IntroductionObservers tend to label the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a bizarre political system that can only be understood on its own terms. One respected analyst suggests that the DPRK might just be "the strangest political system in existence."1 Some observers argue that North Korea is a dangerous rogue state that is heavily armed, unpredictable and dangerous.2 Others argue that North Korea, while strange at first glance, becomes more comprehensible and less threatening in the context of Korean history and culture.3 An analysis of the nature and evolution of the DPRK's political system may provide important clues as to the motivations, policy preferences, and the Pyongyang regime's potential for conflict management.At the outset it is important to ask: what is the nature and scope of the conflict? According to Niklas Swanstrom, Mikael Weissmann and Emma Bjornehed, a conflict entails "perceived differences in issue positions between two or more parties at the same moment in time."4 The conflict on the Korean Peninsula is complex, multifaceted, concerns a number of different "issue positions," and at least six parties. For the purposes of this article, however, I will just identify what appears to have become the critical issue in recent years: the disposition of North Korea's nuclear program. While the ongoing six-party talks involve North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, China and the United States, the issue of North Korea's nuclear program boils down to a deep-seated conflict between Pyongyang and Washington. Baldly put, on the one hand, the United States has adamantly insisted that Pyongyang's nuclear program be completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantled while on the other hand North Korea has been just as adamant in insisting that it has the right to a nuclear program.5According to C.R. Mitchell, a conflict involves at least three aspects: attitudes, situation, and behaviors.6 This paper focuses on change and continuity in Pyongyang's political system rather than directly on conflict prevention or conflict management because the author believes that this potential will not be tapped without major changes in North Korea's political system. The primary attitude of the North Korean regime is one of hard-core indoctrination and absolute information control, the primary situation in North Korea is extreme militarization, and the primary behavior of the Pyongyang regime is mobilization. The persistence of this attitude, this situation, and this behavior appears to seriously hinder the prospects for any meaningful conflict management and certainly precludes the possibility of conflict resolution.Totalitarianism and Post-TotalitarianismThis paper argues that North Korea's political system is best understood as an eroding totalitarian regime of the communist variety.7 The DPRK appears to meet the basic criteria for an orthodox communist regime: it has a Leninist party that monopolizes political power while espousing a M
观察者倾向于给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(DPRK)贴上一个奇怪的政治制度的标签，只能用它自己的方式来理解。一位受人尊敬的分析人士认为，朝鲜可能只是“现存最奇怪的政治制度”。一些观察人士认为，朝鲜是一个危险的流氓国家，拥有大量武装，不可预测且危险另一些人则认为，虽然朝鲜乍一看很奇怪，但在朝鲜的历史和文化背景下，它变得更容易理解，也不那么具有威胁性对朝鲜政治制度的性质和演变的分析可能为了解其动机、政策偏好和平壤政权管理冲突的潜力提供重要线索。首先，重要的是要问:冲突的性质和范围是什么?根据Niklas Swanstrom, Mikael Weissmann和Emma Bjornehed的说法，冲突是指“在同一时刻，两方或多方在问题立场上的感知差异”。朝鲜半岛的冲突是复杂的，多方面的，涉及许多不同的“问题立场”，至少涉及六方。然而，出于本文的目的，我将只指出近年来似乎已成为关键问题的问题:朝鲜核计划的处置。虽然正在进行的六方会谈涉及北韩、韩国、俄罗斯、日本、中国和美国，但北韩核项目问题归根结底是平壤和华盛顿之间根深蒂固的冲突。坦率地说，一方面，美国坚决要求北韩彻底、可核查、不可逆转地废除核项目，另一方面，北韩也坚持认为自己有权拥有核项目。根据米切尔的观点，冲突至少包括三个方面:态度、情况和行为本文关注的是平壤政治制度的变化和连续性，而不是直接关注冲突预防或冲突管理，因为作者认为，如果朝鲜政治制度没有重大变化，这种潜力就不会被挖掘出来。北韩政权的主要态度是强硬的灌输和绝对的信息控制，北韩的主要情况是极端军事化，平壤政权的主要行为是动员。这种态度、这种情况和这种行为的持续似乎严重阻碍了任何有意义的冲突管理的前景，当然也排除了解决冲突的可能性。极权主义和后极权主义本文认为，朝鲜的政治制度最好被理解为一种正在侵蚀的共产主义极权主义政权朝鲜似乎符合正统共产主义政权的基本标准:它拥有一个垄断政治权力的列宁主义政党，同时信奉马克思主义意识形态(“社会主义”)，实行中央计划经济，生产资料为公有尽管一些学者认为朝鲜不是共产主义国家，但更仔细的研究表明，朝鲜与其他共产党国家并没有根本的不同。根据卡尔·弗里德里希和兹比格涅夫·布热津斯基的定义，朝鲜似乎也符合极权主义政权的以下六个特征:(1)绝对的独裁者和群众政党;(2)一种意图彻底改造社会的意识形态;(三)恐怖状态;(四)强制文书的垄断;(五)中央计划经济;(6)大众传播的垄断极权主义政权力图控制社会的方方面面。这种类型的政权需要一个“敌人”来合理化其永久的战争模式。为了证明其压制性控制体系、动员国家和社会的持续努力以及政权的军事化是正当的，必须有一个明确可识别的持久威胁。…
{"title":"The Evolution of North Korea's Political System and Pyongyang's Potential for Conflict Management","authors":"Andrew Scobell","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.91","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionObservers tend to label the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a bizarre political system that can only be understood on its own terms. One respected analyst suggests that the DPRK might just be \"the strangest political system in existence.\"1 Some observers argue that North Korea is a dangerous rogue state that is heavily armed, unpredictable and dangerous.2 Others argue that North Korea, while strange at first glance, becomes more comprehensible and less threatening in the context of Korean history and culture.3 An analysis of the nature and evolution of the DPRK's political system may provide important clues as to the motivations, policy preferences, and the Pyongyang regime's potential for conflict management.At the outset it is important to ask: what is the nature and scope of the conflict? According to Niklas Swanstrom, Mikael Weissmann and Emma Bjornehed, a conflict entails \"perceived differences in issue positions between two or more parties at the same moment in time.\"4 The conflict on the Korean Peninsula is complex, multifaceted, concerns a number of different \"issue positions,\" and at least six parties. For the purposes of this article, however, I will just identify what appears to have become the critical issue in recent years: the disposition of North Korea's nuclear program. While the ongoing six-party talks involve North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, China and the United States, the issue of North Korea's nuclear program boils down to a deep-seated conflict between Pyongyang and Washington. Baldly put, on the one hand, the United States has adamantly insisted that Pyongyang's nuclear program be completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantled while on the other hand North Korea has been just as adamant in insisting that it has the right to a nuclear program.5According to C.R. Mitchell, a conflict involves at least three aspects: attitudes, situation, and behaviors.6 This paper focuses on change and continuity in Pyongyang's political system rather than directly on conflict prevention or conflict management because the author believes that this potential will not be tapped without major changes in North Korea's political system. The primary attitude of the North Korean regime is one of hard-core indoctrination and absolute information control, the primary situation in North Korea is extreme militarization, and the primary behavior of the Pyongyang regime is mobilization. The persistence of this attitude, this situation, and this behavior appears to seriously hinder the prospects for any meaningful conflict management and certainly precludes the possibility of conflict resolution.Totalitarianism and Post-TotalitarianismThis paper argues that North Korea's political system is best understood as an eroding totalitarian regime of the communist variety.7 The DPRK appears to meet the basic criteria for an orthodox communist regime: it has a Leninist party that monopolizes political power while espousing a M","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe KORUS FTA has various effects on intra-Korean relations. The KORUS FTA Document Annex 22-B describes "the effect on intra-Korean relations" as a precondition to be considered in discussing the rules of origin of products from Outward Processing Zones (OPZs). It is a very broad definition, but it is a good example to show that the KORUS FTA is closely linked to intra-Korean relations.There are two perspectives on the KORUS FTA and intra-Korean relations; one is positive and the other negative. Kim, a senior researcher at the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU), said in favor of the FTA that, "the KORUS FTA can be a strong ground enough to give two Koreas a win-win game."1 He argued that the relationship between the two Koreas, as well as their economic cooperation, will jump up to a higher level through the FTA. On that level, South Korea will be able to strengthen its industrial competitiveness. North Korea will also have a role in developing the KIC, and may gain recognition from the United States for the regime's legitimacy. These will result in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and will lead to a peaceful process in solving the Korean problem. In this process, North Korea may expect to restore stability to its economy.However, one precondition is necessary to realize all of these nice processes. This is recognition from the United States that products made in Kaesung can be regarded as products made in Korea. Dong, team director at Samsung Economic Research Institute, also takes a similar perspective. He has a broader viewpoint than Kim's. He sees that the KORUS FTA has an effect not only on the security environment of the Korean Peninsula, but also on intra-Korean relations.In a perception that security has a direct influence on intra-Korean economic cooperation, he summarizes the effects of the FTA in three ways.2 First, the KORUS FTA will improve Korea-U.S. relations from a military basis to a combination of the economic and the military. Second, the KORUS FTA could bring about a fundamental change in intra-Korean relations and in policies on North Korea. Third, the KORUS FTA will stimulate cooperation between North East Asian countries. In this cooperation, North Korea will have a chance to develop its economy.There is a view, however, that the KORUS FTA could have negative effects on intra-Korean relations. Chung, ex-secretary to President Roh, said, "President Roh is now going to fail his reform and if he goes on naively driving in KORUS FTA, he would face a difficult situation." Chung regards the FTA as a U.S. hegemonic strategy on North East Asia.3What is the KORUS FTA? The KORUS FTA will drive the Korean people into infinite competition in global markets. In the past, the global economy meant competition among nations. Today, however, it means competition among people, competition among enterprises, and competition among states, all mixed up simultaneously.First of all, from the legal perspective, the KORUS
{"title":"Impacts of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement on Inter-Korean Relations","authors":"S. H. Lee","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.40","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe KORUS FTA has various effects on intra-Korean relations. The KORUS FTA Document Annex 22-B describes \"the effect on intra-Korean relations\" as a precondition to be considered in discussing the rules of origin of products from Outward Processing Zones (OPZs). It is a very broad definition, but it is a good example to show that the KORUS FTA is closely linked to intra-Korean relations.There are two perspectives on the KORUS FTA and intra-Korean relations; one is positive and the other negative. Kim, a senior researcher at the Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU), said in favor of the FTA that, \"the KORUS FTA can be a strong ground enough to give two Koreas a win-win game.\"1 He argued that the relationship between the two Koreas, as well as their economic cooperation, will jump up to a higher level through the FTA. On that level, South Korea will be able to strengthen its industrial competitiveness. North Korea will also have a role in developing the KIC, and may gain recognition from the United States for the regime's legitimacy. These will result in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and will lead to a peaceful process in solving the Korean problem. In this process, North Korea may expect to restore stability to its economy.However, one precondition is necessary to realize all of these nice processes. This is recognition from the United States that products made in Kaesung can be regarded as products made in Korea. Dong, team director at Samsung Economic Research Institute, also takes a similar perspective. He has a broader viewpoint than Kim's. He sees that the KORUS FTA has an effect not only on the security environment of the Korean Peninsula, but also on intra-Korean relations.In a perception that security has a direct influence on intra-Korean economic cooperation, he summarizes the effects of the FTA in three ways.2 First, the KORUS FTA will improve Korea-U.S. relations from a military basis to a combination of the economic and the military. Second, the KORUS FTA could bring about a fundamental change in intra-Korean relations and in policies on North Korea. Third, the KORUS FTA will stimulate cooperation between North East Asian countries. In this cooperation, North Korea will have a chance to develop its economy.There is a view, however, that the KORUS FTA could have negative effects on intra-Korean relations. Chung, ex-secretary to President Roh, said, \"President Roh is now going to fail his reform and if he goes on naively driving in KORUS FTA, he would face a difficult situation.\" Chung regards the FTA as a U.S. hegemonic strategy on North East Asia.3What is the KORUS FTA? The KORUS FTA will drive the Korean people into infinite competition in global markets. In the past, the global economy meant competition among nations. Today, however, it means competition among people, competition among enterprises, and competition among states, all mixed up simultaneously.First of all, from the legal perspective, the KORUS","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
OverviewThe history of U.S. sanctions against the DPRK can be divided into six stages. The U.S. maintained fairly comprehensive economic sanctions from the time of the Korean War until 1989, occasionally increasing the level of restriction during this period. Between 1989 and 1995 the export of goods from the U.S. commercial sector was permitted solely for the purpose of meeting "basic human needs." A more extensive easing of sanctions accompanied the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 1994.In 2000, President Clinton eased many remaining trade and travel sanctions in response to the DPRK's 1999 voluntary halt in missile testing. Licensing and trade regulations on most items for civilian use were significantly relaxed at this time.Although the George W. Bush administration's approach to the DPRK differed considerably from that of the Clinton administration, no economic sanctions were re-imposed during President Bush's first term, although two North Korean companies were cited for WMD and missile proliferation (Rennack).In March 2005, North Korea declared that because "the DPRK-U.S. dialogue" on which the missile test moratorium was based had been "totally suspended when the Bush administration took office in 2001," the DPRK is "not bound to the moratorium on the missile launch at present." The DPRK then tested short range missiles first on May 1, 2005, and again on March 8, 2006. These short range tests, which did not break any international laws, garnered only limited public attention and condemnation from the United States and international community, and no U.S. economic sanctions were re-imposed.Instead, in this fifth phase, the U.S. administration focused on financial sanc- tions, including the assets of individual companies suspected of proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On June 28, 2005, the United States froze the assets under U.S. jurisdiction of three DPRK firms that it accused of engaging in WMD proliferation, and in October 2005 froze the assets of an additional eight firms (Rennack).In September 2005 the U.S. Department of Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia as a bank of "primary money laundry concern." This action, coupled with a December 2005 Treasury Department advisory warning financial institutions against transactions with the DPRK, proved to have considerable impact on the DPRK's ability to do business, and may have had a greater impact than sanctions that had been lifted during the Clinton administration.In March 2006, the U.S. Department of Treasury accused a Swiss company of doing business with one of the sanctioned North Korean firms, and froze the assets of the Swiss company and its owner and banned U.S. entities from doing business with the firm or owner. In April 2006 the Department of Treasury issued an Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulation banning U.S. persons from owning or leasing North Korean-flagged vessels.On July 5, 2006, the DPRK test-launched an array of ballistic missiles, inclu
{"title":"U.S. Sanctions and Treasury Department Actions against North Korea from 1955 to October 2007","authors":"Karin J. Lee, J. Choi","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"OverviewThe history of U.S. sanctions against the DPRK can be divided into six stages. The U.S. maintained fairly comprehensive economic sanctions from the time of the Korean War until 1989, occasionally increasing the level of restriction during this period. Between 1989 and 1995 the export of goods from the U.S. commercial sector was permitted solely for the purpose of meeting \"basic human needs.\" A more extensive easing of sanctions accompanied the negotiation of the Agreed Framework in 1994.In 2000, President Clinton eased many remaining trade and travel sanctions in response to the DPRK's 1999 voluntary halt in missile testing. Licensing and trade regulations on most items for civilian use were significantly relaxed at this time.Although the George W. Bush administration's approach to the DPRK differed considerably from that of the Clinton administration, no economic sanctions were re-imposed during President Bush's first term, although two North Korean companies were cited for WMD and missile proliferation (Rennack).In March 2005, North Korea declared that because \"the DPRK-U.S. dialogue\" on which the missile test moratorium was based had been \"totally suspended when the Bush administration took office in 2001,\" the DPRK is \"not bound to the moratorium on the missile launch at present.\" The DPRK then tested short range missiles first on May 1, 2005, and again on March 8, 2006. These short range tests, which did not break any international laws, garnered only limited public attention and condemnation from the United States and international community, and no U.S. economic sanctions were re-imposed.Instead, in this fifth phase, the U.S. administration focused on financial sanc- tions, including the assets of individual companies suspected of proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On June 28, 2005, the United States froze the assets under U.S. jurisdiction of three DPRK firms that it accused of engaging in WMD proliferation, and in October 2005 froze the assets of an additional eight firms (Rennack).In September 2005 the U.S. Department of Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia as a bank of \"primary money laundry concern.\" This action, coupled with a December 2005 Treasury Department advisory warning financial institutions against transactions with the DPRK, proved to have considerable impact on the DPRK's ability to do business, and may have had a greater impact than sanctions that had been lifted during the Clinton administration.In March 2006, the U.S. Department of Treasury accused a Swiss company of doing business with one of the sanctioned North Korean firms, and froze the assets of the Swiss company and its owner and banned U.S. entities from doing business with the firm or owner. In April 2006 the Department of Treasury issued an Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) regulation banning U.S. persons from owning or leasing North Korean-flagged vessels.On July 5, 2006, the DPRK test-launched an array of ballistic missiles, inclu","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Second Pyongyang SummitAt the first Japanese-North Korean summit meeting in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il were able to reach agreements on a number of thorny issues which had constituted stumbling blocks in normalizing their relations. Regarding the question of Japan's compensation to North Korea for the suffering inflicted on Koreans during Japan's colonial rule, Pyongyang agreed to accept Tokyo's offer of economic assistance instead of demanding "reparations" as it had insisted previously. Another major issue in Japanese-North Korean normalization talks from 1991 to 2000 was the suspected abduction of a dozen Japanese nationals by North Korea from the late 1970s to the early 1980s; the purpose was apparently to utilize them as language instructors for training North Korean special agents. As the Japanese national police had collected substantial evidence concerning at least 11 such abductions, Tokyo demanded not only information concerning their whereabouts but also their repatriation to Japan. However, Pyongyang flatly denied any knowledge about these abductions until the summer of 2002. At the Pyongyang summit, Kim reversed Pyongyang's previous position of denial and acknowledged North Korea's responsibility for abducting thirteen Japanese nationals and offered an apology, pledging not to repeat such mistakes. According to Kim, out of thirteen, eight had died, while five were still alive. Regarding the nuclear weapons issue, Kim promised to comply with all international agreements. In addition, Kim also promised to extend Pyongyang's self-imposed moratorium on missile testing beyond 2003. When the Pyongyang Declaration (signed jointly by Koizumi and Kim) incorporating these agreements was announced, many reacted with optimism that Japan and North Korea would be able to normalize diplomatic relations quickly. However, such was not to be the case.Rather, Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization talks were stalemated shortly thereafter, largely due to the revelation of North Korea's secret uranium-based (HEU) nuclear weapons program in October 2002 and the backlash in Japanese public opinion on the abduction issue. North Korea refused to comply with Koizumi's persistent demand to abandon its nuclear weapons program by complying fully with international agreements, including the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002. The Japanese were also enraged by Kim's confession on the abduction of Japanese nationals, especially the shocking news of the death of the eight abductees while in North Korea's custody. As Pyongyang's explanations for the causes of these deaths aroused much suspicion about the credibility of Pyongyang's report,2 many Japanese demanded an accurate and convincing explanation for the circumstances surrounding the death of these abductees.Although Pyongyang returned five surviving Japanese abductees to Japan in October 2002, it was not until the summer of 2004 that Pyong
{"title":"Japanese-North Korean Relations after the Second Pyongyang Summit of 2004","authors":"H. N. Kim, Jack L. Hammersmith","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.74","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.74","url":null,"abstract":"The Second Pyongyang SummitAt the first Japanese-North Korean summit meeting in Pyongyang on September 17, 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il were able to reach agreements on a number of thorny issues which had constituted stumbling blocks in normalizing their relations. Regarding the question of Japan's compensation to North Korea for the suffering inflicted on Koreans during Japan's colonial rule, Pyongyang agreed to accept Tokyo's offer of economic assistance instead of demanding \"reparations\" as it had insisted previously. Another major issue in Japanese-North Korean normalization talks from 1991 to 2000 was the suspected abduction of a dozen Japanese nationals by North Korea from the late 1970s to the early 1980s; the purpose was apparently to utilize them as language instructors for training North Korean special agents. As the Japanese national police had collected substantial evidence concerning at least 11 such abductions, Tokyo demanded not only information concerning their whereabouts but also their repatriation to Japan. However, Pyongyang flatly denied any knowledge about these abductions until the summer of 2002. At the Pyongyang summit, Kim reversed Pyongyang's previous position of denial and acknowledged North Korea's responsibility for abducting thirteen Japanese nationals and offered an apology, pledging not to repeat such mistakes. According to Kim, out of thirteen, eight had died, while five were still alive. Regarding the nuclear weapons issue, Kim promised to comply with all international agreements. In addition, Kim also promised to extend Pyongyang's self-imposed moratorium on missile testing beyond 2003. When the Pyongyang Declaration (signed jointly by Koizumi and Kim) incorporating these agreements was announced, many reacted with optimism that Japan and North Korea would be able to normalize diplomatic relations quickly. However, such was not to be the case.Rather, Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization talks were stalemated shortly thereafter, largely due to the revelation of North Korea's secret uranium-based (HEU) nuclear weapons program in October 2002 and the backlash in Japanese public opinion on the abduction issue. North Korea refused to comply with Koizumi's persistent demand to abandon its nuclear weapons program by complying fully with international agreements, including the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002. The Japanese were also enraged by Kim's confession on the abduction of Japanese nationals, especially the shocking news of the death of the eight abductees while in North Korea's custody. As Pyongyang's explanations for the causes of these deaths aroused much suspicion about the credibility of Pyongyang's report,2 many Japanese demanded an accurate and convincing explanation for the circumstances surrounding the death of these abductees.Although Pyongyang returned five surviving Japanese abductees to Japan in October 2002, it was not until the summer of 2004 that Pyong","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Is There Another Wave of American Decline?The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, along with the unusually strong performance of both the U.S. economy and its stock market during the 1990s, elevated the United States to an unsurpassed level of economic, military, and cultural power. However, in the early 2000s, the United States has faced its sixth wave of decline since the 1950s, a phenomenon largely triggered by its external economic problems and the September 11, 2001, attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The first wave occurred in 1957 and 1958, when the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik, the first manned satellite. The second wave came at the end of the 1960s, when President Nixon began to prepare Americans for a multipolar world because American decline economically and militarily was inevitable. The third wave followed immediately after the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 and the dramatic increase in oil prices. The fourth wave took place in the later 1970s, because of the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, the continued development of Soviet nuclear forces, and the expansion of Soviet power in a half-dozen countries, such as Angola. The fifth wave happened in the late 1980s, largely due to U.S. foreign debt as well as financial threats from Japan.Every single empire and great nation of history has been destroyed or greatly diminished in world influence. Why should we assume that the United States, today's great nation, could defeat the pattern of history? If we assume an American decline for a moment, China seems likely to emerge as a great power, which might end the dominance of the United States in the game of influence on world affairs. We can base the current wave of decline on three bodies of evidence: (1) mounting U.S. budget and trade deficits, (2) economic and military threats from China, and (3) a growing world resistance to American unilateral actions. Let us examine, however, these three bodies of evidence, along with other arguments, before we willingly accept such a gloomy conclusion.Fading America and Emerging ChinaWorld economies strongly affect international politics. At present, about 200 economies interact on the world political and economic stages. This interaction raises important questions. Will the United States maintain not only military superiority but also its economic dominance in the world? Will any country challenge the United States as the superpower? If we assume an American decline for a moment, no other economic leader, with the possible exception of China, seems likely to emerge in the next generation. The question, however, is whether China can actually fulfill that potential. The Chinese leaders have long aspired to a great China- a country with a world-class economy, a strong military, and the restoration of full sovereignty over Taiwan and other disputed islands within its claimed territorial boundaries.Is the United States really passing its baton in the
{"title":"Which Country Will Be the World Economic Leader in the Next Generation: The United States or China? and the North Korean Factor","authors":"Suk‐Hi Kim, T. Crick, Junhua Jia","doi":"10.3172/NKR.4.1.56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.4.1.56","url":null,"abstract":"Is There Another Wave of American Decline?The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, along with the unusually strong performance of both the U.S. economy and its stock market during the 1990s, elevated the United States to an unsurpassed level of economic, military, and cultural power. However, in the early 2000s, the United States has faced its sixth wave of decline since the 1950s, a phenomenon largely triggered by its external economic problems and the September 11, 2001, attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. The first wave occurred in 1957 and 1958, when the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik, the first manned satellite. The second wave came at the end of the 1960s, when President Nixon began to prepare Americans for a multipolar world because American decline economically and militarily was inevitable. The third wave followed immediately after the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 and the dramatic increase in oil prices. The fourth wave took place in the later 1970s, because of the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, the continued development of Soviet nuclear forces, and the expansion of Soviet power in a half-dozen countries, such as Angola. The fifth wave happened in the late 1980s, largely due to U.S. foreign debt as well as financial threats from Japan.Every single empire and great nation of history has been destroyed or greatly diminished in world influence. Why should we assume that the United States, today's great nation, could defeat the pattern of history? If we assume an American decline for a moment, China seems likely to emerge as a great power, which might end the dominance of the United States in the game of influence on world affairs. We can base the current wave of decline on three bodies of evidence: (1) mounting U.S. budget and trade deficits, (2) economic and military threats from China, and (3) a growing world resistance to American unilateral actions. Let us examine, however, these three bodies of evidence, along with other arguments, before we willingly accept such a gloomy conclusion.Fading America and Emerging ChinaWorld economies strongly affect international politics. At present, about 200 economies interact on the world political and economic stages. This interaction raises important questions. Will the United States maintain not only military superiority but also its economic dominance in the world? Will any country challenge the United States as the superpower? If we assume an American decline for a moment, no other economic leader, with the possible exception of China, seems likely to emerge in the next generation. The question, however, is whether China can actually fulfill that potential. The Chinese leaders have long aspired to a great China- a country with a world-class economy, a strong military, and the restoration of full sovereignty over Taiwan and other disputed islands within its claimed territorial boundaries.Is the United States really passing its baton in the ","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2007-10-01DOI: 10.1017/9781316874882.003
Byung-Yeon Kim
The North Korean Economy By Nicholas Eberstadt. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions Publishers, 2007, 329 pp, (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-7658-0360-3As the editor of North Korean Review, I know that there are two American economists with the knowledge and experience required to solve the puzzle of this secretive country's economy and the military implications of its economic policies: Marcus Noland of the Institute for International Economics and Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute. Whether or not readers agree with this book's diagnoses and suggested remedies on North Korean economy, they can surely benefit from considering the clear and energetic presentations in Nicholas Eberstadt's book. In my opinion, anyone who has some interest in Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and Korea) should read The North Korean Economy.This book consists of ten chapters. Chapter i, "Reform, Muddling Through, or Collapse," concludes that numerous small attempts by state planners to liberalize the ailing economy have been completely inadequate to pull the economy out of its nosedive. Eberstadt insists that policy makers must be prepared for the possibility that North Korea will continue to strive to amass an ever-growing nuclear arsenal, even as it gives assurances to the contrary.Chapter 2, "Our Own Style of Statistics: Availability and Reliability of Official Quantitative Data," states that in an age of globalization, North Korean statistical authorities stand in virtually complete isolation from all international counterparts. Apparently, there is scant evidence of any improvement in North Korean statistical output over the years since September 1998, when Kim Jung Il formally assumed state power.Chapter 3, "International Trade in Capital Goods, 1970 to 1995," examines the North Korean international trade in "capital goods"; that is to say, machinery, equipment, the manufactured parts used as capital stock in the production process. Eberstadt thinks that the ratio of capital goods to gross domestic capital formation in the North Korean economy during the 1980s and 1990s may have been lowest in the world.Chapter 4, "Interlocking Crisis in Food, Energy, and Transport Equipment: Indications from Mirror Statistics," analyzes North Korea's trends in three sectors of strategic significance to the entire North Korean economy: food, energy, and transport. This chapter states that Pyongyang appears to be pursuing an "aid-based" solution to its food and energy crises, the same one that has been used by the country for half a century.Chapter 5, "Socioeconomic Development in Divided Korea: A Tale of Two Strategies," presents a comparative economic analysis of the two Koreas. Ever since the Korean War, the two rival governments have pursued two different strategies in their economic policies: a highly centralized economic system by North Korea and a government-directed capitalism by South Korea. Some fifty years after the Korean War, South Korea defeated North Ko
《朝鲜经济》尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特著。New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions Publishers, 2007, 329页(布)。作为《朝鲜评论》的编辑，我知道有两位美国经济学家具备解决这个神秘国家的经济及其经济政策的军事含义之谜所需的知识和经验:国际经济研究所的马库斯·诺兰和美国企业研究所的尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特。无论读者是否同意这本书对朝鲜经济的诊断和建议的补救措施，他们肯定会从尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特的书中清晰而充满活力的陈述中受益。在我看来，任何对东北亚(中国、日本和韩国)感兴趣的人都应该阅读《朝鲜经济》。这本书有十章。第一章“改革，蒙混过关，还是崩溃”得出结论，国家计划者为放开病态的经济而进行的无数次小尝试，完全不足以将经济从崩溃中拉出来。埃伯施塔特坚持认为，政策制定者必须为朝鲜继续努力积累不断增长的核武库的可能性做好准备，尽管它做出了相反的保证。第2章“我们自己的统计风格:官方定量数据的可用性和可靠性”指出，在全球化时代，朝鲜统计当局几乎与所有国际同行完全隔离。显然，自1998年9月金正日正式掌权以来，几乎没有证据表明朝鲜的统计产出有任何改善。第三章“资本货物的国际贸易，1970年至1995年”考察了朝鲜的“资本货物”国际贸易;也就是说，在生产过程中作为资本存量的机器、设备、制造零件。埃伯施塔特认为，在20世纪80年代和90年代，朝鲜经济的资本货物占国内资本形成总额的比例可能是世界上最低的。第四章“食品、能源和运输设备的连锁危机:来自镜像统计的迹象”分析了朝鲜在食品、能源和运输这三个对整个朝鲜经济具有战略意义的部门的趋势。本章指出，平壤似乎正在寻求一种“以援助为基础”的解决方案，以解决其粮食和能源危机，这与该国半个世纪以来使用的方法相同。第五章“分裂朝鲜的社会经济发展:两种战略的故事”，对两个朝鲜进行了比较经济分析。自朝鲜战争以来，这两个敌对的政府在经济政策上采取了两种不同的战略:朝鲜的高度集中的经济体系和韩国的政府主导的资本主义。朝鲜战争结束50年后，韩国在经济上打败了朝鲜。剩下的唯一问题是，胜利是最终消灭朝鲜，还是促使它将自己重建为一个与东北亚经济和战略现实相适应的现代国家。…
{"title":"The North Korean Economy","authors":"Byung-Yeon Kim","doi":"10.1017/9781316874882.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316874882.003","url":null,"abstract":"The North Korean Economy By Nicholas Eberstadt. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions Publishers, 2007, 329 pp, (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-7658-0360-3As the editor of North Korean Review, I know that there are two American economists with the knowledge and experience required to solve the puzzle of this secretive country's economy and the military implications of its economic policies: Marcus Noland of the Institute for International Economics and Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute. Whether or not readers agree with this book's diagnoses and suggested remedies on North Korean economy, they can surely benefit from considering the clear and energetic presentations in Nicholas Eberstadt's book. In my opinion, anyone who has some interest in Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and Korea) should read The North Korean Economy.This book consists of ten chapters. Chapter i, \"Reform, Muddling Through, or Collapse,\" concludes that numerous small attempts by state planners to liberalize the ailing economy have been completely inadequate to pull the economy out of its nosedive. Eberstadt insists that policy makers must be prepared for the possibility that North Korea will continue to strive to amass an ever-growing nuclear arsenal, even as it gives assurances to the contrary.Chapter 2, \"Our Own Style of Statistics: Availability and Reliability of Official Quantitative Data,\" states that in an age of globalization, North Korean statistical authorities stand in virtually complete isolation from all international counterparts. Apparently, there is scant evidence of any improvement in North Korean statistical output over the years since September 1998, when Kim Jung Il formally assumed state power.Chapter 3, \"International Trade in Capital Goods, 1970 to 1995,\" examines the North Korean international trade in \"capital goods\"; that is to say, machinery, equipment, the manufactured parts used as capital stock in the production process. Eberstadt thinks that the ratio of capital goods to gross domestic capital formation in the North Korean economy during the 1980s and 1990s may have been lowest in the world.Chapter 4, \"Interlocking Crisis in Food, Energy, and Transport Equipment: Indications from Mirror Statistics,\" analyzes North Korea's trends in three sectors of strategic significance to the entire North Korean economy: food, energy, and transport. This chapter states that Pyongyang appears to be pursuing an \"aid-based\" solution to its food and energy crises, the same one that has been used by the country for half a century.Chapter 5, \"Socioeconomic Development in Divided Korea: A Tale of Two Strategies,\" presents a comparative economic analysis of the two Koreas. Ever since the Korean War, the two rival governments have pursued two different strategies in their economic policies: a highly centralized economic system by North Korea and a government-directed capitalism by South Korea. Some fifty years after the Korean War, South Korea defeated North Ko","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/9781316874882.003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56931112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionOn October 27, 2006, The New York Times published an article by Mark Mazzetti, entitled "In '97, U.S. Panel Predicted a North Korea Collapse in 5 Years" (Mazzetti and Shanker, 2006). Nine years had passed and the DPRK had not collapsed. Why had American experts estimated that North Korea would collapse by 2002 and why did this not happen? One of the reasons proffered was that they had not correctly anticipated the changes in South Korean policy towards the DPRK. If one looks at the reports prior to the North Korean missile test held on 4 July 2006 and the DPRK's nuclear test held on 9 October 2006, the same problem is evident when some of the experts estimated that the DPRK would not conduct these tests. The DPRK did not "follow these analyses." The DPRK is not the only case study in which social science predictions have failed. One can look at the predictions preceding elections in countries worldwide and discover that the results are in some cases completely different from the original forecasts. Forecasts concerning Iraq's attack on Kuwait or the Chinese intervention in the Korean War are examples of how social science researchers can err. When we want to explain why analysts miscalculated the results and did not correctly predict what would happen in the DPRK or in other places, we can find different reasons that are general causes that any social science research faces, but we can also find specific reasons that are linked to the DPRK.This brief commentary does not wish to blame or offend anyone, but to try to discover the reasons why some (but not all) of us tend to make mistakes when we attempt to predict what the DPRK will do. In order not to upset anyone, I will make general observations on this issue, without referring to a specific report.AnalogiesWhen we explain political phenomena we usually make analogies to other case studies. The analogies belong to political science methods of comparing and finding cases that resemble the relevant case study. When analyzing North Korea, the analogy that researchers use is Eastern Europe and other communist states such as Romania and East Germany. In the case of Romania, the political, social, and economic turmoil led to the coup against President Nicolae Ceausescu. Several forecasts have asserted that the political, economic, and social environment in the DPRK might lead to a coup similar to that in Romania. According to this analogy, the regime in Pyongyang should have been overthrown years ago, but the fact that Kim Jong-il is still in power illustrates that there are immense differences between these two states and calls the validity of this analogy into question. As the second analogy, the German case study provides a model for peaceful unification. But the differences between the two countries should be taken into consideration. For example, nationalism plays a much more important role in Korea, and the population and economic differences between the two Germanys and the two Kore
2006年10月27日，《纽约时报》刊登了Mark Mazzetti撰写的题为《1997年，美国专家小组预测朝鲜将在5年内崩溃》的文章(Mazzetti and Shanker, 2006)。9年过去了，朝鲜并没有崩溃。为什么美国专家曾预测朝鲜会在2002年崩溃，而这又没有发生?提出的理由之一是，他们没有正确地预测到南朝鲜对朝鲜政策的变化。如果看一下2006年7月4日北朝鲜进行导弹试验和2006年10月9日北朝鲜进行核试验之前的报告，同样的问题也很明显，有些专家估计北朝鲜不会进行这些试验。朝鲜没有“遵循这些分析”。朝鲜并不是社会科学预测失败的唯一案例。人们可以看看世界各国选举前的预测，并发现结果在某些情况下与最初的预测完全不同。关于伊拉克对科威特的攻击或中国对朝鲜战争的干预的预测都是社会科学研究人员可能出错的例子。当我们想要解释为什么分析人员错误地计算了结果，没有正确地预测朝鲜或其他地方会发生什么时，我们可以找到不同的原因，这是任何社会科学研究面临的一般原因，但我们也可以找到与朝鲜有关的具体原因。这篇简短的评论并不想指责或冒犯任何人，而是试图找出为什么我们中的一些人(但不是所有人)在试图预测朝鲜会做什么的时候往往会犯错误的原因。为了不使任何人感到不安，我就这个问题发表一般性看法，不涉及具体报道。类比当我们解释政治现象时，我们通常用其他案例进行类比。类比属于比较和发现与相关案例研究相似的案例的政治科学方法。研究人员在分析北韩时，把东欧和罗马尼亚、东德等共产主义国家作为类比。在罗马尼亚，政治、社会和经济动荡导致了推翻总统尼古拉·齐奥塞斯库的政变。一些预测断言，朝鲜的政治、经济和社会环境可能导致类似罗马尼亚的政变。按照这一类比，平壤政权早在几年前就应该被推翻，但金正日(Kim Jong-il)仍在掌权的事实表明，这两个国家之间存在巨大差异，并使这种类比的有效性受到质疑。作为第二个类比，德国的案例研究为和平统一提供了一个模式。但应该考虑到两国之间的差异。例如，民族主义在朝鲜扮演着更重要的角色，两个德国和两个朝鲜之间的人口和经济差异影响了统一的成本。冷战时期的一个主要前提是主顾理论。根据这一理论，朝鲜的存在依赖于它的两个赞助人:苏联和中国。在一些文章(Betts, 1993)中，冷战的结束提出了一个问题，即平壤是否可以在没有莫斯科和北京支持的情况下生存。Victor Cha(2002)在他的文章中提出了冷战思维的问题。从字里行间可以看出，对一些研究人员来说，冷战的结束可能会在很短的时间内导致朝鲜的崩溃，因为没有这些老主顾，平壤将无法生存。这一概念被主张制裁朝鲜的人所使用，他们说，一个没有保护人的国家将无法长久存在，经济制裁将导致平壤向自由世界的要求“投降”。平壤的导弹和核试验已经证明，制裁威胁并没有实现其目标。…
{"title":"Why Do We Not Understand the DPRK","authors":"Alon Levkowitz","doi":"10.3172/NKR.3.2.94","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.3.2.94","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionOn October 27, 2006, The New York Times published an article by Mark Mazzetti, entitled \"In '97, U.S. Panel Predicted a North Korea Collapse in 5 Years\" (Mazzetti and Shanker, 2006). Nine years had passed and the DPRK had not collapsed. Why had American experts estimated that North Korea would collapse by 2002 and why did this not happen? One of the reasons proffered was that they had not correctly anticipated the changes in South Korean policy towards the DPRK. If one looks at the reports prior to the North Korean missile test held on 4 July 2006 and the DPRK's nuclear test held on 9 October 2006, the same problem is evident when some of the experts estimated that the DPRK would not conduct these tests. The DPRK did not \"follow these analyses.\" The DPRK is not the only case study in which social science predictions have failed. One can look at the predictions preceding elections in countries worldwide and discover that the results are in some cases completely different from the original forecasts. Forecasts concerning Iraq's attack on Kuwait or the Chinese intervention in the Korean War are examples of how social science researchers can err. When we want to explain why analysts miscalculated the results and did not correctly predict what would happen in the DPRK or in other places, we can find different reasons that are general causes that any social science research faces, but we can also find specific reasons that are linked to the DPRK.This brief commentary does not wish to blame or offend anyone, but to try to discover the reasons why some (but not all) of us tend to make mistakes when we attempt to predict what the DPRK will do. In order not to upset anyone, I will make general observations on this issue, without referring to a specific report.AnalogiesWhen we explain political phenomena we usually make analogies to other case studies. The analogies belong to political science methods of comparing and finding cases that resemble the relevant case study. When analyzing North Korea, the analogy that researchers use is Eastern Europe and other communist states such as Romania and East Germany. In the case of Romania, the political, social, and economic turmoil led to the coup against President Nicolae Ceausescu. Several forecasts have asserted that the political, economic, and social environment in the DPRK might lead to a coup similar to that in Romania. According to this analogy, the regime in Pyongyang should have been overthrown years ago, but the fact that Kim Jong-il is still in power illustrates that there are immense differences between these two states and calls the validity of this analogy into question. As the second analogy, the German case study provides a model for peaceful unification. But the differences between the two countries should be taken into consideration. For example, nationalism plays a much more important role in Korea, and the population and economic differences between the two Germanys and the two Kore","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69761921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can the New Nuclear Deal with North Korea Succeed?The new nuclear deal hammered out in Beijing in mid-February 2007 is a very tentative and limited first step toward ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, it creates numerous new problems without solving any fundamental issues. Prospects for its eventual success could prove worrisome.On the plus side, the accord is a step away from confrontation toward preserving peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The Bush Administration, after four years of exchanging heated rhetoric with Pyongyang and reliance on ineffective coercive tactics like economic sanctions, has finally decided to negotiate with Pyongyang. Frankly, this has always been the only way to achieve a "peaceful diplomatic solution" to the North Korean nuclear issue. Simply put, at long last negotiations have finally just begun.But the accord's negative aspects outweigh its positive points. It is not a new "Agreed Framework." This is a tentative deal. If North Korea does not like the direction of future negotiations, it can pull out at any time and restart its nuclear reactor. The Agreed Framework was not a tentative deal. It was a package deal-all or nothing. The 1994 accord "froze" all nuclear activities and put all North Korean nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. The new deal says that the "DPRK will discuss with other parties" the scope of nuclear activities to be covered. Also the details IAEA monitoring are to be "agreed between IAEA and DPRK." The Agreed Framework resolved such issues prior to its finalization.In other words, the new agreement reverses the process that led to the Agreed Framework. Numerous working level discussions were held in New York and elsewhere to resolve the details of implementation prior to the agreement's conclusion. Under this new deal, North Korea can control the entire process because it can threaten to unfreeze its nuclear activities anytime that it is unhappy with one or more of the working group negotiations.Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has incorrectly claimed that the new deal is better than the old one because it is "multilateral." He simply does not know his history. The Agreed Framework was multilateral. Prior to its finalization, the United States forged an international consensus supportive of the accord by consulting daily for eighteen months with Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow, not to mention many other governments. Also, the Agreed Framework was designed to support the multilateral IAEA, an agency of the United Nations. The Bush Administration has openly and repeatedly belittled the effectiveness of the IAEA and its director, even calling for his replacement.The new accord's shortcomings suggest that the Bush Administration was desperate to continue the Six Party Talks at any price. Over-extended militarily in the Middle East, the Bush Administration cannot afford instability on the Korean Peninsula. …
{"title":"Can the New Nuclear Deal with North Korea Succeed","authors":"C. Quiñones","doi":"10.3172/NKR.3.2.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.3.2.24","url":null,"abstract":"Can the New Nuclear Deal with North Korea Succeed?The new nuclear deal hammered out in Beijing in mid-February 2007 is a very tentative and limited first step toward ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, it creates numerous new problems without solving any fundamental issues. Prospects for its eventual success could prove worrisome.On the plus side, the accord is a step away from confrontation toward preserving peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The Bush Administration, after four years of exchanging heated rhetoric with Pyongyang and reliance on ineffective coercive tactics like economic sanctions, has finally decided to negotiate with Pyongyang. Frankly, this has always been the only way to achieve a \"peaceful diplomatic solution\" to the North Korean nuclear issue. Simply put, at long last negotiations have finally just begun.But the accord's negative aspects outweigh its positive points. It is not a new \"Agreed Framework.\" This is a tentative deal. If North Korea does not like the direction of future negotiations, it can pull out at any time and restart its nuclear reactor. The Agreed Framework was not a tentative deal. It was a package deal-all or nothing. The 1994 accord \"froze\" all nuclear activities and put all North Korean nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. The new deal says that the \"DPRK will discuss with other parties\" the scope of nuclear activities to be covered. Also the details IAEA monitoring are to be \"agreed between IAEA and DPRK.\" The Agreed Framework resolved such issues prior to its finalization.In other words, the new agreement reverses the process that led to the Agreed Framework. Numerous working level discussions were held in New York and elsewhere to resolve the details of implementation prior to the agreement's conclusion. Under this new deal, North Korea can control the entire process because it can threaten to unfreeze its nuclear activities anytime that it is unhappy with one or more of the working group negotiations.Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has incorrectly claimed that the new deal is better than the old one because it is \"multilateral.\" He simply does not know his history. The Agreed Framework was multilateral. Prior to its finalization, the United States forged an international consensus supportive of the accord by consulting daily for eighteen months with Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow, not to mention many other governments. Also, the Agreed Framework was designed to support the multilateral IAEA, an agency of the United Nations. The Bush Administration has openly and repeatedly belittled the effectiveness of the IAEA and its director, even calling for his replacement.The new accord's shortcomings suggest that the Bush Administration was desperate to continue the Six Party Talks at any price. Over-extended militarily in the Middle East, the Bush Administration cannot afford instability on the Korean Peninsula. …","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69761961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe latest round of the Six Party Talks resulted in a joint statement to implement a phase of "Initial Actions" including:* The DPRK will freeze plutonium production and processing at Yongbyon and will let IAEA inspectors back into the country to monitor and verify this freeze* Five working groups will be set up on U.S.-DPRK relations, U.S.-Japan relations, energy and economic aid, Armistice and security issues, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula* Provision of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil equivalent of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK within 60 days.The six parties also agreed to undertake the "next phase," defined as: "provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant-economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK."U.S. Cave-in?The Beijing Deal has been attacked already as a sell-out and reminiscent of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework under which the DPRK froze its nuclear fuel cycle and got two light reactors and half a million tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the reactors were complete. The old Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002 when the United States accused the DPRK of pursuing uranium enrichment outside of the Agreed Framework. The ultra-hard line critics have got it wrong, again.The Agreed Framework provided two reactors at a cost of about $4 billion to the DPRK on a 2 percent per year confessional financing basis. In present value for the capital and operating costs, and assuming the power would have been exported to South Korea on a commercial basis (the North Korean grid being incapable of operating these reactors), the total "annualized" cost the reactors would have been about $300 million per year for the DPRK.The export earnings from the ROK would have been about $700 million per year from the two DPRK reactors exporting power to the ROK grid. The DPRK would thereby have earned about $368 million per year in profit. To this, we add an additional $150 million per year for ∂ a million tons of heavy fuel oil that would have gone to the DPRK each year until the reactors were complete under the old deal.The total net present value that the DPRK stood to gain in the Agreed Framework was about $4.6 billion (this would have been spread over 30 years from the time the reactors began operating). The economics were important in the Agreed Framework, although it foundered primarily on the failure of both parties to implement their commitments to normalize political and security relations.What do they get in the Beijing Deal? A measly 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil in the next 60 days, provided they freeze their plutonium facilities and the talks in the working groups go well over this time frame. When they have fully "disab
{"title":"The Beijing Deal Is Not the Agreed Framework","authors":"P. Hayes","doi":"10.3172/NKR.3.2.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.3.2.19","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe latest round of the Six Party Talks resulted in a joint statement to implement a phase of \"Initial Actions\" including:* The DPRK will freeze plutonium production and processing at Yongbyon and will let IAEA inspectors back into the country to monitor and verify this freeze* Five working groups will be set up on U.S.-DPRK relations, U.S.-Japan relations, energy and economic aid, Armistice and security issues, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula* Provision of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil equivalent of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK within 60 days.The six parties also agreed to undertake the \"next phase,\" defined as: \"provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant-economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.\"U.S. Cave-in?The Beijing Deal has been attacked already as a sell-out and reminiscent of the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework under which the DPRK froze its nuclear fuel cycle and got two light reactors and half a million tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the reactors were complete. The old Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002 when the United States accused the DPRK of pursuing uranium enrichment outside of the Agreed Framework. The ultra-hard line critics have got it wrong, again.The Agreed Framework provided two reactors at a cost of about $4 billion to the DPRK on a 2 percent per year confessional financing basis. In present value for the capital and operating costs, and assuming the power would have been exported to South Korea on a commercial basis (the North Korean grid being incapable of operating these reactors), the total \"annualized\" cost the reactors would have been about $300 million per year for the DPRK.The export earnings from the ROK would have been about $700 million per year from the two DPRK reactors exporting power to the ROK grid. The DPRK would thereby have earned about $368 million per year in profit. To this, we add an additional $150 million per year for ∂ a million tons of heavy fuel oil that would have gone to the DPRK each year until the reactors were complete under the old deal.The total net present value that the DPRK stood to gain in the Agreed Framework was about $4.6 billion (this would have been spread over 30 years from the time the reactors began operating). The economics were important in the Agreed Framework, although it foundered primarily on the failure of both parties to implement their commitments to normalize political and security relations.What do they get in the Beijing Deal? A measly 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil in the next 60 days, provided they freeze their plutonium facilities and the talks in the working groups go well over this time frame. When they have fully \"disab","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69761945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionNorth Korea has been in the headlines with increasing frequency lately thanks mainly to the nuclear standoff with the United States, natural disasters, or famines. Although overshadowed by these events, what is quietly taking place in North Korea and is of much greater long-term importance to the people of North Korea are the economic reforms that have been under way since July 1, 2002.Opinions are divided on the prospects for the reforms' success. Some believe that the current reforms are merely a desperate attempt on the part of the current regime to salvage the central planning that has been rendered unworkable due to the economic collapse brought about by the withdrawal of economic aid and favorable trade terms by the former Soviet Union, followed by a string of natural disasters in the 1990s. They believe that the regime will revert back to the predominantly commanddriven economy once the economy recovers from its current illness (Klingner, 2004). Others believe that the current reforms are similar in essence to the Liberman-style reforms attempted unsuccessfully in the Soviet Union and its Central and East European satellite countries in the 1960s and 1970s, and hence are not likely to work in North Korea. Seliger (2005), for example, points out that the present economic structure of North Korea in terms of degree of industrialization is closer to those of the Soviet Union and its European satellites of the 1960s and 1970s than that of China of the 1970s or Vietnam of the 1980s, and the Chinese and Vietnamese reform experiences are not an appropriate comparison. Seliger also points out correctly that the agricultural reform in North Korea does not go as far as the Chinese model. Others, including myself, are more optimistic about the chances of success of the current North Korean economic reforms, although the optimism must in all practicality be based on the premise that the current nuclear standoff with the United States will be satisfactorily resolved.I attempt in this paper to analyze and assess the significance of current economic reforms in North Korea and their prospects for success in light of the country's history of an open-door policy and economic reform attempts, as well as the current geopolitical and economic climate of Northeast Asia. The conclusion I derive is that the prospects for success of the current economic reforms in North Korea are far better than the pessimists would like us to believe. The paper consists of five sections. The first section presents a historical overview of the North Korean macroeconomic performance and North Korea's open-door policy attempts prior to July 1, 2002. The second section is a brief description of the July 2002 economic reforms and the subsequent follow-up measures. Lessons from the economic reform experiences of other socialist economies are discussed in the third section. The fourth section addresses the prospects for success of the current North Korean economic reforms. T
{"title":"Market Reforms in North Korea: Are They for Real?","authors":"Jong-sung You","doi":"10.3172/NKR.3.2.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.3.2.27","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionNorth Korea has been in the headlines with increasing frequency lately thanks mainly to the nuclear standoff with the United States, natural disasters, or famines. Although overshadowed by these events, what is quietly taking place in North Korea and is of much greater long-term importance to the people of North Korea are the economic reforms that have been under way since July 1, 2002.Opinions are divided on the prospects for the reforms' success. Some believe that the current reforms are merely a desperate attempt on the part of the current regime to salvage the central planning that has been rendered unworkable due to the economic collapse brought about by the withdrawal of economic aid and favorable trade terms by the former Soviet Union, followed by a string of natural disasters in the 1990s. They believe that the regime will revert back to the predominantly commanddriven economy once the economy recovers from its current illness (Klingner, 2004). Others believe that the current reforms are similar in essence to the Liberman-style reforms attempted unsuccessfully in the Soviet Union and its Central and East European satellite countries in the 1960s and 1970s, and hence are not likely to work in North Korea. Seliger (2005), for example, points out that the present economic structure of North Korea in terms of degree of industrialization is closer to those of the Soviet Union and its European satellites of the 1960s and 1970s than that of China of the 1970s or Vietnam of the 1980s, and the Chinese and Vietnamese reform experiences are not an appropriate comparison. Seliger also points out correctly that the agricultural reform in North Korea does not go as far as the Chinese model. Others, including myself, are more optimistic about the chances of success of the current North Korean economic reforms, although the optimism must in all practicality be based on the premise that the current nuclear standoff with the United States will be satisfactorily resolved.I attempt in this paper to analyze and assess the significance of current economic reforms in North Korea and their prospects for success in light of the country's history of an open-door policy and economic reform attempts, as well as the current geopolitical and economic climate of Northeast Asia. The conclusion I derive is that the prospects for success of the current economic reforms in North Korea are far better than the pessimists would like us to believe. The paper consists of five sections. The first section presents a historical overview of the North Korean macroeconomic performance and North Korea's open-door policy attempts prior to July 1, 2002. The second section is a brief description of the July 2002 economic reforms and the subsequent follow-up measures. Lessons from the economic reform experiences of other socialist economies are discussed in the third section. The fourth section addresses the prospects for success of the current North Korean economic reforms. T","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69762030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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