During the past twenty years, Washington has oscillated between tentative engagement with Pyongyang under the Clinton administration and isolation and multilateralism under the Bush administration. With the Obama administration almost nearing its four-year tenure, the Six-Party Talks have stalled and North Korea's multiple attacks on the South in 2010 have created new instabilities. Why so little results despite promises of a radical departure away from the Axis of Evil rhetoric and hard-line politics? This paper suggests that the Obama administration has utilized approaches that no longer fit current circumstances and hence failed to create an original, coherent and effective foreign policy.
{"title":"Failure to relaunch? The United States, nuclear North Korea, and the future of the six-party talks","authors":"V. Grzelczyk","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.1.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.8","url":null,"abstract":"During the past twenty years, Washington has oscillated between tentative engagement with Pyongyang under the Clinton administration and isolation and multilateralism under the Bush administration. With the Obama administration almost nearing its four-year tenure, the Six-Party Talks have stalled and North Korea's multiple attacks on the South in 2010 have created new instabilities. Why so little results despite promises of a radical departure away from the Axis of Evil rhetoric and hard-line politics? This paper suggests that the Obama administration has utilized approaches that no longer fit current circumstances and hence failed to create an original, coherent and effective foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionAlthough North Korea's KCNA news often threatens to launch "unprecedented nuclear strikes," in reality, the North Korean nuclear program has limited offensive capability.1 Just how limited is a matter of dispute between well-informed observers and analysts. South Korea's defense minister, Kim Kwan-j in, for example noted recently that it was "possible" that North Korea had miniaturized a nuclear warhead as there had been, in his opinion, "enough time for them to have succeeded in miniaturization."2 He based his statement on how long it took other states to miniaturize a nuclear warhead, not on an assessment of North Korea's actual nuclear capability. Additionally, even if North Korea has miniaturized a nuclear warhead, the DPRK lacks an effective delivery mechanism and therefore has a limited ability to offensively use nuclear weapons.In our own assessment of North Korea's nuclear capability we found that the North is capable of operationally using nuclear weapons, but its options for a nuclear strike are severely constrained. We concluded that the only credible use of the DPRK's nuclear arsenal would be to detonate a bomb within North Korea itself to slow down or to stop an invasion in the context of an all-out war. Aside from this nuclear-use scenario, conventional weapons predominate in realistic evaluations of deterrence and war-fighting in the Korean Peninsula.North Korean Declaratory Nuclear PostureThe stated purpose of the North Korean nuclear program has changed over the last decade.3 North Korean statements that once described the nuclear program as a tool to secure the state against outside aggression now describe it as a stabilizing force in the region.During and after the collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002, KCNA statements described the nuclear program as a substitute for a security guarantee from the United States. If North Korea's security concerns were addressed, they argued, there would be no need for the nuclear program. An October 2002 statement is particularly telling: "The settlement of all problems with the DPRK, a small country, should be based on removing any threat to its sovereignty and right to existence. There may be negotiations or the use of deterrent force to be consistent with this basis, but the DPRK wants the former, as far as possible."4By 2005 this language had changed. North Korea declared itself to be in possession of nuclear weapons and began to depict its nuclear program as a regional stabilizer which prevented war by countering the U.S. nuclear threat to the region.5 KCNA statements even suggested that North Korea's nuclear program benefited South Korea by raising a nuclear umbrella over the entire Korean Peninsula!6By 2010 North Korea had not only openly threatened to use its nuclear weapons for the first time, saying that "those who seek to bring down the system in the DPRK, whether they play a main role or a passive role, will fall victim to the unprecedented nuclear strikes of the invi
{"title":"Unprecedented Nuclear Strikes of the Invincible Army: A Realistic Assessment of North Korea's Operational Nuclear Capability","authors":"P. Hayes, S. Bruce","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.1.84","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.84","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionAlthough North Korea's KCNA news often threatens to launch \"unprecedented nuclear strikes,\" in reality, the North Korean nuclear program has limited offensive capability.1 Just how limited is a matter of dispute between well-informed observers and analysts. South Korea's defense minister, Kim Kwan-j in, for example noted recently that it was \"possible\" that North Korea had miniaturized a nuclear warhead as there had been, in his opinion, \"enough time for them to have succeeded in miniaturization.\"2 He based his statement on how long it took other states to miniaturize a nuclear warhead, not on an assessment of North Korea's actual nuclear capability. Additionally, even if North Korea has miniaturized a nuclear warhead, the DPRK lacks an effective delivery mechanism and therefore has a limited ability to offensively use nuclear weapons.In our own assessment of North Korea's nuclear capability we found that the North is capable of operationally using nuclear weapons, but its options for a nuclear strike are severely constrained. We concluded that the only credible use of the DPRK's nuclear arsenal would be to detonate a bomb within North Korea itself to slow down or to stop an invasion in the context of an all-out war. Aside from this nuclear-use scenario, conventional weapons predominate in realistic evaluations of deterrence and war-fighting in the Korean Peninsula.North Korean Declaratory Nuclear PostureThe stated purpose of the North Korean nuclear program has changed over the last decade.3 North Korean statements that once described the nuclear program as a tool to secure the state against outside aggression now describe it as a stabilizing force in the region.During and after the collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002, KCNA statements described the nuclear program as a substitute for a security guarantee from the United States. If North Korea's security concerns were addressed, they argued, there would be no need for the nuclear program. An October 2002 statement is particularly telling: \"The settlement of all problems with the DPRK, a small country, should be based on removing any threat to its sovereignty and right to existence. There may be negotiations or the use of deterrent force to be consistent with this basis, but the DPRK wants the former, as far as possible.\"4By 2005 this language had changed. North Korea declared itself to be in possession of nuclear weapons and began to depict its nuclear program as a regional stabilizer which prevented war by countering the U.S. nuclear threat to the region.5 KCNA statements even suggested that North Korea's nuclear program benefited South Korea by raising a nuclear umbrella over the entire Korean Peninsula!6By 2010 North Korea had not only openly threatened to use its nuclear weapons for the first time, saying that \"those who seek to bring down the system in the DPRK, whether they play a main role or a passive role, will fall victim to the unprecedented nuclear strikes of the invi","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionRecently, an opinion has been in circulation that North Korea has something to do with fascism, the aggressive, imperialistic, and ultranationalist political doctrine and movement that grew out of the dislocations of the First World War and the Great Depression, manifesting in Italy in the 1920s, assuming the super-racist form of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s, and being implemented from above in Imperial Japan. Considering that fascism is imperialistic and that its extreme right-wing politics is violently anticommunist and antisocialist, the association of national state-socialist North Korea with fascism is frankly strange.The basic reasoning behind the fascist association is that Korea was a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945 and that Japanese fascist thought in the 1930s and 1940s carried over into Soviet Army-liberated northern Korea from 1945 onwards. The argument continues that many Korean intellectuals had been co-opted in the colonial-fascist era and that these individuals were incorporated into the North Korean cultural apparatus (North Korea became an independent state in 1948), leading to a fascist-rooted state ideology that celebrates race.1 The claim is superficial and impressionistic.Other than the fact that its empirical ground is insufficient, the real problem with the opinion of fascism is that it fixates abstractly on ideology (a servant of politics) and neglects the political perspective and economic structure of postcolonial North Korea. In this regard, it is necessary to briefly consider some North Korean political history; revisit the writings of the late leader Kim Il Sung, whose authority is preeminent in North Korea; and consider how fascism in action has been described in fascism studies and Japanese studies. What the evidence reveals is that the North Korean system is incompatible with fascism.Struggle against Imperial JapanAnti-Japanism and anti-fascism are two policy lines that go hand in hand in North Korea. Both constitute the locus classicus of the political regime, the legitimacy of which derives from the armed struggle of Kim Il Sung and the "anti-Japanese guerrillas," who fought the Imperial Japanese military and police in Manchuria, with some forays into Korea, from about 1931 to 1941. As Kim Han Gil's official Modern History of Korea states, the "anti-Japanese struggle" was poised against the "Japanese imperialists, the "Asian ' shock-troop' of international fascism," and their "imperialist colonial system."2North Korea identifies late Imperial Japan, along with Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, as a fascist state and holds a view of fascism that recalls the Stalininst Comintern in the 1930s. This is not surprising. Before northern Korea was liberated by the Soviet Army in 1945, Kim Il Sung, who became the leader of choice during the three-year Soviet occupation, had been a member of the Mao-led Chinese Communist Party (CCP) when it was a Comintern affiliate, a division commander in the CCP N
最近，流传着一种观点，认为朝鲜与法西斯主义有关。法西斯主义是一种侵略性的、帝国主义的、极端民族主义的政治学说和运动，起源于第一次世界大战和大萧条的混乱，表现在20世纪20年代的意大利，在30年代的德国采取了纳粹主义的超级种族主义形式，并在日本帝国自上而下地实施。考虑到法西斯主义是帝国主义的，其极端右翼政治是强烈的反共和反社会主义，将民族国家社会主义的北韩与法西斯主义联系在一起实在令人感到奇怪。将朝鲜与法西斯联系在一起的基本理由是，朝鲜在1910年至1945年期间是日本的殖民地，而日本在20世纪30年代和40年代的法西斯思想，从1945年起被苏联军队解放的朝鲜延续了下来。该论点继续认为，许多朝鲜知识分子在殖民-法西斯时代被吸收，这些人被纳入朝鲜的文化机器(朝鲜于1948年成为一个独立的国家)，导致了一个法西斯主义根深蒂固的国家意识形态，颂扬种族这种说法是肤浅的和印象主义的。法西斯主义观点的真正问题，除了经验基础不足之外，还在于它抽象地关注意识形态(政治的仆人)，而忽视了后殖民时期朝鲜的政治前景和经济结构。在这方面，有必要简要地考虑一些朝鲜的政治历史;重温已故领袖金日成(Kim Il Sung)的著作，他在朝鲜的权威至高无上;并考虑在法西斯主义研究和日本研究中如何描述行动中的法西斯主义。证据表明，北韩体制与法西斯主义是不相容的。在朝鲜，反日主义和反法西斯主义是两条并行不悖的政策路线。这两个地方都是朝鲜政权的经典所在地，其合法性来自金日成和“抗日游击队”的武装斗争。大约从1931年到1941年，这些游击队员在满洲与日本帝国军队和警察作战，还偶尔进入朝鲜。正如金汉吉的官方《朝鲜现代史》所述，“抗日斗争”是针对“日本帝国主义者、“国际法西斯主义的亚洲‘突击队’”及其“帝国主义殖民体系”。朝鲜将日本帝国晚期，以及墨索里尼的意大利和希特勒的德国视为法西斯国家，并对法西斯主义持有一种让人想起1930年代斯大林主义的共产国际的观点。这并不奇怪。在1945年苏联军队解放朝鲜之前，金日成成为了苏联占领朝鲜三年期间的首选领导人，他曾是毛领导的中国共产党(中共)共产国际分支机构的一名成员，是中共东北抗日联军的师长，并在苏联接受过军事训练，1941年他的游击队被打败后，他撤退到苏联，成为苏联陆军上尉。朝鲜对法西斯主义的定义可以概括为一种帝国主义的反动形式，它以侵略战争作为摆脱经济危机的手段。“反动”一词是指政治上极端保守或右翼，而“帝国主义”一词是指以垄断资本(或金融资本)的统治以及债权国和债务国(即殖民地和半殖民地)的国际体系为基础的一种资本主义。在“日本帝国主义的法西斯暴政和殖民掠夺”的具体案例中，法西斯主义表现出以下特点:*反共*侵略战争*强化暴政*警察信息系统*经济军事化。南虎头会议认为，法西斯主义是一种“出现在许多国家”的反无产阶级的政治运动，法西斯分子采用“血腥的专政和侵略战争的手段”，“不仅奴役本国人民，而且奴役全人类，使全世界法西斯化”。…
{"title":"North Korea and the Opinion of Fascism: A Case of Mistaken Identity","authors":"A. David-West","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.1.105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.105","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionRecently, an opinion has been in circulation that North Korea has something to do with fascism, the aggressive, imperialistic, and ultranationalist political doctrine and movement that grew out of the dislocations of the First World War and the Great Depression, manifesting in Italy in the 1920s, assuming the super-racist form of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s, and being implemented from above in Imperial Japan. Considering that fascism is imperialistic and that its extreme right-wing politics is violently anticommunist and antisocialist, the association of national state-socialist North Korea with fascism is frankly strange.The basic reasoning behind the fascist association is that Korea was a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945 and that Japanese fascist thought in the 1930s and 1940s carried over into Soviet Army-liberated northern Korea from 1945 onwards. The argument continues that many Korean intellectuals had been co-opted in the colonial-fascist era and that these individuals were incorporated into the North Korean cultural apparatus (North Korea became an independent state in 1948), leading to a fascist-rooted state ideology that celebrates race.1 The claim is superficial and impressionistic.Other than the fact that its empirical ground is insufficient, the real problem with the opinion of fascism is that it fixates abstractly on ideology (a servant of politics) and neglects the political perspective and economic structure of postcolonial North Korea. In this regard, it is necessary to briefly consider some North Korean political history; revisit the writings of the late leader Kim Il Sung, whose authority is preeminent in North Korea; and consider how fascism in action has been described in fascism studies and Japanese studies. What the evidence reveals is that the North Korean system is incompatible with fascism.Struggle against Imperial JapanAnti-Japanism and anti-fascism are two policy lines that go hand in hand in North Korea. Both constitute the locus classicus of the political regime, the legitimacy of which derives from the armed struggle of Kim Il Sung and the \"anti-Japanese guerrillas,\" who fought the Imperial Japanese military and police in Manchuria, with some forays into Korea, from about 1931 to 1941. As Kim Han Gil's official Modern History of Korea states, the \"anti-Japanese struggle\" was poised against the \"Japanese imperialists, the \"Asian ' shock-troop' of international fascism,\" and their \"imperialist colonial system.\"2North Korea identifies late Imperial Japan, along with Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, as a fascist state and holds a view of fascism that recalls the Stalininst Comintern in the 1930s. This is not surprising. Before northern Korea was liberated by the Soviet Army in 1945, Kim Il Sung, who became the leader of choice during the three-year Soviet occupation, had been a member of the Mao-led Chinese Communist Party (CCP) when it was a Comintern affiliate, a division commander in the CCP N","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionAre the days of hope for North Korea's nuclear denuclearization over once and for all? North Korea's recent disclosure of its uranium enriched program (UEP), in addition to its plutonium-based nuclear arsenal, the possible instability of power succession from North Korea's top leader, Kim Jong Il, to his son Kim Jong Un, and the North Korean leadership's blind reliance on its nuclear program as the ultimate guarantor of its regime survival, all point to a pessimistic assessment that it would be impossible to persuade North Korea to negotiate away its nuclear program for whatever rewards might obtain from the United States and the international community.Admittedly many people hoped for some sort of breakthrough on the nuclear front as the Obama administration took office in January 2009, expressing its willingness to engage North Korea. Although he didn't mention North Korea by name, President Obama pledged in his inaugural address to reach out to isolated regimes. As Democratic presidential candidate, Obama also expressed an active interest in engaging North Korea in a presidential debate in September 2008 when he criticized the Bush administration's lack of diplomatic engagement with North Korea, and supported "sustained, direct and aggressive diplomacy" to resolve North Korean nuclear issues.2Obama's criticism was clearly directed against the Bush administration's non-engagement policy toward North Korea during its first term. In fact, such an approach was inevitable, given the Bush team's fundamental distrust of the Pyongyang regime that had failed to keep its promises despite a series of previous nuclear pacts with the United States, including the Agreed Framework in 1994. The Bush administration avoided any further nuclear deal with North Korea during its first term, determined not to accept any demands from Pyongyang because "doing so might leave them open to comparison with the Clinton administration." Its North Korea policy was even described as the "ABC (Anything but Clinton) policy."3However, the Bush team's hawkish stance began to crumble when North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in October 2006. Tension was already rising since Washington made a big issue of Pyongyang's secret uranium enrichment program (UEP) in October 2005. North Korea initially acknowledged its presence, but has denied it ever since. Hard pressed by the urgent need to keep North Korea's unfettered nuclear pursuits at bay, chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill hastened to pull off a series of nuclear deals with North Korea, with the full support of President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. North Korea froze its plutonium activities and finally submitted its nuclear declaration in 2009, for which it received political benefits from the United States, including being removed from the U.S. terrorism list. However, the previously uneventful nuclear talks stalled when both sides failed to iron out the differences on verification
{"title":"Strategic Patience or Back to Engagement? Obama's Dilemma on North Korea","authors":"Changsop Pyon","doi":"10.3172/NKR.7.2.73","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.2.73","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionAre the days of hope for North Korea's nuclear denuclearization over once and for all? North Korea's recent disclosure of its uranium enriched program (UEP), in addition to its plutonium-based nuclear arsenal, the possible instability of power succession from North Korea's top leader, Kim Jong Il, to his son Kim Jong Un, and the North Korean leadership's blind reliance on its nuclear program as the ultimate guarantor of its regime survival, all point to a pessimistic assessment that it would be impossible to persuade North Korea to negotiate away its nuclear program for whatever rewards might obtain from the United States and the international community.Admittedly many people hoped for some sort of breakthrough on the nuclear front as the Obama administration took office in January 2009, expressing its willingness to engage North Korea. Although he didn't mention North Korea by name, President Obama pledged in his inaugural address to reach out to isolated regimes. As Democratic presidential candidate, Obama also expressed an active interest in engaging North Korea in a presidential debate in September 2008 when he criticized the Bush administration's lack of diplomatic engagement with North Korea, and supported \"sustained, direct and aggressive diplomacy\" to resolve North Korean nuclear issues.2Obama's criticism was clearly directed against the Bush administration's non-engagement policy toward North Korea during its first term. In fact, such an approach was inevitable, given the Bush team's fundamental distrust of the Pyongyang regime that had failed to keep its promises despite a series of previous nuclear pacts with the United States, including the Agreed Framework in 1994. The Bush administration avoided any further nuclear deal with North Korea during its first term, determined not to accept any demands from Pyongyang because \"doing so might leave them open to comparison with the Clinton administration.\" Its North Korea policy was even described as the \"ABC (Anything but Clinton) policy.\"3However, the Bush team's hawkish stance began to crumble when North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in October 2006. Tension was already rising since Washington made a big issue of Pyongyang's secret uranium enrichment program (UEP) in October 2005. North Korea initially acknowledged its presence, but has denied it ever since. Hard pressed by the urgent need to keep North Korea's unfettered nuclear pursuits at bay, chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill hastened to pull off a series of nuclear deals with North Korea, with the full support of President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. North Korea froze its plutonium activities and finally submitted its nuclear declaration in 2009, for which it received political benefits from the United States, including being removed from the U.S. terrorism list. However, the previously uneventful nuclear talks stalled when both sides failed to iron out the differences on verification ","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For many years, Chinese nationals threatened with torture or persecution for their role in helping North Korean escapees had little success gaining protection from removal in U.S. courts. In 2009 and 2010, however, some courts bucked this trend, showing a greater acceptance of both the dangers faced by Chinese nationals suspected of assisting North Koreans, and the political nature of their actions. However, inconsistency remains on the fundamental question of whether Chinese authorities have engaged in the persecution of individuals who have assisted North Koreans, or whether they instead have legitimately prosecuted them pursuant to Chinese law.
{"title":"Protection for Chinese Nationals Who Have Provided Humanitarian Assistance to North Korean Escapees: Recent Developments in U.S. Immigration Law","authors":"A. Wolman","doi":"10.3172/NKR.7.2.22","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.2.22","url":null,"abstract":"For many years, Chinese nationals threatened with torture or persecution for their role in helping North Korean escapees had little success gaining protection from removal in U.S. courts. In 2009 and 2010, however, some courts bucked this trend, showing a greater acceptance of both the dangers faced by Chinese nationals suspected of assisting North Koreans, and the political nature of their actions. However, inconsistency remains on the fundamental question of whether Chinese authorities have engaged in the persecution of individuals who have assisted North Koreans, or whether they instead have legitimately prosecuted them pursuant to Chinese law.","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionIt is often assumed that in a "totalitarian" state, the decisive surveillance role should be the domain of the political police. In North Korea daily surveillance is often conducted through institutions which occasionally interact with the police, but are generally independent of it-like a neighborhood group, or inminpan (literally "people's group," henceforth PG), whose role and activities constitute the topic of the present article. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2010-330-B00187).This North Korean state has won a deservedly notorious reputation by relying heavily on the old-style methods of coercion and crude state power which followers of the Foucauldian school would probably associate with the ancient regime: institutionalized torture, occasional public executions and the like.1 However, the stability of the North Korean regime seems to be based not only on its use of highly visual, even spectacular, violence but rather on the application of modern techniques of social control and daily surveillance, including what the Foucauldian school describes as the "panopticon principle."David Wood explained this principle in the following words: "Panopticism, the social trajectory represented by the figure of the Panopticon, the drive to selfmonitoring through the belief that one is under constant scrutiny, thus becomes both a driving force and a key symbol of the modernist project."2 In the PG even the most mundane activities of the population are supposed to be watched constantly by the agents of the bureaucratic modernizing state.However, in the course of time the actual PG began to develop features which make it less panopticon-like than most observers would think at the first glance (and definitely less efficient an instrument than the authorities hoped for). The PG heads, instead of being constant and vigilant watchers, had to look for compromises. They had no choice, being torn apart by two incompatible sets of demands-one by their bureaucrat overseers and another by their neighbors. These trends became more visible in the past two decades when the North Korean surveillance system began its gradual disintegration.This article will trace the origins of the PG, their evolution and the changes in their functions. Special attention will be paid to the changes which occurred in the PG system in the last two decades when the carefully constructed system of Kim Il Sung's "surveillance state" began to disintegrate under the economic pressures.The PG has attracted the attention of researchers before, although almost nothing on the PG is available in English. Among studies of the PG one should mention a well-researched MA thesis by Ch'ae Kyong-hui.3 Alexander Zhebin, a Russian scholar, journalist and diplomat wrote a Ph.D. thesis specifically dealing with the topic (in Russian).4 However, in this groundbreaking work Alexander Zhebin was forced to rely largely on p
{"title":"The Decline of the North Korean Surveillance State","authors":"A. Lankov, Kwak In-ok","doi":"10.3172/NKR.7.2.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.2.6","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionIt is often assumed that in a \"totalitarian\" state, the decisive surveillance role should be the domain of the political police. In North Korea daily surveillance is often conducted through institutions which occasionally interact with the police, but are generally independent of it-like a neighborhood group, or inminpan (literally \"people's group,\" henceforth PG), whose role and activities constitute the topic of the present article. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2010-330-B00187).This North Korean state has won a deservedly notorious reputation by relying heavily on the old-style methods of coercion and crude state power which followers of the Foucauldian school would probably associate with the ancient regime: institutionalized torture, occasional public executions and the like.1 However, the stability of the North Korean regime seems to be based not only on its use of highly visual, even spectacular, violence but rather on the application of modern techniques of social control and daily surveillance, including what the Foucauldian school describes as the \"panopticon principle.\"David Wood explained this principle in the following words: \"Panopticism, the social trajectory represented by the figure of the Panopticon, the drive to selfmonitoring through the belief that one is under constant scrutiny, thus becomes both a driving force and a key symbol of the modernist project.\"2 In the PG even the most mundane activities of the population are supposed to be watched constantly by the agents of the bureaucratic modernizing state.However, in the course of time the actual PG began to develop features which make it less panopticon-like than most observers would think at the first glance (and definitely less efficient an instrument than the authorities hoped for). The PG heads, instead of being constant and vigilant watchers, had to look for compromises. They had no choice, being torn apart by two incompatible sets of demands-one by their bureaucrat overseers and another by their neighbors. These trends became more visible in the past two decades when the North Korean surveillance system began its gradual disintegration.This article will trace the origins of the PG, their evolution and the changes in their functions. Special attention will be paid to the changes which occurred in the PG system in the last two decades when the carefully constructed system of Kim Il Sung's \"surveillance state\" began to disintegrate under the economic pressures.The PG has attracted the attention of researchers before, although almost nothing on the PG is available in English. Among studies of the PG one should mention a well-researched MA thesis by Ch'ae Kyong-hui.3 Alexander Zhebin, a Russian scholar, journalist and diplomat wrote a Ph.D. thesis specifically dealing with the topic (in Russian).4 However, in this groundbreaking work Alexander Zhebin was forced to rely largely on p","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionGlobal supply chain management is exposed to a variety of risks such as demand fluctuations, exchange-rate fluctuations, price fluctuations, supply disruption, and supply delays.2 In addition, because of business activities and growth, management often has created conflicts among risks. Thus, business firms must develop mitigation strategies that effectively manage these risks in the supply chain.3 Supply chain risk management (SCRM) takes a proactive approach to the development of mitigation strategies for supply chain risks, giving important strategic alternatives and insights while overcoming challenges presented by the information and knowledge age.4The purpose of this paper is threefold: 1) to identify, assess, and prioritize supply chain risks; 2) to use the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) technique to support the strategic planning in supply chain management (SCM) decision-making; and 3) to provide business decision makers with a model to identify risk mitigation strategies. Using a business firm (BF) in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), the study focuses on exploring supply chain risks' characteristics in order to implement risk mitigation strategies that will improve the BF's and the KIC's decision-making planning process and managerial policy.5 The study will suggest risk mitigation strategies that will enable the BF to respond to innovation and new growth, while reinforcing overall ongoing business planning strategies to meet defined requirements in the KIC business setting.Supply Chain Risk ManagementSupply chain management (SCM) is defined as an integrated business philosophy for managing information, materials, and monetary flows among different facilities, suppliers, customers, and logistic levels. SCM includes both internal customers, such as all cross-functional decision-makers within an organization that have direct and/or indirect impact, and external customers such as suppliers, distributors, transporters, warehouses, retailers, and even end users. Because of the many qualitative and quantitative factors which must be included in SCM, planning is a complicated decision-making problem in business.6 Given the complexity of SCM, especially in cross-border supply chains, many studies have applied different business methodologies to real world situations.7Supply chain risk is defined as any risk associated with the flow of materials, information, and monetary transaction in a supply chain process. An effective supply chain risk management (SCRM) strategy embeds risk management into all supply chain functions, from inbound to outbound supply chain streams. Conventional risk management identifies and evaluates the various supply chain risk factors and their potential effects in areas such as purchasing and procurement, manufacturing and production, resources and real estate, outsourcing, logistics and warehousing, inventory, and legal matters. Risk factors can be identified in terms of sources, places, and relationsh
{"title":"Managing Supply Chain Risks and Risk Mitigation Strategies 1","authors":"C. Lee, Gregory W. Ulferts","doi":"10.3172/NKR.7.2.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.2.34","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionGlobal supply chain management is exposed to a variety of risks such as demand fluctuations, exchange-rate fluctuations, price fluctuations, supply disruption, and supply delays.2 In addition, because of business activities and growth, management often has created conflicts among risks. Thus, business firms must develop mitigation strategies that effectively manage these risks in the supply chain.3 Supply chain risk management (SCRM) takes a proactive approach to the development of mitigation strategies for supply chain risks, giving important strategic alternatives and insights while overcoming challenges presented by the information and knowledge age.4The purpose of this paper is threefold: 1) to identify, assess, and prioritize supply chain risks; 2) to use the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) technique to support the strategic planning in supply chain management (SCM) decision-making; and 3) to provide business decision makers with a model to identify risk mitigation strategies. Using a business firm (BF) in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), the study focuses on exploring supply chain risks' characteristics in order to implement risk mitigation strategies that will improve the BF's and the KIC's decision-making planning process and managerial policy.5 The study will suggest risk mitigation strategies that will enable the BF to respond to innovation and new growth, while reinforcing overall ongoing business planning strategies to meet defined requirements in the KIC business setting.Supply Chain Risk ManagementSupply chain management (SCM) is defined as an integrated business philosophy for managing information, materials, and monetary flows among different facilities, suppliers, customers, and logistic levels. SCM includes both internal customers, such as all cross-functional decision-makers within an organization that have direct and/or indirect impact, and external customers such as suppliers, distributors, transporters, warehouses, retailers, and even end users. Because of the many qualitative and quantitative factors which must be included in SCM, planning is a complicated decision-making problem in business.6 Given the complexity of SCM, especially in cross-border supply chains, many studies have applied different business methodologies to real world situations.7Supply chain risk is defined as any risk associated with the flow of materials, information, and monetary transaction in a supply chain process. An effective supply chain risk management (SCRM) strategy embeds risk management into all supply chain functions, from inbound to outbound supply chain streams. Conventional risk management identifies and evaluates the various supply chain risk factors and their potential effects in areas such as purchasing and procurement, manufacturing and production, resources and real estate, outsourcing, logistics and warehousing, inventory, and legal matters. Risk factors can be identified in terms of sources, places, and relationsh","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe Korean Peninsula remains a hot spot in international security. A puzzling North Korea has turned its back on the world by its incessant pursuit of nuclear weapons, and despite recent reconciliatory developments, tension remains between the two Koreas that may erupt into military conflict at any time. One area with the greatest potential for conflict is in the West Sea near the Northern Limit Line (NLL).2 South Korea is blaming North Korea for sinking one of its navy ships in the waters near the NLL in March 2010. More recently, South and North Korea exchanged artillery fire soon after North Korea fired on Yeonpyeongdo Island, near the NLL, in November 2010. The causes of these military conflicts remain a riddle. Though the NLL is considered a major factor, it alone is not sufficient to explain what brought the two Koreas into conflict.One interpretation posits that North Korea's provocative posture is attributable to South Korea's punitive policy against North Korea. The current Lee Myung-bak government has taken a hard-line policy toward North Korea, making its North Korea policy distinguishable from the unilateral engagement policy of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. The current government has emphasized reciprocity and thus has showed little tolerance against North Korea's provocations. With this shift in policy toward North Korea, fears of a new conflict with North Korea are growing. As a consequence, some critics now speak about the need to ease military tension in the Korean Peninsula by reintroducing a peace and reconciliation policy with North Korea.3 Then, it is relevant to ask whether the unilateral engagement policies of the Kim Dae-j ung and the Roh Moo-hyun governments have reduced North Korea's provocations in the West Sea.4With these concerns in mind, this paper challenges the widespread belief that "conflicts of interest are reduced by interdependence, and that cooperation alone holds the answer to world problems."5 The main argument here is that North Korea's NLL violations do not rise and fall based on South Korea's engagement or containment policy toward North Korea, but rather on North Korea's need to catch more marine products. In order to support the argument of this paper, the second section evaluates the inter-Korean reconciliation process and its impact on North Korea's NLL violations. The third section analyzes why North Korea's economic crisis in the 1990s was conducive to a rise in North Korea's NLL violations. A summary and some policy implications are given in the final section.The Inter-Korean Reconciliation Process and North Korea's NLL ProvocationsThe 1953 Armistice Agreement to end the Korean War included only the landbased military demarcation line (MDL), leaving a maritime border as an unsettled question among the concerned parties, including the U.S.-led United Nations, North Korea, and China. The United Nations military forces, with superior naval and air power, felt urged to con
{"title":"Has South Korea's Engagement Policy Reduced North Korea's Provocations? 1","authors":"Insoo Kim, Minyong Lee","doi":"10.3172/NKR.7.2.57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.2.57","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe Korean Peninsula remains a hot spot in international security. A puzzling North Korea has turned its back on the world by its incessant pursuit of nuclear weapons, and despite recent reconciliatory developments, tension remains between the two Koreas that may erupt into military conflict at any time. One area with the greatest potential for conflict is in the West Sea near the Northern Limit Line (NLL).2 South Korea is blaming North Korea for sinking one of its navy ships in the waters near the NLL in March 2010. More recently, South and North Korea exchanged artillery fire soon after North Korea fired on Yeonpyeongdo Island, near the NLL, in November 2010. The causes of these military conflicts remain a riddle. Though the NLL is considered a major factor, it alone is not sufficient to explain what brought the two Koreas into conflict.One interpretation posits that North Korea's provocative posture is attributable to South Korea's punitive policy against North Korea. The current Lee Myung-bak government has taken a hard-line policy toward North Korea, making its North Korea policy distinguishable from the unilateral engagement policy of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. The current government has emphasized reciprocity and thus has showed little tolerance against North Korea's provocations. With this shift in policy toward North Korea, fears of a new conflict with North Korea are growing. As a consequence, some critics now speak about the need to ease military tension in the Korean Peninsula by reintroducing a peace and reconciliation policy with North Korea.3 Then, it is relevant to ask whether the unilateral engagement policies of the Kim Dae-j ung and the Roh Moo-hyun governments have reduced North Korea's provocations in the West Sea.4With these concerns in mind, this paper challenges the widespread belief that \"conflicts of interest are reduced by interdependence, and that cooperation alone holds the answer to world problems.\"5 The main argument here is that North Korea's NLL violations do not rise and fall based on South Korea's engagement or containment policy toward North Korea, but rather on North Korea's need to catch more marine products. In order to support the argument of this paper, the second section evaluates the inter-Korean reconciliation process and its impact on North Korea's NLL violations. The third section analyzes why North Korea's economic crisis in the 1990s was conducive to a rise in North Korea's NLL violations. A summary and some policy implications are given in the final section.The Inter-Korean Reconciliation Process and North Korea's NLL ProvocationsThe 1953 Armistice Agreement to end the Korean War included only the landbased military demarcation line (MDL), leaving a maritime border as an unsettled question among the concerned parties, including the U.S.-led United Nations, North Korea, and China. The United Nations military forces, with superior naval and air power, felt urged to con","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe North Korean economy has been deteriorating since the 1990s because of food, energy, and raw material shortages, which were mainly driven by the disinteDepartment gration of the Soviet Union and the end of its economic assistance to North Korea.1 Although food shortages have symbolized North Korea's economic crisis, energy shortages have had a more direct impact on its economy. Energy shortages have damaged the operational capability of the country's industries, particularly its heavy industry,2 and crippled its agricultural sector by limiting the supply of chemical fertilizers (which are critical to the sector's production outcome), resulting in grain shortages.3Making matters worse, a number of natural disasters, including floods, droughts, and hailstorms, devastated the country in the mid-1990s. The economic crisis, combined with natural disasters, led to the collapse of the country's food-rationing system, which had played a key role in providing North Koreans with basic necessities, and this collapse in turn led to mass starvation. It is known that a large number of North Koreans died of starvation during this period and that many escaped to China and other countries. When the food-rationing system worked well, it was the main source of food and basic necessities for North Koreans; markets played only a minor role in the public distribution system. However, once the rationing system became dysfunctional, markets became the main distribution channel. Further, when the economic crisis continued, markets spread to all of North Korean society, and market-related rules and norms followed.The ongoing economic crisis has not only changed the North Korean economy as a whole but also had considerable influence on the development of the country's industrial enterprises. Because of the lack of energy and raw materials, the North Korean government no longer establishes economic plans. Instead, it has prioritized its limited resources for some strategic industries (e.g., the munitions industry) and distributed them mainly to enterprises of strategic importance,4 leaving enterprises in light industry and other less important sectors to survive on their own. Currently, various markets provide North Koreans with most of the items that the state-controlled public distribution system used to provide, and newly emerging private enterprises have been playing a key role in such markets. Private enterprises, despite being illegal, have become an integral part of North Korean society, and thus, the government would have considerable difficulty in prohibiting their commercial activity.Private enterprises are very different from collective enterprises, which used to be the primary actor in the socialist economy, in terms of their goals and management. Private enterprises pursue profits, hire workers, and sell products in markets that are not controlled by the state. Further, they follow market rules and norms. The purpose of this paper is to examine
{"title":"Institutional Entrepreneurs in North Korea: Emerging Shadowy Private Enterprises under Dire Economic Conditions","authors":"Jae-cheon Lim, I. Yoon","doi":"10.3172/NKR.7.2.82","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.7.2.82","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe North Korean economy has been deteriorating since the 1990s because of food, energy, and raw material shortages, which were mainly driven by the disinteDepartment gration of the Soviet Union and the end of its economic assistance to North Korea.1 Although food shortages have symbolized North Korea's economic crisis, energy shortages have had a more direct impact on its economy. Energy shortages have damaged the operational capability of the country's industries, particularly its heavy industry,2 and crippled its agricultural sector by limiting the supply of chemical fertilizers (which are critical to the sector's production outcome), resulting in grain shortages.3Making matters worse, a number of natural disasters, including floods, droughts, and hailstorms, devastated the country in the mid-1990s. The economic crisis, combined with natural disasters, led to the collapse of the country's food-rationing system, which had played a key role in providing North Koreans with basic necessities, and this collapse in turn led to mass starvation. It is known that a large number of North Koreans died of starvation during this period and that many escaped to China and other countries. When the food-rationing system worked well, it was the main source of food and basic necessities for North Koreans; markets played only a minor role in the public distribution system. However, once the rationing system became dysfunctional, markets became the main distribution channel. Further, when the economic crisis continued, markets spread to all of North Korean society, and market-related rules and norms followed.The ongoing economic crisis has not only changed the North Korean economy as a whole but also had considerable influence on the development of the country's industrial enterprises. Because of the lack of energy and raw materials, the North Korean government no longer establishes economic plans. Instead, it has prioritized its limited resources for some strategic industries (e.g., the munitions industry) and distributed them mainly to enterprises of strategic importance,4 leaving enterprises in light industry and other less important sectors to survive on their own. Currently, various markets provide North Koreans with most of the items that the state-controlled public distribution system used to provide, and newly emerging private enterprises have been playing a key role in such markets. Private enterprises, despite being illegal, have become an integral part of North Korean society, and thus, the government would have considerable difficulty in prohibiting their commercial activity.Private enterprises are very different from collective enterprises, which used to be the primary actor in the socialist economy, in terms of their goals and management. Private enterprises pursue profits, hire workers, and sell products in markets that are not controlled by the state. Further, they follow market rules and norms. The purpose of this paper is to examine ","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe six-party talks have been suspended since North Korea's withdrawal in April 2009 to protest the UN Security Council's condemnation of l ong-range missile launches in a presidential statement. To solve North Korea's nuclear problem, the deadlock in the negotiations with the North should first be broken in the near future. Once the six-party talks resume, the primary discussion could focus on how to denuclearize the North. In order to achieve such an objective, it will be essential to disDepartmentmantle its nuclear weapons program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. In addition to removing the nuclear material and infrastructure, irreversible dismantling of the North's nuclear weapons program would require a redirection of the North's nuclear workers to other civilian occupations.While dealing with the North's nuclear problem, it will be important to assure the North of a sustainable energy supply for supporting its economic growth. In the present context, nuclear energy is the single huge, economical, and reliable energy source. A constant supply of nuclear energy without proliferation risk would help to eradicate the necessity and false excuses of its indigenous nuclear development program. However, the international society will hesitate to do this because the North has previously attempted to mislead them into believing that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.Therefore, revisiting 1994's Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea could be considered. However, it has several weaknesses: First, it cannot resolve a serious concern regarding the North's intention to divert the spent nuclear fuel discharged from the nuclear power plants, since they are located in the North; second, the North cannot effectively handle the central issue related to the irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program, which is the diversion of its nuclear workers to other civilian occupations; third, such an approach will involve a heavy financial burden on only three countries (Korea, the U.S., and Japan) that took part in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization; and fourth, it is not clear whether the approach would be acceptable to the North. The North Korean Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which Kang proposed as a way to redirect the North's nuclear workers, could also be considered.1 However, Kang's proposal is not a comprehensive approach to the North's nuclear problem, since it simply focused on the relocation of the nuclear workers.Hence, a new comprehensive approach is needed that allows the North an opportunity to reap the benefits of its nuclear energy program according to Article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty but prevents the North's nuclear workers from conducting clandestine nuclear activities. To achieve such an objective, an approach similar to the "multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle" could be a solution. The multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle has been pr
自2009年4月朝鲜为抗议联合国安理会在一份主席声明中谴责朝鲜发射远程导弹而退出后，六方会谈一直处于暂停状态。要想解决北韩核问题，首先要在近期内打破六方会谈的僵局。一旦重启六方会谈，主要讨论的焦点可能是如何实现朝鲜无核化。为了实现这一目标，国务院必须以完整、可核查和不可逆转的方式实施其核武器计划。除了拆除核材料和基础设施外，朝鲜核武器计划的不可逆转的拆除还需要将朝鲜的核工人转移到其他民用职业。在解决北韩核问题的同时，确保北韩经济增长所需的可持续能源供应至关重要。在目前情况下，核能是唯一巨大、经济、可靠的能源。不扩散风险的持续核能供应将有助于消除其本土核发展计划的必要性和虚假借口。但是，由于北韩一直试图误导国际社会，让国际社会相信北韩的核项目是用于和平目的，因此国际社会将会犹豫不决。因此，有可能重新讨论1994年签订的《朝美共同框架协议》。但是，它也存在以下缺点:首先，由于北韩的核电站都在北韩境内，因此无法解决北韩将废弃核燃料转移的严重忧虑;第二，北韩无法有效地解决不可逆弃核的核心问题，即把核工作人员转移到其他民间事业;第三，加入韩半岛能源开发机构(韩半岛能源开发机构)的3个国家(韩国、美国、日本)将承担沉重的财政负担;第四，不清楚朝鲜是否会接受这种做法。此外，还可以考虑将姜长官提议的北韩核工人重新安置的“减少北韩合作威胁计划”但是，姜长官的提议只是集中在核工人的迁移问题上，并不是全面解决北韩核问题的方案。因此，有必要制定一种新的综合方案，使北韩能够根据《核不扩散条约》第4条获得其核能计划的好处，同时阻止北韩的核工作者进行秘密核活动。为实现这一目标，一种类似于“核燃料循环的多边办法”的办法可能是一种解决办法。国际原子能机构(International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA)前总干事穆罕默德•巴拉迪(Mohamed El-Baradei)呼吁建立“一种新机制，确保向有需要的国家供应核燃料和反应堆，同时通过更好地控制核燃料循环的敏感部分，加强防扩散”。自那以后，关于核燃料循环的多边方案就被提出并得到了广泛讨论。本文回顾了自2003年以来提出的关于核燃料循环多边途径的建议，并提出了解决朝鲜核问题的综合多边途径。核燃料循环的多边方法全球能源需求的预期增长将导致世界范围内核能使用的扩大，这主要是由于在目前尚未建立核工业的国家建设核电站。这可能导致铀浓缩和乏燃料后处理技术在世界范围内传播，因为大多数国家的目标是在当地发展这些敏感技术。…
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