Pub Date : 2022-09-07DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604027
E. Kosevich
This article examines the main stages in the development of relations between Russia and Latin America from 2000 to 2022. The research covers the entire set of bilateral cooperation between Russia and Latin American countries, and the internal and external factors influencing their evolution. The article presents the author’s view of interstate interactions from two perspectives – the foreign policy of Russia, and the national and international objectives of leading Latin American countries. The author concludes that for Russian foreign policy in the 21st century, all the countries of this region can be divided into four conditional groups: traditional partners, ideological allies, trade partners, and low priority states. This mapping of the region can explain the peculiarities of the formation of dialogue between Moscow and Latin American countries, and the possibilities and limits of interstate and interregional cooperation.
{"title":"Russia’s Relations with the Countries of Latin America at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Four Levels of Interstate Interaction","authors":"E. Kosevich","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604027","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This article examines the main stages in the development of relations between Russia and Latin America from 2000 to 2022. The research covers the entire set of bilateral cooperation between Russia and Latin American countries, and the internal and external factors influencing their evolution. The article presents the author’s view of interstate interactions from two perspectives – the foreign policy of Russia, and the national and international objectives of leading Latin American countries. The author concludes that for Russian foreign policy in the 21st century, all the countries of this region can be divided into four conditional groups: traditional partners, ideological allies, trade partners, and low priority states. This mapping of the region can explain the peculiarities of the formation of dialogue between Moscow and Latin American countries, and the possibilities and limits of interstate and interregional cooperation.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48028529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-07DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604025
M. Crosston, Dmitry Seltser, D. Zhukov
The system-dynamic model elaborates processes for recruiting political elites across Russia’s regions from 1985 to 2019. The authors consider several counterfactual scenarios through computational simulations. The first series includes the radical disintegration of Soviet recruitment mechanisms. The second series elaborates the opposite scenario: the gradual evolution/preservation of Soviet continuity. The third series simulates a unique situation where Vladimir Putin abandons his policy for strengthening the “vertical of power.” A key finding is that the fight against new threats (crime, corruption, separatism) did not allow the center to realize the impact of traditional existing institutions that had corrosive and destructive power.
{"title":"The Transformation of Russia’s Regional Elites: A System-Dynamics Model with Counterfactual Scenarios 1985-2019","authors":"M. Crosston, Dmitry Seltser, D. Zhukov","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604025","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The system-dynamic model elaborates processes for recruiting political elites across Russia’s regions from 1985 to 2019. The authors consider several counterfactual scenarios through computational simulations. The first series includes the radical disintegration of Soviet recruitment mechanisms. The second series elaborates the opposite scenario: the gradual evolution/preservation of Soviet continuity. The third series simulates a unique situation where Vladimir Putin abandons his policy for strengthening the “vertical of power.” A key finding is that the fight against new threats (crime, corruption, separatism) did not allow the center to realize the impact of traditional existing institutions that had corrosive and destructive power.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46379064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-07DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604023
A. Omidi
One of the most critical foreign policy issues of middle – power states is how to mold attitudes towards major powers. Since 1979, Iran has changed the nature of its relations with major powers. Although the Iranian Revolution adopted the ‘Neither East, Nor West’ motto as a macro guide to its foreign policy, since the late 1980s Iran and the Soviet Union – now Russia, have advanced their bilateral relations. Despite Iran and Russia sharing convergent views on many international issues, they have not promoted their ties to a strategic alliance. The present paper addresses the question of what conceptual model represents Iran-Russia relations and what challenges the two countries face in expanding their strategic partnership in the 2020s. This research addresses these problems at three levels: inter-state, regional, and global, and was conducted through a descriptive-analytical method. It is hypothesized that current Iran-Russia relations could be referred to as a ‘strategic alignment’.
{"title":"Russian-Iranian Ties: Strategic Alliance, Strategic Coalition, or Strategic Alignment (Partnership)","authors":"A. Omidi","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000One of the most critical foreign policy issues of middle – power states is how to mold attitudes towards major powers. Since 1979, Iran has changed the nature of its relations with major powers. Although the Iranian Revolution adopted the ‘Neither East, Nor West’ motto as a macro guide to its foreign policy, since the late 1980s Iran and the Soviet Union – now Russia, have advanced their bilateral relations. Despite Iran and Russia sharing convergent views on many international issues, they have not promoted their ties to a strategic alliance. The present paper addresses the question of what conceptual model represents Iran-Russia relations and what challenges the two countries face in expanding their strategic partnership in the 2020s. This research addresses these problems at three levels: inter-state, regional, and global, and was conducted through a descriptive-analytical method. It is hypothesized that current Iran-Russia relations could be referred to as a ‘strategic alignment’.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47563519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604019
Cole J. Harvey
Local executives in electoral authoritarian regimes can perform important regime-sustaining functions, including by delivering votes to the ruling party at election-time. Furthermore, when local executives are themselves elected, regimes can benefit from improved legitimacy and efficiency in local government. Yet elected local executives can create principal-agent problems and increase the risk that opposition groups gain office. How do authoritarian governments manage this tension? Prior research on Russia shows that elections are used to co-opt strong local mayors, while weak mayors are replaced with appointed managers. This paper argues that strong mayors are more likely to see elections canceled if their local machine is not delivering manufactured electoral support to the national party, while weak mayors are unlikely to be targeted. This hypothesis is supported using data from 207 Russian cities, including election-forensic estimates of election manipulation. The findings improve our understanding of cooptation of local leaders in electoral authoritarian regimes.
{"title":"Why Allow Local Elections? Mobilization, Manipulation, and the Abolition of Russian Mayoral Elections","authors":"Cole J. Harvey","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Local executives in electoral authoritarian regimes can perform important regime-sustaining functions, including by delivering votes to the ruling party at election-time. Furthermore, when local executives are themselves elected, regimes can benefit from improved legitimacy and efficiency in local government. Yet elected local executives can create principal-agent problems and increase the risk that opposition groups gain office. How do authoritarian governments manage this tension? Prior research on Russia shows that elections are used to co-opt strong local mayors, while weak mayors are replaced with appointed managers. This paper argues that strong mayors are more likely to see elections canceled if their local machine is not delivering manufactured electoral support to the national party, while weak mayors are unlikely to be targeted. This hypothesis is supported using data from 207 Russian cities, including election-forensic estimates of election manipulation. The findings improve our understanding of cooptation of local leaders in electoral authoritarian regimes.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41454690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604017
O. J. Reuter, R. Turovsky
This paper explores the impact of vote mobilization and economic performance on gubernatorial appointments in Russia. Previous research has demonstrated that governors are more likely to be reappointed when the regime is performing well at the polls in the region. By contrast, there is inconsistent evidence that regional economic performance affects a governor’s reappointment chances. We revisit this topic by updating and extending quantitative analyses of these key questions. We find consistent evidence that governors are more likely to be reappointed when regime vote shares are high in the region, a finding that extends from 2005 through 2020 and is robust to various model specifications and measurement approaches. In an update to existing research, we also show that this finding holds for multiple types of elections – regional legislative, State Duma and presidential – and we also find that high turnout is positively associated with governor reappointment. With respect to economic indicators, we find some suggestive evidence that governors are more likely to be reappointed when regional unemployment is decreasing, and investment and tax revenue are increasing, but these results are not robust. By evaluating governors on the basis of their ability to mobilize votes the center risks disincentivizing good governance. It may also give governors additional incentive to engage in electoral manipulation.
{"title":"Vote Mobilization, Economic Performance and Gubernatorial Appointments in Russia","authors":"O. J. Reuter, R. Turovsky","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper explores the impact of vote mobilization and economic performance on gubernatorial appointments in Russia. Previous research has demonstrated that governors are more likely to be reappointed when the regime is performing well at the polls in the region. By contrast, there is inconsistent evidence that regional economic performance affects a governor’s reappointment chances. We revisit this topic by updating and extending quantitative analyses of these key questions. We find consistent evidence that governors are more likely to be reappointed when regime vote shares are high in the region, a finding that extends from 2005 through 2020 and is robust to various model specifications and measurement approaches. In an update to existing research, we also show that this finding holds for multiple types of elections – regional legislative, State Duma and presidential – and we also find that high turnout is positively associated with governor reappointment. With respect to economic indicators, we find some suggestive evidence that governors are more likely to be reappointed when regional unemployment is decreasing, and investment and tax revenue are increasing, but these results are not robust. By evaluating governors on the basis of their ability to mobilize votes the center risks disincentivizing good governance. It may also give governors additional incentive to engage in electoral manipulation.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46591403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604016
Allison C. White, I. Saikkonen
This introduction to the special issue on Electoral Politics and Policy under Putin presents the central arguments of the contributors and situates those within the broader relevant literatures. Collectively, the articles cover a sweeping constellation of electoral issues that have become hallmark considerations of the Putin era, such as opposition party performance in a consolidated dictatorship, the election of women and minority candidates, corruption, electoral malfeasance, and cancelled elections. Many of the manuscripts address two central themes in the Russia-specific and comparative literature – first, how dictatorships coordinate machine politics, and second, explanations for why authoritarian regimes may struggle to capture electoral support, even when engaging in blatant and conspicuous forms of manipulation. The contributions shed light on the multifaceted challenges that the Putin regime faces today and suggest that the regime may be experiencing a type of widespread decay that is ultimately insurmountable.
{"title":"New Perspectives on Electoral Politics and Policy Under Putin","authors":"Allison C. White, I. Saikkonen","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This introduction to the special issue on Electoral Politics and Policy under Putin presents the central arguments of the contributors and situates those within the broader relevant literatures. Collectively, the articles cover a sweeping constellation of electoral issues that have become hallmark considerations of the Putin era, such as opposition party performance in a consolidated dictatorship, the election of women and minority candidates, corruption, electoral malfeasance, and cancelled elections. Many of the manuscripts address two central themes in the Russia-specific and comparative literature – first, how dictatorships coordinate machine politics, and second, explanations for why authoritarian regimes may struggle to capture electoral support, even when engaging in blatant and conspicuous forms of manipulation. The contributions shed light on the multifaceted challenges that the Putin regime faces today and suggest that the regime may be experiencing a type of widespread decay that is ultimately insurmountable.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47787360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604022
R. Moser, M. Rybalko
Elections to the Russian State Duma provide a unique context to study the representation of women and ethnic minorities in a national legislature. Russian elections have witnessed dramatic institutional variation, including a shift from semi-democratic contestation to competitive authoritarianism and the use of different electoral systems. Moreover, ethnic federalism has produced political and demographic conditions that promote the representation of titular ethnic groups in ethnic republics. Finally, the transition from a fragmented party system to one controlled by a single dominant party potentially has important potential ramifications for women and minority representation. We use a unique dataset that codes the ethnicity and sex of individual legislators for each election from 1993 to 2021 to examine how regime type, electoral rules, demographic conditions, and party affiliation have affected descriptive representation in Russia. Using similar data on selected states from Eastern Europe, we compare Russia’s experience with that of other postcommunist states as well as the United States.
{"title":"Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in the Russian State Duma 1993-2021","authors":"R. Moser, M. Rybalko","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Elections to the Russian State Duma provide a unique context to study the representation of women and ethnic minorities in a national legislature. Russian elections have witnessed dramatic institutional variation, including a shift from semi-democratic contestation to competitive authoritarianism and the use of different electoral systems. Moreover, ethnic federalism has produced political and demographic conditions that promote the representation of titular ethnic groups in ethnic republics. Finally, the transition from a fragmented party system to one controlled by a single dominant party potentially has important potential ramifications for women and minority representation. We use a unique dataset that codes the ethnicity and sex of individual legislators for each election from 1993 to 2021 to examine how regime type, electoral rules, demographic conditions, and party affiliation have affected descriptive representation in Russia. Using similar data on selected states from Eastern Europe, we compare Russia’s experience with that of other postcommunist states as well as the United States.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42243750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604021
W. Reisinger, Marina Zaloznaya, Haofeng Ma
How do citizens’ experiences of corruption affect their political trust and voting behavior? By analyzing a nationally representative survey of Russian citizens conducted a few months after the 2018 presidential election, we find that citizens who engaged in street-level bureaucratic corruption in the preceding two years assess the national leadership as more corrupt and express lower trust in them. This association between corruption engagement and a worsening of people’s views remains even when citizens gained benefits by providing officials with an incentive. We also show that higher perceptions of elite corruption and lower trust in the political leadership are important factors in reducing pro-Kremlin voting. Our findings indicate that even in an authoritarian country citizens’ negative experiences with bureaucracy reduce political support for the national political regime.
{"title":"The Political Ramifications of Corruption Experience for Political Trust and Pro-Leadership Voting: Evidence from Russia","authors":"W. Reisinger, Marina Zaloznaya, Haofeng Ma","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do citizens’ experiences of corruption affect their political trust and voting behavior? By analyzing a nationally representative survey of Russian citizens conducted a few months after the 2018 presidential election, we find that citizens who engaged in street-level bureaucratic corruption in the preceding two years assess the national leadership as more corrupt and express lower trust in them. This association between corruption engagement and a worsening of people’s views remains even when citizens gained benefits by providing officials with an incentive. We also show that higher perceptions of elite corruption and lower trust in the political leadership are important factors in reducing pro-Kremlin voting. Our findings indicate that even in an authoritarian country citizens’ negative experiences with bureaucracy reduce political support for the national political regime.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42354392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604018
K. Kalinin
Over the 2000s Russian elections have become increasingly unfree and unfair, characterized by suppression of electoral competition, rising levels of administrative interference and drastic growth of electoral frauds. In this paper I propose that the pattern of fraudulent elections in Russia can be explained by combining an idea about federalism with a game-theoretic model of the relationship between the Kremlin and a single regional governor. Specifically, election fraud becomes a basic signaling mechanism of regional bosses’ loyalty and of their ability to control the administrative resources to the Kremlin’s benefit. If electoral signaling occurs, data manipulation is most likely to take place with 0s and 5s in the last digit of rounded percentages of turnout and electoral support, which is the easiest and most readily detected way to report basic information to superiors. Based on the Russian electoral and financial data for 2000-2018, my analysis shows strong evidence of election fraud associated with the post-electoral interbudgetary transfers.
{"title":"Signaling Games of Election Fraud: A Case of Russia","authors":"K. Kalinin","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Over the 2000s Russian elections have become increasingly unfree and unfair, characterized by suppression of electoral competition, rising levels of administrative interference and drastic growth of electoral frauds. In this paper I propose that the pattern of fraudulent elections in Russia can be explained by combining an idea about federalism with a game-theoretic model of the relationship between the Kremlin and a single regional governor. Specifically, election fraud becomes a basic signaling mechanism of regional bosses’ loyalty and of their ability to control the administrative resources to the Kremlin’s benefit. If electoral signaling occurs, data manipulation is most likely to take place with 0s and 5s in the last digit of rounded percentages of turnout and electoral support, which is the easiest and most readily detected way to report basic information to superiors. Based on the Russian electoral and financial data for 2000-2018, my analysis shows strong evidence of election fraud associated with the post-electoral interbudgetary transfers.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44001829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604020
M. Zavadskaya, A. Rumiantseva
After the 2021 State Duma elections, the Communist Party of Russia Federation (KPRF) re-appeared on the Russian political landscape as a new political force with new faces and creative local campaigns. How and why were the communists being treated by most of the analysts and voters as systemic and rather passive opposition successfully accumulated political resistance and grievances at the polls in September 2021? In this study, we argue that mobilization against the pension reform in 2018 proved to be the crucial determinant of the electoral outcomes three years later. The latter provides evidence that protests bring about long-term consequences on voting behavior not only in democracies, but also in autocratic states. We rely on the original dataset on protests in 381 large Russian cities (more than 20,000 residents) that took place in Summer-Fall 2018 merged with the electoral data of the Duma elections in 2016 and 2021.
{"title":"The Party of People’s Distrust: The Roots of Electoral Success of the Communists in 2021","authors":"M. Zavadskaya, A. Rumiantseva","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 After the 2021 State Duma elections, the Communist Party of Russia Federation (KPRF) re-appeared on the Russian political landscape as a new political force with new faces and creative local campaigns. How and why were the communists being treated by most of the analysts and voters as systemic and rather passive opposition successfully accumulated political resistance and grievances at the polls in September 2021? In this study, we argue that mobilization against the pension reform in 2018 proved to be the crucial determinant of the electoral outcomes three years later. The latter provides evidence that protests bring about long-term consequences on voting behavior not only in democracies, but also in autocratic states. We rely on the original dataset on protests in 381 large Russian cities (more than 20,000 residents) that took place in Summer-Fall 2018 merged with the electoral data of the Duma elections in 2016 and 2021.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46981879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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