Pub Date : 2018-11-08DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00304004
Elizabeth Plantan
Despite the increasingly authoritarian atmosphere in Russia and China, mass protests in both countries are pervasive, including protest motivated by environmental grievances. Existing scholarship often focuses on the sources, spread, or volume of mass mobilization, but few examine how civil society actors themselves evaluate the tactic. How does the state respond to environmentally-motivated mass mobilization? In light of the state’s response, how have activists altered their approach to mass mobilization over time? Using case studies and interviews, I find that Russian and Chinese environmental groups approach mass mobilization in distinct ways. Over time, Russian activists have increasingly turned to mass tactics, including coordinated regional protest. Meanwhile, Chinese ENGOs have reduced their formal involvement in such campaigns, limiting visible horizontal linkages between environmental groups. These approaches are shaped by the different historical legacies of mass mobilization in either country, which also shape state perceptions of the threat posed by environmental activism.
{"title":"Mass Mobilization in China and Russia: From Unexpected Victories to Unintended Consequences","authors":"Elizabeth Plantan","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00304004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00304004","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the increasingly authoritarian atmosphere in Russia and China, mass protests in both countries are pervasive, including protest motivated by environmental grievances. Existing scholarship often focuses on the sources, spread, or volume of mass mobilization, but few examine how civil society actors themselves evaluate the tactic. How does the state respond to environmentally-motivated mass mobilization? In light of the state’s response, how have activists altered their approach to mass mobilization over time? Using case studies and interviews, I find that Russian and Chinese environmental groups approach mass mobilization in distinct ways. Over time, Russian activists have increasingly turned to mass tactics, including coordinated regional protest. Meanwhile, Chinese ENGOs have reduced their formal involvement in such campaigns, limiting visible horizontal linkages between environmental groups. These approaches are shaped by the different historical legacies of mass mobilization in either country, which also shape state perceptions of the threat posed by environmental activism.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00304004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45482060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-08DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00304001
Alfred B. Evans, E. Bindman
This article serves as an introduction to this special issue on recent developments in civil society organization and strategies in Russia. Despite the widespread assumption that the increased restrictions placed on NGO activity by the state in recent years have hampered their ability to operate, we argue that civil society in Russia continues to show signs of vitality. This is demonstrated by the fact that protests by ordinary Russians have grown and have often led to the formation of new groups and movements which have had some success in campaigning on specific issues. As the articles in this special issue highlight, one of the key tools affecting whether or not such movements can be successful in achieving their aims is that of framing. When organizations are able to frame the issue they are campaigning on in such a way as to resonate with ordinary people and avoid directly challenging the balance of power within Russia’s political system, they tend to enjoy more success than those groups which tend to take a more confrontational stance and thus face greater pushback and sanction from the authorities. This serves to highlight that NGOs and other civil society groups in Russia employ a range of different strategies and enjoy very different relationships with the authorities as a result.
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"Alfred B. Evans, E. Bindman","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00304001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00304001","url":null,"abstract":"This article serves as an introduction to this special issue on recent developments in civil society organization and strategies in Russia. Despite the widespread assumption that the increased restrictions placed on NGO activity by the state in recent years have hampered their ability to operate, we argue that civil society in Russia continues to show signs of vitality. This is demonstrated by the fact that protests by ordinary Russians have grown and have often led to the formation of new groups and movements which have had some success in campaigning on specific issues. As the articles in this special issue highlight, one of the key tools affecting whether or not such movements can be successful in achieving their aims is that of framing. When organizations are able to frame the issue they are campaigning on in such a way as to resonate with ordinary people and avoid directly challenging the balance of power within Russia’s political system, they tend to enjoy more success than those groups which tend to take a more confrontational stance and thus face greater pushback and sanction from the authorities. This serves to highlight that NGOs and other civil society groups in Russia employ a range of different strategies and enjoy very different relationships with the authorities as a result.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00304001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43245182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-08DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00304003
U. Pape
With more than one million people living with HIV, Russia is facing the biggest HIV epidemic in Europe and is one of the few countries in the world where infection rates are increasing. The response to the epidemic is shaped by the way Russian state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) view the issue of HIV and how they define policy priorities. In order to understand the factors that underlie HIV policies in Russia, this contribution analyses the framing of HIV. It thereby makes use of framing theory. Based on document analysis and interviews with NGO experts, the article differentiates between four main framings in Russia: the framing of HIV as a medical issue, as a security threat, as a moral problem or as a human rights concern. In Russia, the moral framing of HIV has become dominant over the past decade. The epidemic is increasingly viewed as the result of harmful influences from the West which need to be overcome. As a result, Russia has departed from evidence-based approaches to HIV. Instead, it solely focuses on strengthening so-called “traditional values”, e.g. by engaging in healthy lifestyle promotion. The moral framing of HIV has also impacted the mobilization potential of Russian NGOs, as it favour those organizations that relate to the dominant framing of HIV and support government priorities.
{"title":"Framing the Epidemic: NGOs and the Fight Against HIV/AIDS in Russia","authors":"U. Pape","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00304003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00304003","url":null,"abstract":"With more than one million people living with HIV, Russia is facing the biggest HIV epidemic in Europe and is one of the few countries in the world where infection rates are increasing. The response to the epidemic is shaped by the way Russian state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) view the issue of HIV and how they define policy priorities.\u0000In order to understand the factors that underlie HIV policies in Russia, this contribution analyses the framing of HIV. It thereby makes use of framing theory. Based on document analysis and interviews with NGO experts, the article differentiates between four main framings in Russia: the framing of HIV as a medical issue, as a security threat, as a moral problem or as a human rights concern.\u0000In Russia, the moral framing of HIV has become dominant over the past decade. The epidemic is increasingly viewed as the result of harmful influences from the West which need to be overcome. As a result, Russia has departed from evidence-based approaches to HIV. Instead, it solely focuses on strengthening so-called “traditional values”, e.g. by engaging in healthy lifestyle promotion. The moral framing of HIV has also impacted the mobilization potential of Russian NGOs, as it favour those organizations that relate to the dominant framing of HIV and support government priorities.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00304003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49049945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-08DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00304005
Alfred B. Evans
Most protests in Russia in recent years have not demanded the transformation of that country’s political regime. Instead, most of those protests have focused on specific policy goals that have reflected disruptions in the daily lives of groups of citizens. In 2017 a heated debate erupted when Sergei Sobianin, the Mayor of Moscow, announced a plan to demolish and replace hundreds of thousands of old apartments in that city. While many residents of those apartments welcomed that plan, many others charged that it threatened to infringe on their right of ownership of private property. The plan was subjected to vigorous criticism both at the grass roots level and the elite level. The national leadership and the government of Moscow became involved in revising the legislation to authorize Sobianin’s plan that had been introduced in the national legislature. Before the law was approved, the leaders had made a number of concessions to its critics.
{"title":"Property and Protests: The Struggle Over the Renovation of Housing in Moscow","authors":"Alfred B. Evans","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00304005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00304005","url":null,"abstract":"Most protests in Russia in recent years have not demanded the transformation of that country’s political regime. Instead, most of those protests have focused on specific policy goals that have reflected disruptions in the daily lives of groups of citizens. In 2017 a heated debate erupted when Sergei Sobianin, the Mayor of Moscow, announced a plan to demolish and replace hundreds of thousands of old apartments in that city. While many residents of those apartments welcomed that plan, many others charged that it threatened to infringe on their right of ownership of private property. The plan was subjected to vigorous criticism both at the grass roots level and the elite level. The national leadership and the government of Moscow became involved in revising the legislation to authorize Sobianin’s plan that had been introduced in the national legislature. Before the law was approved, the leaders had made a number of concessions to its critics.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00304005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41325815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-08DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00304002
Virginie Lasnier
An important literature on Russian civil society discusses its evolution, challenges, and prospects under Vladimir Putin. In particular, scholars show how the regime skillfully uses a mixture of coercive and channeling strategies to direct civil society into the ‘right path’, namely in the service of the regime. Perhaps the most glaring example of channeling strategies is the direct creation of CSOs from above, such as pro-regime youth groups. These groups are mean to orient public participation into accepted limits fixed by the state, often mimicking and duplicating grassroot organizations. But to what extent have they been effective in creating loyalty for the regime? In this paper, I focus on the little success that one of the most famous pro-regime youth groups, Nashi (Ours), paradoxically achieved in channeling civil society. While Nashi undeniably brought important benefits to some participants at the individual level, its effects at the societal level are significantly more limited. This is because, I argue, Nashi’s fate, just like many other state-projects, depended primarily on internal competition among self-interested elites. Instead of representing a coherent state strategy toward the youth and civil society, Nashi was mirroring the influence of power-maximizing individuals. The arguments of this paper are drawn from participant observations and from interviews with (then) current and former Nashi activists, as well as with other civil society experts
{"title":"Can Authoritarian Regimes Breed Loyalty? The Case of Nashi","authors":"Virginie Lasnier","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00304002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00304002","url":null,"abstract":"An important literature on Russian civil society discusses its evolution, challenges, and prospects under Vladimir Putin. In particular, scholars show how the regime skillfully uses a mixture of coercive and channeling strategies to direct civil society into the ‘right path’, namely in the service of the regime. Perhaps the most glaring example of channeling strategies is the direct creation of CSOs from above, such as pro-regime youth groups. These groups are mean to orient public participation into accepted limits fixed by the state, often mimicking and duplicating grassroot organizations. But to what extent have they been effective in creating loyalty for the regime? In this paper, I focus on the little success that one of the most famous pro-regime youth groups, Nashi (Ours), paradoxically achieved in channeling civil society. While Nashi undeniably brought important benefits to some participants at the individual level, its effects at the societal level are significantly more limited. This is because, I argue, Nashi’s fate, just like many other state-projects, depended primarily on internal competition among self-interested elites. Instead of representing a coherent state strategy toward the youth and civil society, Nashi was mirroring the influence of power-maximizing individuals. The arguments of this paper are drawn from participant observations and from interviews with (then) current and former Nashi activists, as well as with other civil society experts","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00304002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42580391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-29DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00303005
Irakli Gelukashvili
This article examines how the geopolitical representations operate in the Kremlin’s imaging and discursive framing in the context of Georgia’s desire to join NATO and the EU. Furthermore, this paper will look at the existence of permanent motives, continuity or discontinuity on the same issues and the same challenges related to Russia’s relations with Georgia over a nine-year period. Russian authorities employed various, tactically shifting and discursively inconsistent framings on the same issues to give the special meaning to the events, their immediate causes, and their implication for the Russian state.
{"title":"Georgia in Russia’s Discourse","authors":"Irakli Gelukashvili","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00303005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00303005","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines how the geopolitical representations operate in the Kremlin’s imaging and discursive framing in the context of Georgia’s desire to join NATO and the EU. Furthermore, this paper will look at the existence of permanent motives, continuity or discontinuity on the same issues and the same challenges related to Russia’s relations with Georgia over a nine-year period. Russian authorities employed various, tactically shifting and discursively inconsistent framings on the same issues to give the special meaning to the events, their immediate causes, and their implication for the Russian state.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00303005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42850030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-29DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00303002
Derek S. Hutcheson, I. McAllister
The 2018 Russian presidential election was effectively a contest not between Vladimir Putin and the other seven candidates on the ballot paper, but between Putin and the level of election turnout. Anything less than a large majority based on a respectable level of turnout would have undermined Putin’s legitimacy to serve for a further six-year term. In the event, Putin achieved his goal. In this paper we examine the background to the election and the conduct of the campaign, and analyse the result. Putin’s success can be traced to, first, long-standing patterns of differential turnout across the regions and, second, administrative initiatives by the election authorities which created a renewed confidence in the integrity of the election process. While there is evidence that those wishing to protest against Putin spoiled their votes, the impact of this was minor.
{"title":"Putin versus the Turnout? Mapping the Kremlin’s 2018 Presidential Election Support","authors":"Derek S. Hutcheson, I. McAllister","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00303002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00303002","url":null,"abstract":"The 2018 Russian presidential election was effectively a contest not between Vladimir Putin and the other seven candidates on the ballot paper, but between Putin and the level of election turnout. Anything less than a large majority based on a respectable level of turnout would have undermined Putin’s legitimacy to serve for a further six-year term. In the event, Putin achieved his goal. In this paper we examine the background to the election and the conduct of the campaign, and analyse the result. Putin’s success can be traced to, first, long-standing patterns of differential turnout across the regions and, second, administrative initiatives by the election authorities which created a renewed confidence in the integrity of the election process. While there is evidence that those wishing to protest against Putin spoiled their votes, the impact of this was minor.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00303002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49198066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-29DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00303003
A. E. Lyubarev
The article is devoted to the history of changes in the Russian electoral legislation from the beginning of alternative elections in 1989 to 2017. In the first period (1989–1995), the legislation was mainly adapted to the conditions of competitive elections. In 1997–2003, work was carried out to fill the gaps and overcome the negative phenomena that have manifested themselves in practice. The prevailing desire was to make election laws meet international democratic standards. In 2005–2007, a counter-reform took place, which was marked by the introduction of a number of restrictions and prohibitions aimed at ensuring the dominance of one political party. In 2009–2011, along with the introduction of new restrictions, a number of concessions were made to the opposition. After not too successful for the “United Russia” elections of 2011 and mass protests, the legislation was somewhat liberalized, but then again there was a tendency to restrictions and prohibitions. Only in 2017 began to manifest a timid trend towards democratization. The conclusion is made about the need for radical comprehensive electoral reform.
{"title":"How Russian Electoral Legislation has Changed","authors":"A. E. Lyubarev","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00303003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00303003","url":null,"abstract":"The article is devoted to the history of changes in the Russian electoral legislation from the beginning of alternative elections in 1989 to 2017. In the first period (1989–1995), the legislation was mainly adapted to the conditions of competitive elections. In 1997–2003, work was carried out to fill the gaps and overcome the negative phenomena that have manifested themselves in practice. The prevailing desire was to make election laws meet international democratic standards. In 2005–2007, a counter-reform took place, which was marked by the introduction of a number of restrictions and prohibitions aimed at ensuring the dominance of one political party. In 2009–2011, along with the introduction of new restrictions, a number of concessions were made to the opposition. After not too successful for the “United Russia” elections of 2011 and mass protests, the legislation was somewhat liberalized, but then again there was a tendency to restrictions and prohibitions. Only in 2017 began to manifest a timid trend towards democratization. The conclusion is made about the need for radical comprehensive electoral reform.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00303003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48670514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-29DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00303004
R. Turovsky, E. Korneeva
This study investigates the institutional influence on Russia’s regional voter turnout and establishes differences between federal and regional voter participation. Given the regional turnout in the 2011–2016 national and regional elections, the authors test the hypothesis that Russia’s turnout largely hinges on institutional rather than socio-economic factors. For a deeper analysis of electoral behavior, the researchers consider a range of institutional aspects applicable to the country’s regional peculiarities. Such an empirical approach demonstrates that different types of elections are conditioned by different indicators and metrics. Consequently, the analysis proves the relevance of institutional factors to voter turnout.
{"title":"The Institutional Impact on Voter Turnout: The Case of Russia and its Regions (2011–2016)","authors":"R. Turovsky, E. Korneeva","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00303004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00303004","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the institutional influence on Russia’s regional voter turnout and establishes differences between federal and regional voter participation. Given the regional turnout in the 2011–2016 national and regional elections, the authors test the hypothesis that Russia’s turnout largely hinges on institutional rather than socio-economic factors. For a deeper analysis of electoral behavior, the researchers consider a range of institutional aspects applicable to the country’s regional peculiarities. Such an empirical approach demonstrates that different types of elections are conditioned by different indicators and metrics. Consequently, the analysis proves the relevance of institutional factors to voter turnout.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00303004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44571983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-29DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00303006
Anna-Liisa Heusala
The article analyzes the evolution of Russian migration policy vis-à-vis national security thinking in a historical perspective. The idea put forward is that Russian migration policy is built on the early Soviet experiences of population control, in which ‘national security’ was an essential component of policy developments. In today’s conditions, the interconnectedness of transnational security challenges, such as large-scale migration, is an important factor that officially motivates Russia to emphasize pragmatic institutional choices. Russia has followed the global trend of securitization of legislation and administrative policies underlying the re-emergence of national security as an important policy framework. This ambitious framework is constrained by unfinished institutional changes and legacies rooted in the Soviet past. Migration continues to be an arena of policy-making where different interests override each other. Russian migration policy can best be described as an attempt to find a balance between economic incentives and security concerns, or between institutional pathologies and recycled dysfunctions and the need for modernization.
{"title":"The Soviet Legacy of ‘national security’ in Russian Migration Policy","authors":"Anna-Liisa Heusala","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00303006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00303006","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the evolution of Russian migration policy vis-à-vis national security thinking in a historical perspective. The idea put forward is that Russian migration policy is built on the early Soviet experiences of population control, in which ‘national security’ was an essential component of policy developments. In today’s conditions, the interconnectedness of transnational security challenges, such as large-scale migration, is an important factor that officially motivates Russia to emphasize pragmatic institutional choices. Russia has followed the global trend of securitization of legislation and administrative policies underlying the re-emergence of national security as an important policy framework. This ambitious framework is constrained by unfinished institutional changes and legacies rooted in the Soviet past. Migration continues to be an arena of policy-making where different interests override each other. Russian migration policy can best be described as an attempt to find a balance between economic incentives and security concerns, or between institutional pathologies and recycled dysfunctions and the need for modernization.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00303006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42666343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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