Pub Date : 2019-06-14DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00402004
Tuomas Forsberg, Sirke Mäkinen
This article addresses the question of how the Crimean case relates to Russia’s general understanding of territorial questions and border regimes. We examine the historical evolution of Russian discourse on borders and territorial questions and investigate to what extent they can explain Russia’s decision to annex Crimea. We will look into the principles of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity that sustain the status quo, and how this has been challenged by three partly interlinked doctrines: national self-determination, geopolitics, and historical rights. We argue that the discourse on territorial integrity and the status quo has predominated in Russia since the Cold War, and that this has not changed fundamentally, either before or after the annexation of Crimea. Russia does not seem to want to abolish the existing norms altogether or to advocate any clearly articulated reformist agenda. Rather, it picks and chooses arguments on an ad hoc basis, imitating Western positions in some other cases when departing from the basic norm of the status quo. Hence, we claim that Russia’s territorial revisionism is reactive, self-serving, and constrained by the desire to avoid changing the status quo doctrine to any great extent.
{"title":"Russian Discourse on Borders and Territorial Questions – Crimea as a Watershed?","authors":"Tuomas Forsberg, Sirke Mäkinen","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00402004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00402004","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses the question of how the Crimean case relates to Russia’s general understanding of territorial questions and border regimes. We examine the historical evolution of Russian discourse on borders and territorial questions and investigate to what extent they can explain Russia’s decision to annex Crimea. We will look into the principles of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity that sustain the status quo, and how this has been challenged by three partly interlinked doctrines: national self-determination, geopolitics, and historical rights. We argue that the discourse on territorial integrity and the status quo has predominated in Russia since the Cold War, and that this has not changed fundamentally, either before or after the annexation of Crimea. Russia does not seem to want to abolish the existing norms altogether or to advocate any clearly articulated reformist agenda. Rather, it picks and chooses arguments on an ad hoc basis, imitating Western positions in some other cases when departing from the basic norm of the status quo. Hence, we claim that Russia’s territorial revisionism is reactive, self-serving, and constrained by the desire to avoid changing the status quo doctrine to any great extent.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00402004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45026882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-27DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00401001
R. Sakwa
A revisionist state would seek to challenge the existing balance of power in the system and threaten the foundations of the system itself. This does not apply to contemporary Russia. It seeks to enhance its status within the existing framework of international society. Russian neo-revisionism does not attempt to create new rules or to advance an alternative model of the international system but to ensure the universal and consistent application of existing norms. Russia’s neo-revisionism represents a critique of western practices in defense of the universal proclaimed principles. It is not the principles of international law and governance that Russia condemns but the practices that accompany their implementation. This reflected Russia’s broader perception in the post-Cold War era that it was locked into a strategic stalemate, and that the country was forced into a politics of resistance. This has taken many forms, including the creation of an anti-hegemonic alignment with China and others. For Moscow, it was the West that had become revisionist, not Russia. Although the implementation of applicable norms was patchy, Russia did not repudiate them. In its relations with the European Union, Russia’s neo-revisionist stance means that it was unable to become simply the passive recipient of eu norms, and instead tried to become a co-creator of Europe’s destiny. The struggle is not only over contested norms, but also over who has the prerogative to claim their norms as universal. However, it was precisely at the level of practices that there was least room for compromise, and thus Russian neo-revisionism became another form of the impasse, and only intensified tensions between Russia and the Atlantic system.
{"title":"Russian Neo-Revisionism","authors":"R. Sakwa","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00401001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401001","url":null,"abstract":"A revisionist state would seek to challenge the existing balance of power in the system and threaten the foundations of the system itself. This does not apply to contemporary Russia. It seeks to enhance its status within the existing framework of international society. Russian neo-revisionism does not attempt to create new rules or to advance an alternative model of the international system but to ensure the universal and consistent application of existing norms. Russia’s neo-revisionism represents a critique of western practices in defense of the universal proclaimed principles. It is not the principles of international law and governance that Russia condemns but the practices that accompany their implementation. This reflected Russia’s broader perception in the post-Cold War era that it was locked into a strategic stalemate, and that the country was forced into a politics of resistance. This has taken many forms, including the creation of an anti-hegemonic alignment with China and others. For Moscow, it was the West that had become revisionist, not Russia. Although the implementation of applicable norms was patchy, Russia did not repudiate them. In its relations with the European Union, Russia’s neo-revisionist stance means that it was unable to become simply the passive recipient of eu norms, and instead tried to become a co-creator of Europe’s destiny. The struggle is not only over contested norms, but also over who has the prerogative to claim their norms as universal. However, it was precisely at the level of practices that there was least room for compromise, and thus Russian neo-revisionism became another form of the impasse, and only intensified tensions between Russia and the Atlantic system.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00401001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49505457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-27DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00401005
Andrew M. Akin
An ever-growing body of scholarship on Russian foreign policy focuses attention to redefining concepts such as sovereignty and power. Aggressive and successful Russian foreign policy initiatives in the last decade give urgency and relevancy to such initiatives, from invading Georgia to deploying an aircraft carrier to support ground operations in Syria. While these proactive Russian foreign policies may characterize a reclamation of Russia’s great power status in the international community, I argue that the goal of Russia’s foreign policy is to create a new system, not beholden to the u.s.-led Western world. By undermining the legitimacy of Western style democracy and pushing the boundaries of existing norms in the international community, Russian President Vladimir Putin offers a new construct for international relations: the polycentric world order. Using Role Theory, I discuss the domestic and international pressures on the Russian state to create its identity and the evolution of Russian roles in previous international systems. Formal leader statements and official policy documents provide evidence of the changing roles Russia plays in the international arena, while role theory provides an explanatory context for the purpose of new Russian foreign policy.
{"title":"Role Conceptions and Belligerent Foreign Policy: Why Russia is Remaking the International Order","authors":"Andrew M. Akin","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00401005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401005","url":null,"abstract":"An ever-growing body of scholarship on Russian foreign policy focuses attention to redefining concepts such as sovereignty and power. Aggressive and successful Russian foreign policy initiatives in the last decade give urgency and relevancy to such initiatives, from invading Georgia to deploying an aircraft carrier to support ground operations in Syria. While these proactive Russian foreign policies may characterize a reclamation of Russia’s great power status in the international community, I argue that the goal of Russia’s foreign policy is to create a new system, not beholden to the u.s.-led Western world. By undermining the legitimacy of Western style democracy and pushing the boundaries of existing norms in the international community, Russian President Vladimir Putin offers a new construct for international relations: the polycentric world order. Using Role Theory, I discuss the domestic and international pressures on the Russian state to create its identity and the evolution of Russian roles in previous international systems. Formal leader statements and official policy documents provide evidence of the changing roles Russia plays in the international arena, while role theory provides an explanatory context for the purpose of new Russian foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00401005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42562457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-27DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00401002
Mari Aburamoto
United Russia (ur), which has served as one of the pillars of Russian authoritarianism, experienced a radical decline in its support around the time of Putin’s return to Presidency. In this study, I examine the regime’s responses to the declining support for ur by focusing on the nuanced relationship between the regime and ur. Especially important in this context is that ur can be characterized as a “party of power” that is embedded in the political system; this allows the regime to be opportunistic toward the party, but there is also a limitation in the extent that the regime can distance itself from the party. I demonstrate that the regime took various measures, including the creation of the All-Russia People’s Front (onf) to escape the ire of voters; however, the range of responses adopted did not lead to the replacement of ur.
{"title":"An Indispensable Party of Power? United Russia and Putin’s Return to the Presidency, 2011–14","authors":"Mari Aburamoto","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00401002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401002","url":null,"abstract":"United Russia (ur), which has served as one of the pillars of Russian authoritarianism, experienced a radical decline in its support around the time of Putin’s return to Presidency. In this study, I examine the regime’s responses to the declining support for ur by focusing on the nuanced relationship between the regime and ur. Especially important in this context is that ur can be characterized as a “party of power” that is embedded in the political system; this allows the regime to be opportunistic toward the party, but there is also a limitation in the extent that the regime can distance itself from the party. I demonstrate that the regime took various measures, including the creation of the All-Russia People’s Front (onf) to escape the ire of voters; however, the range of responses adopted did not lead to the replacement of ur.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00401002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47522612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-27DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00401003
Alexey Levinson
The 2018 Russian presidential election was effectively a contest not between Vladimir Putin and the other seven candidates on the ballot paper, but between Putin and the level of election turnout. Anything less than a large majority based on a respectable level of turnout would have undermined Putin’s legitimacy to serve for a further six-year term. In the event, Putin achieved his goal. Through the analysis of public opinion polls conducted by the Levada Center, we examine the background to the election. Putin’s success can be traced, first to long-standing patterns of differential turnout across the regions and, second, administrative initiatives by the election authorities which created a renewed confidence in the integrity of the election process.
{"title":"Public Attitudes to Politics in Russia","authors":"Alexey Levinson","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00401003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401003","url":null,"abstract":"The 2018 Russian presidential election was effectively a contest not between Vladimir Putin and the other seven candidates on the ballot paper, but between Putin and the level of election turnout. Anything less than a large majority based on a respectable level of turnout would have undermined Putin’s legitimacy to serve for a further six-year term. In the event, Putin achieved his goal. Through the analysis of public opinion polls conducted by the Levada Center, we examine the background to the election. Putin’s success can be traced, first to long-standing patterns of differential turnout across the regions and, second, administrative initiatives by the election authorities which created a renewed confidence in the integrity of the election process.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00401003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46217166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-27DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00401004
S. Shkel
The regional machines created by the Russian governors in the mid-1990s turned out to be most effective in the ethnic republics. This phenomenon is supported by several facts, with the primary as follows: the density of the patronage networks among the rural ethnic minorities, and the economic heritage of the Soviet period and ethnical institutionalization. These factors allowed regional elites to integrate ethnic minorities into the clientelism structure to distribute symbolic and material benefits in exchange for their electoral support. However, at present, the federal authorities have considerably reduced the autonomy of the ethnic republics and deprived them of many ethnic preferences. Basing on the analysis of the electoral statistics from the Russian Presidential Election of 2018, this article researches the political consequences caused by the changed relationship between the center and the regions, as well as the changes in functioning of regional political machines in the circumstances where the governors’ institutional and resource autonomy has been reduced. The data analysis allowed for the discovery of the diversified electoral behavior of ethnic minorities in different republics. The reasons for the above diversification have been explained based on a comparative analysis of five case studies (the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Tatarstan, the Komi Republic, the Chuvash Republic, and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)).
{"title":"Bastions of Tradition: The Ethnic Factor and Political Machines in Russian Regions","authors":"S. Shkel","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00401004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401004","url":null,"abstract":"The regional machines created by the Russian governors in the mid-1990s turned out to be most effective in the ethnic republics. This phenomenon is supported by several facts, with the primary as follows: the density of the patronage networks among the rural ethnic minorities, and the economic heritage of the Soviet period and ethnical institutionalization. These factors allowed regional elites to integrate ethnic minorities into the clientelism structure to distribute symbolic and material benefits in exchange for their electoral support. However, at present, the federal authorities have considerably reduced the autonomy of the ethnic republics and deprived them of many ethnic preferences. Basing on the analysis of the electoral statistics from the Russian Presidential Election of 2018, this article researches the political consequences caused by the changed relationship between the center and the regions, as well as the changes in functioning of regional political machines in the circumstances where the governors’ institutional and resource autonomy has been reduced. The data analysis allowed for the discovery of the diversified electoral behavior of ethnic minorities in different republics. The reasons for the above diversification have been explained based on a comparative analysis of five case studies (the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Tatarstan, the Komi Republic, the Chuvash Republic, and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)).","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00401004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44973598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-08DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00304004
Elizabeth Plantan
Despite the increasingly authoritarian atmosphere in Russia and China, mass protests in both countries are pervasive, including protest motivated by environmental grievances. Existing scholarship often focuses on the sources, spread, or volume of mass mobilization, but few examine how civil society actors themselves evaluate the tactic. How does the state respond to environmentally-motivated mass mobilization? In light of the state’s response, how have activists altered their approach to mass mobilization over time? Using case studies and interviews, I find that Russian and Chinese environmental groups approach mass mobilization in distinct ways. Over time, Russian activists have increasingly turned to mass tactics, including coordinated regional protest. Meanwhile, Chinese ENGOs have reduced their formal involvement in such campaigns, limiting visible horizontal linkages between environmental groups. These approaches are shaped by the different historical legacies of mass mobilization in either country, which also shape state perceptions of the threat posed by environmental activism.
{"title":"Mass Mobilization in China and Russia: From Unexpected Victories to Unintended Consequences","authors":"Elizabeth Plantan","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00304004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00304004","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the increasingly authoritarian atmosphere in Russia and China, mass protests in both countries are pervasive, including protest motivated by environmental grievances. Existing scholarship often focuses on the sources, spread, or volume of mass mobilization, but few examine how civil society actors themselves evaluate the tactic. How does the state respond to environmentally-motivated mass mobilization? In light of the state’s response, how have activists altered their approach to mass mobilization over time? Using case studies and interviews, I find that Russian and Chinese environmental groups approach mass mobilization in distinct ways. Over time, Russian activists have increasingly turned to mass tactics, including coordinated regional protest. Meanwhile, Chinese ENGOs have reduced their formal involvement in such campaigns, limiting visible horizontal linkages between environmental groups. These approaches are shaped by the different historical legacies of mass mobilization in either country, which also shape state perceptions of the threat posed by environmental activism.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00304004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45482060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-08DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00304001
Alfred B. Evans, E. Bindman
This article serves as an introduction to this special issue on recent developments in civil society organization and strategies in Russia. Despite the widespread assumption that the increased restrictions placed on NGO activity by the state in recent years have hampered their ability to operate, we argue that civil society in Russia continues to show signs of vitality. This is demonstrated by the fact that protests by ordinary Russians have grown and have often led to the formation of new groups and movements which have had some success in campaigning on specific issues. As the articles in this special issue highlight, one of the key tools affecting whether or not such movements can be successful in achieving their aims is that of framing. When organizations are able to frame the issue they are campaigning on in such a way as to resonate with ordinary people and avoid directly challenging the balance of power within Russia’s political system, they tend to enjoy more success than those groups which tend to take a more confrontational stance and thus face greater pushback and sanction from the authorities. This serves to highlight that NGOs and other civil society groups in Russia employ a range of different strategies and enjoy very different relationships with the authorities as a result.
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"Alfred B. Evans, E. Bindman","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00304001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00304001","url":null,"abstract":"This article serves as an introduction to this special issue on recent developments in civil society organization and strategies in Russia. Despite the widespread assumption that the increased restrictions placed on NGO activity by the state in recent years have hampered their ability to operate, we argue that civil society in Russia continues to show signs of vitality. This is demonstrated by the fact that protests by ordinary Russians have grown and have often led to the formation of new groups and movements which have had some success in campaigning on specific issues. As the articles in this special issue highlight, one of the key tools affecting whether or not such movements can be successful in achieving their aims is that of framing. When organizations are able to frame the issue they are campaigning on in such a way as to resonate with ordinary people and avoid directly challenging the balance of power within Russia’s political system, they tend to enjoy more success than those groups which tend to take a more confrontational stance and thus face greater pushback and sanction from the authorities. This serves to highlight that NGOs and other civil society groups in Russia employ a range of different strategies and enjoy very different relationships with the authorities as a result.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00304001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43245182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-11-08DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00304003
U. Pape
With more than one million people living with HIV, Russia is facing the biggest HIV epidemic in Europe and is one of the few countries in the world where infection rates are increasing. The response to the epidemic is shaped by the way Russian state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) view the issue of HIV and how they define policy priorities. In order to understand the factors that underlie HIV policies in Russia, this contribution analyses the framing of HIV. It thereby makes use of framing theory. Based on document analysis and interviews with NGO experts, the article differentiates between four main framings in Russia: the framing of HIV as a medical issue, as a security threat, as a moral problem or as a human rights concern. In Russia, the moral framing of HIV has become dominant over the past decade. The epidemic is increasingly viewed as the result of harmful influences from the West which need to be overcome. As a result, Russia has departed from evidence-based approaches to HIV. Instead, it solely focuses on strengthening so-called “traditional values”, e.g. by engaging in healthy lifestyle promotion. The moral framing of HIV has also impacted the mobilization potential of Russian NGOs, as it favour those organizations that relate to the dominant framing of HIV and support government priorities.
{"title":"Framing the Epidemic: NGOs and the Fight Against HIV/AIDS in Russia","authors":"U. Pape","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00304003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00304003","url":null,"abstract":"With more than one million people living with HIV, Russia is facing the biggest HIV epidemic in Europe and is one of the few countries in the world where infection rates are increasing. The response to the epidemic is shaped by the way Russian state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) view the issue of HIV and how they define policy priorities.\u0000In order to understand the factors that underlie HIV policies in Russia, this contribution analyses the framing of HIV. It thereby makes use of framing theory. Based on document analysis and interviews with NGO experts, the article differentiates between four main framings in Russia: the framing of HIV as a medical issue, as a security threat, as a moral problem or as a human rights concern.\u0000In Russia, the moral framing of HIV has become dominant over the past decade. The epidemic is increasingly viewed as the result of harmful influences from the West which need to be overcome. As a result, Russia has departed from evidence-based approaches to HIV. Instead, it solely focuses on strengthening so-called “traditional values”, e.g. by engaging in healthy lifestyle promotion. The moral framing of HIV has also impacted the mobilization potential of Russian NGOs, as it favour those organizations that relate to the dominant framing of HIV and support government priorities.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00304003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49049945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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