IntroductionNorth Koreans suffer from human rights abuses at the hands of the Kim regime. Despite consensus regarding the serious nature of abuses, addressing (much less resolving) these issues has proven to be difficult. Complicating matters further, the problem of North Korean human rights is embedded in the context of perpetual nuclear and humanitarian crises. This has stimulated ethical debates and much soul-searching among policymakers, aid workers, and activists torn between choices of principle and pragmatism. It has also inevitability led to the politicization of North Korean human rights.The politicization of North Korean human rights in U.S. foreign policy raises an interesting puzzle: why do human rights and humanitarian aid groups with noble intentions of alleviating human suffering at times distrust one another? In an ideal world, human rights, and its close cousin, humanitarian aid, knows no politics. But among narrow policy and activist circles within the human rights and humanitarian aid communities, politics has inevitably crept into the picture as different tactics, goals, and worldviews collide.This article explores different responses to human suffering in North Korea and the evolution of the contrasting yet symbiotic relationship between engagement and advocacy approaches to human rights since the mid-1990s in the United States. More concretely, I examine how short and long term strategic goals interacted with different moral and principled beliefs. This interaction produced two different networks working to alleviate the plight of North Koreans. One response to North Korean suffering stressed continued engagement with North Korea at the strategic, but more importantly humanitarian level. As evidence of gross human rights violations mounted in the late 1990s, a second network emerged shifting their focus toward advocacy and awareness, demanding greater political rights and freedoms for North Koreans.Understanding the Political ContextTo clarify the difference between these two ideal-type camps,1 an engagement-oriented approach seeks to meet the basic needs of North Koreans and improve living conditions through humanitarian initiatives, social entrepreneurship, educational training, and market-oriented business development.2 Engagement does not necessarily mean holding negotiations with the regime. Rather, it implies various levels of interaction with North Koreans at the state or local level with the goal of building working relationships.3 At the heart of an engagement approach is the idea of building relations and partnerships at the people-to-people level.On the other end of the spectrum are the human rights universalists who advocate greater freedom, liberty, and political rights for North Koreans.4 Naming and shaming the regime by documenting violations and reporting on topics such as the location of gulags, sex trafficking, the refugee crisis, or religious persecution remain their staple. Some have engaged in activities
{"title":"Alleviating Misery: The Politics of North Korean Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy","authors":"Andrew Yeo","doi":"10.3172/NKR.10.2.71","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.10.2.71","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionNorth Koreans suffer from human rights abuses at the hands of the Kim regime. Despite consensus regarding the serious nature of abuses, addressing (much less resolving) these issues has proven to be difficult. Complicating matters further, the problem of North Korean human rights is embedded in the context of perpetual nuclear and humanitarian crises. This has stimulated ethical debates and much soul-searching among policymakers, aid workers, and activists torn between choices of principle and pragmatism. It has also inevitability led to the politicization of North Korean human rights.The politicization of North Korean human rights in U.S. foreign policy raises an interesting puzzle: why do human rights and humanitarian aid groups with noble intentions of alleviating human suffering at times distrust one another? In an ideal world, human rights, and its close cousin, humanitarian aid, knows no politics. But among narrow policy and activist circles within the human rights and humanitarian aid communities, politics has inevitably crept into the picture as different tactics, goals, and worldviews collide.This article explores different responses to human suffering in North Korea and the evolution of the contrasting yet symbiotic relationship between engagement and advocacy approaches to human rights since the mid-1990s in the United States. More concretely, I examine how short and long term strategic goals interacted with different moral and principled beliefs. This interaction produced two different networks working to alleviate the plight of North Koreans. One response to North Korean suffering stressed continued engagement with North Korea at the strategic, but more importantly humanitarian level. As evidence of gross human rights violations mounted in the late 1990s, a second network emerged shifting their focus toward advocacy and awareness, demanding greater political rights and freedoms for North Koreans.Understanding the Political ContextTo clarify the difference between these two ideal-type camps,1 an engagement-oriented approach seeks to meet the basic needs of North Koreans and improve living conditions through humanitarian initiatives, social entrepreneurship, educational training, and market-oriented business development.2 Engagement does not necessarily mean holding negotiations with the regime. Rather, it implies various levels of interaction with North Koreans at the state or local level with the goal of building working relationships.3 At the heart of an engagement approach is the idea of building relations and partnerships at the people-to-people level.On the other end of the spectrum are the human rights universalists who advocate greater freedom, liberty, and political rights for North Koreans.4 Naming and shaming the regime by documenting violations and reporting on topics such as the location of gulags, sex trafficking, the refugee crisis, or religious persecution remain their staple. Some have engaged in activities","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69760786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionSatellite imagery has revealed steam coming from the renovated North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon,1 implying that Pyongyang has renewed efforts to accumulate plutonium, which can be processed from the reactor's waste products, in order to expand its stockpile of nuclear warheads. If this is true, it represents a fresh phase of nuclear escalation from North Korea, made all the more serious since this action nullifies previous disarmament progress made in 2008 when Pyongyang demolished a cooling tower at the Yongbyon reactor,2 partially disabling its nuclear weapons program.Worryingly, the reactor needs to run for at least a year before spent fuel rods can be removed for plutonium harvesting, and the predicted date when the DPRK can begin reaping fresh weapons grade plutonium is fast approaching. Additionally, North Korea has a uranium enrichment program, which was first detected in 2002, and could also produce uranium-based nuclear arms. Despite the lack of concrete intelligence regarding the efficacy of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment for weapons building, it would be fair to assume that if left to its own devices, the DPRK's pool of nuclear explosives is set to grow.However, Pyongyang's behavior does not preclude an improvement in disarmament prospects leading to nuclear rollback. Turning to the South African nuclear disarmament model, hope for North Korean nuclear disarmament can be salvaged by the fact that Pretoria decommissioned its entire nuclear munitions manufacturing capability along with all operational atomic bombs. Hence, if the latter can relinquish its nuclear deterrent, so can the former.Learning from South Africa's Nuclear DisarmamentRevisiting the decommissioning of the South African nuclear weapons program from 1990 to 1991,3 permits the parsing of ideas for North Korean denuclearization despite the disparate nature of both states. South Africa's status as the only country to indigenously build and dismantle its nuclear arsenal should provide pointers as to how North Korea can be encouraged to relinquish nuclear arms.Concerning factors driving President F.W. de Klerk to order the dismantlement of Pretoria's nuclear weapons program in 1989, it can be substantiated that: (1) weakening Soviet support for Angola and Mozambique lessened the security threat that these two adversarial states posed against South Africa's northern borders4; (2) years of sanctions due to the imposition of apartheid had battered the South African economy, leading to a desperate need for externally driven economic rehabilitation5 (which would be jeopardized by pariah status from nuclear arms possession) and; (3) De Klerk strongly believed in the morality of nuclear disarmament.6As such, South African nuclear disarmament was brought about by a pacification of serious national security threats, the realization that sanctions induced economic autarky was intolerable, and the positive effect of international nonproliferation norms. Correspondin
{"title":"Applying the Lessons of South African Nuclear Disarmament to North Korea","authors":"Liang Tuang Nah","doi":"10.3172/NKR.10.2.89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.10.2.89","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionSatellite imagery has revealed steam coming from the renovated North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon,1 implying that Pyongyang has renewed efforts to accumulate plutonium, which can be processed from the reactor's waste products, in order to expand its stockpile of nuclear warheads. If this is true, it represents a fresh phase of nuclear escalation from North Korea, made all the more serious since this action nullifies previous disarmament progress made in 2008 when Pyongyang demolished a cooling tower at the Yongbyon reactor,2 partially disabling its nuclear weapons program.Worryingly, the reactor needs to run for at least a year before spent fuel rods can be removed for plutonium harvesting, and the predicted date when the DPRK can begin reaping fresh weapons grade plutonium is fast approaching. Additionally, North Korea has a uranium enrichment program, which was first detected in 2002, and could also produce uranium-based nuclear arms. Despite the lack of concrete intelligence regarding the efficacy of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment for weapons building, it would be fair to assume that if left to its own devices, the DPRK's pool of nuclear explosives is set to grow.However, Pyongyang's behavior does not preclude an improvement in disarmament prospects leading to nuclear rollback. Turning to the South African nuclear disarmament model, hope for North Korean nuclear disarmament can be salvaged by the fact that Pretoria decommissioned its entire nuclear munitions manufacturing capability along with all operational atomic bombs. Hence, if the latter can relinquish its nuclear deterrent, so can the former.Learning from South Africa's Nuclear DisarmamentRevisiting the decommissioning of the South African nuclear weapons program from 1990 to 1991,3 permits the parsing of ideas for North Korean denuclearization despite the disparate nature of both states. South Africa's status as the only country to indigenously build and dismantle its nuclear arsenal should provide pointers as to how North Korea can be encouraged to relinquish nuclear arms.Concerning factors driving President F.W. de Klerk to order the dismantlement of Pretoria's nuclear weapons program in 1989, it can be substantiated that: (1) weakening Soviet support for Angola and Mozambique lessened the security threat that these two adversarial states posed against South Africa's northern borders4; (2) years of sanctions due to the imposition of apartheid had battered the South African economy, leading to a desperate need for externally driven economic rehabilitation5 (which would be jeopardized by pariah status from nuclear arms possession) and; (3) De Klerk strongly believed in the morality of nuclear disarmament.6As such, South African nuclear disarmament was brought about by a pacification of serious national security threats, the realization that sanctions induced economic autarky was intolerable, and the positive effect of international nonproliferation norms. Correspondin","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69760841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe survival of the North Korean political system in the face of a wide range of challenges has generated vigorous debates within the academic community. One school of thought, the so-called "collapsists," argues that the leadership's reluctance to introduce radical economic reforms foreshadows a dramatic collapse, as the regime's grip over society is increasingly undermined by the process of marketization.1 In contrast, the "resilientists" expect the regime to "muddle through" the economic crises. In their opinion, the state's unusually pervasive control over society can offset the absence of radical reforms. Since reforms would actually undermine regime stability, the leadership has good reason to refrain from such steps.2The Arab Spring has reignited this debate. While the collapsists emphasize that the regime might eventually face popular unrest akin to the upheavals that rocked North Africa and the Middle East in 2011-2012, the resilientists argue that the experiences of the Arab Spring cannot be applied to the vastly different socio-cultural environment in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).Despite the different scenarios, the aforementioned studies were commonly focused on the capabilities of the North Korean state, rather than the peculiarities of the social environment in which it operated. Their elite-centered perspective reflected both the scarcity of reliable information about the political attitudes of ordinary citizens and the conspicuous absence of mass protests against the regime. To date, the North Korean political system has never encountered any serious challenge from below, serious socio-economic problems notwithstanding.To be sure, certain scholars, having analyzed the views of North Korean refugees, assessed the regime's durability from the perspective of social stratification. They raised the question of why mass protests have not occurred in the DPRK, and whether they might occur in the future.3 Still, there is a need for further investigation, for some of these studies have lacked a comparative perspective, while others have concentrated solely on the totalitarian institutions of Communist regimes, or compared North Korea with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, whose socio-political systems had little in common with the DPRK.Due to space limitations, this article does not aspire to provide a full explanation for the durability of the North Korean regime. Nor does it cover such general causes of non-resistance as political repression and isolation from external influences. Instead, it seeks to examine whether certain specific social and subnational groups that proved able to show resistance against other one-party states might play, or have played, a similar role in the DPRK. The selected groups are: (1) industrial workers; (2) private entrepreneurs; and (3) religious, ethnic, and regional identities. Notably, in various other countries the regimes' general durability, and their penchant for harsh repressi
{"title":"Immunity to Resistance? State- Society Relations and Political Stability in North Korea in a Comparative Perspective","authors":"B. Szalontai, C. Choi","doi":"10.3172/NKR.10.1.55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.10.1.55","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe survival of the North Korean political system in the face of a wide range of challenges has generated vigorous debates within the academic community. One school of thought, the so-called \"collapsists,\" argues that the leadership's reluctance to introduce radical economic reforms foreshadows a dramatic collapse, as the regime's grip over society is increasingly undermined by the process of marketization.1 In contrast, the \"resilientists\" expect the regime to \"muddle through\" the economic crises. In their opinion, the state's unusually pervasive control over society can offset the absence of radical reforms. Since reforms would actually undermine regime stability, the leadership has good reason to refrain from such steps.2The Arab Spring has reignited this debate. While the collapsists emphasize that the regime might eventually face popular unrest akin to the upheavals that rocked North Africa and the Middle East in 2011-2012, the resilientists argue that the experiences of the Arab Spring cannot be applied to the vastly different socio-cultural environment in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).Despite the different scenarios, the aforementioned studies were commonly focused on the capabilities of the North Korean state, rather than the peculiarities of the social environment in which it operated. Their elite-centered perspective reflected both the scarcity of reliable information about the political attitudes of ordinary citizens and the conspicuous absence of mass protests against the regime. To date, the North Korean political system has never encountered any serious challenge from below, serious socio-economic problems notwithstanding.To be sure, certain scholars, having analyzed the views of North Korean refugees, assessed the regime's durability from the perspective of social stratification. They raised the question of why mass protests have not occurred in the DPRK, and whether they might occur in the future.3 Still, there is a need for further investigation, for some of these studies have lacked a comparative perspective, while others have concentrated solely on the totalitarian institutions of Communist regimes, or compared North Korea with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, whose socio-political systems had little in common with the DPRK.Due to space limitations, this article does not aspire to provide a full explanation for the durability of the North Korean regime. Nor does it cover such general causes of non-resistance as political repression and isolation from external influences. Instead, it seeks to examine whether certain specific social and subnational groups that proved able to show resistance against other one-party states might play, or have played, a similar role in the DPRK. The selected groups are: (1) industrial workers; (2) private entrepreneurs; and (3) religious, ethnic, and regional identities. Notably, in various other countries the regimes' general durability, and their penchant for harsh repressi","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69760586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionResolving the security threats between North Korea and its regional neighbors remains key to building a viable Northeast Asian security regime. Relationships with the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are marked by episodes of urgency and high tensions in an otherwise predictable operating environment in which all actors seem resigned to the continuation of the status quo.1 Since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) revealed its nuclear ambitions in 2002, withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the following year, the U.S.-ROK Alliance has held the resolution of the nuclear crisis as a precondition for normalizing diplomatic ties. This hardline stance, arguably, has contributed to the present diplomatic impasse and there appears to be little impetus for progress under the prevailing rigid policies.2The current stalemate warrants exploration of a second front in engaging North Korea-one not mired by the politics of denuclearization. The carrot-and-stick approach, offering incentives for good behavior and punishing bad, has contributed little toward normalizing North Korea's relations with the international community, and has failed to coerce obedience towards international norms.3 The contemporary U.S. policy of "strategic patience"4 hints at fatigue and lack of direction. When combined with economic sanctions, "strategic patience" affords North Korea more time to develop a credible nuclear delivery capability while simultaneously building resentment. This article contends that continuation of this combination will (1) harden the positions and rhetoric of relevant political actors, increasing the political cost, internationally and domestically, of reversing stances5; (2) increase the likelihood of unintentional military clashes and escalation6; and (3) increase the internal insecurity of the North Korean regime.Appreciation of the North Korean regime's insecurity dilemma7 is essential to deciphering its motivations and designing a more effective North Korea policy. Under current conditions, Pyongyang arguably faces greater existential threats from internal forces than external ones. The elimination or collapse of the current regime in North Korea in the short- to mid-term, given the resulting unpredictable fallout, is not in the interests of any of the strategically engaged regional powers. North Korea therefore likely faces external existential threats only in the event of uncontainable internal insecurity spillover, or a humanitarian crisis of such magnitude that it shocks the conscience of humankind, compelling outside actors to intervene. Internally, however, waves of domestic change, including "marketization from below"8 and external knowledge proliferation, have already started to undermine the state's absolute control over the economy and information. In the current internal environment, the North Korean regime lacks desirable alternative options; the regime must eventually
{"title":"Addressing North Korean security challenges through non-state-centric international economic engagement","authors":"B. Howe, J. Park","doi":"10.3172/NKR.10.1.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.10.1.39","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionResolving the security threats between North Korea and its regional neighbors remains key to building a viable Northeast Asian security regime. Relationships with the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are marked by episodes of urgency and high tensions in an otherwise predictable operating environment in which all actors seem resigned to the continuation of the status quo.1 Since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) revealed its nuclear ambitions in 2002, withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) the following year, the U.S.-ROK Alliance has held the resolution of the nuclear crisis as a precondition for normalizing diplomatic ties. This hardline stance, arguably, has contributed to the present diplomatic impasse and there appears to be little impetus for progress under the prevailing rigid policies.2The current stalemate warrants exploration of a second front in engaging North Korea-one not mired by the politics of denuclearization. The carrot-and-stick approach, offering incentives for good behavior and punishing bad, has contributed little toward normalizing North Korea's relations with the international community, and has failed to coerce obedience towards international norms.3 The contemporary U.S. policy of \"strategic patience\"4 hints at fatigue and lack of direction. When combined with economic sanctions, \"strategic patience\" affords North Korea more time to develop a credible nuclear delivery capability while simultaneously building resentment. This article contends that continuation of this combination will (1) harden the positions and rhetoric of relevant political actors, increasing the political cost, internationally and domestically, of reversing stances5; (2) increase the likelihood of unintentional military clashes and escalation6; and (3) increase the internal insecurity of the North Korean regime.Appreciation of the North Korean regime's insecurity dilemma7 is essential to deciphering its motivations and designing a more effective North Korea policy. Under current conditions, Pyongyang arguably faces greater existential threats from internal forces than external ones. The elimination or collapse of the current regime in North Korea in the short- to mid-term, given the resulting unpredictable fallout, is not in the interests of any of the strategically engaged regional powers. North Korea therefore likely faces external existential threats only in the event of uncontainable internal insecurity spillover, or a humanitarian crisis of such magnitude that it shocks the conscience of humankind, compelling outside actors to intervene. Internally, however, waves of domestic change, including \"marketization from below\"8 and external knowledge proliferation, have already started to undermine the state's absolute control over the economy and information. In the current internal environment, the North Korean regime lacks desirable alternative options; the regime must eventually","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69760293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionOne of the striking aspects of the March-April 2013 security crisis on the Korean peninsula was the relatively sanguine response of most commentators to a series of events that had the potential to escalate to war. While there was no direct evidence that North Korea had mobilized its military forces at any point during the two months in which the major U.S.-ROK military exercise "Key Resolve" took place, the rhetorical threats emanating from Pyongyang involved an unprecedented number of explicit references to nuclear use. Furthermore, the U.S. flew several nuclearcapable platforms close to North Korean airspace in the most robust demonstration of immediate extended deterrence on the peninsula since U.S. nuclear-armed submarines surfaced in South Korea's harbours in the 1970s.1 By any reckoning, there was potential for serious consequences flowing from miscalculation.2 However, most analysts tended to be dismissive of the idea that war was on the horizon. As one seasoned observer of North Korea claimed in the midst of the crisis, "most people in Seoul don't care about the North's belligerent statements: the farther one is from the Korean Peninsula, the more one will find people worried about the recent developments here."3An important underlying assumption about North Korea's nuclear weapons program has acquired currency among observers over the past few years. This assumption aligns closely with the view held by proliferation optimists that the risks posed by new nuclear powers are exaggerated and that these states are likely to exercise significant caution after crossing the nuclear threshold.4 Optimists maintain that the leaders of new nuclear powers will be chastened by their awesome responsibility and act with appropriate restraint. Contrary to proliferation pessimists, who argue that the risks of nuclear conflict multiply with each new entrant into the nuclear club, optimists claim that the inherently compelling deterrence attributes of the world's most powerful weapon will have the effect of stabilizing regional security complexes. According to proliferation optimists, all leaders operate within a rational actor mindset; no rational individual will countenance nuclear war; and nuclear weapons inevitably induce a high degree of caution. If the established nuclear weapons states have managed to co-exist for several decades, why should we assume there is a greater risk that new nuclear powers will act any less responsibly?In this article, I challenge optimistic interpretations of North Korea's behavior as a nuclear weapons state by using the neglected prism of crisis instability. Employed as a framework of analysis to assess the dynamics of the Cold War superpower nuclear relationship, notions of crisis instability focus on the extent to which stability is achievable between nuclear-armed states during crisis situations. It is one thing to say that Pyongyang will never under any circumstances launch a bolt-fromthe-blue nuclear atta
{"title":"Command without Control? Nuclear Crisis Instability on the Korean Peninsula","authors":"Andrew O’Neil","doi":"10.3172/NKR.10.1.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.10.1.7","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionOne of the striking aspects of the March-April 2013 security crisis on the Korean peninsula was the relatively sanguine response of most commentators to a series of events that had the potential to escalate to war. While there was no direct evidence that North Korea had mobilized its military forces at any point during the two months in which the major U.S.-ROK military exercise \"Key Resolve\" took place, the rhetorical threats emanating from Pyongyang involved an unprecedented number of explicit references to nuclear use. Furthermore, the U.S. flew several nuclearcapable platforms close to North Korean airspace in the most robust demonstration of immediate extended deterrence on the peninsula since U.S. nuclear-armed submarines surfaced in South Korea's harbours in the 1970s.1 By any reckoning, there was potential for serious consequences flowing from miscalculation.2 However, most analysts tended to be dismissive of the idea that war was on the horizon. As one seasoned observer of North Korea claimed in the midst of the crisis, \"most people in Seoul don't care about the North's belligerent statements: the farther one is from the Korean Peninsula, the more one will find people worried about the recent developments here.\"3An important underlying assumption about North Korea's nuclear weapons program has acquired currency among observers over the past few years. This assumption aligns closely with the view held by proliferation optimists that the risks posed by new nuclear powers are exaggerated and that these states are likely to exercise significant caution after crossing the nuclear threshold.4 Optimists maintain that the leaders of new nuclear powers will be chastened by their awesome responsibility and act with appropriate restraint. Contrary to proliferation pessimists, who argue that the risks of nuclear conflict multiply with each new entrant into the nuclear club, optimists claim that the inherently compelling deterrence attributes of the world's most powerful weapon will have the effect of stabilizing regional security complexes. According to proliferation optimists, all leaders operate within a rational actor mindset; no rational individual will countenance nuclear war; and nuclear weapons inevitably induce a high degree of caution. If the established nuclear weapons states have managed to co-exist for several decades, why should we assume there is a greater risk that new nuclear powers will act any less responsibly?In this article, I challenge optimistic interpretations of North Korea's behavior as a nuclear weapons state by using the neglected prism of crisis instability. Employed as a framework of analysis to assess the dynamics of the Cold War superpower nuclear relationship, notions of crisis instability focus on the extent to which stability is achievable between nuclear-armed states during crisis situations. It is one thing to say that Pyongyang will never under any circumstances launch a bolt-fromthe-blue nuclear atta","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69760636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionAfter succeeding Kim Jong-il upon his death on December 17, 2011, Kim Jongun, the new leader of North Korea, oversaw testing of nuclear weapons on February 12, 2013, marking North Korea's third nuclear weapon test.1 The objectives of the nuclear tests were those of regime consolidation of domestic political and military power over North Korea after increasing tension among neighborhood countries. North Korea's nuclear program, begun by Kim Il-sung, the country's founder, has been used strategically under the leadership of his son Kim Jong-il and his grandson Kim Jong-un.2 In this context, the first nuclear test in 2006 is still meaningful to the analysis of the dynamic reactions of the neighboring countries to North Korea's nuclear program.News of North Korea's first nuclear weapon test on October 9, 2006, made headlines around the globe. However, perhaps no five countries took such a keen interest in the issue as the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia- the nations involved in the six-party talks with North Korea, aimed at the negotiation of a peaceful solution. The underground explosion of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility in the North Hamgyong Province of North Korea was a sensational global news media issue. This article examines how native-l anguage print media from the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia presented the news of North Korea's nuclear weapon testing to their primarily domestic audiences; the news frames employed by each; and the differences in the cross-national media coverage of this single news event. Within the frame analysis, this study used war journalism and peace journalism as two competing frames in the news coverage of the first nuclear test conducted by North Korea.Media coverage of the North Korean nuclear crisis has received little attention from media scholars. In a peripheral study of media involvement in the issue, Jiang examined cross-cultural differences in U.S. and Chinese press conferences on the test.3 However, published academic research about the news coverage of the crisis is sparse. Academic inquiry into how the U.S., Chinese, South Korean, Japanese, and Russian media relayed information about an event of great national and tional to their respective audiences as well as identifying and analyzing analyzing differences in that coverage would benefit not only mass communication scholars and framing theorists, but also those engaged in diplomatic, political, or sociological endeavors in those countries. This study will begin to fill the gap in the available analysis of news coverage of the North Korean nuclear crisis, add to the body of media framing literature, and examine how each country's native news media content may have influenced how its respective audiences understood North Korea's nuclear test.News Coverage of International IssuesStudies about international news coverage have focused on the differences in the domestic coverage of international news
在2011年12月17日金正日去世后，朝鲜新领导人金正恩于2013年2月12日监督了朝鲜的核武器试验，这是朝鲜的第三次核武器试验核试验的目的是在周边国家的紧张局势加剧后，巩固对朝鲜的国内政治和军事权力。朝鲜的核项目由该国的缔造者金日成(Kim Il-sung)启动，在其子金正日(Kim Jong-il)和孙子金正恩(Kim jong -un)的领导下，一直被战略性地利用在这种背景下，2006年的第一次核试验对于分析周边国家对北韩核计划的动态反应仍然有意义。2006年10月9日，朝鲜首次进行核武器试验的消息登上了世界各地的头条。但是，也许没有5个国家像美国、中国、韩国、日本、俄罗斯这样对北韩核问题如此关心。这5个国家是为和平解决北韩核问题而参加六方会谈的国家。北韩咸镜北道丰溪里核试验场的地下爆炸引起了全球媒体的轰动。本文考察了来自美国、中国、韩国、日本和俄罗斯的母语印刷媒体是如何将朝鲜核武器试验的新闻呈现给主要的国内受众的;各自使用的新闻框架;以及跨国媒体对这一单一新闻事件的不同报道。在框架分析中，本研究将战争新闻与和平新闻作为朝鲜第一次核试验新闻报道的两个相互竞争的框架。媒体对朝鲜核危机的报道很少受到媒体学者的关注。在媒体参与这一问题的外围研究中，Jiang在测试中考察了美国和中国新闻发布会的跨文化差异然而，关于金融危机新闻报道的学术研究却寥寥无几。对美国、中国、韩国、日本和俄罗斯媒体如何向各自的受众传递有关重大国家和民族事件的信息，以及识别和分析报道中的差异进行学术研究，不仅有利于大众传播学者和框架理论家，也有利于那些在这些国家从事外交、政治或社会学工作的人。本研究将开始填补现有朝鲜核危机新闻报道分析的空白，增加媒体框架文献的主体，并研究每个国家的本土新闻媒体内容如何影响其各自的受众如何理解朝鲜核试验。国际问题的新闻报道关于国际新闻报道的研究集中在国内对国际新闻事件报道的差异，如新闻媒体对两起飞机被击落事件的报道，苏联空军击落大韩航空公司007航班和美国海军击落伊朗航空公司655航班4,1991年波斯湾战争5,1994年南非选举5，联合国会议6，以及2003年美国领导的入侵和占领伊拉克8。虽然在较小程度上，研究了各种国际事件和问题的跨国和跨文化新闻报道，包括1971年斯里兰卡起义，9美国和欧洲之间的外交关系，10 1991年波斯湾战争，11冷战后美国和中国的环境，12以及光州和天安门民主运动。这种跨国和跨文化的新闻分析直到最近才被推到国内大众传播研究的前沿。2001年9月11日发生在美国本土的恐怖袭击表明了国际无知和跨文化误解的危险，并导致了美国. ...的激增
{"title":"Framing the Nuke: How News Media among Countries in the Six- Party Talks Framed North Korea's Nuclear Test","authors":"Mun-Young Chung, J. Lessman, Meijing Fan","doi":"10.3172/NKR.10.1.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.10.1.22","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionAfter succeeding Kim Jong-il upon his death on December 17, 2011, Kim Jongun, the new leader of North Korea, oversaw testing of nuclear weapons on February 12, 2013, marking North Korea's third nuclear weapon test.1 The objectives of the nuclear tests were those of regime consolidation of domestic political and military power over North Korea after increasing tension among neighborhood countries. North Korea's nuclear program, begun by Kim Il-sung, the country's founder, has been used strategically under the leadership of his son Kim Jong-il and his grandson Kim Jong-un.2 In this context, the first nuclear test in 2006 is still meaningful to the analysis of the dynamic reactions of the neighboring countries to North Korea's nuclear program.News of North Korea's first nuclear weapon test on October 9, 2006, made headlines around the globe. However, perhaps no five countries took such a keen interest in the issue as the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia- the nations involved in the six-party talks with North Korea, aimed at the negotiation of a peaceful solution. The underground explosion of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility in the North Hamgyong Province of North Korea was a sensational global news media issue. This article examines how native-l anguage print media from the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia presented the news of North Korea's nuclear weapon testing to their primarily domestic audiences; the news frames employed by each; and the differences in the cross-national media coverage of this single news event. Within the frame analysis, this study used war journalism and peace journalism as two competing frames in the news coverage of the first nuclear test conducted by North Korea.Media coverage of the North Korean nuclear crisis has received little attention from media scholars. In a peripheral study of media involvement in the issue, Jiang examined cross-cultural differences in U.S. and Chinese press conferences on the test.3 However, published academic research about the news coverage of the crisis is sparse. Academic inquiry into how the U.S., Chinese, South Korean, Japanese, and Russian media relayed information about an event of great national and tional to their respective audiences as well as identifying and analyzing analyzing differences in that coverage would benefit not only mass communication scholars and framing theorists, but also those engaged in diplomatic, political, or sociological endeavors in those countries. This study will begin to fill the gap in the available analysis of news coverage of the North Korean nuclear crisis, add to the body of media framing literature, and examine how each country's native news media content may have influenced how its respective audiences understood North Korea's nuclear test.News Coverage of International IssuesStudies about international news coverage have focused on the differences in the domestic coverage of international news ","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69760212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionWith its geographic proximity, historical and cultural ties, and ideological affinity, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has occupied an important place in the conduct of China's foreign policy. Following the Chinese intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953), which saved the DPRK from its demise, China signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with North Korea in 1961, which is still in effect today. As North Korea's economy deteriorated as a result of the so-called military first policy of the Kim Jong-Il regime from the latter part of the 1990s, China provided increasingly larger amounts of economic aid to its impoverished ally, while shielding it diplomatically and politically from the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council for Pyongyang's violations of international agreements on the denuclearization of North Korea. China is estimated to provide over 90 percent of North Korea's energy imports, 80 percent of its consumer goods and 45 percent of its food.1Under the Hu Jintao government (2002-2012), China's Korea policy revolved around three basic concerns: prevention of the collapse of the North Korean regime, preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. First, China did not want to see the collapse of the North Korean regime, as North Korea provided a valuable buffer zone between China and South Korea where over 28,000 U.S. troops remain stationed. If the North Korean regime collapsed, or were absorbed by South Korea, China would have to face a unified Korea controlled by the capitalist South and allied with the United States. Such a contingency would mean not only the loss of a valuable buffer zone but also a considerable burden on China's national defense, for as many as one-fifth (or 400,000) of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) may need to be deployed along the Sino-Korean border to ensure China's national security.2 Second, China desired to prevent the outbreak of another war in Korea, for that could embroil China in an unwanted war because of its alliance with North Korea. In order for China to continue its economic development and "peaceful rise," it needed a peaceful international environment in East Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula. Third, China also became concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons program, for the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by North Korea would trigger a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would likely be compelled to counter the North's move by developing their own nuclear weapons programs. Such a development would not be conducive to the maintenance of China's special status as the sole legitimate nuclear power in the region. As a result, China became involved in the politics of denuclearization of North Korea through the Six-Party Talks in and after 2003.Throughout the Kim Jong-Il's rule in North Korea (1994-2011), China's priority was the survival of the Nort
{"title":"China's Policy toward North Korea under the XI Jinping Leadership","authors":"H. N. Kim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.9.2.83","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.9.2.83","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionWith its geographic proximity, historical and cultural ties, and ideological affinity, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has occupied an important place in the conduct of China's foreign policy. Following the Chinese intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953), which saved the DPRK from its demise, China signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with North Korea in 1961, which is still in effect today. As North Korea's economy deteriorated as a result of the so-called military first policy of the Kim Jong-Il regime from the latter part of the 1990s, China provided increasingly larger amounts of economic aid to its impoverished ally, while shielding it diplomatically and politically from the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council for Pyongyang's violations of international agreements on the denuclearization of North Korea. China is estimated to provide over 90 percent of North Korea's energy imports, 80 percent of its consumer goods and 45 percent of its food.1Under the Hu Jintao government (2002-2012), China's Korea policy revolved around three basic concerns: prevention of the collapse of the North Korean regime, preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. First, China did not want to see the collapse of the North Korean regime, as North Korea provided a valuable buffer zone between China and South Korea where over 28,000 U.S. troops remain stationed. If the North Korean regime collapsed, or were absorbed by South Korea, China would have to face a unified Korea controlled by the capitalist South and allied with the United States. Such a contingency would mean not only the loss of a valuable buffer zone but also a considerable burden on China's national defense, for as many as one-fifth (or 400,000) of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) may need to be deployed along the Sino-Korean border to ensure China's national security.2 Second, China desired to prevent the outbreak of another war in Korea, for that could embroil China in an unwanted war because of its alliance with North Korea. In order for China to continue its economic development and \"peaceful rise,\" it needed a peaceful international environment in East Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula. Third, China also became concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons program, for the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by North Korea would trigger a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would likely be compelled to counter the North's move by developing their own nuclear weapons programs. Such a development would not be conducive to the maintenance of China's special status as the sole legitimate nuclear power in the region. As a result, China became involved in the politics of denuclearization of North Korea through the Six-Party Talks in and after 2003.Throughout the Kim Jong-Il's rule in North Korea (1994-2011), China's priority was the survival of the Nort","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69766446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionOn July 5, 2006, North Korea test-launched an array of missiles, which ended a self-imposed moratorium of eight years. Ten days after the missile test (on July 15, 2006), in its toughest official response to North Korean actions since 1994, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1695. This resolution condemned the missile tests, demanded North Korea cease all activities related to its ballistic mi - ssile program, and required all member states to comply with measures limiting North Korea's access to missile-tested materials or technology. On October 9, 2006, North Korea set offits first nuclear test. The UN Security Council voted unanimously on October 14 to slap North Korea with trade, travel, and other sanctions as punishment for its claimed nuclear weapons test. This resolution (1718) is much stronger than the earlier resolutions; it calls for inspection of North Korea cargoes, bars the travel to UN member states of North Koreans responsible for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, requires UN member states to freeze the financial assets of North Korean people or entities designated by the UN as engaged in North Korean WMD activities, and requires the establishment of an oversight committee.Under the latest resolution (2094), tougher sanctions impose penalties on North Korean banking, travel, and trade, and were passed in a 15-0 vote that reflected the country's increased international isolation. China, the North's longtime benefactor, helped the United States draftthe sanctions resolution, in what outside experts called a sign of Beijing's growing annoyance with Pyongyang's defiant behavior on the nuclear issue. The Chinese had entreated the North Koreans not to proceed with the February 12, 2013, underground nuclear test, their third. It is questionable whether these new sanctions will work. In other words, will the sanctions compel North Korean leaders to comply fully with UN demands, or will they lead the North Korean masses to rebel against their leaders? This article discusses reasons for the possible failure of these new sanctions against North Korea, the consequences of their failure to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, and policy options on a nuclear North Korea.The Effectiveness of Sanctions Against Outlaw CountriesThe term "economic sanctions" means restrictions on normal commercial relations with a target country, including trade, investment, and other cross-border activities. Economic sanctions are either unilateral or multilateral. A unilateral sanction is imposed by one country, such as the U.S., against another country, such as North Korea. Multilateral sanctions require the cooperation of at least two nations. The clearest examples of multilateral sanctions are those imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations.Multinational sanctions were relatively rare before 1990. The UN Security Council, obviously incapacitated due to Cold War-related veto powe
{"title":"The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against a Nuclear North Korea","authors":"Suk‐Hi Kim, Mario Martin-Hermosillo","doi":"10.3172/NKR.9.2.99","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.9.2.99","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionOn July 5, 2006, North Korea test-launched an array of missiles, which ended a self-imposed moratorium of eight years. Ten days after the missile test (on July 15, 2006), in its toughest official response to North Korean actions since 1994, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1695. This resolution condemned the missile tests, demanded North Korea cease all activities related to its ballistic mi - ssile program, and required all member states to comply with measures limiting North Korea's access to missile-tested materials or technology. On October 9, 2006, North Korea set offits first nuclear test. The UN Security Council voted unanimously on October 14 to slap North Korea with trade, travel, and other sanctions as punishment for its claimed nuclear weapons test. This resolution (1718) is much stronger than the earlier resolutions; it calls for inspection of North Korea cargoes, bars the travel to UN member states of North Koreans responsible for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, requires UN member states to freeze the financial assets of North Korean people or entities designated by the UN as engaged in North Korean WMD activities, and requires the establishment of an oversight committee.Under the latest resolution (2094), tougher sanctions impose penalties on North Korean banking, travel, and trade, and were passed in a 15-0 vote that reflected the country's increased international isolation. China, the North's longtime benefactor, helped the United States draftthe sanctions resolution, in what outside experts called a sign of Beijing's growing annoyance with Pyongyang's defiant behavior on the nuclear issue. The Chinese had entreated the North Koreans not to proceed with the February 12, 2013, underground nuclear test, their third. It is questionable whether these new sanctions will work. In other words, will the sanctions compel North Korean leaders to comply fully with UN demands, or will they lead the North Korean masses to rebel against their leaders? This article discusses reasons for the possible failure of these new sanctions against North Korea, the consequences of their failure to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, and policy options on a nuclear North Korea.The Effectiveness of Sanctions Against Outlaw CountriesThe term \"economic sanctions\" means restrictions on normal commercial relations with a target country, including trade, investment, and other cross-border activities. Economic sanctions are either unilateral or multilateral. A unilateral sanction is imposed by one country, such as the U.S., against another country, such as North Korea. Multilateral sanctions require the cooperation of at least two nations. The clearest examples of multilateral sanctions are those imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations.Multinational sanctions were relatively rare before 1990. The UN Security Council, obviously incapacitated due to Cold War-related veto powe","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69766577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionIn recent years, financial sanctions have become an increasingly important tool of U.S. foreign policy, playing a central role in efforts to prevent or counter nuclear proliferation and other illicit international activities such as money laundering or terrorist financing. In the case of North Korea, the imposition of financial sanctions has been a key part of both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations' strategies for pressuring the country to abandon its development of weapons of mass destruction and adhere to international norms. By impeding North Korea's access to the international financial system, these sanctions have had a disruptive effect on its international commercial activities, both legitimate and illicit. Should North Korea's proliferation activities stay on their current trajectory, the further implementation of such sanctions will likely continue to be a major part of efforts to degrade North Korea's WMD programs and pressure it to return to the bargaining table on terms acceptable to the United States.Financial sanctions, which aim to deny targeted entities such as proliferationlinked banks or enterprises access to the international financial system, are a fairly novel tool, relying on the risk calculus of private financial institutions as much as on direct actions by governments. Because of the importance of the dollar in the international financial system, U.S. policymakers have been able to pressure third-country banks doing business with "bad actors" such as North Korea into applying greater scrutiny in their transactions, or cutting offtheir relations altogether. This dynamic has allowed the U.S. to apply economic pressure even when direct trade or financial ties with the target of sanctions are minimal.1To many global financial institutions, the risks of bad publicity, increased regulatory costs or fines, or the possibility of losing access to the U.S. financial system outweigh the potential profits to be made from doing business with an entity that may be linked to proliferation, terrorism, or other illicit activities. Some financial institutions may go beyond avoiding entities specifically linked to such activities and avoid business with a country such as North Korea altogether if the risk of facilitating illicit transactions, or the cost of implementing a due diligence framework to ensure that all transactions are legitimate, outweighs the potential profit to be made. While a third-country business engaged in commerce with North Korea but not the U.S. may be able to shrug offthe threat of secondary sanctions,2 such as the loss of access to the U.S. market, ready access to the U.S. financial system is the lifeblood of most global financial institutions.Lacking easy access to a foreign bank account, an entity affected by financial sanctions may therefore find it difficult to conduct international transactions or remit hard currency. Resolving this problem may be as simple as finding a new banker w
近年来，金融制裁已成为美国外交政策中越来越重要的工具，在防止或打击核扩散以及洗钱或恐怖主义融资等其他非法国际活动方面发挥着核心作用。就朝鲜而言，实施金融制裁一直是乔治·w·布什(George W. Bush)和巴拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)政府向朝鲜施压、迫使其放弃发展大规模杀伤性武器、遵守国际准则的战略的关键部分。这些制裁阻碍了朝鲜进入国际金融体系，对其合法和非法的国际商业活动产生了破坏性影响。如果朝鲜的扩散活动保持在目前的轨道上，进一步实施此类制裁可能会继续成为削弱朝鲜大规模杀伤性武器项目并迫使其以美国可接受的条件重返谈判桌的努力的重要组成部分。金融制裁是一种相当新颖的工具，其目的是阻止目标实体(如与扩散有关的银行或企业)进入国际金融体系，它既依赖于政府的直接行动，也依赖于私人金融机构的风险计算。由于美元在国际金融体系中的重要性，美国政策制定者一直能够向与朝鲜等“不良行为者”有业务往来的第三国银行施压，要求它们对交易进行更严格的审查，或者完全切断与朝鲜的关系。这种动态使美国能够在与制裁目标的直接贸易或金融联系微乎其微的情况下施加经济压力。对许多全球金融机构来说，与可能与扩散、恐怖主义或其他非法活动有关的实体做生意所带来的潜在利润相比，负面宣传、增加监管成本或罚款、或失去进入美国金融体系的可能性所带来的风险更大。如果为非法交易提供便利的风险，或实施尽职调查框架以确保所有交易合法的成本超过可能获得的利润，一些金融机构可能不仅会避开与此类活动有特别关联的实体，还会完全避免与朝鲜等国家开展业务。虽然与朝鲜而不是美国进行贸易的第三国企业可能能够摆脱二级制裁的威胁，例如失去进入美国市场的机会，但随时进入美国金融体系是大多数全球金融机构的命脉。因此，受金融制裁影响的实体由于无法方便地使用外国银行账户，可能难以进行国际交易或汇出硬通货。解决这个问题可能很简单，只要找到一个愿意承担风险的新银行家(也许是为了获得溢价)，但一个陷入困境的实体可能不得不采取更昂贵的措施，如物物交换、通过幌子公司洗钱或使用大量现金。当这种受影响的实体是一个国家经济的重要节点时，例如一家大银行，破坏性影响可能会蔓延很远，使商业活动复杂化并造成通货膨胀压力。因此，合法和非法商业都可能受到金融制裁的影响，促使合法企业进入地下金融世界，而非法企业则进一步深入地下。从美国决策者的角度来看，金融制裁是对贸易禁运、封锁和有针对性的“聪明”制裁等更传统制裁工具箱的重要补充。这些措施完全符合各国实施制裁的多重目标:迫使目标政权改变其行为;破坏其领导地位;阻止它将来采取行动;降低其能力;警告国际观众不要采取类似行为;并满足国内观众的要求。…
{"title":"The Evolution of Financial Sanctions on North Korea","authors":"D. Wertz","doi":"10.3172/NKR.9.2.69","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.9.2.69","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionIn recent years, financial sanctions have become an increasingly important tool of U.S. foreign policy, playing a central role in efforts to prevent or counter nuclear proliferation and other illicit international activities such as money laundering or terrorist financing. In the case of North Korea, the imposition of financial sanctions has been a key part of both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations' strategies for pressuring the country to abandon its development of weapons of mass destruction and adhere to international norms. By impeding North Korea's access to the international financial system, these sanctions have had a disruptive effect on its international commercial activities, both legitimate and illicit. Should North Korea's proliferation activities stay on their current trajectory, the further implementation of such sanctions will likely continue to be a major part of efforts to degrade North Korea's WMD programs and pressure it to return to the bargaining table on terms acceptable to the United States.Financial sanctions, which aim to deny targeted entities such as proliferationlinked banks or enterprises access to the international financial system, are a fairly novel tool, relying on the risk calculus of private financial institutions as much as on direct actions by governments. Because of the importance of the dollar in the international financial system, U.S. policymakers have been able to pressure third-country banks doing business with \"bad actors\" such as North Korea into applying greater scrutiny in their transactions, or cutting offtheir relations altogether. This dynamic has allowed the U.S. to apply economic pressure even when direct trade or financial ties with the target of sanctions are minimal.1To many global financial institutions, the risks of bad publicity, increased regulatory costs or fines, or the possibility of losing access to the U.S. financial system outweigh the potential profits to be made from doing business with an entity that may be linked to proliferation, terrorism, or other illicit activities. Some financial institutions may go beyond avoiding entities specifically linked to such activities and avoid business with a country such as North Korea altogether if the risk of facilitating illicit transactions, or the cost of implementing a due diligence framework to ensure that all transactions are legitimate, outweighs the potential profit to be made. While a third-country business engaged in commerce with North Korea but not the U.S. may be able to shrug offthe threat of secondary sanctions,2 such as the loss of access to the U.S. market, ready access to the U.S. financial system is the lifeblood of most global financial institutions.Lacking easy access to a foreign bank account, an entity affected by financial sanctions may therefore find it difficult to conduct international transactions or remit hard currency. Resolving this problem may be as simple as finding a new banker w","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69766305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe economic recovery of North Korea has stagnated over the last two decades, the regime seemingly lacking the capacity to resolve food shortages and economic problems. Moreover, due to the recurrence of the nuclear issue and subsequent imposition of tighter sanctions against Pyongyang, not only has the scale of foreign aid decreased sharply, but the engagement of international donors in humanitarian assistance has also been greatly reduced. According to UN data, foreign aid to the country amounted to only USD twenty-four million in 2010, the lowest level since the international community began providing humanitarian assistance to alleviate the North Korean famine of the mid-1990s. It is widely accepted that the living standards of many ordinary North Koreans have deteriorated, a situation that is clearly reflected in the recent recurrence of food crises and malnutrition among its vulnerable population. Total food deficits for the 2010/11 fiscal year were estimated to amount to some 886,000 tons, and more than six million people were reportedly in urgent need of external food assistance.1 Such a nutritional situation and sluggish economic performance suggests that the rehabilitation of North Korea is unfeasible without international aid and the normalization of foreign relations, both of which may only be possible with the abandonment of its nuclear development program and a major shiftin economic policy direction.For South Korea and its neighboring countries, the North is a source of great regional turbulence, and its development of nuclear weaponry would likely alter the entire security situation of East Asia. Added to this, the food shortage and economic crisis possess a great likelihood of creating socioeconomic instability in the region. In this regard, the "softlanding" of North Korea's economic transition coupled with denuclearization is a critical goal for South Korea and its neighbors. Accordingly, it appears that a feasible institutional instrument for the amelioration of the regional instability caused by North Korea's economic problems and the nuclear stand-offis the establishment of a multilateral framework involving bilateral donors and international organizations. Indeed, it is necessary that the international community draws up a concrete blueprint for moving beyond its economic and diplomatic stalemate with North Korea.The effective provision and management of foreign aid is an important incentive in holding Pyongyang to its word in any treaty, as well as ensuring close cooperation among stakeholders. The establishment of one or more multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) could thus be a feasible option for promoting resource mobilization and donor coordination of development assistance to North Korea.2 As almost all pooled trust funds implemented in developing countries encompass governance arrangements involving bilateral donors and multilateral organizations, the creation of trust funds for North Korea could provide a pol
{"title":"Future development assistance to North Korea through the establishment of multi-donor trust funds","authors":"Jong won Lee, H. Zang","doi":"10.3172/NKR.9.2.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.9.2.43","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe economic recovery of North Korea has stagnated over the last two decades, the regime seemingly lacking the capacity to resolve food shortages and economic problems. Moreover, due to the recurrence of the nuclear issue and subsequent imposition of tighter sanctions against Pyongyang, not only has the scale of foreign aid decreased sharply, but the engagement of international donors in humanitarian assistance has also been greatly reduced. According to UN data, foreign aid to the country amounted to only USD twenty-four million in 2010, the lowest level since the international community began providing humanitarian assistance to alleviate the North Korean famine of the mid-1990s. It is widely accepted that the living standards of many ordinary North Koreans have deteriorated, a situation that is clearly reflected in the recent recurrence of food crises and malnutrition among its vulnerable population. Total food deficits for the 2010/11 fiscal year were estimated to amount to some 886,000 tons, and more than six million people were reportedly in urgent need of external food assistance.1 Such a nutritional situation and sluggish economic performance suggests that the rehabilitation of North Korea is unfeasible without international aid and the normalization of foreign relations, both of which may only be possible with the abandonment of its nuclear development program and a major shiftin economic policy direction.For South Korea and its neighboring countries, the North is a source of great regional turbulence, and its development of nuclear weaponry would likely alter the entire security situation of East Asia. Added to this, the food shortage and economic crisis possess a great likelihood of creating socioeconomic instability in the region. In this regard, the \"softlanding\" of North Korea's economic transition coupled with denuclearization is a critical goal for South Korea and its neighbors. Accordingly, it appears that a feasible institutional instrument for the amelioration of the regional instability caused by North Korea's economic problems and the nuclear stand-offis the establishment of a multilateral framework involving bilateral donors and international organizations. Indeed, it is necessary that the international community draws up a concrete blueprint for moving beyond its economic and diplomatic stalemate with North Korea.The effective provision and management of foreign aid is an important incentive in holding Pyongyang to its word in any treaty, as well as ensuring close cooperation among stakeholders. The establishment of one or more multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) could thus be a feasible option for promoting resource mobilization and donor coordination of development assistance to North Korea.2 As almost all pooled trust funds implemented in developing countries encompass governance arrangements involving bilateral donors and multilateral organizations, the creation of trust funds for North Korea could provide a pol","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69766651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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