Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604021
W. Reisinger, Marina Zaloznaya, Haofeng Ma
How do citizens’ experiences of corruption affect their political trust and voting behavior? By analyzing a nationally representative survey of Russian citizens conducted a few months after the 2018 presidential election, we find that citizens who engaged in street-level bureaucratic corruption in the preceding two years assess the national leadership as more corrupt and express lower trust in them. This association between corruption engagement and a worsening of people’s views remains even when citizens gained benefits by providing officials with an incentive. We also show that higher perceptions of elite corruption and lower trust in the political leadership are important factors in reducing pro-Kremlin voting. Our findings indicate that even in an authoritarian country citizens’ negative experiences with bureaucracy reduce political support for the national political regime.
{"title":"The Political Ramifications of Corruption Experience for Political Trust and Pro-Leadership Voting: Evidence from Russia","authors":"W. Reisinger, Marina Zaloznaya, Haofeng Ma","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do citizens’ experiences of corruption affect their political trust and voting behavior? By analyzing a nationally representative survey of Russian citizens conducted a few months after the 2018 presidential election, we find that citizens who engaged in street-level bureaucratic corruption in the preceding two years assess the national leadership as more corrupt and express lower trust in them. This association between corruption engagement and a worsening of people’s views remains even when citizens gained benefits by providing officials with an incentive. We also show that higher perceptions of elite corruption and lower trust in the political leadership are important factors in reducing pro-Kremlin voting. Our findings indicate that even in an authoritarian country citizens’ negative experiences with bureaucracy reduce political support for the national political regime.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42354392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604018
K. Kalinin
Over the 2000s Russian elections have become increasingly unfree and unfair, characterized by suppression of electoral competition, rising levels of administrative interference and drastic growth of electoral frauds. In this paper I propose that the pattern of fraudulent elections in Russia can be explained by combining an idea about federalism with a game-theoretic model of the relationship between the Kremlin and a single regional governor. Specifically, election fraud becomes a basic signaling mechanism of regional bosses’ loyalty and of their ability to control the administrative resources to the Kremlin’s benefit. If electoral signaling occurs, data manipulation is most likely to take place with 0s and 5s in the last digit of rounded percentages of turnout and electoral support, which is the easiest and most readily detected way to report basic information to superiors. Based on the Russian electoral and financial data for 2000-2018, my analysis shows strong evidence of election fraud associated with the post-electoral interbudgetary transfers.
{"title":"Signaling Games of Election Fraud: A Case of Russia","authors":"K. Kalinin","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Over the 2000s Russian elections have become increasingly unfree and unfair, characterized by suppression of electoral competition, rising levels of administrative interference and drastic growth of electoral frauds. In this paper I propose that the pattern of fraudulent elections in Russia can be explained by combining an idea about federalism with a game-theoretic model of the relationship between the Kremlin and a single regional governor. Specifically, election fraud becomes a basic signaling mechanism of regional bosses’ loyalty and of their ability to control the administrative resources to the Kremlin’s benefit. If electoral signaling occurs, data manipulation is most likely to take place with 0s and 5s in the last digit of rounded percentages of turnout and electoral support, which is the easiest and most readily detected way to report basic information to superiors. Based on the Russian electoral and financial data for 2000-2018, my analysis shows strong evidence of election fraud associated with the post-electoral interbudgetary transfers.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44001829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-11DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604020
M. Zavadskaya, A. Rumiantseva
After the 2021 State Duma elections, the Communist Party of Russia Federation (KPRF) re-appeared on the Russian political landscape as a new political force with new faces and creative local campaigns. How and why were the communists being treated by most of the analysts and voters as systemic and rather passive opposition successfully accumulated political resistance and grievances at the polls in September 2021? In this study, we argue that mobilization against the pension reform in 2018 proved to be the crucial determinant of the electoral outcomes three years later. The latter provides evidence that protests bring about long-term consequences on voting behavior not only in democracies, but also in autocratic states. We rely on the original dataset on protests in 381 large Russian cities (more than 20,000 residents) that took place in Summer-Fall 2018 merged with the electoral data of the Duma elections in 2016 and 2021.
{"title":"The Party of People’s Distrust: The Roots of Electoral Success of the Communists in 2021","authors":"M. Zavadskaya, A. Rumiantseva","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 After the 2021 State Duma elections, the Communist Party of Russia Federation (KPRF) re-appeared on the Russian political landscape as a new political force with new faces and creative local campaigns. How and why were the communists being treated by most of the analysts and voters as systemic and rather passive opposition successfully accumulated political resistance and grievances at the polls in September 2021? In this study, we argue that mobilization against the pension reform in 2018 proved to be the crucial determinant of the electoral outcomes three years later. The latter provides evidence that protests bring about long-term consequences on voting behavior not only in democracies, but also in autocratic states. We rely on the original dataset on protests in 381 large Russian cities (more than 20,000 residents) that took place in Summer-Fall 2018 merged with the electoral data of the Duma elections in 2016 and 2021.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46981879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604011
Lesia Dorosh, Bohdana Voiat
The article analyzes specifics of instrumental and perceptional dimensions of the soft power of Russia. The analysis of these dimensions is particularly relevant in terms of studying the likelihood of the fact that Russia may continue applying the soft power strategy of long-term external influence. The main tools of the instrumental foundation of Russia’s soft power have been analyzed. Russia’s position in the rankings of well-known international rating agencies have been compared. The comprehensive studies are considered to be promising, combining detailed analysis of the soft power tools in the domestic and foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation and the way it is perceived by different target audiences. It is concluded that foreign countries and societies perception of the soft tools application (mostly perceived as propaganda) may affect Russia’s low position in international soft power and branding rankings.
{"title":"Soft Power of the Russian Federation: Instrumental and Perceptional Dimensions","authors":"Lesia Dorosh, Bohdana Voiat","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The article analyzes specifics of instrumental and perceptional dimensions of the soft power of Russia. The analysis of these dimensions is particularly relevant in terms of studying the likelihood of the fact that Russia may continue applying the soft power strategy of long-term external influence. The main tools of the instrumental foundation of Russia’s soft power have been analyzed. Russia’s position in the rankings of well-known international rating agencies have been compared. The comprehensive studies are considered to be promising, combining detailed analysis of the soft power tools in the domestic and foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation and the way it is perceived by different target audiences. It is concluded that foreign countries and societies perception of the soft tools application (mostly perceived as propaganda) may affect Russia’s low position in international soft power and branding rankings.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41744379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604013
M. Popov
At the beginning of the 21st century in the North Caucasus, the processes of depoliticizing ethnicity, which created an opportunity for a democratic restructuring of regional politics, gave way to the process of politicizing religion. A new stage of politicized regional identity, which began in the middle of the 2000s, in contrast to the beginning and the middle of the 1990s, is characterized by an active confessional factor in conflict processes in Russia’s most volatile region. Religious extremism as a protracted threat to regional and global security is becoming the main source of North Caucasian large-scale demodernization and ethnic mobilization. Current approaches to combating terrorism and extremism fuel existing social instability, inequality, disintegration, resentment and discontent with regional and federal authorities. As a result of many years of Russian counter-terrorism strategies (including the strategy of ‘collective responsibility’), the Caucasus Emirate has disintegrated and is almost non-functioning, however, this is also explained by an ideological expansion of ISIS in the region. Today, ISIS propaganda and reemerging Taliban find their audience between North Caucasian youth, agitating them to embark on the path of global jihad in Russia or abroad. Remaining unresolved and unsettled, protracted regional conflicts turn into religious extremism, giving rise to a new round of violence, the likelihood of overcoming which is significantly reduced. The long-term activities of ISIS and the growing role of the Taliban create favorable conditions for the further transformation of the North Caucasus into one of the influential geopolitical centers of contemporary jihadism.
{"title":"Russia’s Most Volatile Region: Contemporary Extremist Threats to Global Security in the North Caucasus","authors":"M. Popov","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000At the beginning of the 21st century in the North Caucasus, the processes of depoliticizing ethnicity, which created an opportunity for a democratic restructuring of regional politics, gave way to the process of politicizing religion. A new stage of politicized regional identity, which began in the middle of the 2000s, in contrast to the beginning and the middle of the 1990s, is characterized by an active confessional factor in conflict processes in Russia’s most volatile region. Religious extremism as a protracted threat to regional and global security is becoming the main source of North Caucasian large-scale demodernization and ethnic mobilization. Current approaches to combating terrorism and extremism fuel existing social instability, inequality, disintegration, resentment and discontent with regional and federal authorities. As a result of many years of Russian counter-terrorism strategies (including the strategy of ‘collective responsibility’), the Caucasus Emirate has disintegrated and is almost non-functioning, however, this is also explained by an ideological expansion of ISIS in the region. Today, ISIS propaganda and reemerging Taliban find their audience between North Caucasian youth, agitating them to embark on the path of global jihad in Russia or abroad. Remaining unresolved and unsettled, protracted regional conflicts turn into religious extremism, giving rise to a new round of violence, the likelihood of overcoming which is significantly reduced. The long-term activities of ISIS and the growing role of the Taliban create favorable conditions for the further transformation of the North Caucasus into one of the influential geopolitical centers of contemporary jihadism.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41891088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604014
V. Ledyaev, A. Chirikova
Empirical research conducted in four small Russian towns over the period 2011-2015 and 2018-2020, discovered different patterns of power and leadership despite the centralization policy pursued by the federal center. Not all the heads of towns were the most influential figures/leaders in the urban communities, although they have the most significant formal resources of power. Major differences between the heads of the towns were due to the personal factor, support from a team of followers, and relationships with regional authorities. Despite the completion of the “power vertical” down to the municipal level, the patterns of power and leadership of the heads of small towns are dynamic and vary significantly. The most important changes are often caused by change of the heads of towns. Although leaders are unable to completely reverse negative tendencies in the social and economic spheres of local communities, they can mitigate their consequences. Therefore, when difficulties arise, a demand for leadership is formed.
{"title":"Heads of Small Russian Towns: Power and Leadership","authors":"V. Ledyaev, A. Chirikova","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Empirical research conducted in four small Russian towns over the period 2011-2015 and 2018-2020, discovered different patterns of power and leadership despite the centralization policy pursued by the federal center. Not all the heads of towns were the most influential figures/leaders in the urban communities, although they have the most significant formal resources of power. Major differences between the heads of the towns were due to the personal factor, support from a team of followers, and relationships with regional authorities. Despite the completion of the “power vertical” down to the municipal level, the patterns of power and leadership of the heads of small towns are dynamic and vary significantly. The most important changes are often caused by change of the heads of towns. Although leaders are unable to completely reverse negative tendencies in the social and economic spheres of local communities, they can mitigate their consequences. Therefore, when difficulties arise, a demand for leadership is formed.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46296306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604010
Suzanne Loftus
The system of informal governance, despite its weak performance in many international comparative governance indicators, turned Russia around in the early 2000s, and keeps the country functioning despite evidence of endemic corruption or economic stagnation. Despite increasing authoritarianism, the regime has the consent of the governed and is considered legitimate inside Russia. Despite what many scholars have argued on the long-term prospects of the survival of the regime, the Russian political system has demonstrated resilience and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Legitimacy of the regime is based both on state capacity and state national identity. The former is an entity of the latter along with a strong and unique international standing. The post-Soviet national identity that took shape while Putin has been in power has allowed for positive “national self-esteem” to flourish throughout the country. The mentality of the general population has allowed the space necessary for this narrative to evolve and for the post-Soviet identity to take shape, exhibited by the symbiotic relationship between elite action and popular support.
{"title":"Legitimacy and Societal Consent under Putin’s Leadership: State Capacity and National Identity","authors":"Suzanne Loftus","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The system of informal governance, despite its weak performance in many international comparative governance indicators, turned Russia around in the early 2000s, and keeps the country functioning despite evidence of endemic corruption or economic stagnation. Despite increasing authoritarianism, the regime has the consent of the governed and is considered legitimate inside Russia. Despite what many scholars have argued on the long-term prospects of the survival of the regime, the Russian political system has demonstrated resilience and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Legitimacy of the regime is based both on state capacity and state national identity. The former is an entity of the latter along with a strong and unique international standing. The post-Soviet national identity that took shape while Putin has been in power has allowed for positive “national self-esteem” to flourish throughout the country. The mentality of the general population has allowed the space necessary for this narrative to evolve and for the post-Soviet identity to take shape, exhibited by the symbiotic relationship between elite action and popular support.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43310912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604015
Aleksander A. Yefanov, V. Tomin
The highly resonant 2019 cases in Russia (‘Golunov’s Case’ and ‘Moscow Case’) make it possible to notice the tendency associated with the consolidating significance of protest mood in the context of the dynamically proceeding sociopolitical process of forming a developed civil society. This self-organizing system is determined by strengthening the role of the communicative and cultural memory in constructing ideological landmarks. Media merch is a product of communicative and cultural memory, used for the mythologized interpretation of a particular phenomenon or process based on previously created existing archetypes. #iwe … which initially served to manifest solidarization, subsequently became a trigger to mark a case as especially worthy of attention. Its abuse (mainly in the promotions of marketers and social media memes) led to the routinization of the form and banalization of the content – the destruction of the originally ‘sacred’ meaning as an indicator of the developed civil society subjects’ will.
{"title":"The Significance of Protest Mood in Forming a Developed Civil Society in Russia","authors":"Aleksander A. Yefanov, V. Tomin","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The highly resonant 2019 cases in Russia (‘Golunov’s Case’ and ‘Moscow Case’) make it possible to notice the tendency associated with the consolidating significance of protest mood in the context of the dynamically proceeding sociopolitical process of forming a developed civil society. This self-organizing system is determined by strengthening the role of the communicative and cultural memory in constructing ideological landmarks. Media merch is a product of communicative and cultural memory, used for the mythologized interpretation of a particular phenomenon or process based on previously created existing archetypes. #iwe … which initially served to manifest solidarization, subsequently became a trigger to mark a case as especially worthy of attention. Its abuse (mainly in the promotions of marketers and social media memes) led to the routinization of the form and banalization of the content – the destruction of the originally ‘sacred’ meaning as an indicator of the developed civil society subjects’ will.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44308240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604012
Jennifer M. Ramos, Nigel A. Raab
The rise of the Far Right has been a steady global phenomenon, illustrated by political leaders such as Narendra Modi, Geert Wilders and Jair Bolsonaro. One of the main facilitators of this rise is Russia, supporting Far Right campaigns and movements in various regions of the world. Moreover, the Far Right parties around the world look to Russia as a beacon of hope, enticed by the messaging of Russia Today, Russia’s state-run international news network, and other curated social media platforms. While some argue that Russia’s support of the Far Right is an extension of its domestic values, we posit that this support is mainly to serve Russia’s strategic foreign policy and that the Far Right ideology has little to do with Russia’s domestic values and policy. In fact, Russia’s domestic stability depends on values that are contrary to classic understandings of the Far Right. Given the multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition of the Russian Federation, the classic parameters of Far Right discourse would undermine the stability so dear to Putin. To support our propositions, we use comparative case studies of Russia’s messaging abroad in Germany and the U.S. We then contrast this messaging and support with Russia’s domestic rhetoric. In all cases, we engage in a systematic analysis of relevant documents, transcripts of elite speeches and media.
{"title":"Russia Abroad, Russia at Home: The Paradox of Russia’s Support for the Far Right","authors":"Jennifer M. Ramos, Nigel A. Raab","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The rise of the Far Right has been a steady global phenomenon, illustrated by political leaders such as Narendra Modi, Geert Wilders and Jair Bolsonaro. One of the main facilitators of this rise is Russia, supporting Far Right campaigns and movements in various regions of the world. Moreover, the Far Right parties around the world look to Russia as a beacon of hope, enticed by the messaging of Russia Today, Russia’s state-run international news network, and other curated social media platforms. While some argue that Russia’s support of the Far Right is an extension of its domestic values, we posit that this support is mainly to serve Russia’s strategic foreign policy and that the Far Right ideology has little to do with Russia’s domestic values and policy. In fact, Russia’s domestic stability depends on values that are contrary to classic understandings of the Far Right. Given the multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition of the Russian Federation, the classic parameters of Far Right discourse would undermine the stability so dear to Putin. To support our propositions, we use comparative case studies of Russia’s messaging abroad in Germany and the U.S. We then contrast this messaging and support with Russia’s domestic rhetoric. In all cases, we engage in a systematic analysis of relevant documents, transcripts of elite speeches and media.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41504682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-29DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00604002
S. Karaganov
There have been several stages in Russia’s foreign policy since 1991. From a naive and idealistic pro-Western course, to ‘getting up from its knees’, to asserting itself as an independent great power. Around 2018, this trajectory reached a plateau, with the potential for decline. Since then, Russia and the world began to face fresh challenges and an almost qualitatively different environment. Even before the start of the epidemic in 2020, it was clear that Russia required a new foreign policy, built on what had been achieved in previous decades, but geared towards the future. This would include a strong ideology, focus on internal growth and development, and the development a streamlined and more cost-effective approach to foreign policy to adjust to a more turbulent and chaotic external environment. Despite growing international chaos and unpredictability, two scenarios for Russian foreign policy are surfacing. An optimistic one in which Russia successfully adapts to these changing circumstances, and a less optimistic one where it continues its current course of internal development, failing to live up to its full potential, but nevertheless still retaining the ability to play an independent and significant role in world affairs.
{"title":"Russian Foreign Policy: Three Historical Stages and Two Future Scenarios","authors":"S. Karaganov","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00604002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00604002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000There have been several stages in Russia’s foreign policy since 1991. From a naive and idealistic pro-Western course, to ‘getting up from its knees’, to asserting itself as an independent great power. Around 2018, this trajectory reached a plateau, with the potential for decline. Since then, Russia and the world began to face fresh challenges and an almost qualitatively different environment. Even before the start of the epidemic in 2020, it was clear that Russia required a new foreign policy, built on what had been achieved in previous decades, but geared towards the future. This would include a strong ideology, focus on internal growth and development, and the development a streamlined and more cost-effective approach to foreign policy to adjust to a more turbulent and chaotic external environment. Despite growing international chaos and unpredictability, two scenarios for Russian foreign policy are surfacing. An optimistic one in which Russia successfully adapts to these changing circumstances, and a less optimistic one where it continues its current course of internal development, failing to live up to its full potential, but nevertheless still retaining the ability to play an independent and significant role in world affairs.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45753485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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