Pub Date : 2019-06-14DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00402003
B. Taylor
Security issues were a central part of Soviet studies. This article considers how the study of security issues has changed with respect to Russia and Eurasia since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It highlights a series of positive changes: a broadening of vision beyond Moscow, more engagement with mainstream social science, greater attention to security issues internal to post-Soviet states, and the creation of an expert community that spans North America, Europe, and Eurasia. At the same time, I argue that scholarship on Russian and Eurasian security issues has become less strategic, in the sense this word is used by Richard Betts – about the interaction of political ends and military means, rooted in an appreciation of military science. The academy, especially in North America, has become a less welcoming place for scholars working on Russia and Eurasia who care about previously central issues in the field such as nuclear strategy, weapons procurement, military doctrine, and defense planning.
{"title":"What Happened to Soviet Security Studies?: An Essay on the State of the Field","authors":"B. Taylor","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00402003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00402003","url":null,"abstract":"Security issues were a central part of Soviet studies. This article considers how the study of security issues has changed with respect to Russia and Eurasia since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It highlights a series of positive changes: a broadening of vision beyond Moscow, more engagement with mainstream social science, greater attention to security issues internal to post-Soviet states, and the creation of an expert community that spans North America, Europe, and Eurasia. At the same time, I argue that scholarship on Russian and Eurasian security issues has become less strategic, in the sense this word is used by Richard Betts – about the interaction of political ends and military means, rooted in an appreciation of military science. The academy, especially in North America, has become a less welcoming place for scholars working on Russia and Eurasia who care about previously central issues in the field such as nuclear strategy, weapons procurement, military doctrine, and defense planning.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00402003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43658306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-14DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00402004
Tuomas Forsberg, Sirke Mäkinen
This article addresses the question of how the Crimean case relates to Russia’s general understanding of territorial questions and border regimes. We examine the historical evolution of Russian discourse on borders and territorial questions and investigate to what extent they can explain Russia’s decision to annex Crimea. We will look into the principles of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity that sustain the status quo, and how this has been challenged by three partly interlinked doctrines: national self-determination, geopolitics, and historical rights. We argue that the discourse on territorial integrity and the status quo has predominated in Russia since the Cold War, and that this has not changed fundamentally, either before or after the annexation of Crimea. Russia does not seem to want to abolish the existing norms altogether or to advocate any clearly articulated reformist agenda. Rather, it picks and chooses arguments on an ad hoc basis, imitating Western positions in some other cases when departing from the basic norm of the status quo. Hence, we claim that Russia’s territorial revisionism is reactive, self-serving, and constrained by the desire to avoid changing the status quo doctrine to any great extent.
{"title":"Russian Discourse on Borders and Territorial Questions – Crimea as a Watershed?","authors":"Tuomas Forsberg, Sirke Mäkinen","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00402004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00402004","url":null,"abstract":"This article addresses the question of how the Crimean case relates to Russia’s general understanding of territorial questions and border regimes. We examine the historical evolution of Russian discourse on borders and territorial questions and investigate to what extent they can explain Russia’s decision to annex Crimea. We will look into the principles of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity that sustain the status quo, and how this has been challenged by three partly interlinked doctrines: national self-determination, geopolitics, and historical rights. We argue that the discourse on territorial integrity and the status quo has predominated in Russia since the Cold War, and that this has not changed fundamentally, either before or after the annexation of Crimea. Russia does not seem to want to abolish the existing norms altogether or to advocate any clearly articulated reformist agenda. Rather, it picks and chooses arguments on an ad hoc basis, imitating Western positions in some other cases when departing from the basic norm of the status quo. Hence, we claim that Russia’s territorial revisionism is reactive, self-serving, and constrained by the desire to avoid changing the status quo doctrine to any great extent.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00402004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45026882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-14DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00402006
R. I. Zalyaev
The article deals with issues relating to the establishment of regional political parties in Russia. We assess the requirements imposed by the Political Parties Act (Federal Law 95-FZ of 11 July 2001) on the number of regional branches of a political party and analyze whether those requirements, which set an indirect ban on the creation and the activities of regional political parties, comply with the right of individuals to freedom of association. One of the conclusions made in the article is that the legislative restriction on the right to freedom of association introduced by the Political Parties Act as an indirect ban on the creation and the activities of regional political parties in Russia is excessive, it is disproportionate to the objective sought to be achieved by the measure in question and hinders the exercise of the right to freedom of association at the regional territorial level.
{"title":"On the Issue of Regional Political Parties in Russia","authors":"R. I. Zalyaev","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00402006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00402006","url":null,"abstract":"The article deals with issues relating to the establishment of regional political parties in Russia. We assess the requirements imposed by the Political Parties Act (Federal Law 95-FZ of 11 July 2001) on the number of regional branches of a political party and analyze whether those requirements, which set an indirect ban on the creation and the activities of regional political parties, comply with the right of individuals to freedom of association. One of the conclusions made in the article is that the legislative restriction on the right to freedom of association introduced by the Political Parties Act as an indirect ban on the creation and the activities of regional political parties in Russia is excessive, it is disproportionate to the objective sought to be achieved by the measure in question and hinders the exercise of the right to freedom of association at the regional territorial level.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00402006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49475501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-14DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00402001
A. Melville, A. Akhremenko, M. Mironyuk
There is a striking opposition within the current discourse on Russia’s position in the world. On the one hand, there are well-known arguments about Russia’s “weak hand” (relatively small and stagnating economy, vulnerability to sanctions, technological backwardness, deteriorating demography, corruption, bad institutions, etc.). On the other hand, Russia is accused of “global revisionism”, attempts to reshape and undermine the liberal world order, and Western democracy itself. There seems to be a paradox: Russia with a perceived decline of major resources of national power, exercises dramatically increased international influence. This paradox of power and/or influence is further explored. This paper introduces a new complex Index of national power. On the basis of ratings of countries authors compare the dynamics of distribution of power in the world with a focus on Russia’s national power in world politics since 1995. The analysis brings evidence that the cumulative resources of Russia’s power in international affairs did not increase during the last two decades. However, Russia’s influence in world politics has significantly increased as demonstrated by assertive foreign policy in different parts of the world and its perception by the international political community and the public. Russia remains a major power in today’s world, although some of its power resources are stagnating or decreasing in comparison to the US and rising China. To compensate for weaknesses Russia is using both traditional and nontraditional capabilities of international influence.
{"title":"What Russia Can Teach Us about Power and Influence in World Politics","authors":"A. Melville, A. Akhremenko, M. Mironyuk","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00402001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00402001","url":null,"abstract":"There is a striking opposition within the current discourse on Russia’s position in the world. On the one hand, there are well-known arguments about Russia’s “weak hand” (relatively small and stagnating economy, vulnerability to sanctions, technological backwardness, deteriorating demography, corruption, bad institutions, etc.). On the other hand, Russia is accused of “global revisionism”, attempts to reshape and undermine the liberal world order, and Western democracy itself. There seems to be a paradox: Russia with a perceived decline of major resources of national power, exercises dramatically increased international influence. This paradox of power and/or influence is further explored. This paper introduces a new complex Index of national power. On the basis of ratings of countries authors compare the dynamics of distribution of power in the world with a focus on Russia’s national power in world politics since 1995. The analysis brings evidence that the cumulative resources of Russia’s power in international affairs did not increase during the last two decades. However, Russia’s influence in world politics has significantly increased as demonstrated by assertive foreign policy in different parts of the world and its perception by the international political community and the public. Russia remains a major power in today’s world, although some of its power resources are stagnating or decreasing in comparison to the US and rising China. To compensate for weaknesses Russia is using both traditional and nontraditional capabilities of international influence.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00402001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48586360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-27DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00401001
R. Sakwa
A revisionist state would seek to challenge the existing balance of power in the system and threaten the foundations of the system itself. This does not apply to contemporary Russia. It seeks to enhance its status within the existing framework of international society. Russian neo-revisionism does not attempt to create new rules or to advance an alternative model of the international system but to ensure the universal and consistent application of existing norms. Russia’s neo-revisionism represents a critique of western practices in defense of the universal proclaimed principles. It is not the principles of international law and governance that Russia condemns but the practices that accompany their implementation. This reflected Russia’s broader perception in the post-Cold War era that it was locked into a strategic stalemate, and that the country was forced into a politics of resistance. This has taken many forms, including the creation of an anti-hegemonic alignment with China and others. For Moscow, it was the West that had become revisionist, not Russia. Although the implementation of applicable norms was patchy, Russia did not repudiate them. In its relations with the European Union, Russia’s neo-revisionist stance means that it was unable to become simply the passive recipient of eu norms, and instead tried to become a co-creator of Europe’s destiny. The struggle is not only over contested norms, but also over who has the prerogative to claim their norms as universal. However, it was precisely at the level of practices that there was least room for compromise, and thus Russian neo-revisionism became another form of the impasse, and only intensified tensions between Russia and the Atlantic system.
{"title":"Russian Neo-Revisionism","authors":"R. Sakwa","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00401001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401001","url":null,"abstract":"A revisionist state would seek to challenge the existing balance of power in the system and threaten the foundations of the system itself. This does not apply to contemporary Russia. It seeks to enhance its status within the existing framework of international society. Russian neo-revisionism does not attempt to create new rules or to advance an alternative model of the international system but to ensure the universal and consistent application of existing norms. Russia’s neo-revisionism represents a critique of western practices in defense of the universal proclaimed principles. It is not the principles of international law and governance that Russia condemns but the practices that accompany their implementation. This reflected Russia’s broader perception in the post-Cold War era that it was locked into a strategic stalemate, and that the country was forced into a politics of resistance. This has taken many forms, including the creation of an anti-hegemonic alignment with China and others. For Moscow, it was the West that had become revisionist, not Russia. Although the implementation of applicable norms was patchy, Russia did not repudiate them. In its relations with the European Union, Russia’s neo-revisionist stance means that it was unable to become simply the passive recipient of eu norms, and instead tried to become a co-creator of Europe’s destiny. The struggle is not only over contested norms, but also over who has the prerogative to claim their norms as universal. However, it was precisely at the level of practices that there was least room for compromise, and thus Russian neo-revisionism became another form of the impasse, and only intensified tensions between Russia and the Atlantic system.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00401001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49505457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-27DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00401005
Andrew M. Akin
An ever-growing body of scholarship on Russian foreign policy focuses attention to redefining concepts such as sovereignty and power. Aggressive and successful Russian foreign policy initiatives in the last decade give urgency and relevancy to such initiatives, from invading Georgia to deploying an aircraft carrier to support ground operations in Syria. While these proactive Russian foreign policies may characterize a reclamation of Russia’s great power status in the international community, I argue that the goal of Russia’s foreign policy is to create a new system, not beholden to the u.s.-led Western world. By undermining the legitimacy of Western style democracy and pushing the boundaries of existing norms in the international community, Russian President Vladimir Putin offers a new construct for international relations: the polycentric world order. Using Role Theory, I discuss the domestic and international pressures on the Russian state to create its identity and the evolution of Russian roles in previous international systems. Formal leader statements and official policy documents provide evidence of the changing roles Russia plays in the international arena, while role theory provides an explanatory context for the purpose of new Russian foreign policy.
{"title":"Role Conceptions and Belligerent Foreign Policy: Why Russia is Remaking the International Order","authors":"Andrew M. Akin","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00401005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401005","url":null,"abstract":"An ever-growing body of scholarship on Russian foreign policy focuses attention to redefining concepts such as sovereignty and power. Aggressive and successful Russian foreign policy initiatives in the last decade give urgency and relevancy to such initiatives, from invading Georgia to deploying an aircraft carrier to support ground operations in Syria. While these proactive Russian foreign policies may characterize a reclamation of Russia’s great power status in the international community, I argue that the goal of Russia’s foreign policy is to create a new system, not beholden to the u.s.-led Western world. By undermining the legitimacy of Western style democracy and pushing the boundaries of existing norms in the international community, Russian President Vladimir Putin offers a new construct for international relations: the polycentric world order. Using Role Theory, I discuss the domestic and international pressures on the Russian state to create its identity and the evolution of Russian roles in previous international systems. Formal leader statements and official policy documents provide evidence of the changing roles Russia plays in the international arena, while role theory provides an explanatory context for the purpose of new Russian foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00401005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42562457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-27DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00401002
Mari Aburamoto
United Russia (ur), which has served as one of the pillars of Russian authoritarianism, experienced a radical decline in its support around the time of Putin’s return to Presidency. In this study, I examine the regime’s responses to the declining support for ur by focusing on the nuanced relationship between the regime and ur. Especially important in this context is that ur can be characterized as a “party of power” that is embedded in the political system; this allows the regime to be opportunistic toward the party, but there is also a limitation in the extent that the regime can distance itself from the party. I demonstrate that the regime took various measures, including the creation of the All-Russia People’s Front (onf) to escape the ire of voters; however, the range of responses adopted did not lead to the replacement of ur.
{"title":"An Indispensable Party of Power? United Russia and Putin’s Return to the Presidency, 2011–14","authors":"Mari Aburamoto","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00401002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401002","url":null,"abstract":"United Russia (ur), which has served as one of the pillars of Russian authoritarianism, experienced a radical decline in its support around the time of Putin’s return to Presidency. In this study, I examine the regime’s responses to the declining support for ur by focusing on the nuanced relationship between the regime and ur. Especially important in this context is that ur can be characterized as a “party of power” that is embedded in the political system; this allows the regime to be opportunistic toward the party, but there is also a limitation in the extent that the regime can distance itself from the party. I demonstrate that the regime took various measures, including the creation of the All-Russia People’s Front (onf) to escape the ire of voters; however, the range of responses adopted did not lead to the replacement of ur.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00401002","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47522612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-27DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00401003
Alexey Levinson
The 2018 Russian presidential election was effectively a contest not between Vladimir Putin and the other seven candidates on the ballot paper, but between Putin and the level of election turnout. Anything less than a large majority based on a respectable level of turnout would have undermined Putin’s legitimacy to serve for a further six-year term. In the event, Putin achieved his goal. Through the analysis of public opinion polls conducted by the Levada Center, we examine the background to the election. Putin’s success can be traced, first to long-standing patterns of differential turnout across the regions and, second, administrative initiatives by the election authorities which created a renewed confidence in the integrity of the election process.
{"title":"Public Attitudes to Politics in Russia","authors":"Alexey Levinson","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00401003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401003","url":null,"abstract":"The 2018 Russian presidential election was effectively a contest not between Vladimir Putin and the other seven candidates on the ballot paper, but between Putin and the level of election turnout. Anything less than a large majority based on a respectable level of turnout would have undermined Putin’s legitimacy to serve for a further six-year term. In the event, Putin achieved his goal. Through the analysis of public opinion polls conducted by the Levada Center, we examine the background to the election. Putin’s success can be traced, first to long-standing patterns of differential turnout across the regions and, second, administrative initiatives by the election authorities which created a renewed confidence in the integrity of the election process.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00401003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46217166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-02-27DOI: 10.1163/2451-8921-00401004
S. Shkel
The regional machines created by the Russian governors in the mid-1990s turned out to be most effective in the ethnic republics. This phenomenon is supported by several facts, with the primary as follows: the density of the patronage networks among the rural ethnic minorities, and the economic heritage of the Soviet period and ethnical institutionalization. These factors allowed regional elites to integrate ethnic minorities into the clientelism structure to distribute symbolic and material benefits in exchange for their electoral support. However, at present, the federal authorities have considerably reduced the autonomy of the ethnic republics and deprived them of many ethnic preferences. Basing on the analysis of the electoral statistics from the Russian Presidential Election of 2018, this article researches the political consequences caused by the changed relationship between the center and the regions, as well as the changes in functioning of regional political machines in the circumstances where the governors’ institutional and resource autonomy has been reduced. The data analysis allowed for the discovery of the diversified electoral behavior of ethnic minorities in different republics. The reasons for the above diversification have been explained based on a comparative analysis of five case studies (the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Tatarstan, the Komi Republic, the Chuvash Republic, and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)).
{"title":"Bastions of Tradition: The Ethnic Factor and Political Machines in Russian Regions","authors":"S. Shkel","doi":"10.1163/2451-8921-00401004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00401004","url":null,"abstract":"The regional machines created by the Russian governors in the mid-1990s turned out to be most effective in the ethnic republics. This phenomenon is supported by several facts, with the primary as follows: the density of the patronage networks among the rural ethnic minorities, and the economic heritage of the Soviet period and ethnical institutionalization. These factors allowed regional elites to integrate ethnic minorities into the clientelism structure to distribute symbolic and material benefits in exchange for their electoral support. However, at present, the federal authorities have considerably reduced the autonomy of the ethnic republics and deprived them of many ethnic preferences. Basing on the analysis of the electoral statistics from the Russian Presidential Election of 2018, this article researches the political consequences caused by the changed relationship between the center and the regions, as well as the changes in functioning of regional political machines in the circumstances where the governors’ institutional and resource autonomy has been reduced. The data analysis allowed for the discovery of the diversified electoral behavior of ethnic minorities in different republics. The reasons for the above diversification have been explained based on a comparative analysis of five case studies (the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Tatarstan, the Komi Republic, the Chuvash Republic, and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)).","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/2451-8921-00401004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44973598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：