Tata's Sentencing: A social process re-thinking research and policy argues that far from being a mere technical exercise, sentencing is a culturally reflective process, offering emotional resolution and a democratic function to the public – it allows us to discuss what we all view as legitimate levels of punishment.
His central thesis is that sentencing is a social process comprising of three key ideas: it is interpretive, ‘a collaborative process of sense-making’ (p.6), processual, a ‘collaborative activity among a range of professionals signalling meanings to each other’ (p.6), and performative (p.8).
Tata skilfully addresses the supposed conflict between the ‘two giants of sentencing thought’, the legal-rational tradition and the judicial-defensive tradition (p.14). This debate is commonly referred to as the debate between consistency in sentencing (e.g., in the form of guidelines) and judicial discretion.
He draws on scholarship from the 1960s onwards which called for sentencing reforms to structure decision making: Frankel (1972), for example, castigated the lawless state of sentencing in America, calling discretionary sentencing practices a ‘wasteland of law’ (p.16). Highly discretionary practices lead to unjustifiable inequalities at sentencing stage, including the race or ethnicity of the defendant (Hood, 1992).
Opposing legal-rationalism in sentencing is the judicial-defensive tradition, sometimes referred to as individualised sentencing: the idea that each case turns on its own facts, and a sentence should be tailored to the offence but also the offender. Tata cites a volume of academic work that supports the judicial-defensive view. The literature charts a move away from welfare-oriented ideas and individualisation to new risk and managerial logics, and a dehumanised and mechanistic approach to sentencing: Tata calls this the ‘criminological warnings about the drift into a managerialist dystopia’ (p.19).
Tata sets out in his view that the two traditions share the same underlying assumption of liberalism – the belief in the rights of the individual, equality before the law and the consent of the governed. He highlights that discretion only exists because the law permits discretion, drawing on Dworkin's doughnut analogy (p.27): ‘Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction …’ (Dworkin, 2013, p.48). Foucault's (1977) work on power is relied upon, wherein he states that power is dispersed more simply than the commands of the state, it is ‘diffused in a range of subtle, capillary, micro-relations’ (p.28).
In abstract discourse, law and discretion are opposite forces, however, Tata argues in Chapter 3 that in practice these concepts are exercised simultaneously. In decrying their helplessness and lamenting the law's harsh results, individual judges are themselves