Pub Date : 2023-03-07DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00801002
P. Rutland
This article charts the trajectory of Putin’s economic policy. All countries face the challenge of preserving national interests and identity while reaping the benefits of global economic integration. These pressures are particularly acute in the case of Russia, given its historical legacy as a global superpower. From the outset, Putin’s pragmatic embrace of global integration and market incentives was in tension with his authoritarian centralization of power at home and hostility towards the West abroad. Up until 2008, Putin was able to keep these two conflicting worldviews, and rival policy teams, in balance. But after 2012, geopolitical confrontation won out over economic development, culminating in the reckless invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
{"title":"The Contradictions in Putin’s Economic Nationalism: From Western Partner to Fortress Russia","authors":"P. Rutland","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00801002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00801002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article charts the trajectory of Putin’s economic policy. All countries face the challenge of preserving national interests and identity while reaping the benefits of global economic integration. These pressures are particularly acute in the case of Russia, given its historical legacy as a global superpower. From the outset, Putin’s pragmatic embrace of global integration and market incentives was in tension with his authoritarian centralization of power at home and hostility towards the West abroad. Up until 2008, Putin was able to keep these two conflicting worldviews, and rival policy teams, in balance. But after 2012, geopolitical confrontation won out over economic development, culminating in the reckless invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42867102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-07DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00801001
N. Robinson
Russia’s need to modernize in order both to provide for its peoples and deliver on the ambitions of its rulers are perennial. The articles in this special edition speak to the difficulties that Russia has in modernizing and the hybridity that it demonstrates as modernization and economic development have been shaped by compromise and historical legacies. This introductory article introduces some of these themes by looking at how Russia has reproduced forms of what are called ‘regime-supporting economy’, forms of economy that generate resources to support particular political configurations in power whilst limiting resource accumulation, redistribution and institution-building that can deal with all of the tasks that face the Russian state.
{"title":"Regime and State in the Struggle for Russian Modernization","authors":"N. Robinson","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00801001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00801001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Russia’s need to modernize in order both to provide for its peoples and deliver on the ambitions of its rulers are perennial. The articles in this special edition speak to the difficulties that Russia has in modernizing and the hybridity that it demonstrates as modernization and economic development have been shaped by compromise and historical legacies. This introductory article introduces some of these themes by looking at how Russia has reproduced forms of what are called ‘regime-supporting economy’, forms of economy that generate resources to support particular political configurations in power whilst limiting resource accumulation, redistribution and institution-building that can deal with all of the tasks that face the Russian state.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41825951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-07DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00801003
Igor Logvinenko
The twenty-year period of modernization of the Russian economy under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, prior to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, was characterized by a consistent trend towards a statist domestic orientation, coupled with an increasingly radical policy of financial openness. Despite numerous domestic economic reforms, which were oriented towards free-market principles, being either reversed or significantly altered, foreign economic policy reforms proved to be more enduring. In this paper, I argue that the differential outcomes along the axis of internal and external economic reforms are interrelated. The absence of a robust rule of law domestically enabled the reversal of privatization reforms, but also made financial openness policies more appealing to political elites. Furthermore, the society’s expectation of welfare paternalism enabled the regime to tolerate the negative aspects of greater integration by relying on distributive policies rather than widespread repression. In contrast, I demonstrate that the inheritance of a less developed welfare state and an over-reliance on repression led the Chinese Communist Party to adopt a more cautious approach towards financial integration.
{"title":"Why Did Financial Openness Reforms Succeed in Russia and Not in China?","authors":"Igor Logvinenko","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00801003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00801003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The twenty-year period of modernization of the Russian economy under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, prior to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, was characterized by a consistent trend towards a statist domestic orientation, coupled with an increasingly radical policy of financial openness. Despite numerous domestic economic reforms, which were oriented towards free-market principles, being either reversed or significantly altered, foreign economic policy reforms proved to be more enduring. In this paper, I argue that the differential outcomes along the axis of internal and external economic reforms are interrelated. The absence of a robust rule of law domestically enabled the reversal of privatization reforms, but also made financial openness policies more appealing to political elites. Furthermore, the society’s expectation of welfare paternalism enabled the regime to tolerate the negative aspects of greater integration by relying on distributive policies rather than widespread repression. In contrast, I demonstrate that the inheritance of a less developed welfare state and an over-reliance on repression led the Chinese Communist Party to adopt a more cautious approach towards financial integration.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45836610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-09DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604030
N. Grishin
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant transformations of electoral institutions, and provoked changes in the politics of electoral reforms in some polities. The paper claims that Russia has used a special model of electoral reform during the pandemic that differs from both its previous experience and recommendations of international organizations. The comparative historical method is applied to bridge internal and external explanations that may offer an understanding of the current reform of electoral rule in the Russian political context. The pandemic has become a reason for changing traditional electoral procedures and for implementing this reform. Empirical evidence suggests that the reform has been implemented by a depoliticized technocratic procedure ignoring the principles of political consensus. The reform process implies a shift of the government’s main efforts from decision-making to increasing dependence on propaganda, and informational confrontation with opponents in the subsequent reform cycle. The approach to the implementation of the electoral reform casts doubt on the level of public support for the new procedures and exacerbates political risks.
{"title":"Electoral Reform during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Empirical Evidence from Russia","authors":"N. Grishin","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604030","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant transformations of electoral institutions, and provoked changes in the politics of electoral reforms in some polities. The paper claims that Russia has used a special model of electoral reform during the pandemic that differs from both its previous experience and recommendations of international organizations. The comparative historical method is applied to bridge internal and external explanations that may offer an understanding of the current reform of electoral rule in the Russian political context. The pandemic has become a reason for changing traditional electoral procedures and for implementing this reform. Empirical evidence suggests that the reform has been implemented by a depoliticized technocratic procedure ignoring the principles of political consensus. The reform process implies a shift of the government’s main efforts from decision-making to increasing dependence on propaganda, and informational confrontation with opponents in the subsequent reform cycle. The approach to the implementation of the electoral reform casts doubt on the level of public support for the new procedures and exacerbates political risks.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47446680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-09DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604031
T. Romashko
The paper claims that contemporary Russian cultural policy has been determined by political transformations associated with the political project to establish sovereignty that has organized Putin’s regime since 2012. The idea behind it is traced to Putin’s 2006 intention ‘to make a people out of a mere population’. To understand that intention, and to explain the contribution of culture and cultural policy to its concretization, the paper draws on Foucault’s account of sovereignty and governmentality, and the development of the Gramscian notion of hegemony. The paper argues that Putin’s regime uses governmentality in its hegemonic project to establish sovereignty. To describe that project, and the contribution of culture and cultural policy to it, the paper presents evidence of the relation between Putin’s political actions and changes in the structure of Russian state and government, Russian culture, and the cultural policy infrastructure. The paper begins with a discussion of the draft Concept of culture introduced in 2018 and concludes with an examination of its fate in order to raise the question of the contingency of Putin’s hegemonic project.
{"title":"‘To Make a People Out of a Mere Population’: Sovereignty and Governmentality in Hegemonic Russian Cultural Policy","authors":"T. Romashko","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604031","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The paper claims that contemporary Russian cultural policy has been determined by political transformations associated with the political project to establish sovereignty that has organized Putin’s regime since 2012. The idea behind it is traced to Putin’s 2006 intention ‘to make a people out of a mere population’. To understand that intention, and to explain the contribution of culture and cultural policy to its concretization, the paper draws on Foucault’s account of sovereignty and governmentality, and the development of the Gramscian notion of hegemony. The paper argues that Putin’s regime uses governmentality in its hegemonic project to establish sovereignty. To describe that project, and the contribution of culture and cultural policy to it, the paper presents evidence of the relation between Putin’s political actions and changes in the structure of Russian state and government, Russian culture, and the cultural policy infrastructure. The paper begins with a discussion of the draft Concept of culture introduced in 2018 and concludes with an examination of its fate in order to raise the question of the contingency of Putin’s hegemonic project.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47136149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-09DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604032
N. Sarkisyan
This article explores the role of the term “tolerance” in Russian presidential discourse, 2000-2020. The word became de-politicized (used equally in liberal and in conservative contexts), functioning as a buzzword and as a symbol. As a buzzword, it stood “for all good things” and denoted the positive dynamics in Russia’s nationalities and foreign policies; as a symbol, it served as a building block in constructing national identity. The use of “tolerance” also indicated the Kremlin’s firm belief in the normative power of words and ideas: that “tolerance” can change public attitudes and shape institutional design. However, the word’s conflicting semantics prompted the Kremlin to remove the term abruptly in 2013 against the background of the unfolding conservative turn. This study examines the zigzags of ideational governance in Putin’s Russia.
{"title":"Becoming (In)tolerant: Vicissitudes of a Political Term in Russia, 2000-2020","authors":"N. Sarkisyan","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604032","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article explores the role of the term “tolerance” in Russian presidential discourse, 2000-2020. The word became de-politicized (used equally in liberal and in conservative contexts), functioning as a buzzword and as a symbol. As a buzzword, it stood “for all good things” and denoted the positive dynamics in Russia’s nationalities and foreign policies; as a symbol, it served as a building block in constructing national identity. The use of “tolerance” also indicated the Kremlin’s firm belief in the normative power of words and ideas: that “tolerance” can change public attitudes and shape institutional design. However, the word’s conflicting semantics prompted the Kremlin to remove the term abruptly in 2013 against the background of the unfolding conservative turn. This study examines the zigzags of ideational governance in Putin’s Russia.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41383363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-09DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604028
R. Turovsky, K. Funk
This study examines the dynamics of electoral reforms in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and their influence on the disproportionality of parliamentary representation since the electoral system experienced major changes in 2003. We suggest that some characteristics of the electoral system may be highly instrumental in ensuring and maintaining United Russia’s influence in legislative bodies. This makes it possible to classify them as forms of institutional manipulation typical of electoral authoritarianism. Based on the statistical description and regression analysis, the study demonstrates the impact of some elements of electoral reforms on disproportionality during the periods at issue. At the same time, we can identify the methods of cementing the dominant party’s hold on power that the authorities find the most effective. In this regard, we make the conclusion that certain elements of the electoral system function as a balanced mechanism, which is evidenced by how they have been used during the different periods. Additionally, the study analyses the impact of disproportionality on electoral behavior, with the hypothesis about its negative influence on the electoral turnout being supported. Yet we regard the lower turnout as a consequence of the voting behavior of both the opposition’s supporters and loyalists. Finally, the electoral reforms in Russia seem to have put limits on disproportionality of parliamentary representation due to the issue of legitimacy.
{"title":"Electoral Reforms in Russia’s Regions: An Equilibrium between Disproportionality and Legitimacy","authors":"R. Turovsky, K. Funk","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This study examines the dynamics of electoral reforms in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and their influence on the disproportionality of parliamentary representation since the electoral system experienced major changes in 2003. We suggest that some characteristics of the electoral system may be highly instrumental in ensuring and maintaining United Russia’s influence in legislative bodies. This makes it possible to classify them as forms of institutional manipulation typical of electoral authoritarianism. Based on the statistical description and regression analysis, the study demonstrates the impact of some elements of electoral reforms on disproportionality during the periods at issue. At the same time, we can identify the methods of cementing the dominant party’s hold on power that the authorities find the most effective. In this regard, we make the conclusion that certain elements of the electoral system function as a balanced mechanism, which is evidenced by how they have been used during the different periods. Additionally, the study analyses the impact of disproportionality on electoral behavior, with the hypothesis about its negative influence on the electoral turnout being supported. Yet we regard the lower turnout as a consequence of the voting behavior of both the opposition’s supporters and loyalists. Finally, the electoral reforms in Russia seem to have put limits on disproportionality of parliamentary representation due to the issue of legitimacy.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44374773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-09DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604029
V. Kovin, A. Semenov
In this paper, we investigate the endorsement strategies of municipal council members in Russia. Since 2012, the candidates for chief executive office are required to collect the signatures at the local level. Filtering had been an important political toll before the return of direct gubernatorial elections, however, for the latter there are specific requirements in terms of territorial quotas and coverage that can be used against the independent candidates. We theorize that partisanship, gender, and employment sector on individual level and political competition, population size, and budget autonomy on the municipality level are important in shaping the councilmembers’ decision. We test this theory against the data on 2020 Perm krai gubernatorial elections and find out that while the general pattern is largely in line with our expectations, there are nuances when it comes to supporting particular opposition candidates. This study contributes to the literature on electoral authoritarianism and subnational elections in Russia and to the general scholarship on the means of authoritarian control.
{"title":"Political Logic of the “Municipal Filter” in Russia: Evidence from Perm Krai 2020 Elections","authors":"V. Kovin, A. Semenov","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604029","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000In this paper, we investigate the endorsement strategies of municipal council members in Russia. Since 2012, the candidates for chief executive office are required to collect the signatures at the local level. Filtering had been an important political toll before the return of direct gubernatorial elections, however, for the latter there are specific requirements in terms of territorial quotas and coverage that can be used against the independent candidates. We theorize that partisanship, gender, and employment sector on individual level and political competition, population size, and budget autonomy on the municipality level are important in shaping the councilmembers’ decision. We test this theory against the data on 2020 Perm krai gubernatorial elections and find out that while the general pattern is largely in line with our expectations, there are nuances when it comes to supporting particular opposition candidates. This study contributes to the literature on electoral authoritarianism and subnational elections in Russia and to the general scholarship on the means of authoritarian control.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46292510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-07DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604026
K. Petrov, A. Kazantsev, E. Minchenko, I. Loshkariov
The article is devoted to the current state of the discussion around transition of power in Russia in 1999-2001. The authors rely both on the patronal approach to show post-Soviet specificity and on the theory of neo-elitism to show its universal features. This transition was the point at which the highly differentiated post-Soviet elite was able to create a fragile base for integration. The article shows that it is possible to apply the theory of the elite pact to the Russian case, but the effects of the pact itself may ultimately differ from the trajectory of movement towards democracy predicted by the neo-elite theory. The trajectory deviates from the given one due to the patronal ribbon structures and the reversibility of the differentiation process. A new form of elite pact in Russia is possible, but the newborn elite coalition is doomed to be unsustainable unless a new constitutional reconsolidation follows.
{"title":"Putin’s Rise to Power: Russian Roulette or Elite Pact?","authors":"K. Petrov, A. Kazantsev, E. Minchenko, I. Loshkariov","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604026","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The article is devoted to the current state of the discussion around transition of power in Russia in 1999-2001. The authors rely both on the patronal approach to show post-Soviet specificity and on the theory of neo-elitism to show its universal features. This transition was the point at which the highly differentiated post-Soviet elite was able to create a fragile base for integration. The article shows that it is possible to apply the theory of the elite pact to the Russian case, but the effects of the pact itself may ultimately differ from the trajectory of movement towards democracy predicted by the neo-elite theory. The trajectory deviates from the given one due to the patronal ribbon structures and the reversibility of the differentiation process. A new form of elite pact in Russia is possible, but the newborn elite coalition is doomed to be unsustainable unless a new constitutional reconsolidation follows.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49634945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-07DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604024
A. V. Grinëv
The branch of public knowledge that is designated as “historical science” has its own mythology. It is based not only on one-sided historical facts, but also on various theoretical concepts. Some historical and theoretical myths are peculiar to individual countries, while others are more widespread, for example, the myth of democracy as the power of the people. Now in Russia there is final approval for the concept of the “Great Russian Revolution of 1917,” which is another pseudoscientific myth that quite happily coexists with the old myth of socialism in the USSR. The new myth enjoys full support from the authorities and is positively accepted by the vast majority of the Russian scholarly community, which is entirely dependent on the state and adapts to its policies quite consciously or by force of habit. This article attempts not only to critically analyze the concept of the “Great Russian Revolution” as another phenomenon of Russian historical mythology, but also to present a different explanation for the events of 1917 in Russia.
{"title":"The Birth of a New Pseudo-Historical Myth in Modern Russia: How Two Revolutions Were Made into One","authors":"A. V. Grinëv","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The branch of public knowledge that is designated as “historical science” has its own mythology. It is based not only on one-sided historical facts, but also on various theoretical concepts. Some historical and theoretical myths are peculiar to individual countries, while others are more widespread, for example, the myth of democracy as the power of the people. Now in Russia there is final approval for the concept of the “Great Russian Revolution of 1917,” which is another pseudoscientific myth that quite happily coexists with the old myth of socialism in the USSR. The new myth enjoys full support from the authorities and is positively accepted by the vast majority of the Russian scholarly community, which is entirely dependent on the state and adapts to its policies quite consciously or by force of habit. This article attempts not only to critically analyze the concept of the “Great Russian Revolution” as another phenomenon of Russian historical mythology, but also to present a different explanation for the events of 1917 in Russia.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45427653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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