Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21533369.2020.1753387
N. Friedman
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Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21533369.2018.1528721
Marion Gibson
referencing the work of Michel Foucault and James C. Scott in the introduction, and here and there throughout, Malcomson remains mostly very close to the empirical ground. Many readers will likely find that a relief. Others, however, will wish he had dissected his material with a sharper analytical tool, and that he had been a little more self-critical in examining his theoretical assumptions regarding the nature and operation of what he calls order. For example, it is not clear on what grounds, or to what analytical ends, he chooses to privilege the top-down perspective by categorising officers’ actions, even when they wreak havoc on the social order, as order-creating, while lower-deck self-activity, even when it is overtly relationship-building like sex or mutiny, is deemed to be disordering. There is of course a logical and theoretical framework at work here, but Malcomson does not overtly engage with it. In a similar vein, while he is careful to emphasise that the three parts of the book should not be read as a causal sequence – order, disorder, and then punishment – he does not explain how their complex dialectical dance might fruitfully be understood instead. This is a missed opportunity. Malcomson is similarly reticent when it comes to the historiographical implications of his findings, of which there are many. Indeed, despite the book’s frankly misleading title, he is careful not to claim that his arguments have validity beyond the North American and West India stations in the early to mid-1810s. At the same time, by not closely analysing his discoveries in relationship to that particular geographic and chronological context, he also does not try very hard to avoid suggesting the opposite. As a result, it remains unclear whether his work really challenges previous studies, or simply enriches their arguments by complicating the overall picture. And perhaps we should be grateful: more stories of rum, sodomy and the lash will no doubt be forthcoming.
{"title":"Sea narratives: cultural responses to the sea, 1600–present","authors":"Marion Gibson","doi":"10.1080/21533369.2018.1528721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21533369.2018.1528721","url":null,"abstract":"referencing the work of Michel Foucault and James C. Scott in the introduction, and here and there throughout, Malcomson remains mostly very close to the empirical ground. Many readers will likely find that a relief. Others, however, will wish he had dissected his material with a sharper analytical tool, and that he had been a little more self-critical in examining his theoretical assumptions regarding the nature and operation of what he calls order. For example, it is not clear on what grounds, or to what analytical ends, he chooses to privilege the top-down perspective by categorising officers’ actions, even when they wreak havoc on the social order, as order-creating, while lower-deck self-activity, even when it is overtly relationship-building like sex or mutiny, is deemed to be disordering. There is of course a logical and theoretical framework at work here, but Malcomson does not overtly engage with it. In a similar vein, while he is careful to emphasise that the three parts of the book should not be read as a causal sequence – order, disorder, and then punishment – he does not explain how their complex dialectical dance might fruitfully be understood instead. This is a missed opportunity. Malcomson is similarly reticent when it comes to the historiographical implications of his findings, of which there are many. Indeed, despite the book’s frankly misleading title, he is careful not to claim that his arguments have validity beyond the North American and West India stations in the early to mid-1810s. At the same time, by not closely analysing his discoveries in relationship to that particular geographic and chronological context, he also does not try very hard to avoid suggesting the opposite. As a result, it remains unclear whether his work really challenges previous studies, or simply enriches their arguments by complicating the overall picture. And perhaps we should be grateful: more stories of rum, sodomy and the lash will no doubt be forthcoming.","PeriodicalId":38023,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Maritime Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88115388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21533369.2019.1647642
Richard Crockatt
ABSTRACT HMS Beagle is remembered primarily in connection with Charles Darwin, though maritime historians have always focused attention on the ship’s commander, Captain Robert Fitzroy. Even they, however, have overlooked the contribution of the ship’s boats in carrying out the role of completing the survey of the coast of South America. The Beagle carried seven open boats of varying types, which were employed in surveys of waters which the ship could not reach. They worked in challenging waters and often undertook expeditions lasting weeks or even months. Besides the inherent drama of these voyages, they are important for what they reveal about the skills and human qualities of officers and men of the Royal Navy in this period. There is evidence too that Darwin’s participation in some of these small-boat expeditions and the wider surveying role of the Beagle contributed to his formulation of the theory of natural selection.
{"title":"The Beagle’s pups: small-boat surveying expeditions in South America*","authors":"Richard Crockatt","doi":"10.1080/21533369.2019.1647642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21533369.2019.1647642","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT HMS Beagle is remembered primarily in connection with Charles Darwin, though maritime historians have always focused attention on the ship’s commander, Captain Robert Fitzroy. Even they, however, have overlooked the contribution of the ship’s boats in carrying out the role of completing the survey of the coast of South America. The Beagle carried seven open boats of varying types, which were employed in surveys of waters which the ship could not reach. They worked in challenging waters and often undertook expeditions lasting weeks or even months. Besides the inherent drama of these voyages, they are important for what they reveal about the skills and human qualities of officers and men of the Royal Navy in this period. There is evidence too that Darwin’s participation in some of these small-boat expeditions and the wider surveying role of the Beagle contributed to his formulation of the theory of natural selection.","PeriodicalId":38023,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Maritime Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72598203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21533369.2018.1514750
N. Frykman
interweaving of background information is sensitively done and, overall, adds value to the story, providing a broad perspective on Fanny’s life both as part of the lively Austen clan and as a member of a wider naval ‘family’. Of greatest interest to literary scholars is undoubtedly the link that Fanny may have provided between Austen and her fictional naval characters. Austen was an author who valued realism and accuracy in her writing and Kindred speculates on the information Fanny may have been able to supply that was subsequently immortalised in the novels. While Fanny does not appear to have a direct fictional counterpart, there are some similarities between her experiences and those of Mrs Croft, the wife of Admiral Croft, in Persuasion. Like Mrs Croft, Fanny was devoted to her husband and, importantly, spent time at sea with him. Also like Mrs Croft, the evidence suggests that Fanny was happiest when she and Charles were together, even if that was on board a warship in a conflict situation (196). Mrs Croft also displays a familiarity with specific naval terminology which may have been passed to Austen by Fanny and, perhaps most tellingly, she demonstrates a local knowledge of Fanny’s home island: ‘we do not call Bermuda or Bahama, you know, the West Indies’ (197). Sadly, there is no evidence of Fanny’s advice being directly sought by Austen, or of any conversations between the two women which might have yielded such nuggets of information. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that Fanny would have been one of Austen’s sources, particularly as her other naval sister-in-law, Mary, did not go to sea – although Kindred suggests other links between Mary and Mrs Croft (205–06). For those with a primary interest in Austen and her inspirations, the chapter which explores the possible links between Fanny and the novels is undoubtedly the most satisfying of the book and demonstrates Kindred’s depth of expertise as a scholar of both literature and history. Although those hoping for a rich new seam of Austen-related material may be disappointed, this is a meticulously researched, learned and well-written book. It provides a fascinating insight into the all-too-short life of Jane Austen’s seafaring sister-in-law and, although Fanny did not live to see her twenty-fifth birthday, it is comforting to think that she may in some small way live on through the pages of some of the world’s best-loved novels.
{"title":"Order and disorder in the British Navy, 1793–1815: control, resistance, flogging and hanging","authors":"N. Frykman","doi":"10.1080/21533369.2018.1514750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21533369.2018.1514750","url":null,"abstract":"interweaving of background information is sensitively done and, overall, adds value to the story, providing a broad perspective on Fanny’s life both as part of the lively Austen clan and as a member of a wider naval ‘family’. Of greatest interest to literary scholars is undoubtedly the link that Fanny may have provided between Austen and her fictional naval characters. Austen was an author who valued realism and accuracy in her writing and Kindred speculates on the information Fanny may have been able to supply that was subsequently immortalised in the novels. While Fanny does not appear to have a direct fictional counterpart, there are some similarities between her experiences and those of Mrs Croft, the wife of Admiral Croft, in Persuasion. Like Mrs Croft, Fanny was devoted to her husband and, importantly, spent time at sea with him. Also like Mrs Croft, the evidence suggests that Fanny was happiest when she and Charles were together, even if that was on board a warship in a conflict situation (196). Mrs Croft also displays a familiarity with specific naval terminology which may have been passed to Austen by Fanny and, perhaps most tellingly, she demonstrates a local knowledge of Fanny’s home island: ‘we do not call Bermuda or Bahama, you know, the West Indies’ (197). Sadly, there is no evidence of Fanny’s advice being directly sought by Austen, or of any conversations between the two women which might have yielded such nuggets of information. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that Fanny would have been one of Austen’s sources, particularly as her other naval sister-in-law, Mary, did not go to sea – although Kindred suggests other links between Mary and Mrs Croft (205–06). For those with a primary interest in Austen and her inspirations, the chapter which explores the possible links between Fanny and the novels is undoubtedly the most satisfying of the book and demonstrates Kindred’s depth of expertise as a scholar of both literature and history. Although those hoping for a rich new seam of Austen-related material may be disappointed, this is a meticulously researched, learned and well-written book. It provides a fascinating insight into the all-too-short life of Jane Austen’s seafaring sister-in-law and, although Fanny did not live to see her twenty-fifth birthday, it is comforting to think that she may in some small way live on through the pages of some of the world’s best-loved novels.","PeriodicalId":38023,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Maritime Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74836828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21533369.2019.1602301
S. Mackenzie
ABSTRACT The post-war court-martial of Lieutenant-Commander Rupert Lonsdale, skipper of a British submarine captured at sea by the German Navy eight months into the Second World War, resulted in a full acquittal. It has been widely assumed that this trial was a pro forma exercise mounted simply in order to absolve publicly a gallant officer who had found himself in an impossible situation, the final verdict being a foregone conclusion. This was not so. Under the terms of the Naval Discipline Act then in force it was a serious offence to surrender a vessel of the Royal Navy to the enemy if it could still be defended, and the former captain had already admitted to having surrendered HMS Seal without preparing to scuttle her. Given the undisputed central facts of the case, only the introduction at trial by the defence of an unprecedented argument – that a slow build-up of carbon dioxide inside the boat over many hours while it was stuck underwater had rendered its captain mentally incompetent at a critical time – allowed the Court to side with the accused. The outcome influenced later naval disciplinary proceedings and was eventually acknowledged in changes to armed forces law in the United Kingdom.
{"title":"‘His brain was not working properly’: the surrender of HMS Seal and the court-martial of Lieutenant-Commander Rupert Lonsdale, RN","authors":"S. Mackenzie","doi":"10.1080/21533369.2019.1602301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21533369.2019.1602301","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The post-war court-martial of Lieutenant-Commander Rupert Lonsdale, skipper of a British submarine captured at sea by the German Navy eight months into the Second World War, resulted in a full acquittal. It has been widely assumed that this trial was a pro forma exercise mounted simply in order to absolve publicly a gallant officer who had found himself in an impossible situation, the final verdict being a foregone conclusion. This was not so. Under the terms of the Naval Discipline Act then in force it was a serious offence to surrender a vessel of the Royal Navy to the enemy if it could still be defended, and the former captain had already admitted to having surrendered HMS Seal without preparing to scuttle her. Given the undisputed central facts of the case, only the introduction at trial by the defence of an unprecedented argument – that a slow build-up of carbon dioxide inside the boat over many hours while it was stuck underwater had rendered its captain mentally incompetent at a critical time – allowed the Court to side with the accused. The outcome influenced later naval disciplinary proceedings and was eventually acknowledged in changes to armed forces law in the United Kingdom.","PeriodicalId":38023,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Maritime Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90275977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21533369.2018.1528718
Morgan Breene
ABSTRACT Napoleon's Egyptian campaign has long been a source of fascination for historians, as it can be considered a turning point in Western Europe's relationship with the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East. There are aspects of this campaign, however, that have not yet been critically analysed. The role played by the unique physical environment of the Nile and Levantine coast, and the specific vessel technologies that navigating these areas required, has as of yet been ignored in favour of the major naval actions at the Battle of the Nile and the Siege of Acre. Both French and British forces adopted indigenous Nile vessel types, in particular djermes, for use throughout the course of the campaign in response to restrictive Nilotic conditions. This article compiles mentions of the use of indigenous vessels in the historical record of Napoleon's campaign and stresses the importance of incorporating the use of locally developed craft into studies of the Egyptian campaign and other naval campaigns of the period.
{"title":"Outfitting the country boats as gunboats: indigenous vessels and the Egyptian campaign, 1798–1802","authors":"Morgan Breene","doi":"10.1080/21533369.2018.1528718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21533369.2018.1528718","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Napoleon's Egyptian campaign has long been a source of fascination for historians, as it can be considered a turning point in Western Europe's relationship with the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East. There are aspects of this campaign, however, that have not yet been critically analysed. The role played by the unique physical environment of the Nile and Levantine coast, and the specific vessel technologies that navigating these areas required, has as of yet been ignored in favour of the major naval actions at the Battle of the Nile and the Siege of Acre. Both French and British forces adopted indigenous Nile vessel types, in particular djermes, for use throughout the course of the campaign in response to restrictive Nilotic conditions. This article compiles mentions of the use of indigenous vessels in the historical record of Napoleon's campaign and stresses the importance of incorporating the use of locally developed craft into studies of the Egyptian campaign and other naval campaigns of the period.","PeriodicalId":38023,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Maritime Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81311563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21533369.2019.1608665
R. Duffey, John Gallehawk
ABSTRACT This article provides a detailed analysis using learning theory of the classic naval confrontation between the Allies and Germany in the North Atlantic during the Second World War. New measures of countermeasure effectiveness introduced are the rate and probability of sinking as a function of the risk exposure and learning opportunity on both sides. These replace the ‘sweep rate’ used in earlier analyses, and demonstrates that a relevant risk exposure, experience and learning measure must replace the usual calendar time representation. Using archival data, the analysis confirms that the use of decryption intelligence did not itself result in a statistically significant increase in U-boat sinkings. At both the entire system and the individual human performance levels the rate, probability and number of sinkings are all exponential in form, decreasing with increasing experience and/or risk exposure. The reduction of between five and ten in the merchant ship loss data is exactly the range attained in multiple industrial and technological systems worldwide. The analysis shows the learning rate and countermeasure effectiveness trends are adversely affected by the stress of combat and wartime chaos as compared to peacetime.
{"title":"Quantifying countermeasure and detection effectiveness to threats using U-boat data from the Second World War","authors":"R. Duffey, John Gallehawk","doi":"10.1080/21533369.2019.1608665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21533369.2019.1608665","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article provides a detailed analysis using learning theory of the classic naval confrontation between the Allies and Germany in the North Atlantic during the Second World War. New measures of countermeasure effectiveness introduced are the rate and probability of sinking as a function of the risk exposure and learning opportunity on both sides. These replace the ‘sweep rate’ used in earlier analyses, and demonstrates that a relevant risk exposure, experience and learning measure must replace the usual calendar time representation. Using archival data, the analysis confirms that the use of decryption intelligence did not itself result in a statistically significant increase in U-boat sinkings. At both the entire system and the individual human performance levels the rate, probability and number of sinkings are all exponential in form, decreasing with increasing experience and/or risk exposure. The reduction of between five and ten in the merchant ship loss data is exactly the range attained in multiple industrial and technological systems worldwide. The analysis shows the learning rate and countermeasure effectiveness trends are adversely affected by the stress of combat and wartime chaos as compared to peacetime.","PeriodicalId":38023,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Maritime Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87074629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21533369.2018.1518682
Caroline Varin
the role of the opponent. Aside from the strategy of the latter, there is the case of their antistrategy or response to British strategy. Lastly, there are questions of politics. Conflict both results from and entails coalitions of support and position, and moves arise from seeking to sustain these coalitions. As a consequence, there is no optimum strategy in some sort of mechanistic fashion, but, instead, a shifting response to often complex tensions or possible tensions in such coalitions. It cannot be said that work on naval history has always captured the latter. There is, for example, more material on the impact of the Anglo-Prussian alliance on British amphibious operations against the French coast than there is as far as most of the naval operations are concerned; although there is worthwhile work on the Prussian pressure for a British naval commitment to the Baltic. That pressure was unsuccessful, but that did not mean that it was without significance for the politics of British naval moves. Alas, it cannot be said that foreign and British diplomatic sources have been systemically probed for this question. Nor is there an adequate assessment of the changing domestic dimension, although Richard Middleton’s work in the 1980s is still of great value. As a consequence of these limitations, work on the strategy of the conflict can be somewhat simplistic. This is notably so in terms of the relationships with foreign policy, for example the possibility of Hanover dropping out of the war for good in 1757–8. Robson’s forte is a more operational approach to strategy. Within that, he offers an excellent, accessible and highly lucid account of the vital role played by the Royal Navy in British success during the Seven Years War. It situates naval and maritime power firmly at the centre of British strategy. The approach is essentially chronological, and, within that, geographical. This helps provide coherence for the reader and aids analysis. At the same time, this approach risks underplaying the simultaneity of events and pressures. On the whole, Robson handles that well and provides, as a consequence, the best book on the subject. It is particularly valuable to see the scope of his account. For example, he covers the war on the Great Lakes. In doing so, he is able to argue that the loss of Fort William Henry in 1757 was a direct result of its commanders’ lack of naval resources to contest the French projecting power across Lake George. Such observations indicate the range of this most impressive book. It should be in every library covering naval history. Some works in this series by I.B. Tauris and National Museum of the Royal Navy do not work well but that is not the case for this book. More generally, it raises interesting questions about the relationships between capabilities and outcomes and between strategic and operational dimensions.
{"title":"Global responses to maritime violence: collaboration and collective action","authors":"Caroline Varin","doi":"10.1080/21533369.2018.1518682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21533369.2018.1518682","url":null,"abstract":"the role of the opponent. Aside from the strategy of the latter, there is the case of their antistrategy or response to British strategy. Lastly, there are questions of politics. Conflict both results from and entails coalitions of support and position, and moves arise from seeking to sustain these coalitions. As a consequence, there is no optimum strategy in some sort of mechanistic fashion, but, instead, a shifting response to often complex tensions or possible tensions in such coalitions. It cannot be said that work on naval history has always captured the latter. There is, for example, more material on the impact of the Anglo-Prussian alliance on British amphibious operations against the French coast than there is as far as most of the naval operations are concerned; although there is worthwhile work on the Prussian pressure for a British naval commitment to the Baltic. That pressure was unsuccessful, but that did not mean that it was without significance for the politics of British naval moves. Alas, it cannot be said that foreign and British diplomatic sources have been systemically probed for this question. Nor is there an adequate assessment of the changing domestic dimension, although Richard Middleton’s work in the 1980s is still of great value. As a consequence of these limitations, work on the strategy of the conflict can be somewhat simplistic. This is notably so in terms of the relationships with foreign policy, for example the possibility of Hanover dropping out of the war for good in 1757–8. Robson’s forte is a more operational approach to strategy. Within that, he offers an excellent, accessible and highly lucid account of the vital role played by the Royal Navy in British success during the Seven Years War. It situates naval and maritime power firmly at the centre of British strategy. The approach is essentially chronological, and, within that, geographical. This helps provide coherence for the reader and aids analysis. At the same time, this approach risks underplaying the simultaneity of events and pressures. On the whole, Robson handles that well and provides, as a consequence, the best book on the subject. It is particularly valuable to see the scope of his account. For example, he covers the war on the Great Lakes. In doing so, he is able to argue that the loss of Fort William Henry in 1757 was a direct result of its commanders’ lack of naval resources to contest the French projecting power across Lake George. Such observations indicate the range of this most impressive book. It should be in every library covering naval history. Some works in this series by I.B. Tauris and National Museum of the Royal Navy do not work well but that is not the case for this book. More generally, it raises interesting questions about the relationships between capabilities and outcomes and between strategic and operational dimensions.","PeriodicalId":38023,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Maritime Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88277169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21533369.2018.1513394
Erin Spinney
ABSTRACT Historians have typically viewed the construction of naval hospitals in the mid-eighteenth century as, variously, the British imperial state’s response to a broken system of contract care, a training ground for medical officers, a controlled and regimented space for healing, and a representation of the interests of the state through the quick return of sailors to ships. Yet, contemporaries conceived of the hospitals in household terms. Nurses, washerwomen, and labourers, were ‘servants’ of the hospital and often lived on the premises. Hospital agents kept a ‘household book’, composed of tradesmen’s bills, disbursements, and ward books that detailed issues of coals, beer, and wine to the various wards. Adopting a household model facilitates envisioning the hospitals as dynamic systems that responded to internal and external forces. Pay list prosopography demonstrates how the number of nurses responded to epidemics and battle casualties. This analytical framework illuminates the stability of the core nursing staff further reinforcing the household dynamic.
{"title":"Servants to the hospital and the state: nurses in Plymouth and Haslar Naval Hospitals, 1775–1815","authors":"Erin Spinney","doi":"10.1080/21533369.2018.1513394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21533369.2018.1513394","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Historians have typically viewed the construction of naval hospitals in the mid-eighteenth century as, variously, the British imperial state’s response to a broken system of contract care, a training ground for medical officers, a controlled and regimented space for healing, and a representation of the interests of the state through the quick return of sailors to ships. Yet, contemporaries conceived of the hospitals in household terms. Nurses, washerwomen, and labourers, were ‘servants’ of the hospital and often lived on the premises. Hospital agents kept a ‘household book’, composed of tradesmen’s bills, disbursements, and ward books that detailed issues of coals, beer, and wine to the various wards. Adopting a household model facilitates envisioning the hospitals as dynamic systems that responded to internal and external forces. Pay list prosopography demonstrates how the number of nurses responded to epidemics and battle casualties. This analytical framework illuminates the stability of the core nursing staff further reinforcing the household dynamic.","PeriodicalId":38023,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Maritime Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88534952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21533369.2018.1528726
R. Blyth, J. Davey
{"title":"A note from the editors","authors":"R. Blyth, J. Davey","doi":"10.1080/21533369.2018.1528726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21533369.2018.1528726","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38023,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Maritime Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84539307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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