Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00603005
Maksim Kulaev
Protests in today’s Russia are still influenced by trends emerged in the 2000s. According to Graeme B. Robertson, in the second half of the 2000s, the repertoire of the Russian protest changed and direct actions were replaced by symbolic actions. The article argues that protest trends and changes in the repertoire of actions were accompanied by the formation of widespread political perceptions among protesters. These perceptions reflected and influenced transformations of Russian protest movements. The article analyzes political discourses of three lifestyle media outlets, namely Afisha, Bol’shoi Gorod, Esquire, GQ and Epic Hero. All of them drew attention to protests and elaborated their own vision of preferable protest methods. This vision denounced direct actions and advocated constructive and non-antagonistic relations between protesters and the authorities.
{"title":"Lifestyle Media and Changing Political Perceptions Among Russian Protesters in the Second Half of the 2000s","authors":"Maksim Kulaev","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00603005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00603005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Protests in today’s Russia are still influenced by trends emerged in the 2000s. According to Graeme B. Robertson, in the second half of the 2000s, the repertoire of the Russian protest changed and direct actions were replaced by symbolic actions. The article argues that protest trends and changes in the repertoire of actions were accompanied by the formation of widespread political perceptions among protesters. These perceptions reflected and influenced transformations of Russian protest movements. The article analyzes political discourses of three lifestyle media outlets, namely Afisha, Bol’shoi Gorod, Esquire, GQ and Epic Hero. All of them drew attention to protests and elaborated their own vision of preferable protest methods. This vision denounced direct actions and advocated constructive and non-antagonistic relations between protesters and the authorities.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49494986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00603004
Derek S. Hutcheson, I. McAllister
In July 2020, Russian voters gave strong support to a package of constitutional reforms that reconfigured the Russian political system and enshrined social guarantees and conservative identity values, consolidating the regime that has been built over a 20-year period. This was achieved through an alteration that ‘zeroed’ presidential terms that commenced before the constitutional change, potentially allowing President Vladimir Putin to overcome term limits and continue in office beyond 2024. The article explains how such a far-reaching and important change was successfully endorsed by the Russian electorate. The analysis shows that the main explanation rests with variations in voting patterns across the regions, a pattern that has been evident in previous Russian elections and resulted in strong pro-Putin support. The article also evaluates questions raised about the legitimacy of the result, and its long-term significance for the Russian political system.
{"title":"Consolidating the Putin Regime: The 2020 Referendum on Russia’s Constitutional Amendments","authors":"Derek S. Hutcheson, I. McAllister","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00603004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00603004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In July 2020, Russian voters gave strong support to a package of constitutional reforms that reconfigured the Russian political system and enshrined social guarantees and conservative identity values, consolidating the regime that has been built over a 20-year period. This was achieved through an alteration that ‘zeroed’ presidential terms that commenced before the constitutional change, potentially allowing President Vladimir Putin to overcome term limits and continue in office beyond 2024. The article explains how such a far-reaching and important change was successfully endorsed by the Russian electorate. The analysis shows that the main explanation rests with variations in voting patterns across the regions, a pattern that has been evident in previous Russian elections and resulted in strong pro-Putin support. The article also evaluates questions raised about the legitimacy of the result, and its long-term significance for the Russian political system.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46119234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-02DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00602002
Ekaterina Paustyan
This paper studies the signing of bilateral treaties between the federal and regional governments of Russia in the period of 1994–1998. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 64 cases suggests that by signing bilateral treaties in exchange for political support President Yeltsin built a broad coalition with subnational leaders. This strategy allowed Yeltsin to win the 1996 presidential election but, in the long run, contributed to the preservation of authoritarian enclaves in Russia. The results are in line with the argument that authoritarian consolidation in Russia during the 2000s was deeply embedded in the center-region relations of the 1990s.
{"title":"A Treaty for the Rich and Politically Loyal? Explaining the Bilateral Center-Region Treaties in Post-Soviet Russia","authors":"Ekaterina Paustyan","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00602002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00602002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This paper studies the signing of bilateral treaties between the federal and regional governments of Russia in the period of 1994–1998. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 64 cases suggests that by signing bilateral treaties in exchange for political support President Yeltsin built a broad coalition with subnational leaders. This strategy allowed Yeltsin to win the 1996 presidential election but, in the long run, contributed to the preservation of authoritarian enclaves in Russia. The results are in line with the argument that authoritarian consolidation in Russia during the 2000s was deeply embedded in the center-region relations of the 1990s.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43717586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-30DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00601001
W. Pomeranz, R. Smyth
The articles in this issue explore the longer-term implications of Russia’s 2020 Constitutional Reform process. Assessing constitutional change from different theoretical and empirical approaches, these authors find that the constitution largely codified the status-quo as it had evolved over the past decade. The resulting institutional changes solidified the personalist political system that concentrates power in one leader. These reforms also created new mechanisms to preclude elite defection and generate societal quiescence. At the same time, the three-staged reform process that included formal adoption, national vote, and legal reconciliation, introduced new political risk by raising societal expectations, reinforcing cleavages through patriotic legitimization strategies, introducing new rigid structures, and relying on personalism and networks over institutional governance. These risks do not predict state failure but they suggest new challenges that will continue to shape Russian political development.
{"title":"Russia’s 2020 Constitutional Reform: The Politics of Institutionalizing the Status-Quo","authors":"W. Pomeranz, R. Smyth","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00601001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00601001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The articles in this issue explore the longer-term implications of Russia’s 2020 Constitutional Reform process. Assessing constitutional change from different theoretical and empirical approaches, these authors find that the constitution largely codified the status-quo as it had evolved over the past decade. The resulting institutional changes solidified the personalist political system that concentrates power in one leader. These reforms also created new mechanisms to preclude elite defection and generate societal quiescence. At the same time, the three-staged reform process that included formal adoption, national vote, and legal reconciliation, introduced new political risk by raising societal expectations, reinforcing cleavages through patriotic legitimization strategies, introducing new rigid structures, and relying on personalism and networks over institutional governance. These risks do not predict state failure but they suggest new challenges that will continue to shape Russian political development.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43476360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-30DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00601008
Benjamin S. Noble, N. Petrov
Although 4 July 2020 saw the coming into force of constitutional changes in Russia, this was far from the end of the story. Most clearly, these changes to the 1993 constitution required implementation, including through amendments to, and the writing of new pieces of, federal legislation. In part, this process was the mundane work of legal bureaucrats, tweaking and creating many pieces of legislation to reflect the new constitutional text. But the implementation process also reveals much more about the broader constitutional reform project. This article reviews the implementation process, discussing its complexity, the improvisation shown when fleshing out certain new constitutional details, its relationship with other political developments, and the chasm laid bare between Putin’s promise of the rebalancing of power in his 15 January 2020 Address to the Federal Assembly versus the reality of reform in practice.
{"title":"From Constitution to Law: Implementing the 2020 Russian Constitutional Changes","authors":"Benjamin S. Noble, N. Petrov","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00601008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00601008","url":null,"abstract":"Although 4 July 2020 saw the coming into force of constitutional changes in Russia, this was far from the end of the story. Most clearly, these changes to the 1993 constitution required implementation, including through amendments to, and the writing of new pieces of, federal legislation. In part, this process was the mundane work of legal bureaucrats, tweaking and creating many pieces of legislation to reflect the new constitutional text. But the implementation process also reveals much more about the broader constitutional reform project. This article reviews the implementation process, discussing its complexity, the improvisation shown when fleshing out certain new constitutional details, its relationship with other political developments, and the chasm laid bare between Putin’s promise of the rebalancing of power in his 15 January 2020 Address to the Federal Assembly versus the reality of reform in practice.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48440843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-16DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00502005
A. Semenov
This paper documents the patterns of opposition parties’ engagement with street politics in Russia. It claims that in the electoral authoritarian regimes like Russia under Vladimir Putin, public protests remain a viable instrument for reaching out to the constituencies and eliciting concessions from the regime. In addition, collective actions signal commitment and strength and help to overcome the media blockade usually imposed by the state. However, in order to be a successful player in contentious politics, parties have to develop organizational capacity. Using the data on more than 7000 protest events that took place in Russia in 2012–2015, I show that the regional party branches with higher electoral returns in federal and regional elections organize more protest events controlling for other possible determinants of mobilization. The Communist Party remains the major mobilizing force covering a large array of issues and demands. However, the loyal opposition—LDPR and Just Russia—and the liberal parties like Yabloko and People’s Freedom Party also consistently stage the public protests with their electoral performance on the regional level being associated with the level of their protest activity. Overall, the study shows that the organizational capacity of the opposition is necessary though insufficient condition for the parties to engage with street politics.
{"title":"Electoral Performance and Mobilization of Opposition Parties in Russia","authors":"A. Semenov","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00502005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00502005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This paper documents the patterns of opposition parties’ engagement with street politics in Russia. It claims that in the electoral authoritarian regimes like Russia under Vladimir Putin, public protests remain a viable instrument for reaching out to the constituencies and eliciting concessions from the regime. In addition, collective actions signal commitment and strength and help to overcome the media blockade usually imposed by the state. However, in order to be a successful player in contentious politics, parties have to develop organizational capacity. Using the data on more than 7000 protest events that took place in Russia in 2012–2015, I show that the regional party branches with higher electoral returns in federal and regional elections organize more protest events controlling for other possible determinants of mobilization. The Communist Party remains the major mobilizing force covering a large array of issues and demands. However, the loyal opposition—LDPR and Just Russia—and the liberal parties like Yabloko and People’s Freedom Party also consistently stage the public protests with their electoral performance on the regional level being associated with the level of their protest activity. Overall, the study shows that the organizational capacity of the opposition is necessary though insufficient condition for the parties to engage with street politics.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45138765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-16DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00502002
A. Kynev
This article examines the outcomes of renewal of personnel in the Russian regional authorities during different stages of their development: 1991–1995 (primarily assigned based on elections in individual regions), 1995–2005 (the period of mass direct elections), 2005–2012 (a system of appointment based on the president’s nomination), and 2012–2018 (elections via a municipal filter). It attempts to aggregate and analyse the instances where the heads of regional authorities were elected (or appointed) despite having no previous relationship to those regions (outsider politicians). It offers a classification system for these outsiders, distinguishing “pure outsiders”, “returnees”, “adapted outsiders”, “naturalised outsiders” and “federalised locals”.
{"title":"The Membership of Governors’ Teams in Russia’s Regions, and the Key Features of the Formation of Regional Administrations 1991–2018","authors":"A. Kynev","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00502002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00502002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article examines the outcomes of renewal of personnel in the Russian regional authorities during different stages of their development: 1991–1995 (primarily assigned based on elections in individual regions), 1995–2005 (the period of mass direct elections), 2005–2012 (a system of appointment based on the president’s nomination), and 2012–2018 (elections via a municipal filter). It attempts to aggregate and analyse the instances where the heads of regional authorities were elected (or appointed) despite having no previous relationship to those regions (outsider politicians). It offers a classification system for these outsiders, distinguishing “pure outsiders”, “returnees”, “adapted outsiders”, “naturalised outsiders” and “federalised locals”.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46042793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-16DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00502003
A. E. Lyubarev
The article discusses defects of Russian elections, with emphasis on the fact that the electoral systems being used favour the regime. The system used for registration of candidates and party lists allows the state to deny access to strong candidates whose election would inconvenience the state bureaucracy. Pro-government candidates are advantaged during election campaigns, as segments of the population that are dependent upon the state find themselves pressured to participate, sometimes including outright control of their vote. Furthermore, many regions experience large-scale electoral fraud. The article suggests means to overcome these defects, including a comprehensive revision of electoral legislation.
{"title":"Defects of Russian Elections and Ways to Overcome Them","authors":"A. E. Lyubarev","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00502003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00502003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The article discusses defects of Russian elections, with emphasis on the fact that the electoral systems being used favour the regime. The system used for registration of candidates and party lists allows the state to deny access to strong candidates whose election would inconvenience the state bureaucracy. Pro-government candidates are advantaged during election campaigns, as segments of the population that are dependent upon the state find themselves pressured to participate, sometimes including outright control of their vote. Furthermore, many regions experience large-scale electoral fraud. The article suggests means to overcome these defects, including a comprehensive revision of electoral legislation.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48751187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00501005
Vahid Nick Pay, Harry Gray Calvo
International interest in the Arctic is heating up along with the planet’s atmosphere and the region is increasingly presented as a new potential hotspot for inter-state competition and discord. Inevitably, Russia is often at the centre of this implicitly ‘realist’ narrative. This study provides an evaluation of Moscow’s Arctic policy between 2000 and 2019 from an international relation theory perspective by building upon the burgeoning literature on the Arctic and sources on Russian foreign policy in general. This study postulates that several elements of Russian regional policy in the High North do indeed follow realist readings of the international politics yet it also demonstrates how structural realism fails to adequately account for the institutionalization of regional relations and, most notably, neglects the importance of domestic factors, specifically historical memory, towards understanding Moscow’s contemporary Arctic policy.
{"title":"Arctic Diplomacy: A Theoretical Evaluation of Russian Foreign Policy in the High North","authors":"Vahid Nick Pay, Harry Gray Calvo","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00501005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00501005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000International interest in the Arctic is heating up along with the planet’s atmosphere and the region is increasingly presented as a new potential hotspot for inter-state competition and discord. Inevitably, Russia is often at the centre of this implicitly ‘realist’ narrative. This study provides an evaluation of Moscow’s Arctic policy between 2000 and 2019 from an international relation theory perspective by building upon the burgeoning literature on the Arctic and sources on Russian foreign policy in general. This study postulates that several elements of Russian regional policy in the High North do indeed follow realist readings of the international politics yet it also demonstrates how structural realism fails to adequately account for the institutionalization of regional relations and, most notably, neglects the importance of domestic factors, specifically historical memory, towards understanding Moscow’s contemporary Arctic policy.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47925816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-02DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00501003
Matthew Blackburn
This paper explores how urban Russians perceive, negotiate, challenge and reaffirm the political configuration of the country and leadership in terms of the ‘imagined nation’. Based on around 100 interviews in three Russian cities, three main pillars appear to prop up the imagined ‘pro-Putin’ social contract: (i) the belief that ‘delegating’ all power into the hands of the President is the best way to discipline and mould state and society; (ii) the acceptance of Putin’s carefully crafted image as a ‘real man’, juxtaposed against negative views of the Russian ‘national character’; (iii) the internalization of a pro-Putin mythology on a ‘government of saviors’ that delivers normality and redeems a ‘once-ruined’ nation. The paper shows that those who reject these pillars do so due to differing views on what constitutes ‘normality’ in politics. This normative split is examined over a number of issues, leading to a discussion of internal orientalism and the limited success of state media agitation in winning over the skeptical.
{"title":"Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Russia ‘from Below’: ‘Pro-Putin’ Stances, the Normative Split and Imagining Two Russias","authors":"Matthew Blackburn","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00501003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00501003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This paper explores how urban Russians perceive, negotiate, challenge and reaffirm the political configuration of the country and leadership in terms of the ‘imagined nation’. Based on around 100 interviews in three Russian cities, three main pillars appear to prop up the imagined ‘pro-Putin’ social contract: (i) the belief that ‘delegating’ all power into the hands of the President is the best way to discipline and mould state and society; (ii) the acceptance of Putin’s carefully crafted image as a ‘real man’, juxtaposed against negative views of the Russian ‘national character’; (iii) the internalization of a pro-Putin mythology on a ‘government of saviors’ that delivers normality and redeems a ‘once-ruined’ nation. The paper shows that those who reject these pillars do so due to differing views on what constitutes ‘normality’ in politics. This normative split is examined over a number of issues, leading to a discussion of internal orientalism and the limited success of state media agitation in winning over the skeptical.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44941816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}