{"title":"Soldiers on the Cultural Front: Developments in the Early History of North Korea Literature and Literary Policy","authors":"A. David-West","doi":"10.5860/choice.48-3125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.48-3125","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71132538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe future of the two Koreas has a great influence on the security landscape of the Northeast Asian region. It is clear that the two Korean regimes are facing both internal and external challenges and opportunities. Moreover, regional powers, such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, are concerned with changing inter- Korean relations especially with regard to the prospect for future security concerns of Northeast Asia in general, and the Korean Peninsula in particular. To explore the future of the Korean Peninsula, it is important to explore and understand the domestic political factors that could shape future policy direction within each Korean government.1This article argues that internal conditions in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime are the most important factor in determining future outcomes on the Korean Peninsula. More specifically, it suggests that the North's nuclear weapons program, its ongoing political transition process, and the policies of regional powers such as the U.S. are critical uncertainties that would have a great impact on the changing dynamics in the security environment of the Korean Peninsula. Based on a thorough exploration of these critical uncertainties, it concludes that the policy-makers of the South Korean government and the regional powers should take the possible collapse of North Korea scenario seriously, while making every effort to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula by creating a stable North Korea.Two Scenarios: Divorce Plus Reconciliation and the End of Absolute TyrannyRegarding the future of the two Koreas, there is one pessimistic view that only the collapse of the Kim family regime could lead to "genuine" denuclearization and subsequent peace-building on the Korean Peninsula.2 From this perspective, without the demise of the Kim regime, any efforts for peace and reconciliation in the security environment of the Korean Peninsula would be fruitless. On the other hand, scholars such as David Kang argue that economic cooperation between the North and the South plus the U.S. engagement policy toward the North could lead to political reconciliation and national reunification.3 Specifically, proponents of this view tend to think of the prospect for the North's economic reform and denuclearization as promising, based on their belief in the power of capitalist ideas flowing into North Korean society.It should be noted that the two scenarios-Divorce Plus Reconciliation and End of Absolute Tyranny4-are based on distinct perspectives: The former is based on an optimistic liberal view, while the latter is dependent upon a pessimistic realist view.Divorce Plus Reconciliation and Liberal OptimismSupported by an optimistic liberal prospect for the future of the two Korean states, Divorce Plus Reconciliation tries to provide a clear solution for the Korean question-one that involves multilateralism, economic cooperation, and political reconciliation. First, the Divorce Plu
{"title":"The Future of the Two Koreas: How to Build Peace on the Korean Peninsula","authors":"Donglin Han","doi":"10.3172/NKR.7.1.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.1.49","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe future of the two Koreas has a great influence on the security landscape of the Northeast Asian region. It is clear that the two Korean regimes are facing both internal and external challenges and opportunities. Moreover, regional powers, such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, are concerned with changing inter- Korean relations especially with regard to the prospect for future security concerns of Northeast Asia in general, and the Korean Peninsula in particular. To explore the future of the Korean Peninsula, it is important to explore and understand the domestic political factors that could shape future policy direction within each Korean government.1This article argues that internal conditions in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime are the most important factor in determining future outcomes on the Korean Peninsula. More specifically, it suggests that the North's nuclear weapons program, its ongoing political transition process, and the policies of regional powers such as the U.S. are critical uncertainties that would have a great impact on the changing dynamics in the security environment of the Korean Peninsula. Based on a thorough exploration of these critical uncertainties, it concludes that the policy-makers of the South Korean government and the regional powers should take the possible collapse of North Korea scenario seriously, while making every effort to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula by creating a stable North Korea.Two Scenarios: Divorce Plus Reconciliation and the End of Absolute TyrannyRegarding the future of the two Koreas, there is one pessimistic view that only the collapse of the Kim family regime could lead to \"genuine\" denuclearization and subsequent peace-building on the Korean Peninsula.2 From this perspective, without the demise of the Kim regime, any efforts for peace and reconciliation in the security environment of the Korean Peninsula would be fruitless. On the other hand, scholars such as David Kang argue that economic cooperation between the North and the South plus the U.S. engagement policy toward the North could lead to political reconciliation and national reunification.3 Specifically, proponents of this view tend to think of the prospect for the North's economic reform and denuclearization as promising, based on their belief in the power of capitalist ideas flowing into North Korean society.It should be noted that the two scenarios-Divorce Plus Reconciliation and End of Absolute Tyranny4-are based on distinct perspectives: The former is based on an optimistic liberal view, while the latter is dependent upon a pessimistic realist view.Divorce Plus Reconciliation and Liberal OptimismSupported by an optimistic liberal prospect for the future of the two Korean states, Divorce Plus Reconciliation tries to provide a clear solution for the Korean question-one that involves multilateralism, economic cooperation, and political reconciliation. First, the Divorce Plu","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On May 12, 2008, the 11th International Trade Fair opened at the Three- Revolution Building in Pyongyang.1 During the months leading to the trade fair, much ado was made as North Koreans cleaned streets, decorated buildings, and prepared for the much expected trade fair. According to the North Korean government, more than 220 companies would participate in the fair, displaying various products, such as "electronic appliances, vehicles, petrochemical goods, medicines, daily necessities, foodstuffs, etc." (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA],May 5, 2008). It was supposed to be a major international fair with all sorts of consumer products from all around the world. When the fair finally opened with great fanfare, however, outside observers as well as North Korean citizens were perplexed to witness thatmore than 90 percent of products were Chinese products. As one reporter pointed out, the so-called international fair was practically a Chinese expo (Joongang Ilbo, May 15, 2008).The incident is symbolic in that Beijing has emerged as the outlet of North Korea to the outside world. In 2000, China constituted 25 percent of the North Korean trade. By 2009, the figure rose to 78.5 percent. As a result, there is little difference between a Chinese expo and an "international fair" fromthe viewpoint of Pyongyang. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the increasing North Korean dependence on Beijing and provide some policies to deal with it. In the first section, the divergence between the North Korean rhetoric of "self-reliance" and its dependence on socialist aids during the cold war is analyzed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pyongyang became heavily dependent on China. In the second section, the North Korean overdependence on China is investigated. As many scholars point out, dependence comes at the price of vulnerability. Pyongyang paid its price of overdependence as Beijing squeezed its vulnerable points during the nuclear crisis. In the third section, the vulnerability of North Korea is analyzed. In response to the tightening grip of China, Pyongyang has become increasingly sensitive to its vulnerability. In the fourth section, North Korea's recent efforts to distance itself from China are investigated. Finally, policy recommendations are discussed in the conclusion to alleviate the North Korean dependence on China.Behind the Rhetoric of "Self-reliance"Although Moscow engineered the establishment of North Korea, Stalin looked the other way when its initial victory during the KoreanWar (1950-1953) was reversed due to the U.S. intervention.2With the fate of North Korea hanging by a thread, Mao Zedong intervened with his "voluntary" army.3 The fact that China-and only China-came to the rescue of North Korea was not forgotten. The war experience solidified the two countries as "blood allies." Leaders of both countries have often invoked the expression "teeth and lips" to describe their solidarity. Like lips and teeth, it is argued, the fate of
{"title":"Is North Korea Putting All of the Eggs in One Basket","authors":"Hyung-min Joo","doi":"10.3172/NKR.7.1.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.1.21","url":null,"abstract":"On May 12, 2008, the 11th International Trade Fair opened at the Three- Revolution Building in Pyongyang.1 During the months leading to the trade fair, much ado was made as North Koreans cleaned streets, decorated buildings, and prepared for the much expected trade fair. According to the North Korean government, more than 220 companies would participate in the fair, displaying various products, such as \"electronic appliances, vehicles, petrochemical goods, medicines, daily necessities, foodstuffs, etc.\" (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA],May 5, 2008). It was supposed to be a major international fair with all sorts of consumer products from all around the world. When the fair finally opened with great fanfare, however, outside observers as well as North Korean citizens were perplexed to witness thatmore than 90 percent of products were Chinese products. As one reporter pointed out, the so-called international fair was practically a Chinese expo (Joongang Ilbo, May 15, 2008).The incident is symbolic in that Beijing has emerged as the outlet of North Korea to the outside world. In 2000, China constituted 25 percent of the North Korean trade. By 2009, the figure rose to 78.5 percent. As a result, there is little difference between a Chinese expo and an \"international fair\" fromthe viewpoint of Pyongyang. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the increasing North Korean dependence on Beijing and provide some policies to deal with it. In the first section, the divergence between the North Korean rhetoric of \"self-reliance\" and its dependence on socialist aids during the cold war is analyzed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pyongyang became heavily dependent on China. In the second section, the North Korean overdependence on China is investigated. As many scholars point out, dependence comes at the price of vulnerability. Pyongyang paid its price of overdependence as Beijing squeezed its vulnerable points during the nuclear crisis. In the third section, the vulnerability of North Korea is analyzed. In response to the tightening grip of China, Pyongyang has become increasingly sensitive to its vulnerability. In the fourth section, North Korea's recent efforts to distance itself from China are investigated. Finally, policy recommendations are discussed in the conclusion to alleviate the North Korean dependence on China.Behind the Rhetoric of \"Self-reliance\"Although Moscow engineered the establishment of North Korea, Stalin looked the other way when its initial victory during the KoreanWar (1950-1953) was reversed due to the U.S. intervention.2With the fate of North Korea hanging by a thread, Mao Zedong intervened with his \"voluntary\" army.3 The fact that China-and only China-came to the rescue of North Korea was not forgotten. The war experience solidified the two countries as \"blood allies.\" Leaders of both countries have often invoked the expression \"teeth and lips\" to describe their solidarity. Like lips and teeth, it is argued, the fate of","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionChina is in violation of a number of its obligations as a signatory to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.1 The Convention guarantees refugees a number of important rights, including access to courts, freedom of movement, and the right to work.2 On September 24, 1982, China became a signatory to the Convention, binding itself under international law to honor the agreement's provisions. 3 Yet today, more than twenty-five years later, China remains in violation of its obligations under the Convention, especially with regard to thousands of North Korean asylum seekers streaming across its border annually.North Korea remains one of the most repressive, isolated, and impoverished nations on earth. Freedom of press, movement, religion, and assembly are nonexistent, while torture, harsh imprisonment, and execution are routine.4 Increasingly, North Koreans risk death to illegally cross into China for a chance to flee persecution and enjoy a better life. However, the danger does not end once they have successfully crossed. Chinese officials routinely refouler-that is, return-North Koreans to their homeland where they face severe repercussions for what their government views as an act of treason.In returning refugees to North Korea, China argues that North Korean asylum seekers are not refugees under the Convention's definition and that therefore they do not qualify for its protection. This argument is without merit, and China must be held accountable to its treaty obligations under international law.The "Refugee" Question: Classifying North Korean Asylum SeekersChina considers the North Korean asylum seekers to be economic migrants, not refugees, and thus maintains that they do not qualify for protection under the Convention. This argument is baseless. First, North Korea's extreme economic hardship disproportionately burdens certain segments of the North Korean population and is therefore tantamount to persecution, and moreover, it is sufficiently discriminatory to meet the Convention's definition of the term "refugee." Second, the Convention's object and purpose suggest a broader interpretation of "refugee" which indicates China should deal humanely with the North Koreans when determining a course of action. Third, even if North Koreans did not qualify for the Convention's protection prior to crossing into China, they most likely do after the fact as refugees sur place because they have a well- founded fear of persecution if they ever return to North Korea. Lastly, China's unwillingness to make a good faith determination of status should require that any request by a North Korean for refugee status should be accepted as true until proven otherwise.Dismissing China's "Economic Migrant" ArgumentChina maintains that the Convention does not apply because the North Koreans illegally crossing its border are economic migrants, not refugees.5 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines economic migr
{"title":"An Examination of China's Treatment of North Korean Asylum Seekers","authors":"Russ Aldrich","doi":"10.3172/NKR.7.1.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.1.36","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionChina is in violation of a number of its obligations as a signatory to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.1 The Convention guarantees refugees a number of important rights, including access to courts, freedom of movement, and the right to work.2 On September 24, 1982, China became a signatory to the Convention, binding itself under international law to honor the agreement's provisions. 3 Yet today, more than twenty-five years later, China remains in violation of its obligations under the Convention, especially with regard to thousands of North Korean asylum seekers streaming across its border annually.North Korea remains one of the most repressive, isolated, and impoverished nations on earth. Freedom of press, movement, religion, and assembly are nonexistent, while torture, harsh imprisonment, and execution are routine.4 Increasingly, North Koreans risk death to illegally cross into China for a chance to flee persecution and enjoy a better life. However, the danger does not end once they have successfully crossed. Chinese officials routinely refouler-that is, return-North Koreans to their homeland where they face severe repercussions for what their government views as an act of treason.In returning refugees to North Korea, China argues that North Korean asylum seekers are not refugees under the Convention's definition and that therefore they do not qualify for its protection. This argument is without merit, and China must be held accountable to its treaty obligations under international law.The \"Refugee\" Question: Classifying North Korean Asylum SeekersChina considers the North Korean asylum seekers to be economic migrants, not refugees, and thus maintains that they do not qualify for protection under the Convention. This argument is baseless. First, North Korea's extreme economic hardship disproportionately burdens certain segments of the North Korean population and is therefore tantamount to persecution, and moreover, it is sufficiently discriminatory to meet the Convention's definition of the term \"refugee.\" Second, the Convention's object and purpose suggest a broader interpretation of \"refugee\" which indicates China should deal humanely with the North Koreans when determining a course of action. Third, even if North Koreans did not qualify for the Convention's protection prior to crossing into China, they most likely do after the fact as refugees sur place because they have a well- founded fear of persecution if they ever return to North Korea. Lastly, China's unwillingness to make a good faith determination of status should require that any request by a North Korean for refugee status should be accepted as true until proven otherwise.Dismissing China's \"Economic Migrant\" ArgumentChina maintains that the Convention does not apply because the North Koreans illegally crossing its border are economic migrants, not refugees.5 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines economic migr","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThere is a new economic focus in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, one that overtly states it will improve the quality of people's lives and covertly states that the central government will provide this improvement. This has been made clear both through the Korean Worker's Party's public pronouncements and recent economic policies, in particular the currency reform of November 2009, which was car- ried out without warning and served to confiscate the wealth traders and corrupt officials privately earned through market activities. North Korea's deepening economic ties to China are the key material factor for this development strategy; no other trading partner is able or willing to provide the necessary investment. However, to understand the DPRK's prospects for success, one must first understand how the new focus has been constituted as a social movement. It is a recasting of the intimately bound Juche (the official ideology emphasizing self-reliance and independence) and the DPRK's national narrative. For North Korea's citizens, it is this national narrative that contextualizes the plans currently being implemented by Pyongyang, giving them a chance to stabilize the regime.The National NarrativeAll states employ some form of national narrative to shape the conduct and ideals of the populace. North Korea, more than any other nation, uses a national narrative that subsumes all other stories, local and personal. When one's society is ostensibly without a profit motive for individual success, the role of the national narrative becomes elevated for motivating the citizenry. Despite the hardships that ordinary North Korean citizens endure, there exists a basic, shared understanding of North Korea's position in the world, to which the majority of citizens subscribe, to varying degrees.The national narrative rests on the very edge of two seemingly contradictory positions: extreme victimhood and extraordinary accomplishment. A cursory glance at any North Korean media will reveal that victimization at the hands of the Japanese and then Americans is the glue that bonds their society and motivates action. Psychologist Joshua Searle White writes:One powerful way in which individuals can achieve a feeling of being right is to have been victimized, and to have others recognize that victimization. One would think that in a group's stories about its own history, national triumphs might play the dominant role. However, national tragedies often play an even more prominent role in the way that a nation sees itself.1Victimhood, as White writes, may be dominant in most nations, but in North Korea it operates only insofar as it contextualizes the successes the Korean people have achieved through struggle and unity. Shared victimhood that doesn't bear fruit will simply become uninspiring after a while. In this sense, the DPRK's domestic propaganda, while always intense and unremitting, must constantly be adjusted to actual circumstances, at times em
{"title":"North Korea's 2009 currency reform in the context of national narrative","authors":"A. Abrahamian","doi":"10.3172/NKR.7.1.64","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.1.64","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThere is a new economic focus in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, one that overtly states it will improve the quality of people's lives and covertly states that the central government will provide this improvement. This has been made clear both through the Korean Worker's Party's public pronouncements and recent economic policies, in particular the currency reform of November 2009, which was car- ried out without warning and served to confiscate the wealth traders and corrupt officials privately earned through market activities. North Korea's deepening economic ties to China are the key material factor for this development strategy; no other trading partner is able or willing to provide the necessary investment. However, to understand the DPRK's prospects for success, one must first understand how the new focus has been constituted as a social movement. It is a recasting of the intimately bound Juche (the official ideology emphasizing self-reliance and independence) and the DPRK's national narrative. For North Korea's citizens, it is this national narrative that contextualizes the plans currently being implemented by Pyongyang, giving them a chance to stabilize the regime.The National NarrativeAll states employ some form of national narrative to shape the conduct and ideals of the populace. North Korea, more than any other nation, uses a national narrative that subsumes all other stories, local and personal. When one's society is ostensibly without a profit motive for individual success, the role of the national narrative becomes elevated for motivating the citizenry. Despite the hardships that ordinary North Korean citizens endure, there exists a basic, shared understanding of North Korea's position in the world, to which the majority of citizens subscribe, to varying degrees.The national narrative rests on the very edge of two seemingly contradictory positions: extreme victimhood and extraordinary accomplishment. A cursory glance at any North Korean media will reveal that victimization at the hands of the Japanese and then Americans is the glue that bonds their society and motivates action. Psychologist Joshua Searle White writes:One powerful way in which individuals can achieve a feeling of being right is to have been victimized, and to have others recognize that victimization. One would think that in a group's stories about its own history, national triumphs might play the dominant role. However, national tragedies often play an even more prominent role in the way that a nation sees itself.1Victimhood, as White writes, may be dominant in most nations, but in North Korea it operates only insofar as it contextualizes the successes the Korean people have achieved through struggle and unity. Shared victimhood that doesn't bear fruit will simply become uninspiring after a while. In this sense, the DPRK's domestic propaganda, while always intense and unremitting, must constantly be adjusted to actual circumstances, at times em","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe North-South Korean economic cooperation has been expanding since it was made official in 1988. The amount of trade between the two Koreas has increased from $18,724 in 1989 to $190 million in 2009. The sustained development of the two Koreas' economic cooperation is a result of efforts by not only the private sector but also the public sector, academia, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the Korean public. This cooperation represents more than just practical results from economic cooperation between the two Koreas; it is a barometer by which the possibility of Korean unification may be gauged.The North-South Korean economic cooperation started off by trading restricted items and by the consignment processing of manufacturing industries, and in 2002, a joint Korean industrial park, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, was established in North Korea. For South Korea, Gaeseong is an opportunity to utilize North Korea's low-wage workers, which would enhance the competitiveness of South Korean companies. On the other hand, North Korea could achieve much-needed economic growth by attracting South Korea's investment in the North's special economic zones (SEZs). At present, 116 companies have moved to the Gaeseong SEZ, employing 40,000 North Korean workers. The accumulated production volume between January 2005 and November 2009 was $729 million, and the exports were $120 million. The Gaeseong SEZ is planning to include 2,000 companies with 350,000 workers and is targeting an annual production volume of $16 billion.Previous studies on the North-South Korean economic cooperation have approached the topic mainly in the context of domestic and foreign policies, not in the business context.1 That is, previous studies have generally regarded well-organized business models and management ability as exogenous variables. Based on this assumption, an examination of the North-South Korean economic cooperation in the business context should yield a deeper understanding of the project's sustainability. Further, such an approach may induce higher levels of participation in the project by all sectors of Korean society.This paper examines how the North-South Korean economic cooperation and firms in North Korea could achieve success. In addition, the paper illustrates a profitdriven North-South business model and provides applicable cases for each model. The paper also determines the types of firms that would most likely succeed for each of the four SEZs and discusses the practical implications.North-South Korean Economic Cooperation Business ModelsThis paper classifies the business types of the two Koreas by using productive combinations of economic resources. The neoclassical school looks at labor, capital, and natural resources, among others, as main economic resources.2 Today, such resources also include production and technology/management know-how. These added factors are essential in explaining not only the issue of trade but also the phenomeno
{"title":"Seven Business Models for Success of North Korea's Economic Reform","authors":"Sunghack Lim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.2.86","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.2.86","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe North-South Korean economic cooperation has been expanding since it was made official in 1988. The amount of trade between the two Koreas has increased from $18,724 in 1989 to $190 million in 2009. The sustained development of the two Koreas' economic cooperation is a result of efforts by not only the private sector but also the public sector, academia, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the Korean public. This cooperation represents more than just practical results from economic cooperation between the two Koreas; it is a barometer by which the possibility of Korean unification may be gauged.The North-South Korean economic cooperation started off by trading restricted items and by the consignment processing of manufacturing industries, and in 2002, a joint Korean industrial park, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, was established in North Korea. For South Korea, Gaeseong is an opportunity to utilize North Korea's low-wage workers, which would enhance the competitiveness of South Korean companies. On the other hand, North Korea could achieve much-needed economic growth by attracting South Korea's investment in the North's special economic zones (SEZs). At present, 116 companies have moved to the Gaeseong SEZ, employing 40,000 North Korean workers. The accumulated production volume between January 2005 and November 2009 was $729 million, and the exports were $120 million. The Gaeseong SEZ is planning to include 2,000 companies with 350,000 workers and is targeting an annual production volume of $16 billion.Previous studies on the North-South Korean economic cooperation have approached the topic mainly in the context of domestic and foreign policies, not in the business context.1 That is, previous studies have generally regarded well-organized business models and management ability as exogenous variables. Based on this assumption, an examination of the North-South Korean economic cooperation in the business context should yield a deeper understanding of the project's sustainability. Further, such an approach may induce higher levels of participation in the project by all sectors of Korean society.This paper examines how the North-South Korean economic cooperation and firms in North Korea could achieve success. In addition, the paper illustrates a profitdriven North-South business model and provides applicable cases for each model. The paper also determines the types of firms that would most likely succeed for each of the four SEZs and discusses the practical implications.North-South Korean Economic Cooperation Business ModelsThis paper classifies the business types of the two Koreas by using productive combinations of economic resources. The neoclassical school looks at labor, capital, and natural resources, among others, as main economic resources.2 Today, such resources also include production and technology/management know-how. These added factors are essential in explaining not only the issue of trade but also the phenomeno","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
OverviewThe tension on the Korean Peninsula decreased immediately following the dramatic reconciliation, in June 2000, between Kim Il-Sung, former leader of North Korea, and Kim Dae-jung, president of South Korea. President Kim Dae-jung adopted a policy of engagement toward North Korea called the "Sunshine Policy." Subsequent to President Kim Dae-jung's five-year rule, President Ro Moo Hyun inherited the engagement policy from his predecessor. Under the Sunshine Policy, South Korea provided North Korea with generous economic aid on an annual basis from 1998 to 2007.At the beginning of 2008, South Korea switched from a one-way engagement policy to a policy of give-and-take. South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, initiated this policy shift. President Lee came to believe that South Korea's engagement policy had failed. In February 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th president of the U.S.Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. attempted to settle disputes through direct dialogue with North Korea. It is reasonable to assume therefore that under the Obama regime, more of a direct dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. may be pursued to resolve pending issues, including North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and support of rogue terrorist states.North Korea has been excessively provocative in recent years. On October 9, 2006, North Korea test-launched a nuclear missile. Neighboring countries immediately expressed serious concern, and the U.S. nuclear envoy, Christopher Hill, doubled his efforts to ensure that North Korea fulfill its agreements on denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks countries; namely, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. North Korea agreed to disable the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and to dismantle nuclear facilities in the interest of nonproliferation. The international community is watching closely to determine whether North Korea will fulfill its obligations under these agreements. Kim Jong-il has to decide whether he will take further steps to put North Korea in the nuclear power club-which would be likely to invite furious resistance from the Western world-or opt instead to abandon the nuclear program to improve international relations.The purpose of this paper is to envisage President Obama's North Korea policy by applying game theory. In game theory, players try to adopt the best strategy, given their objective function. There have been six major players so far in the Korean Peninsula's nuclear conflict. We point out that interstate differences in the objectives between the national leaders and the party/military leaders have undermined the Six-Party Talks.This paper focuses on the game play between North Korea and the U.S. Although Kim Jong-il can effectively control his military advisers at present, there are potential divergences in their respective viewpoints, which may become more evident in the future.The Game Play in Economi
{"title":"A Game-Theoretic Approach to Derivation of President Barack Obama's North Korea Policy","authors":"Inchul Kim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.2.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.2.12","url":null,"abstract":"OverviewThe tension on the Korean Peninsula decreased immediately following the dramatic reconciliation, in June 2000, between Kim Il-Sung, former leader of North Korea, and Kim Dae-jung, president of South Korea. President Kim Dae-jung adopted a policy of engagement toward North Korea called the \"Sunshine Policy.\" Subsequent to President Kim Dae-jung's five-year rule, President Ro Moo Hyun inherited the engagement policy from his predecessor. Under the Sunshine Policy, South Korea provided North Korea with generous economic aid on an annual basis from 1998 to 2007.At the beginning of 2008, South Korea switched from a one-way engagement policy to a policy of give-and-take. South Korea's new president, Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, initiated this policy shift. President Lee came to believe that South Korea's engagement policy had failed. In February 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th president of the U.S.Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. attempted to settle disputes through direct dialogue with North Korea. It is reasonable to assume therefore that under the Obama regime, more of a direct dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. may be pursued to resolve pending issues, including North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction and support of rogue terrorist states.North Korea has been excessively provocative in recent years. On October 9, 2006, North Korea test-launched a nuclear missile. Neighboring countries immediately expressed serious concern, and the U.S. nuclear envoy, Christopher Hill, doubled his efforts to ensure that North Korea fulfill its agreements on denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks countries; namely, South Korea, North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. North Korea agreed to disable the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and to dismantle nuclear facilities in the interest of nonproliferation. The international community is watching closely to determine whether North Korea will fulfill its obligations under these agreements. Kim Jong-il has to decide whether he will take further steps to put North Korea in the nuclear power club-which would be likely to invite furious resistance from the Western world-or opt instead to abandon the nuclear program to improve international relations.The purpose of this paper is to envisage President Obama's North Korea policy by applying game theory. In game theory, players try to adopt the best strategy, given their objective function. There have been six major players so far in the Korean Peninsula's nuclear conflict. We point out that interstate differences in the objectives between the national leaders and the party/military leaders have undermined the Six-Party Talks.This paper focuses on the game play between North Korea and the U.S. Although Kim Jong-il can effectively control his military advisers at present, there are potential divergences in their respective viewpoints, which may become more evident in the future.The Game Play in Economi","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionNorth Korean foreign policy has been formulated and implemented with priority given to policy towards the U.S. after the North Korean nuclear crisis of the early 1990s. North Korea assumes that it can survive only under the guarantee of the U.S. for its national security. This attitude was substantially formed after the normalization of South Korean relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992. North Korean relations with China, in particular, were regarded as a blood alliance forged in the Korean War. However, the nature of Sino-North Korean relations changed after the normalization of South Korea-China relations. Moreover, China has begun to value international norms and law as it has grown into a power state in the international community and is apt to treat North Korea as a normal rather than special state. These circumstances forced the North to concentrate its efforts on foreign policy towards the U.S.As for the nuclear program, North Korea believes that nuclear weapons can protect it from external invasion and has therefore developed long-range missiles and nuclear warheads. The North Korean intention to develop nuclear weapons runs against the American foreign policy of emphasizing the nonproliferation of nuclear warheads. The conflict between North Korea and the U.S. on the nuclear program led North Korea to formulate and implement its nuclear policy with prudence and the involvement of many government departments.Most studies on North Korean foreign policy have focused on the influence of the top leader's perception and rational action. This paper conducts research from a different perspective by examining the North's foreign policy in terms of the bureaucratic politics model. Analysts argue that North Korean foreign policies have mostly been made by the top decision-maker. In contrast to such previous studies, this article focuses on the decision-making process under the top leader and argues that the "pulling and hauling" among North Korean bureaucrats to establish foreign policies has significantly affected North Korean foreign policies. Different policy preferences have been identified by U.S. negotiators who participated in the North Korea-U.S. talks held in 1993 and 1994 and by analysts who interviewed North Korean officials. This research is conducted by analyzing those policy preferences and the process of reaching compromise between bureaucratic groups in North Korea.Making Foreign Policy in North Korea and Bureaucratic Politics ModelUntil the demise of the Cold War, analysts who specialized in North Korean foreign policy mostly inquired into the role of the top leader and the Juche (self-reliance) ideology. Since then, such studies have mainly covered its historical changes and its characteristics in the era of Kim Jong-il. Some studies expanded their scope to examine the structure and process of North Korean foreign policy on the basis of theoretical frameworks.1 Theory-based studies must be increased
{"title":"North Korea's Nuclear Policy towards the U.S.: The Bureaucratic Politics Model","authors":"M. Ahn","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.2.100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.2.100","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionNorth Korean foreign policy has been formulated and implemented with priority given to policy towards the U.S. after the North Korean nuclear crisis of the early 1990s. North Korea assumes that it can survive only under the guarantee of the U.S. for its national security. This attitude was substantially formed after the normalization of South Korean relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992. North Korean relations with China, in particular, were regarded as a blood alliance forged in the Korean War. However, the nature of Sino-North Korean relations changed after the normalization of South Korea-China relations. Moreover, China has begun to value international norms and law as it has grown into a power state in the international community and is apt to treat North Korea as a normal rather than special state. These circumstances forced the North to concentrate its efforts on foreign policy towards the U.S.As for the nuclear program, North Korea believes that nuclear weapons can protect it from external invasion and has therefore developed long-range missiles and nuclear warheads. The North Korean intention to develop nuclear weapons runs against the American foreign policy of emphasizing the nonproliferation of nuclear warheads. The conflict between North Korea and the U.S. on the nuclear program led North Korea to formulate and implement its nuclear policy with prudence and the involvement of many government departments.Most studies on North Korean foreign policy have focused on the influence of the top leader's perception and rational action. This paper conducts research from a different perspective by examining the North's foreign policy in terms of the bureaucratic politics model. Analysts argue that North Korean foreign policies have mostly been made by the top decision-maker. In contrast to such previous studies, this article focuses on the decision-making process under the top leader and argues that the \"pulling and hauling\" among North Korean bureaucrats to establish foreign policies has significantly affected North Korean foreign policies. Different policy preferences have been identified by U.S. negotiators who participated in the North Korea-U.S. talks held in 1993 and 1994 and by analysts who interviewed North Korean officials. This research is conducted by analyzing those policy preferences and the process of reaching compromise between bureaucratic groups in North Korea.Making Foreign Policy in North Korea and Bureaucratic Politics ModelUntil the demise of the Cold War, analysts who specialized in North Korean foreign policy mostly inquired into the role of the top leader and the Juche (self-reliance) ideology. Since then, such studies have mainly covered its historical changes and its characteristics in the era of Kim Jong-il. Some studies expanded their scope to examine the structure and process of North Korean foreign policy on the basis of theoretical frameworks.1 Theory-based studies must be increased","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69763846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionAs Seoul and Washington moved towards detente vis-a-vis Pyongyang following the nuclear crisis of the mid-1990s, Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il held a summit in Pyongyang in September 2002, during which a surprising revelation came to light regarding the fate of a number of missing Japanese citizens that were long believed to have been abducted by North Korean agents. As necessitated by the agreements reached during summit negotiations and outlined in the Pyongyang Declaration, Kim Jong Il acknowledged and apologized for the kidnappings of Japanese nationals during the 1970s and 1980s, which were carried out by the North Korean military to learn the Japanese language and assume the identities of the abductees.1 However, the admission did not improve relations between the two countries. On the contrary, normalization talks came to a screeching halt when the Japanese public became enraged following the news of North Korea's official confirmation, as most considered the abductions as an infringement on Japan's national sovereignty. This issue now plays a central role in Japan's policy-making with regard to North Korea, prompting Tokyo to take tough measures against Japan's pro-Pyongyang Korean community and to freeze diplomatic normalization talks until the abduction cases are satisfactorily resolved.The sensation over the abduction issue formed not only a rift in Japan-North Korea relations but it also caused an atmosphere of distrust for the ethnic Korean communities in Japan. Japan's over 600,000 ethnic Korean permanent residents have experienced widespread discrimination and racism for decades in Japanese society. As a result, they created a vast network of businesses and community support organizations to protect their interests.2 The majority of the country's ethnic Koreans are members of either the Korean Residents' Union (KRU, or Mindan in Japanese) or the General Association of Korean Residents (GAKR, or Chosen Soren), depending on their citizenship status in either South Korea or North Korea, respectively. While members of either organization face legal barriers and persistent maltreatment in their day-to-day lives, the brunt of the criticism from the Japanese since 2002 has primarily been aimed at the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents and its 50,000 members. This increasingly aggressive trend is seen in harsh media coverage, physical and verbal attacks, and damaging governmental policies that single out the GAKR and its members.The General Association of Korean Residents is a support organization for ethnic Koreans that provides access to ethnic-education-based private schools, as well as financial institutions, job placement programs, cultural centers and other services. It serves as an umbrella organization that facilitates and coordinates services offered by member organizations and businesses among the pro-North community, and brokers contact among Japan's
{"title":"On Bringing Japan's Pachinko Gaming Industry into the Debate on North Korea","authors":"E. Magaña","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.2.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.2.24","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionAs Seoul and Washington moved towards detente vis-a-vis Pyongyang following the nuclear crisis of the mid-1990s, Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il held a summit in Pyongyang in September 2002, during which a surprising revelation came to light regarding the fate of a number of missing Japanese citizens that were long believed to have been abducted by North Korean agents. As necessitated by the agreements reached during summit negotiations and outlined in the Pyongyang Declaration, Kim Jong Il acknowledged and apologized for the kidnappings of Japanese nationals during the 1970s and 1980s, which were carried out by the North Korean military to learn the Japanese language and assume the identities of the abductees.1 However, the admission did not improve relations between the two countries. On the contrary, normalization talks came to a screeching halt when the Japanese public became enraged following the news of North Korea's official confirmation, as most considered the abductions as an infringement on Japan's national sovereignty. This issue now plays a central role in Japan's policy-making with regard to North Korea, prompting Tokyo to take tough measures against Japan's pro-Pyongyang Korean community and to freeze diplomatic normalization talks until the abduction cases are satisfactorily resolved.The sensation over the abduction issue formed not only a rift in Japan-North Korea relations but it also caused an atmosphere of distrust for the ethnic Korean communities in Japan. Japan's over 600,000 ethnic Korean permanent residents have experienced widespread discrimination and racism for decades in Japanese society. As a result, they created a vast network of businesses and community support organizations to protect their interests.2 The majority of the country's ethnic Koreans are members of either the Korean Residents' Union (KRU, or Mindan in Japanese) or the General Association of Korean Residents (GAKR, or Chosen Soren), depending on their citizenship status in either South Korea or North Korea, respectively. While members of either organization face legal barriers and persistent maltreatment in their day-to-day lives, the brunt of the criticism from the Japanese since 2002 has primarily been aimed at the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents and its 50,000 members. This increasingly aggressive trend is seen in harsh media coverage, physical and verbal attacks, and damaging governmental policies that single out the GAKR and its members.The General Association of Korean Residents is a support organization for ethnic Koreans that provides access to ethnic-education-based private schools, as well as financial institutions, job placement programs, cultural centers and other services. It serves as an umbrella organization that facilitates and coordinates services offered by member organizations and businesses among the pro-North community, and brokers contact among Japan's ","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe North Korean state has been suspected of sponsoring illicit drug trafficking for more than 20 years.1 The rogue state tightly controlled this industry. The ordinary citizens had no knowledge of the existence of drug trafficking.2 However, there are allegations3 that a growing number of civilian North Koreans have been aware of and involved with drug trafficking for personal profit.As a response to the aforementioned allegations, this paper tries to explore the evolution of North Korean drug trafficking from state control into substantial private participation. This study answers three research questions: (1) Is private participation in the North Korea drug trafficking substantial? (2) If so, what is the current state of the privately controlled North Korean illicit drug business? (3) How has North Korean drug operations evolved from tight state control to private participation?The authors have documented and evaluated this issue, and have adopted two feasible ways to collect data: from primary and supplementary sources. Primary data sources are in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors who were victims of human trafficking from North Korea into China. Supplementary data sources include various written documents, reports, and articles. The content analysis of these various written reports will be used as a supplement.4It has been found that the issue of North Korean drug trafficking has very few empirical studies. This may be due to the difficulty of obtaining empirical data as a result of the secluded nature of North Korea on one hand and the overemphasis on political, economic, and security matters of the North Korean state and relative neglect on criminal matters of North Korean private individuals among social scientists. Thus, this study has a certain merit in this regard.Historical Background of North Korean Drug TraffickingDue to North Korea's economic trouble,5 the North Korean state deliberately chose various transnational crime businesses including drug trafficking as a state policy to earn foreign currency.6 In the early 1970s, North Korean officials simply bought and sold foreign-sourced illicit drugs. Then, beginning in 1976, the state itself began to cultivate the opium poppy and sell the raw opium overseas.7 However, since raw opium was not very profitable, the state soon launched the refining process that turns raw opium into heroin. By the mid-1980s, the North Korean state had a wellestablished heroin production system. The state cultivated, refined, and exported products. During this period, illicit drug production and trafficking were under the strict control of the state. Most opium poppy farms were located on remote mountainsides which were strictly off limits to the ordinary population.8Since 1990, a series of international, economic, and environmental crises has significantly weakened the North Korean state.9 The state's production and distribution system collapsed. A substantial proportion of the North
{"title":"Evolution of North Korean Drug Trafficking: State Control to Private Participation","authors":"Min-woo Yun, E. Y. Kim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.2.55","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.2.55","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe North Korean state has been suspected of sponsoring illicit drug trafficking for more than 20 years.1 The rogue state tightly controlled this industry. The ordinary citizens had no knowledge of the existence of drug trafficking.2 However, there are allegations3 that a growing number of civilian North Koreans have been aware of and involved with drug trafficking for personal profit.As a response to the aforementioned allegations, this paper tries to explore the evolution of North Korean drug trafficking from state control into substantial private participation. This study answers three research questions: (1) Is private participation in the North Korea drug trafficking substantial? (2) If so, what is the current state of the privately controlled North Korean illicit drug business? (3) How has North Korean drug operations evolved from tight state control to private participation?The authors have documented and evaluated this issue, and have adopted two feasible ways to collect data: from primary and supplementary sources. Primary data sources are in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors who were victims of human trafficking from North Korea into China. Supplementary data sources include various written documents, reports, and articles. The content analysis of these various written reports will be used as a supplement.4It has been found that the issue of North Korean drug trafficking has very few empirical studies. This may be due to the difficulty of obtaining empirical data as a result of the secluded nature of North Korea on one hand and the overemphasis on political, economic, and security matters of the North Korean state and relative neglect on criminal matters of North Korean private individuals among social scientists. Thus, this study has a certain merit in this regard.Historical Background of North Korean Drug TraffickingDue to North Korea's economic trouble,5 the North Korean state deliberately chose various transnational crime businesses including drug trafficking as a state policy to earn foreign currency.6 In the early 1970s, North Korean officials simply bought and sold foreign-sourced illicit drugs. Then, beginning in 1976, the state itself began to cultivate the opium poppy and sell the raw opium overseas.7 However, since raw opium was not very profitable, the state soon launched the refining process that turns raw opium into heroin. By the mid-1980s, the North Korean state had a wellestablished heroin production system. The state cultivated, refined, and exported products. During this period, illicit drug production and trafficking were under the strict control of the state. Most opium poppy farms were located on remote mountainsides which were strictly off limits to the ordinary population.8Since 1990, a series of international, economic, and environmental crises has significantly weakened the North Korean state.9 The state's production and distribution system collapsed. A substantial proportion of the North","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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