Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1177/1879366521999757
R. Sakwa
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the idea that the fall of the Berlin Wall represented the beginning of the unification of Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev talked in terms of a “Common European Home,” an idea that continues in the guise of the project for a “Greater Europe.” However, right from the start, the transformative idea of Greater Europe was countered by the notion of “Europe whole and free,” whose fundamental dynamic was the enlargement of the existing West European order to encompass the rest of the continent. This was a program for the enlargement of the Atlantic system. After some prevarication, the enlargement agenda proved unacceptable to Moscow, and while it continues to argue in favor of transformation its main efforts are now devoted to creating some sort of “greater Eurasia.” There remains a fundamental tension between Atlanticist and pan-continental version of the post-–Cold War international order in the region. This tension gave rise to conflict and war: in 2008 (the Russo-Georgian War) and again from 2014 (Ukraine), and to what some call the Second Cold War. The continent is once again divided. However, pan-continentalism is far from dead, and although Greater Eurasian ideas have thrived, some sort of Greater European continentalism remains on the agenda. Is this, though, no more than a “sad delusion” or a genuine possibility?
{"title":"Sad delusions: The decline and rise of Greater Europe","authors":"R. Sakwa","doi":"10.1177/1879366521999757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366521999757","url":null,"abstract":"The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the idea that the fall of the Berlin Wall represented the beginning of the unification of Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev talked in terms of a “Common European Home,” an idea that continues in the guise of the project for a “Greater Europe.” However, right from the start, the transformative idea of Greater Europe was countered by the notion of “Europe whole and free,” whose fundamental dynamic was the enlargement of the existing West European order to encompass the rest of the continent. This was a program for the enlargement of the Atlantic system. After some prevarication, the enlargement agenda proved unacceptable to Moscow, and while it continues to argue in favor of transformation its main efforts are now devoted to creating some sort of “greater Eurasia.” There remains a fundamental tension between Atlanticist and pan-continental version of the post-–Cold War international order in the region. This tension gave rise to conflict and war: in 2008 (the Russo-Georgian War) and again from 2014 (Ukraine), and to what some call the Second Cold War. The continent is once again divided. However, pan-continentalism is far from dead, and although Greater Eurasian ideas have thrived, some sort of Greater European continentalism remains on the agenda. Is this, though, no more than a “sad delusion” or a genuine possibility?","PeriodicalId":39195,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","volume":"6 1","pages":"5 - 18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86652436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.31203/AEPA.2021.18.1.005
Y. Chan, Song Jae-Hoon
{"title":"A study on the effect of COVID-19 on job satisfaction of SME’ workers in China -Job involvement as intermediary variable and welfare as moderating variable-","authors":"Y. Chan, Song Jae-Hoon","doi":"10.31203/AEPA.2021.18.1.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31203/AEPA.2021.18.1.005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39195,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","volume":"22 1","pages":"81-105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89348283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1177/1879366521998241
I. Busygina, M. Filippov
In this article, we explore the inherent trade-offs and inconsistencies of Russia’s policies toward the post-Soviet space. We argue that attempts to rebuild an image of Russia as a “great power” have actually led to a reduction of Russian influence in the post-Soviet region. The more Russia acted as a “Great Power,” the less credible was its promise to respect the national sovereignty of the former Soviet republics. In 2011, Vladimir Putin declared that during his next term as president, his goal would be to establish a powerful supra-national Eurasian Union capable of becoming one of the poles in a multipolar world. However, Russia’s attempt to force Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union provoked the 2014 crisis. The Ukrainian crisis has de-facto completed the separation of Ukraine and Russia and made successful post-Soviet re-integration around Russia improbable.
{"title":"Trade-offs and inconsistencies of the Russian foreign policy: The case of Eurasia","authors":"I. Busygina, M. Filippov","doi":"10.1177/1879366521998241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366521998241","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we explore the inherent trade-offs and inconsistencies of Russia’s policies toward the post-Soviet space. We argue that attempts to rebuild an image of Russia as a “great power” have actually led to a reduction of Russian influence in the post-Soviet region. The more Russia acted as a “Great Power,” the less credible was its promise to respect the national sovereignty of the former Soviet republics. In 2011, Vladimir Putin declared that during his next term as president, his goal would be to establish a powerful supra-national Eurasian Union capable of becoming one of the poles in a multipolar world. However, Russia’s attempt to force Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union provoked the 2014 crisis. The Ukrainian crisis has de-facto completed the separation of Ukraine and Russia and made successful post-Soviet re-integration around Russia improbable.","PeriodicalId":39195,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","volume":"31 1","pages":"46 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81754968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.1177/1879366521998242
A. Kazantsev, S. Medvedeva, I. Safranchuk
Central Asian states are usually considered as passive elements rather than active agents of integration in Greater Eurasia. This article considers the role of these states as active agents shaping integration processes according to their own interests and perspectives. All Central Asian states conduct so-called “multivector” foreign policies balancing relations with the key great powers (Russia, China, and “collective West”) as well as with Middle Eastern and South Asian nations. From their point of view, the ideal formula for Greater Eurasia should include the entire continent. However, the current geopolitical situation in the world turns integration of Central Asian nations with Russia and China into the only available option. Political and military integration with Russia within the CSTO as well as economic integration with Russia within the Eurasian Economic Union are key elements of this. The SCO is also very important as the key structure shaping regional security system. The general framework for the construction of Greater Eurasia including Russia, China, and Central Asian nations in the economic sphere is mostly connected to the Chinese “Belt and Road” initiative and to the agreement on cooperation between this initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union. However, between Central Asian nations, on one hand, and Moscow and Beijing, on the other hand, there are still many practical issues that must be solved to push integration forward, and currently there are no indicators that these issues would be solved in the near future.
{"title":"Between Russia and China: Central Asia in Greater Eurasia","authors":"A. Kazantsev, S. Medvedeva, I. Safranchuk","doi":"10.1177/1879366521998242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366521998242","url":null,"abstract":"Central Asian states are usually considered as passive elements rather than active agents of integration in Greater Eurasia. This article considers the role of these states as active agents shaping integration processes according to their own interests and perspectives. All Central Asian states conduct so-called “multivector” foreign policies balancing relations with the key great powers (Russia, China, and “collective West”) as well as with Middle Eastern and South Asian nations. From their point of view, the ideal formula for Greater Eurasia should include the entire continent. However, the current geopolitical situation in the world turns integration of Central Asian nations with Russia and China into the only available option. Political and military integration with Russia within the CSTO as well as economic integration with Russia within the Eurasian Economic Union are key elements of this. The SCO is also very important as the key structure shaping regional security system. The general framework for the construction of Greater Eurasia including Russia, China, and Central Asian nations in the economic sphere is mostly connected to the Chinese “Belt and Road” initiative and to the agreement on cooperation between this initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union. However, between Central Asian nations, on one hand, and Moscow and Beijing, on the other hand, there are still many practical issues that must be solved to push integration forward, and currently there are no indicators that these issues would be solved in the near future.","PeriodicalId":39195,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","volume":"120 1","pages":"57 - 71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79892744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-27DOI: 10.1177/1879366520949886
I. Gurkov, Zokirzhon B. Saidov
This article retraces the development of Russian manufacturing subsidiaries of Western multinational corporations from the late 1980s until 2019. Using secondary sources and a unique handcrafted database on significant extensions of manufacturing facilities of Western multinational corporations in Russia during 2012–2018, we present the position of Russian manufacturing subsidiaries of Western multinational corporations before and after the beginning of sanctions. We also indicate the major strategic challenges that they currently face, including the necessity to maintain dual loyalty (to home country and host country authorities), manage the deteriorating quality of business regulations in Russia, and overcome the increasing shortage of qualified personnel at all levels. The data on the opening of new facilities in 2017–2018 reveal that such issues impede but cannot stop the quantitative development of foreign-owned Russian manufacturing facilities. At the same time, saving on managerial expenses and low “investments in non-current assets” of the established manufacturing subsidiaries may break down “the innovation engine” assembled in many Russian manufacturing subsidiaries of Western multinational corporations and bring them into the periphery of their corporate parents, where the attention and resources from the corporate center are lacking.
{"title":"The past, the present, and the foreseeable future of Russian manufacturing subsidiaries of Western multinational corporations","authors":"I. Gurkov, Zokirzhon B. Saidov","doi":"10.1177/1879366520949886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366520949886","url":null,"abstract":"This article retraces the development of Russian manufacturing subsidiaries of Western multinational corporations from the late 1980s until 2019. Using secondary sources and a unique handcrafted database on significant extensions of manufacturing facilities of Western multinational corporations in Russia during 2012–2018, we present the position of Russian manufacturing subsidiaries of Western multinational corporations before and after the beginning of sanctions. We also indicate the major strategic challenges that they currently face, including the necessity to maintain dual loyalty (to home country and host country authorities), manage the deteriorating quality of business regulations in Russia, and overcome the increasing shortage of qualified personnel at all levels. The data on the opening of new facilities in 2017–2018 reveal that such issues impede but cannot stop the quantitative development of foreign-owned Russian manufacturing facilities. At the same time, saving on managerial expenses and low “investments in non-current assets” of the established manufacturing subsidiaries may break down “the innovation engine” assembled in many Russian manufacturing subsidiaries of Western multinational corporations and bring them into the periphery of their corporate parents, where the attention and resources from the corporate center are lacking.","PeriodicalId":39195,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","volume":"16 1","pages":"155 - 168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86815062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-01DOI: 10.1177/1879366520943899
Insebayeva Nafissa
This article joins the discussion on foreign aid triggered by the rise of multiplicity of emerging donors in international development. Informed by the constructivist framework of analysis, this article evaluates the philosophy and core features of Kazakhstan’s chosen development aid model and explains the factors that account for the construction of distinct aid patterns of Kazakh donorship. This article asserts that Kazakhstan embraces a hybrid identity as a foreign aid provider through combining features and characteristics pertaining to both—emerging and traditional donors. On one hand, it discursively constructed its identity as a “development cooperation partner,” adopting the relevant discourse of mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference, which places it among those providers that actively associate themselves with the community of “emerging donors.” On the other hand, it selectively complies with policies and practices advocated by traditional donors. This study suggests that a combination of domestic and international factors played an important role in shaping Kazakhstan’s understanding of the aid-giving practices, and subsequently determined its constructed aid modality.
{"title":"On becoming a development cooperation partner: Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, identity, and international norms","authors":"Insebayeva Nafissa","doi":"10.1177/1879366520943899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366520943899","url":null,"abstract":"This article joins the discussion on foreign aid triggered by the rise of multiplicity of emerging donors in international development. Informed by the constructivist framework of analysis, this article evaluates the philosophy and core features of Kazakhstan’s chosen development aid model and explains the factors that account for the construction of distinct aid patterns of Kazakh donorship. This article asserts that Kazakhstan embraces a hybrid identity as a foreign aid provider through combining features and characteristics pertaining to both—emerging and traditional donors. On one hand, it discursively constructed its identity as a “development cooperation partner,” adopting the relevant discourse of mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference, which places it among those providers that actively associate themselves with the community of “emerging donors.” On the other hand, it selectively complies with policies and practices advocated by traditional donors. This study suggests that a combination of domestic and international factors played an important role in shaping Kazakhstan’s understanding of the aid-giving practices, and subsequently determined its constructed aid modality.","PeriodicalId":39195,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","volume":"43 1","pages":"158 - 173"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80218825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-01DOI: 10.1177/1879366520943896
Timur Dadabaev
This article argues that Uzbekistan’s cooperation agenda with Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea demonstrates clear signs of breaking with the Karimov-era security-driven agenda for cooperation in favor of de-securitization. This article uses a comparative analysis of the engagement of Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea with Uzbekistan through an analysis of the shifting political discourses in Uzbekistan and these states, statistics regarding their interaction, and an analysis of the economic road maps of their engagement from 2015 onward. This timeframe is attributed particular importance in this article, as it symbolizes the new opening of Uzbekistan toward these four states after the death of its dictatorial President Islam Karimov. In terms of the narrative, this article will first explore the problem of the securitization of the Central Asian region and the cooperation agenda. The article then discusses the motivations of Uzbekistan and its cooperation counterparts in pursuing closer ties. This discussion will then be followed by an analysis of how the new leadership in Uzbekistan re-evaluated its past behavior to address its post- and neocolonial challenges and the cooperation agendas with Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan.
{"title":"De-securitizing the “Silk Road”: Uzbekistan’s cooperation agenda with Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea in the post-Karimov era","authors":"Timur Dadabaev","doi":"10.1177/1879366520943896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366520943896","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that Uzbekistan’s cooperation agenda with Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea demonstrates clear signs of breaking with the Karimov-era security-driven agenda for cooperation in favor of de-securitization. This article uses a comparative analysis of the engagement of Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea with Uzbekistan through an analysis of the shifting political discourses in Uzbekistan and these states, statistics regarding their interaction, and an analysis of the economic road maps of their engagement from 2015 onward. This timeframe is attributed particular importance in this article, as it symbolizes the new opening of Uzbekistan toward these four states after the death of its dictatorial President Islam Karimov. In terms of the narrative, this article will first explore the problem of the securitization of the Central Asian region and the cooperation agenda. The article then discusses the motivations of Uzbekistan and its cooperation counterparts in pursuing closer ties. This discussion will then be followed by an analysis of how the new leadership in Uzbekistan re-evaluated its past behavior to address its post- and neocolonial challenges and the cooperation agendas with Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan.","PeriodicalId":39195,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"174 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88655278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-01DOI: 10.1177/1879366520947105
Azamat Sakiev
A puzzling aspect of the Syrian war has been the seemingly endless infusion of foreign fighters who have fueled and sustained the conflict. Unique among these are the militants from former Soviet regions such as Northern Caucasus in Russia and republics of Central Asia. In the evolving complexity of a layered and multifaceted conflict, it is easy to overlook the incongruousness of their presence in the conflict. Unlike most other foreign fighters, including those joining from Western Europe and North America, the post-Soviet militants lack the ethno-linguistic ties to the region. Rather, they hail from areas steeped in comparatively secular traditions and largely detached from the central tenants of the Syrian war. This makes their presence among extremist groups, such as the Islamic State, somewhat intriguing and anomalous. A key question, therefore, is why would these individuals join what to them in many ways is an alien war with extremely prohibitive costs? This articles proposes, as complementary to the dominant religious-ideological accounts, an explanation rooted in the enabling effect of marginalization processes in militants’ domestic settings.
{"title":"Guest warriors: The phenomenon of post-soviet fighters in the Syrian conflict","authors":"Azamat Sakiev","doi":"10.1177/1879366520947105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366520947105","url":null,"abstract":"A puzzling aspect of the Syrian war has been the seemingly endless infusion of foreign fighters who have fueled and sustained the conflict. Unique among these are the militants from former Soviet regions such as Northern Caucasus in Russia and republics of Central Asia. In the evolving complexity of a layered and multifaceted conflict, it is easy to overlook the incongruousness of their presence in the conflict. Unlike most other foreign fighters, including those joining from Western Europe and North America, the post-Soviet militants lack the ethno-linguistic ties to the region. Rather, they hail from areas steeped in comparatively secular traditions and largely detached from the central tenants of the Syrian war. This makes their presence among extremist groups, such as the Islamic State, somewhat intriguing and anomalous. A key question, therefore, is why would these individuals join what to them in many ways is an alien war with extremely prohibitive costs? This articles proposes, as complementary to the dominant religious-ideological accounts, an explanation rooted in the enabling effect of marginalization processes in militants’ domestic settings.","PeriodicalId":39195,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","volume":"28 1","pages":"188 - 200"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77637485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-14DOI: 10.1177/1879366520928363
Volodymyr Ishchenko
The article explains the violent radicalization of the initially peaceful Maidan uprising in January 2014 as the result of failure to build efficient leverage against Viktor Yanukovych with nonviolent methods. Maidan lacked critical diversity of nonviolent tactics insofar as directly disruptive methods of noncooperation (e.g., strikes and boycott) remained small-scale and inefficient. The Maidan protest coalition primarily lacked social-organizational resources, i.e. authoritative civil society organizations and strong labor movement, for developing nonviolent leverage that was partially connected to gaps in ideological and regional diversity and partially to unfavorable structural conditions. However, radical nationalists actively participating in the protests possessed a unique combination of resources for initiating and diffusing efficient, coordinated, and strategic violence when it became legitimated by intensifying repressions and disillusionment in the incapacity of the oppositional political parties to propose an efficient strategy against the government. Violent radicalization facilitated geographical expansion of disruption via occupations of governmental buildings in western and central Ukrainian regions that the state was ultimately incapable of containing.
{"title":"Insufficiently diverse: The problem of nonviolent leverage and radicalization of Ukraine’s Maidan uprising, 2013–2014","authors":"Volodymyr Ishchenko","doi":"10.1177/1879366520928363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366520928363","url":null,"abstract":"The article explains the violent radicalization of the initially peaceful Maidan uprising in January 2014 as the result of failure to build efficient leverage against Viktor Yanukovych with nonviolent methods. Maidan lacked critical diversity of nonviolent tactics insofar as directly disruptive methods of noncooperation (e.g., strikes and boycott) remained small-scale and inefficient. The Maidan protest coalition primarily lacked social-organizational resources, i.e. authoritative civil society organizations and strong labor movement, for developing nonviolent leverage that was partially connected to gaps in ideological and regional diversity and partially to unfavorable structural conditions. However, radical nationalists actively participating in the protests possessed a unique combination of resources for initiating and diffusing efficient, coordinated, and strategic violence when it became legitimated by intensifying repressions and disillusionment in the incapacity of the oppositional political parties to propose an efficient strategy against the government. Violent radicalization facilitated geographical expansion of disruption via occupations of governmental buildings in western and central Ukrainian regions that the state was ultimately incapable of containing.","PeriodicalId":39195,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","volume":"150 1","pages":"201 - 215"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77386776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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