to formulate their intellectual identities and define their place within intellectual landscape. However, the self-perception and self-styling this involved could take on many forms and meanings. In an effort to address these areas, this paper explores how various methods developed to express new intellectual identities and adherence to doctrines, schools of thought, or even concrete groups of thinkers gathered in sociable circles. Considering and applying ideas recently published by Martin Mulsow, and using the radical
{"title":"Joining the Radical Enlightenment: Some Thoughts on Intellectual Identity, Precarity and Sociability in the Eighteenth Century","authors":"J.P.T. Geerlings","doi":"10.21825/philosophica.82128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82128","url":null,"abstract":"Historians have for some time asked themselves whether the Radical Enlightenment refers to a cohesive radical wing of the Enlightenment, or whether it merely groups together a number of highly diverse strands of heterodox thought. At the same time, little attention is being given to the ways in which radical thinkers experienced and helped shape the intellectual contexts within which they operated. Although often viewed as isolated individuals, many heterodox, radical, and marginalized thinkers exhibited a keen concern to formulate their intellectual identities and define their place within intellectual landscape. However, the self-perception and self-styling this involved could take on many forms and meanings. In an effort to address these areas, this paper explores how various methods developed to express new intellectual identities and adherence to doctrines, schools of thought, or even concrete groups of thinkers gathered in sociable circles. Considering and applying ideas recently published by Martin Mulsow, and using the radical","PeriodicalId":36843,"journal":{"name":"Argumenta Philosophica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79593879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2014-01-02DOI: 10.21825/philosophica.82129
Els Walravens
In this paper Johann Christian Edelmann’s radicalism is studied from two points of view. First, the reasons why he unanimously is labeled as a radical thinker are considered and evaluated: his vehement style and language, his affinity with radical pietism, his turn to rationalism, his Spinozism, his massive internal and external criticism of the Bible and of the Christian faith. Second, the threefold progressive message Edelmann wanted to transmit to us through his dynamic and unstructured works is revealed and discussed: his plea for peace and justice based on a secularization of Jezus’ gospel of love, his promotion of a non-dogmatic freethinking which combines freedom of thought and of speech with pluralism and open-mindedness, his defence of a pan(en)theistic, philosophical religiosity by which he extends the scope of religiosity beyond the limits of any established creed. The extreme rational nature of his external criticism of religion and his humanistic messages prove that Edelmann joined after a long journey the Enlightenment movement. Simultaneously, he remained a homo religiosus. His
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