Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.17994/it.2022.20.2.69.7
N. Niyazov
The article touches upon peculiarities of interaction of the Republic of Azerbaijan with new NATO members in military sphere by the example of Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. The objective of the work is to show that post-Soviet states, having chosen a successful pattern of cooperation with European countries, are able to gain their place on the international arena even not being a member of a European block. To reach the goal the author of the article gives a review of literature covering different aspects of military policy of Azerbaijan and studies the factors that provoked Baku to advance collaboration with Prague and Sofia in military sphere. Historical and genetical scientific method, decision-making system analysis, case study, institutional, and elements of germenevtic method are applied. The results of the research are the following: after the defeat in the First Karabakh war Azerbaijan focused on modernization of economy and military forces while it continued to conduct negotiations on the conflict settlement under the authority of the OSCE Minsk Group. To achieve this goal Azerbaijan started to collaborate with Ukraine, Belarus, Israel, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, South Africa and other states in military sphere. The improving of mutually beneficial collaboration with new NATO members was an essential focus area. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan tended to solve both military problems including strengthening the potential of armed forces and political problems aimed at receiving support in the Karabakh settlement. The latter played more important role for Baku than purchasing different arms systems, because by the time Azerbaijan had already had access to weapons markets of Israel, Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, Jordan and Turkey. Thus, two patterns of interaction were constructed – the first case concerns the Czech Republic and full-scale military and political cooperation, the second deals with Bulgaria where the military aspect was an approach to the political integrant. The analysis shows that expertly combining military and diplomatic interaction and military and technical cooperation with new NATO members Baku managed to win the support, even if unofficial, and it became obvious in the Second Karabakh war.
{"title":"Models of Cooperation between Azerbaijan and NATO Member-States","authors":"N. Niyazov","doi":"10.17994/it.2022.20.2.69.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17994/it.2022.20.2.69.7","url":null,"abstract":"The article touches upon peculiarities of interaction of the Republic of Azerbaijan with new NATO members in military sphere by the example of Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. The objective of the work is to show that post-Soviet states, having chosen a successful pattern of cooperation with European countries, are able to gain their place on the international arena even not being a member of a European block. To reach the goal the author of the article gives a review of literature covering different aspects of military policy of Azerbaijan and studies the factors that provoked Baku to advance collaboration with Prague and Sofia in military sphere. Historical and genetical scientific method, decision-making system analysis, case study, institutional, and elements of germenevtic method are applied. The results of the research are the following: after the defeat in the First Karabakh war Azerbaijan focused on modernization of economy and military forces while it continued to conduct negotiations on the conflict settlement under the authority of the OSCE Minsk Group. To achieve this goal Azerbaijan started to collaborate with Ukraine, Belarus, Israel, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, South Africa and other states in military sphere. The improving of mutually beneficial collaboration with new NATO members was an essential focus area. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan tended to solve both military problems including strengthening the potential of armed forces and political problems aimed at receiving support in the Karabakh settlement. The latter played more important role for Baku than purchasing different arms systems, because by the time Azerbaijan had already had access to weapons markets of Israel, Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, Jordan and Turkey. Thus, two patterns of interaction were constructed – the first case concerns the Czech Republic and full-scale military and political cooperation, the second deals with Bulgaria where the military aspect was an approach to the political integrant. The analysis shows that expertly combining military and diplomatic interaction and military and technical cooperation with new NATO members Baku managed to win the support, even if unofficial, and it became obvious in the Second Karabakh war.","PeriodicalId":37798,"journal":{"name":"Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67545458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.17994/it.2022.20.1.68.5
E. Mikhaylenko
The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has become known for its active engagement in the drafting and promotion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The success of the campaign is related to the fact that not only other anti-nuclear non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but also a number of state figures and diplomats have joined the campaign. ICAN is a "transnational advocacy network" (TAN) that has managed to engage a significant pool of state and non-state stakeholders (actors). This paper aims to explore the ICAN phenomenon and identify the features of this transnational advocacy network. The study is based on documents and materials drawn from the official ICAN website, working papers from the NPT Review Conferences, as well as interviews with representatives of anti-nuclear NGOs. The novelty of the study consists in the fact that a new interpretation of the concept of "transnational advocacy network" was introduced into Russian academic discourse and the main instruments and principles of TAN were identified on the basis of the ICAN example. The research of ICAN was carried out according to three bullet-points: (1) analysis of NGO activities in the NPT negotiation process; (2) identification of the features of ICAN as a TAN, the main trends and methods of work; (3) problems and limitations of ICAN. A hallmark of today's TANs is that they combine advocacy and examination, allowing such coalitions to work successfully with international organizations and states. ICAN is an interesting case study because there has been a convergence of interests between a number of states and anti-nuclear NGOs. However, the question still remains how long will it be able to keep functioning in the TAN format and continue to frame the agenda of the NPT Conferences? The drive to ban nuclear weapons, and then to lobby for the signing and ratification of the NPT, demonstrated that ICAN had moved from public activity to direct diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is reason to assume that ICAN and its coordinating role in the NPT negotiation process may become less important as the focus and interests of states shift back to public outreach activities.
{"title":"From Advocacy to Diplomacy: the Case of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons","authors":"E. Mikhaylenko","doi":"10.17994/it.2022.20.1.68.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17994/it.2022.20.1.68.5","url":null,"abstract":"The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has become known for its active engagement in the drafting and promotion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The success of the campaign is related to the fact that not only other anti-nuclear non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but also a number of state figures and diplomats have joined the campaign. ICAN is a \"transnational advocacy network\" (TAN) that has managed to engage a significant pool of state and non-state stakeholders (actors). This paper aims to explore the ICAN phenomenon and identify the features of this transnational advocacy network. The study is based on documents and materials drawn from the official ICAN website, working papers from the NPT Review Conferences, as well as interviews with representatives of anti-nuclear NGOs. The novelty of the study consists in the fact that a new interpretation of the concept of \"transnational advocacy network\" was introduced into Russian academic discourse and the main instruments and principles of TAN were identified on the basis of the ICAN example. The research of ICAN was carried out according to three bullet-points: (1) analysis of NGO activities in the NPT negotiation process; (2) identification of the features of ICAN as a TAN, the main trends and methods of work; (3) problems and limitations of ICAN. A hallmark of today's TANs is that they combine advocacy and examination, allowing such coalitions to work successfully with international organizations and states. ICAN is an interesting case study because there has been a convergence of interests between a number of states and anti-nuclear NGOs. However, the question still remains how long will it be able to keep functioning in the TAN format and continue to frame the agenda of the NPT Conferences? The drive to ban nuclear weapons, and then to lobby for the signing and ratification of the NPT, demonstrated that ICAN had moved from public activity to direct diplomacy. Nevertheless, there is reason to assume that ICAN and its coordinating role in the NPT negotiation process may become less important as the focus and interests of states shift back to public outreach activities.","PeriodicalId":37798,"journal":{"name":"Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67545535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.17994/it.2022.20.1.68.8
L. Sokolshchik, D. Suslov
The authors present complex analysis of US–Russia relations under the Biden Administration. W. Mead’s methodology (typology of foreign policy ideology) and S. Gunnitsky and A. Tsygankov’s theoretical framework (Wilsonian approach) are used. The article examines the motives of Russian and American foreign policies towards each other, as well as the outcomes for the Russia factor in US domestic politics and its impact on the bilateral relations. The authors identify the nature of ideological and political confrontation of the two nations which stems from their mutual perceptions and interpretations of the world order. It is revealed that the strengthening of ideological motivation of US foreign policy under the Biden Administration is aimed to rally Western countries behind the rivalry with illiberal regimes (Russia and China). At the same time, Russia perceives the current confrontation with the United States as an existential threat since it challenges its geopolitical power and national identity. The research looks into such aspects of US–Russia relations as sanctions against Russia, climate change interaction, global security and arms control. The authors conclude that US–Russia ideological confrontation is systematic; steps towards cooperation are aimed at preventing possible escalation. In the near future, US–Russia relations can be considered as a combination (i.e. sanctions, supporting Russian opposition, countering Russia in the post-Soviet region) and selective dialogue and cooperation on such issues as strategic stability, arms control, cybersecurity and climate change. US–Russia relations are not likely to undergo fundamental changes until at least 2024, when new electoral cycles start both in Russia and in the United States. Under current conditions, the management of the US–Russia confrontation remains the major goal for the sides.
{"title":"Prospects for US-Russia Relations under Biden","authors":"L. Sokolshchik, D. Suslov","doi":"10.17994/it.2022.20.1.68.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17994/it.2022.20.1.68.8","url":null,"abstract":"The authors present complex analysis of US–Russia relations under the Biden Administration. W. Mead’s methodology (typology of foreign policy ideology) and S. Gunnitsky and A. Tsygankov’s theoretical framework (Wilsonian approach) are used. The article examines the motives of Russian and American foreign policies towards each other, as well as the outcomes for the Russia factor in US domestic politics and its impact on the bilateral relations. The authors identify the nature of ideological and political confrontation of the two nations which stems from their mutual perceptions and interpretations of the world order. It is revealed that the strengthening of ideological motivation of US foreign policy under the Biden Administration is aimed to rally Western countries behind the rivalry with illiberal regimes (Russia and China). At the same time, Russia perceives the current confrontation with the United States as an existential threat since it challenges its geopolitical power and national identity. The research looks into such aspects of US–Russia relations as sanctions against Russia, climate change interaction, global security and arms control. The authors conclude that US–Russia ideological confrontation is systematic; steps towards cooperation are aimed at preventing possible escalation. In the near future, US–Russia relations can be considered as a combination (i.e. sanctions, supporting Russian opposition, countering Russia in the post-Soviet region) and selective dialogue and cooperation on such issues as strategic stability, arms control, cybersecurity and climate change. US–Russia relations are not likely to undergo fundamental changes until at least 2024, when new electoral cycles start both in Russia and in the United States. Under current conditions, the management of the US–Russia confrontation remains the major goal for the sides.","PeriodicalId":37798,"journal":{"name":"Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67545694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.17994/it.2022.20.2.69.3
P. Kanevskiy
Lobbying is an integral part of contemporary international processes. Globalization, spread of market relations and transnational links, liberalization of national and supranational governance increased the role of interest groups in international relations. However, interest groups activities at the global level are still largely a terra incognita for international relations theory and international law which requires a more comprehensive analysis. The main goal of the article is to fill the gaps in modern IR theory as well as in theories of lobbying and interest groups by systematization of lobbying regulation experience in international and transnational spheres. Even though single approach towards formalization of international lobbying is hardly feasible, systematization of current global practices should facilitate better understanding of the nature of interest groups activity in international and transnational spheres, of potential and limits for its regulation both in sovereign states and international organizations. The article analyzes separate regulatory regimes aimed at formalizing lobbying in international and transnational spheres. There are two types of regimes: those existing on supranational level that set rules of interaction between interest groups and international organizations; those that regulate interactions of foreign interest groups and sovereign states. Analysis has demonstrated that supranational and national authorities have different approaches towards regulating their interactions with transnational interest groups. Moreover, difference exists not only between these two levels but within levels. I study supranational regulation with the cases of the European Union and the United Nations. The EU is an example of the most inclusive regulatory regime within the international organization. It technically covers all types of interest groups that wish to lobby EU officials. The UN takes a different approach – it officially regulates interactions only with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). However, real interests behind INGOs include not only public interests but also business groups. There is an unfolding discussion within the UN over what should be the right approach towards regulating business interests. Various UN bodies have varying opinions on the issue that results in existence of various sub-regimes in the organization. The analysis of foreign lobbying regulation regimes in sovereign states has demonstrated that their development is connected mainly to political motivations of national authorities who wish to limit political and information influence by foreign interest groups while leaving economic ties and interaction with foreign business groups relatively immune to such regulation.
{"title":"Regulating Lobbying in International and Transnational Spheres","authors":"P. Kanevskiy","doi":"10.17994/it.2022.20.2.69.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17994/it.2022.20.2.69.3","url":null,"abstract":"Lobbying is an integral part of contemporary international processes. Globalization, spread of market relations and transnational links, liberalization of national and supranational governance increased the role of interest groups in international relations. However, interest groups activities at the global level are still largely a terra incognita for international relations theory and international law which requires a more comprehensive analysis. The main goal of the article is to fill the gaps in modern IR theory as well as in theories of lobbying and interest groups by systematization of lobbying regulation experience in international and transnational spheres. Even though single approach towards formalization of international lobbying is hardly feasible, systematization of current global practices should facilitate better understanding of the nature of interest groups activity in international and transnational spheres, of potential and limits for its regulation both in sovereign states and international organizations. The article analyzes separate regulatory regimes aimed at formalizing lobbying in international and transnational spheres. There are two types of regimes: those existing on supranational level that set rules of interaction between interest groups and international organizations; those that regulate interactions of foreign interest groups and sovereign states. Analysis has demonstrated that supranational and national authorities have different approaches towards regulating their interactions with transnational interest groups. Moreover, difference exists not only between these two levels but within levels. I study supranational regulation with the cases of the European Union and the United Nations. The EU is an example of the most inclusive regulatory regime within the international organization. It technically covers all types of interest groups that wish to lobby EU officials. The UN takes a different approach – it officially regulates interactions only with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). However, real interests behind INGOs include not only public interests but also business groups. There is an unfolding discussion within the UN over what should be the right approach towards regulating business interests. Various UN bodies have varying opinions on the issue that results in existence of various sub-regimes in the organization. The analysis of foreign lobbying regulation regimes in sovereign states has demonstrated that their development is connected mainly to political motivations of national authorities who wish to limit political and information influence by foreign interest groups while leaving economic ties and interaction with foreign business groups relatively immune to such regulation.","PeriodicalId":37798,"journal":{"name":"Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67545828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.17994/it.2022.20.2.69.6
E. Entina, M. Entin
The European Union is being dragged deeper into another systemic crisis, largely caused by itself. The EU usually saved face from the crises and got stronger, modernized, with broader powers vested by the Member States. Now the situation is different. The EU has hedged its bets. Using the tools of "deliberative" democracy, it held a Conference on the future of Europe, which is discussed in detail in this article. It was organized in a modern network format. Owing to it, the EU leadership was able to involve tens of thousands of people and all segments of society in the discussion of implementing the European project and deepening integration. According to their plan, such an impressive representativeness legitimizes in advance the widest range of recommendations approved by the Conference. Given these recommendations, the European Parliament, the EU Council and the European Commission can now draw any recipes for revitalizing what they are already doing, tightening their course and renewing the EU. They got a free hand, which they counted on: it will be difficult for opponents of reforms to go against the mandate of voters. Some of the measures proposed by the Conference have already been taken up by the EU institutions. Some may require amendments to the founding agreements of the integration bloc and the convening of a convention. The result could be a profound transformation in the way the EU is organized and functions. However, Brussels' plans seem to fall far from reality, contradict the interests of other world players and promotion of equal international cooperation and multilateralism.
{"title":"EU Development in the Context of the Conference on the Future of Europe","authors":"E. Entina, M. Entin","doi":"10.17994/it.2022.20.2.69.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17994/it.2022.20.2.69.6","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union is being dragged deeper into another systemic crisis, largely caused by itself. The EU usually saved face from the crises and got stronger, modernized, with broader powers vested by the Member States. Now the situation is different. The EU has hedged its bets. Using the tools of \"deliberative\" democracy, it held a Conference on the future of Europe, which is discussed in detail in this article. It was organized in a modern network format. Owing to it, the EU leadership was able to involve tens of thousands of people and all segments of society in the discussion of implementing the European project and deepening integration. According to their plan, such an impressive representativeness legitimizes in advance the widest range of recommendations approved by the Conference. Given these recommendations, the European Parliament, the EU Council and the European Commission can now draw any recipes for revitalizing what they are already doing, tightening their course and renewing the EU. They got a free hand, which they counted on: it will be difficult for opponents of reforms to go against the mandate of voters. Some of the measures proposed by the Conference have already been taken up by the EU institutions. Some may require amendments to the founding agreements of the integration bloc and the convening of a convention. The result could be a profound transformation in the way the EU is organized and functions. However, Brussels' plans seem to fall far from reality, contradict the interests of other world players and promotion of equal international cooperation and multilateralism.","PeriodicalId":37798,"journal":{"name":"Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67545424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.17994/it.2022.20.1.68.1
M. Shevchuk
The article analyzes the phenomenon of the small steps tactics in the peace process. An attempt is made to demonstrate how the systematic interaction of the parties to resolve non-politicized issues allows either to avoid another "freeze" of the negotiation process, or, at least, to maintain an informal dialogue when negotiations are not conducted at the political and diplomatic level. This approach is adjacent to the Track II diplomacy or one-and-a-half track diplomacy, as well as to the concepts of sustainable dialogue and confidence building measures. Reconciliation and finding a reliable formula for settlement is impossible in cases of protracted and smoldering conflicts without creating a sufficient level of mutual trust, at least between those social groups of representatives of the parties who form the political agenda and who are at the negotiating table. The study allowed the author to identify the similarity of confidence building measures and the "small steps" tactics, as well as conceptual differences that allow us to talk about its innovative nature. The article reviews the positive narratives of the "small steps" tactics and identifies limitations for its application. For this purpose, archival documents of the negotiation process, reports of the OSCE and foreign ministries of the parties to the conflict, statements of the involved participants, as well as the personal experience of the author, who was involved for a number of years in the negotiation process on the Transdnistrian settlement in the "5+2" format. The paper concludes that the "small steps" tactic is not able to resolve the conflict or build a settlement model, but, thanks to the principle of mutual security of behavior models, it makes it possible to achieve a change in the relations of the parties to the conflict, to transfer them from confrontational to cooperative, thus influencing the situation in the conflict zone.
{"title":"‘Small Steps’ Approach to Conflict Settlement","authors":"M. Shevchuk","doi":"10.17994/it.2022.20.1.68.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17994/it.2022.20.1.68.1","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the phenomenon of the small steps tactics in the peace process. An attempt is made to demonstrate how the systematic interaction of the parties to resolve non-politicized issues allows either to avoid another \"freeze\" of the negotiation process, or, at least, to maintain an informal dialogue when negotiations are not conducted at the political and diplomatic level. This approach is adjacent to the Track II diplomacy or one-and-a-half track diplomacy, as well as to the concepts of sustainable dialogue and confidence building measures. Reconciliation and finding a reliable formula for settlement is impossible in cases of protracted and smoldering conflicts without creating a sufficient level of mutual trust, at least between those social groups of representatives of the parties who form the political agenda and who are at the negotiating table. The study allowed the author to identify the similarity of confidence building measures and the \"small steps\" tactics, as well as conceptual differences that allow us to talk about its innovative nature. The article reviews the positive narratives of the \"small steps\" tactics and identifies limitations for its application. For this purpose, archival documents of the negotiation process, reports of the OSCE and foreign ministries of the parties to the conflict, statements of the involved participants, as well as the personal experience of the author, who was involved for a number of years in the negotiation process on the Transdnistrian settlement in the \"5+2\" format. The paper concludes that the \"small steps\" tactic is not able to resolve the conflict or build a settlement model, but, thanks to the principle of mutual security of behavior models, it makes it possible to achieve a change in the relations of the parties to the conflict, to transfer them from confrontational to cooperative, thus influencing the situation in the conflict zone.","PeriodicalId":37798,"journal":{"name":"Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67545427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.17994/it.2020.18.1.60.6
A. Crowley-Vigneau, A. Baykov
This article offers an analysis of why Russia has been struggling to implement the environmental policies adopted by the government. While Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), much discussed in the Constructivist scholarship and concerned with forces behind normative and behavioral change, do indeed have an independent effect on the adoption of environmental laws, they act predominantly through inter-governmental channels, not necessarily impacting on society itself. This partly explains why norms get adopted but may end up not getting implemented. Based on the existing literature on TANs, the authors’inquiry establishes the fact that, to be successful in facilitating implementation, transnational networks can operate not only in the capacity of Advocacy Networks for the adoption of norms, but also as what the authors of this article previously chose to refer to as Expertise and Experience Networks, primarily aiming to aid norm implementation. Countries can be affected by TANs but not by TEENs, which might account for the paradoxical situation in Russia regarding norm implementation. The difference between the two only becomes apparent in cases when they do not operate simultaneously.
{"title":"TRANSNATIONAL EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE NETWORKS AND RUSSIA'S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES","authors":"A. Crowley-Vigneau, A. Baykov","doi":"10.17994/it.2020.18.1.60.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17994/it.2020.18.1.60.6","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers an analysis of why Russia has been struggling to implement the environmental policies adopted by the government. While Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), much discussed in the Constructivist scholarship and concerned with forces behind normative and behavioral change, do indeed have an independent effect on the adoption of environmental laws, they act predominantly through inter-governmental channels, not necessarily impacting on society itself. This partly explains why norms get adopted but may end up not getting implemented. Based on the existing literature on TANs, the authors’inquiry establishes the fact that, to be successful in facilitating implementation, transnational networks can operate not only in the capacity of Advocacy Networks for the adoption of norms, but also as what the authors of this article previously chose to refer to as Expertise and Experience Networks, primarily aiming to aid norm implementation. Countries can be affected by TANs but not by TEENs, which might account for the paradoxical situation in Russia regarding norm implementation. The difference between the two only becomes apparent in cases when they do not operate simultaneously.","PeriodicalId":37798,"journal":{"name":"Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67544025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.17994/it.2020.18.1.60.3
A. Fenenko
Thus, the present article aims at answering the question whether there exists an anti-soft power, both as ideology and practice, which could be efficient enough for the state to protect itself from the impact of external informational and cultural influence. The theory of soft power is based on the idea that its object accepts normative subordination. Consequently, such object should not pursue major political ambitions, should be ready to collaborate within the established world order and, above all, agree with superiority of the world leaders and the rules they impose. Anti-soft power is different. The core idea is that its holder is not willing to comply with the opponent’s superiority as well as its rules of the game. The subject of anti-soft power is politically ambitious and never recognizes its dependence or inferiority. Regardless of being strong or weak, it will not admit its junior or secondary position in a community. We saw a few such subjects during the era of globalization. However, the globalization crisis may change the situation and thus give rise to a new political trend, that is the resurgence of anti-soft power. The article states that anti-soft power has repeatedly blocked the attempts of one country to influence another country. In the course of history, we can single out three main types of policy: 1) the policy based on supremacism, or chauvinism; 2) the policy based on ideological alternatives; 3) the policy based on segment restrictions of the oppo nent’s soft power. Each of these, though, can bring its subjects both political benefits and unwanted costs.
{"title":"ANTI-SOFT POWER IN POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE","authors":"A. Fenenko","doi":"10.17994/it.2020.18.1.60.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17994/it.2020.18.1.60.3","url":null,"abstract":"Thus, the present article aims at answering the question whether there exists an anti-soft power, both as ideology and practice, which could be efficient enough for the state to protect itself from the impact of external informational and cultural influence. The theory of soft power is based on the idea that its object accepts normative subordination. Consequently, such object should not pursue major political ambitions, should be ready to collaborate within the established world order and, above all, agree with superiority of the world leaders and the rules they impose. Anti-soft power is different. The core idea is that its holder is not willing to comply with the opponent’s superiority as well as its rules of the game. The subject of anti-soft power is politically ambitious and never recognizes its dependence or inferiority. Regardless of being strong or weak, it will not admit its junior or secondary position in a community. We saw a few such subjects during the era of globalization. However, the globalization crisis may change the situation and thus give rise to a new political trend, that is the resurgence of anti-soft power. The article states that anti-soft power has repeatedly blocked the attempts of one country to influence another country. In the course of history, we can single out three main types of policy: 1) the policy based on supremacism, or chauvinism; 2) the policy based on ideological alternatives; 3) the policy based on segment restrictions of the oppo nent’s soft power. Each of these, though, can bring its subjects both political benefits and unwanted costs.","PeriodicalId":37798,"journal":{"name":"Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67543968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-26DOI: 10.17994/it.2020.18.1.60.9
I. Sokov
Карагианнис Э. Новый политический ислам: права человека, демократия и справедливость. Филадельфия: Юниверсити оф Пенсильвания Пресс, 2018. 255 с.
新的政治伊斯兰:人权、民主和正义。费城:宾夕法尼亚大学出版社，2018年。255和。
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Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.17994/it.2021.19.2.65.5
A. Vavilov
This article analyzes the manifestations of regionalism in the context of a deep socio-political crisis in Ukraine. With the development of the political crisis that followed the coup d'etat in February 2014 in Ukraine, there was a noticeable actualization of issues and problems related to regionalism, society as a whole demonstrated a request for the redistribution of powers between the power center and the regions. This is reflected in numerous initiatives of regional authorities and public organizations aimed at expanding the financial base, functions and rights of local authorities and self-government, as well as in policy documents of political forces. At the same time, in some cases, the idea of establishing a contractual relationship between the Central government and the regions was put forward, which is typical for the Federal model of government. In response to this request, the Executive branch made another attempt to implement local government reform under the slogan of decentralizing the country's state structure. Since 2014, Ukraine has developed two multidirectional trends – centrifugal and centripetal, the ratio of which will determine the dynamics and severity of political manifestations of regionalism. Despite numerous autonomist statements, Ukrainian regionalism remains within the "rigid" model formed in the post-Soviet period. The conflict in the South-East of the country and the deep involvement of the leading powers – Russia, the United States and the European Union-are the determining factor that predetermined the "freezing" of regionalization processes in Ukraine after 2014. After the signing of the Minsk agreements, the implementation of which means for Ukraine to introduce elements of Federal relations into the system of state structure, the reform of the state structure and territorial administration has become inextricably linked with Kiev's strategy towards the self-proclaimed republics of Donbass. Manifestations of regionalism were perceived by Kiev to a large extent in the context of threats to the territorial integrity of the country, which significantly limited the possibility of implementing the policy of decentralization. In addition, Russia and the United States have demonstrated in practice different approaches to the interpretation and implementation of the Minsk agreements, which has had a negative impact on the regionalization processes in Ukraine. The nature of the processes of regionalization in Ukraine allows to draw Parallels with the situation in Transnistria and around him, and to talk about common Moldovan and Ukrainian models hard regionalism, the hallmark of which is the transformation of the regionalization processes in a tool to achieve political goals of Russia and the West in conflict with the nature of their interaction on post-Soviet space.
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