Pub Date : 2021-10-28DOI: 10.1177/20531680221135432
Liqun Liu
This paper analyzes an agency model of crisis bargaining where two states have private information about war payoffs. In the model, two leaders bargain on behalf of their own states. Importantly, owing to political bias and audience costs, a leader’s war payoff and peace payoff differ from those of her state at large. I establish general results about leaders’ bargaining strategies and the possibility of peaceful resolution. By examining incentive compatibility constraints, I show that in any equilibrium that has zero probability of costly war, a leader’s payoff net of audience costs cannot vary with their private information. After that, I identify the size of resource necessary to appease both states. If this necessary condition holds, which is affected by political bias, there exist properly specified audience costs that guarantee peaceful bargaining outcomes.
{"title":"Domestic constraints in crisis bargaining","authors":"Liqun Liu","doi":"10.1177/20531680221135432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680221135432","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes an agency model of crisis bargaining where two states have private information about war payoffs. In the model, two leaders bargain on behalf of their own states. Importantly, owing to political bias and audience costs, a leader’s war payoff and peace payoff differ from those of her state at large. I establish general results about leaders’ bargaining strategies and the possibility of peaceful resolution. By examining incentive compatibility constraints, I show that in any equilibrium that has zero probability of costly war, a leader’s payoff net of audience costs cannot vary with their private information. After that, I identify the size of resource necessary to appease both states. If this necessary condition holds, which is affected by political bias, there exist properly specified audience costs that guarantee peaceful bargaining outcomes.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42599303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680211067881
Ronald J. McGauvran, Brandon M Stewart
Ethnic outbidding, where parties adopt ever more extreme positions to capture electoral advantage, has become an increasingly common practice among ethnic parties. As economic issues have often served as a catalyst for ethnic tension, increasing levels of economic inequality should lead parties to adopt more extreme positions in an attempt to outbid one another. Furthermore, as their economic and ethnic platforms will appeal to the same ethnically defined constituency, ethnic outbidding should be more effective where inequality is high. Using a sample of over 150 ethnonational parties in Europe between 2011 and 2017, this paper finds that inequality is linked to increasing ideological extremism along a number of policy dimensions. Employing local-level voting data for Romania and Slovakia, we show that higher inequality makes adopting a more ideological extreme position a more successful electoral strategy, especially where economic issues are ethnically salient.
{"title":"Turning discontent into votes: Economic inequality and ethnic outbidding","authors":"Ronald J. McGauvran, Brandon M Stewart","doi":"10.1177/20531680211067881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211067881","url":null,"abstract":"Ethnic outbidding, where parties adopt ever more extreme positions to capture electoral advantage, has become an increasingly common practice among ethnic parties. As economic issues have often served as a catalyst for ethnic tension, increasing levels of economic inequality should lead parties to adopt more extreme positions in an attempt to outbid one another. Furthermore, as their economic and ethnic platforms will appeal to the same ethnically defined constituency, ethnic outbidding should be more effective where inequality is high. Using a sample of over 150 ethnonational parties in Europe between 2011 and 2017, this paper finds that inequality is linked to increasing ideological extremism along a number of policy dimensions. Employing local-level voting data for Romania and Slovakia, we show that higher inequality makes adopting a more ideological extreme position a more successful electoral strategy, especially where economic issues are ethnically salient.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42067317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680211066767
Faradj Koliev, Magnus Lundgren
Diplomacy is a chief instrument of foreign policy. Through high-level diplomatic visits, governments can facilitate cooperation and signal the quality of their relations with other states. Because host countries cannot receive an indefinite number of visits, they must make strategic decisions, prioritizing some countries over others. This reveals information about their foreign policy priorities as well as diplomatic hierarchies and practices in the system as a whole. But what determines high-level diplomatic visits? Existing scholarship disagrees. In this research note, we assess the determinants of high-level diplomatic visits to the U.S. Theoretically, we draw on previous studies and formulate structural, domestic, and practice-oriented accounts of high-level visits as tools of foreign policy. Empirically, we gather original data on diplomatic visits to the U.S. by foreign leaders from 1946 to 2012. Our main results are two-fold. First, high-level diplomatic visits to the U.S. are primarily determined by structural factors such as economic relations. Second, we find clear differences in invited country profiles during and after the Cold War, demonstrating that high-level visits are used strategically to promote shifting foreign policy priorities.
{"title":"Visiting the hegemon: Explaining diplomatic visits to the United States","authors":"Faradj Koliev, Magnus Lundgren","doi":"10.1177/20531680211066767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211066767","url":null,"abstract":"Diplomacy is a chief instrument of foreign policy. Through high-level diplomatic visits, governments can facilitate cooperation and signal the quality of their relations with other states. Because host countries cannot receive an indefinite number of visits, they must make strategic decisions, prioritizing some countries over others. This reveals information about their foreign policy priorities as well as diplomatic hierarchies and practices in the system as a whole. But what determines high-level diplomatic visits? Existing scholarship disagrees. In this research note, we assess the determinants of high-level diplomatic visits to the U.S. Theoretically, we draw on previous studies and formulate structural, domestic, and practice-oriented accounts of high-level visits as tools of foreign policy. Empirically, we gather original data on diplomatic visits to the U.S. by foreign leaders from 1946 to 2012. Our main results are two-fold. First, high-level diplomatic visits to the U.S. are primarily determined by structural factors such as economic relations. Second, we find clear differences in invited country profiles during and after the Cold War, demonstrating that high-level visits are used strategically to promote shifting foreign policy priorities.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42485523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680211062668
A. Blais, C. Plescia, Semra Sevi
We ascertain whether citizens want to have smart ballots, that is, whether they appreciate having the possibility to express some support for more than one option (expression across options) and to indicate different levels of support for these options (expression within options). We conducted two independent yet complementary survey experiments at the time of the Super Tuesday Democratic primaries to examine which voting method citizens prefer, one with the real candidates in the states holding Democratic primaries and one with fictitious candidates in the whole country. In both surveys, respondents were asked to vote using four different voting rules: single, approval, rank, and point (score). After they cast their vote, respondents were asked how satisfied they were using each voting method. The findings are consistent in both studies: the single vote is the most preferred voting method. We show that this is a reflection of a status quo bias, as citizens’ views are strongly correlated with age.
{"title":"Do people want smarter ballots?","authors":"A. Blais, C. Plescia, Semra Sevi","doi":"10.1177/20531680211062668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211062668","url":null,"abstract":"We ascertain whether citizens want to have smart ballots, that is, whether they appreciate having the possibility to express some support for more than one option (expression across options) and to indicate different levels of support for these options (expression within options). We conducted two independent yet complementary survey experiments at the time of the Super Tuesday Democratic primaries to examine which voting method citizens prefer, one with the real candidates in the states holding Democratic primaries and one with fictitious candidates in the whole country. In both surveys, respondents were asked to vote using four different voting rules: single, approval, rank, and point (score). After they cast their vote, respondents were asked how satisfied they were using each voting method. The findings are consistent in both studies: the single vote is the most preferred voting method. We show that this is a reflection of a status quo bias, as citizens’ views are strongly correlated with age.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44477579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680211067640
Curtis Bram
This paper uses an experiment and a follow-up survey immediately before and after the publicly revealed results of the Department of Defense’s 2021 report on unidentified flying object (UFO) origins to test how public opinion changes when government leaders across the political spectrum take an issue that had been on the margins of respectability seriously. In both studies, I find that when politicians acknowledge the possibility that UFOs are extraterrestrial visitors, people report more positive attitudes toward those who believe in conspiracies in general. Implications are that when government leaders publicly walk back a long-held consensus that a particular issue is not worth serious consideration, they may cause people to feel more favorable toward those perceived to hold other fringe views.
{"title":"When a conspiracy theory goes mainstream, people feel more positive toward conspiracy theorists","authors":"Curtis Bram","doi":"10.1177/20531680211067640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211067640","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses an experiment and a follow-up survey immediately before and after the publicly revealed results of the Department of Defense’s 2021 report on unidentified flying object (UFO) origins to test how public opinion changes when government leaders across the political spectrum take an issue that had been on the margins of respectability seriously. In both studies, I find that when politicians acknowledge the possibility that UFOs are extraterrestrial visitors, people report more positive attitudes toward those who believe in conspiracies in general. Implications are that when government leaders publicly walk back a long-held consensus that a particular issue is not worth serious consideration, they may cause people to feel more favorable toward those perceived to hold other fringe views.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41728523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680211058550
Francisco Villamil, Laia Balcells
Memories of old conflicts often shape domestic politics long after these conflicts end. Contemporary debates about past civil wars and/or repressive regimes in different parts of the world suggest that these are sensitive topics that might increase political polarization, particularly when transitional justice policies are implemented and political parties mobilize discontentment with such policies. One such policy recently debated in Spain is removing public symbols linked to a past civil war and subsequent authoritarian regime (i.e., Francoism). However, the empirical evidence on its impact is still limited. This article attempts to fill this gap by examining the political consequences of street renaming. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we show that the removal of Francoist street names has contributed to an increase of electoral support for a new far-right party, Vox, mainly at the expense of a traditional right-wing conservative party, PP. Our results suggest that revisiting the past can cause a backlash among those ideologically aligned with the perpetrator, and that some political parties can capitalize on this.
{"title":"Do TJ policies cause backlash? Evidence from street name changes in Spain","authors":"Francisco Villamil, Laia Balcells","doi":"10.1177/20531680211058550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211058550","url":null,"abstract":"Memories of old conflicts often shape domestic politics long after these conflicts end. Contemporary debates about past civil wars and/or repressive regimes in different parts of the world suggest that these are sensitive topics that might increase political polarization, particularly when transitional justice policies are implemented and political parties mobilize discontentment with such policies. One such policy recently debated in Spain is removing public symbols linked to a past civil war and subsequent authoritarian regime (i.e., Francoism). However, the empirical evidence on its impact is still limited. This article attempts to fill this gap by examining the political consequences of street renaming. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we show that the removal of Francoist street names has contributed to an increase of electoral support for a new far-right party, Vox, mainly at the expense of a traditional right-wing conservative party, PP. Our results suggest that revisiting the past can cause a backlash among those ideologically aligned with the perpetrator, and that some political parties can capitalize on this.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45246888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680211061056
Matthew Nanes
Research on the role of grievances in civil conflict is surprisingly inconclusive, with well-cited studies disagreeing on the relationship between perceived deprivation and violence. I argue that the role of grievances depends on an interaction between individual and group-level incentives. Individuals who perceive themselves as personally deprived are more likely to support or participate in anti-regime violence, but only if a successful rebellion would enhance their group’s power relative to the status quo. I test this argument in the context of Iraq’s sectarian civil war using data from a 2016 survey of 800 Baghdad residents. Using a list experiment to measure individuals’ willingness to consider violence against a government they feel is ignoring their needs, I find that minority Sunnis who are economically dissatisfied are significantly more willing to consider violence than similarly aggrieved Shias. However, as economic satisfaction increases, Sunnis’ propensity for violence decreases until it becomes indistinguishable from Shias’ propensity. These results clarify the joint impacts of vertical and horizontal grievances. Group inequality and individual deprivation are each necessary but not sufficient to fully explain individuals’ propensities for anti-state violence.
{"title":"Linking individual and group motives for violent conflict","authors":"Matthew Nanes","doi":"10.1177/20531680211061056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211061056","url":null,"abstract":"Research on the role of grievances in civil conflict is surprisingly inconclusive, with well-cited studies disagreeing on the relationship between perceived deprivation and violence. I argue that the role of grievances depends on an interaction between individual and group-level incentives. Individuals who perceive themselves as personally deprived are more likely to support or participate in anti-regime violence, but only if a successful rebellion would enhance their group’s power relative to the status quo. I test this argument in the context of Iraq’s sectarian civil war using data from a 2016 survey of 800 Baghdad residents. Using a list experiment to measure individuals’ willingness to consider violence against a government they feel is ignoring their needs, I find that minority Sunnis who are economically dissatisfied are significantly more willing to consider violence than similarly aggrieved Shias. However, as economic satisfaction increases, Sunnis’ propensity for violence decreases until it becomes indistinguishable from Shias’ propensity. These results clarify the joint impacts of vertical and horizontal grievances. Group inequality and individual deprivation are each necessary but not sufficient to fully explain individuals’ propensities for anti-state violence.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41264005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680211049660
Matthew Hauenstein, Marcellius Smith, Mark Souva
A number of studies find that democracies spend less on their military than non-democracies. Yet there are well known counter-examples, including but not limited to the United States and Israel. We contend that these counter-examples are part of a larger pattern. The relationship between regime type and military spending is conditional on external threat. Among countries that do not perceive a significant external threat to their interests, democracies allocate considerably less to the military than non-democracies. However, democracies with a significant external threat do not allocate less to the military than non-democracies. The reason prior research consistently finds that democracies, on average, spend less on the military, even while controlling for external threat, is that democracies are much less likely to have a high external threat. For example, autocracies are nearly twice as likely as democracies to have a significant external threat in our sample. An empirical analysis of military spending from 1952–2000 is consistent with these expectations.
{"title":"Democracy, external threat, and military spending","authors":"Matthew Hauenstein, Marcellius Smith, Mark Souva","doi":"10.1177/20531680211049660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211049660","url":null,"abstract":"A number of studies find that democracies spend less on their military than non-democracies. Yet there are well known counter-examples, including but not limited to the United States and Israel. We contend that these counter-examples are part of a larger pattern. The relationship between regime type and military spending is conditional on external threat. Among countries that do not perceive a significant external threat to their interests, democracies allocate considerably less to the military than non-democracies. However, democracies with a significant external threat do not allocate less to the military than non-democracies. The reason prior research consistently finds that democracies, on average, spend less on the military, even while controlling for external threat, is that democracies are much less likely to have a high external threat. For example, autocracies are nearly twice as likely as democracies to have a significant external threat in our sample. An empirical analysis of military spending from 1952–2000 is consistent with these expectations.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49331811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-29DOI: 10.1177/20531680231166457
Drew Stommes, P. Aronow, F. Sävje
The regression discontinuity (RD) design offers identification of causal effects under weak assumptions, earning it a position as a standard method in modern political science research. But identification does not necessarily imply that causal effects can be estimated accurately with limited data. In this paper, we highlight that estimation under the RD design involves serious statistical challenges and investigate how these challenges manifest themselves in the empirical literature in political science. We collect all RD-based findings published in top political science journals in the period 2009–2018. The distribution of published results exhibits pathological features; estimates tend to bunch just above the conventional level of statistical significance. A reanalysis of all studies with available data suggests that researcher discretion is not a major driver of these features. However, researchers tend to use inappropriate methods for inference, rendering standard errors artificially small. A retrospective power analysis reveals that most of these studies were underpowered to detect all but large effects. The issues we uncover, combined with well-documented selection pressures in academic publishing, cause concern that many published findings using the RD design may be exaggerated.
{"title":"On the reliability of published findings using the regression discontinuity design in political science","authors":"Drew Stommes, P. Aronow, F. Sävje","doi":"10.1177/20531680231166457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680231166457","url":null,"abstract":"The regression discontinuity (RD) design offers identification of causal effects under weak assumptions, earning it a position as a standard method in modern political science research. But identification does not necessarily imply that causal effects can be estimated accurately with limited data. In this paper, we highlight that estimation under the RD design involves serious statistical challenges and investigate how these challenges manifest themselves in the empirical literature in political science. We collect all RD-based findings published in top political science journals in the period 2009–2018. The distribution of published results exhibits pathological features; estimates tend to bunch just above the conventional level of statistical significance. A reanalysis of all studies with available data suggests that researcher discretion is not a major driver of these features. However, researchers tend to use inappropriate methods for inference, rendering standard errors artificially small. A retrospective power analysis reveals that most of these studies were underpowered to detect all but large effects. The issues we uncover, combined with well-documented selection pressures in academic publishing, cause concern that many published findings using the RD design may be exaggerated.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46863693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1177/20531680211031045
Shane P. Singh, N. S. Williams
Chile is undergoing perhaps the most dramatic reformation of any contemporary democracy and will adopt a wholly new constitution in the coming two years. Against this backdrop, in this Research Note we investigate which democratic features Chileans prefer. To so do, we field a conjoint experiment with a large quota sample of Chileans. Results reveal that Chileans have several distinct preferences over democratic features that are currently subject to change. We also find that these preferences are largely indistinguishable within demographic subgroups. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings in light of Chile’s ongoing processes of democratic reform and lessons for other democracies.
{"title":"What type of democracy do Chileans want?","authors":"Shane P. Singh, N. S. Williams","doi":"10.1177/20531680211031045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680211031045","url":null,"abstract":"Chile is undergoing perhaps the most dramatic reformation of any contemporary democracy and will adopt a wholly new constitution in the coming two years. Against this backdrop, in this Research Note we investigate which democratic features Chileans prefer. To so do, we field a conjoint experiment with a large quota sample of Chileans. Results reveal that Chileans have several distinct preferences over democratic features that are currently subject to change. We also find that these preferences are largely indistinguishable within demographic subgroups. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings in light of Chile’s ongoing processes of democratic reform and lessons for other democracies.","PeriodicalId":37327,"journal":{"name":"Research and Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/20531680211031045","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45708402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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