IntroductionThis paper investigates gender disparities among children raised in North Korea, perhaps the last remaining bastion of communism. Ever since the separation of the Korean Peninsula into two Koreas in 1948, the socialist agenda of North Korea has aimed at equal status for women, whereas South Korea is one of the most strongly patriarchal societies in the world.1 Considering North Korea's official proclamation of being an egalitarian society, the question remains as to whether or not the communist system in the North has managed to reduce cultural gender gaps.Previous studies on North Korean gender issues are scarce or rely on qualitative evidence, given the overall lack of information on North Korea. These studies usually limit themselves to examining the role of women in North Korean communist society. Conclusions are commonly drawn on material released by North Korea's Foreign Languages Publishing House, such as the collected works or speeches of North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung2 and the official constitution.3 The main conclusion of these articles is that women have become liberated in North Korean society. This is due to the communist agenda that has largely integrated women into the labor force and abolished the Confucian patrilineal family registration system. However, it is also noteworthy that the role of women in North Korean society is mostly limited to a producer or reproducer role.4Recent studies on North Korean gender bias are based mainly on data from defectors. During and after the North Korean famine of the 1990s, the number of North Korean economic refugees increased drastically, allowing information to be obtained via the interviewing of North Koreans living abroad. For instance, 46 percent of the respondents in a 1999 survey conducted among 332 refugees said that their husbands were the main decision-makers when it came to purchases, whereas only 37 percent answered that the wife was.5 This indicates a clear, though not severe, patriarchal bias within North Korean households. In contrary, another refugee study suggests that the mid-1990s famine could have led to a change in gender roles, division of labor, and gender-preference within North Korean families.6 In the 1990s, the collapse of the heavy-industry-oriented North Korean economy combined with the food crisis might have strengthened the positions of females in North Korean society. Housewives found efficient ways to contribute to the family income by engaging in the emerging informal and light-industry-oriented economy, while mothers began to prefer daughters since they were perceived as requiring less food to survive during crisis periods.In 1999, demographic researcher Daniel Goodkind raised an interesting question that shed light on the extent of gender discrimination in North Korea: Do parents in North Korea prefer sons? Child malnutrition data based on a 1998 UN survey report were analyzed along with sex ratios at birth taken from the North Korean population
{"title":"Why Has Son-Preference Disappeared in North Korea?","authors":"D. Schwekendiek","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.2.65","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.2.65","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThis paper investigates gender disparities among children raised in North Korea, perhaps the last remaining bastion of communism. Ever since the separation of the Korean Peninsula into two Koreas in 1948, the socialist agenda of North Korea has aimed at equal status for women, whereas South Korea is one of the most strongly patriarchal societies in the world.1 Considering North Korea's official proclamation of being an egalitarian society, the question remains as to whether or not the communist system in the North has managed to reduce cultural gender gaps.Previous studies on North Korean gender issues are scarce or rely on qualitative evidence, given the overall lack of information on North Korea. These studies usually limit themselves to examining the role of women in North Korean communist society. Conclusions are commonly drawn on material released by North Korea's Foreign Languages Publishing House, such as the collected works or speeches of North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung2 and the official constitution.3 The main conclusion of these articles is that women have become liberated in North Korean society. This is due to the communist agenda that has largely integrated women into the labor force and abolished the Confucian patrilineal family registration system. However, it is also noteworthy that the role of women in North Korean society is mostly limited to a producer or reproducer role.4Recent studies on North Korean gender bias are based mainly on data from defectors. During and after the North Korean famine of the 1990s, the number of North Korean economic refugees increased drastically, allowing information to be obtained via the interviewing of North Koreans living abroad. For instance, 46 percent of the respondents in a 1999 survey conducted among 332 refugees said that their husbands were the main decision-makers when it came to purchases, whereas only 37 percent answered that the wife was.5 This indicates a clear, though not severe, patriarchal bias within North Korean households. In contrary, another refugee study suggests that the mid-1990s famine could have led to a change in gender roles, division of labor, and gender-preference within North Korean families.6 In the 1990s, the collapse of the heavy-industry-oriented North Korean economy combined with the food crisis might have strengthened the positions of females in North Korean society. Housewives found efficient ways to contribute to the family income by engaging in the emerging informal and light-industry-oriented economy, while mothers began to prefer daughters since they were perceived as requiring less food to survive during crisis periods.In 1999, demographic researcher Daniel Goodkind raised an interesting question that shed light on the extent of gender discrimination in North Korea: Do parents in North Korea prefer sons? Child malnutrition data based on a 1998 UN survey report were analyzed along with sex ratios at birth taken from the North Korean population","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Introduction: Security and Insecurity DilemmasNorth Korea has a long history of brinkmanship, using incendiary rhetoric often aimed at its target's deepest fears to improve Pyongyang's leverage. In addition, ever since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the infamous "Axis of Evil" speech, much has been written about the United States' aggressive unilateralism and the heightened possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula.1 Events such as reports of the North Koreans restarting their nuclear program, the United States attacking the first member of the Axis, and the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel may be seen to have brought such a conflict even closer.2In traditional security and strategic analysis, the military capabilities of one state, even if they are perceived by that state as being for defensive purposes (to deter others from aggression), are viewed by other states as a potential threat.3 This is referred to as the security dilemma. Thus North Korean acquisition of enhanced military capabilities, particularly those with long-range force projection (such as missiles) or mass destruction potential (such as nuclear weapons), is seen as posing a threat to the security of other parties.However, this paper contends that it is not the increasing strength of North Korea that poses the threat to regional security, but rather Pyongyang's increasing weakness- an "insecurity dilemma"4 rather than a security dilemma. For Georg Sorenson an insecurity dilemma exists when inwardly weak but outwardly strong states pose an intervention dilemma for liberal states-they do not pose a threat to others, but do pose a threat to their own people.5 The term is used slightly differently here in that inward vulnerability is projected outwards as a diversionary and unifying tactic, thereby causing international uncertainty and instability and even potential security threats to neighboring states and their allies, almost as a form of collateral damage.Increased ThreatsIn the wake of a second, more successful North Korean nuclear weapon test on May 25, 2009, and the test-firing of more missiles on the following day, South Korea and the United States upgraded the threat level and readiness of their forces to the second highest level.6 The UN Security Council issued statements of concern and criticism, and on June 12 passed UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (with the support of both China and Russia) condemning Pyongyang's actions, increasing existing sanctions, and adding some new provisions aimed at curtailing the regime's nuclear activities.7South Korea also announced it would join the Proliferation Security Initiative, leading to the prospect of South Korean personnel boarding North Korean vessels.8 Pyongyang responded by issuing belligerent statements, including that it would consider any search or seizure of its vessels as an act of war to which it would respond with a military strike. On May 27 North Korea announced it was abandoning the truce t
{"title":"North Korea's Insecurity Dilemma *","authors":"B. Howe","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.2.74","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.2.74","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction: Security and Insecurity DilemmasNorth Korea has a long history of brinkmanship, using incendiary rhetoric often aimed at its target's deepest fears to improve Pyongyang's leverage. In addition, ever since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the infamous \"Axis of Evil\" speech, much has been written about the United States' aggressive unilateralism and the heightened possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula.1 Events such as reports of the North Koreans restarting their nuclear program, the United States attacking the first member of the Axis, and the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel may be seen to have brought such a conflict even closer.2In traditional security and strategic analysis, the military capabilities of one state, even if they are perceived by that state as being for defensive purposes (to deter others from aggression), are viewed by other states as a potential threat.3 This is referred to as the security dilemma. Thus North Korean acquisition of enhanced military capabilities, particularly those with long-range force projection (such as missiles) or mass destruction potential (such as nuclear weapons), is seen as posing a threat to the security of other parties.However, this paper contends that it is not the increasing strength of North Korea that poses the threat to regional security, but rather Pyongyang's increasing weakness- an \"insecurity dilemma\"4 rather than a security dilemma. For Georg Sorenson an insecurity dilemma exists when inwardly weak but outwardly strong states pose an intervention dilemma for liberal states-they do not pose a threat to others, but do pose a threat to their own people.5 The term is used slightly differently here in that inward vulnerability is projected outwards as a diversionary and unifying tactic, thereby causing international uncertainty and instability and even potential security threats to neighboring states and their allies, almost as a form of collateral damage.Increased ThreatsIn the wake of a second, more successful North Korean nuclear weapon test on May 25, 2009, and the test-firing of more missiles on the following day, South Korea and the United States upgraded the threat level and readiness of their forces to the second highest level.6 The UN Security Council issued statements of concern and criticism, and on June 12 passed UN Security Council Resolution 1874 (with the support of both China and Russia) condemning Pyongyang's actions, increasing existing sanctions, and adding some new provisions aimed at curtailing the regime's nuclear activities.7South Korea also announced it would join the Proliferation Security Initiative, leading to the prospect of South Korean personnel boarding North Korean vessels.8 Pyongyang responded by issuing belligerent statements, including that it would consider any search or seizure of its vessels as an act of war to which it would respond with a military strike. On May 27 North Korea announced it was abandoning the truce t","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionAmong today's and in history's divided countries, such as China/Taiwan, Yemen, Cyprus, Ireland, and India/Pakistan/Bangladesh, the similarities between Korea and Germany are remarkable: Both countries were divided after World War II and both were divided under the involvement of the United Statesand the USSR. The latter assumed the existence of uniform states which emerged from the declaration of intent of the Potsdam conference in August 1945, as well as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs conference in Moscow in December 1945.1Despite the initial similarities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), their further development on the political side-economically and ideologically-almost disappeared in the further progress. Rudolf Appelt, who published an article in the Socialist Unity Party's (SUP)2 magazine Einheit, was probably the first author to analyze the situation of both countries directly after the war in 1947. He found that already in 1947 the political and economic situation and trend in Soviet-occupied North Korea was very similar to the situation in Soviet-occupied East Germany. Appelt discovered similarities between the U.S.-occupied South Korea and the occupied western zones of Germany. Only a little time passed after the foundation of the two states until the DPRK recognized the GDR as a state.The special solidarity of the GDR to the DPRK is exhibited in the political, technical and humanitarian support during the Korean War and beyond. In the 1950s the SUP initiated a broad solidarity and donation campaign for North Korea. The Korea committee was founded in June 1951 and started fund-raising in nationally owned enterprises and other associations of the GDR. Until 1957, the Korea committee transferred donations to North Korea at a value of 40 million deutschmarks ( equivalent toabout 20 million euros) in total under the slogan "Who helps Korea, helps Germany." The total sum of unpaid postwar assistance to rebuild the country was a multiple higher (see table 1).3Commencement of Diplomatic RelationsAlready in November 1949 the GDR and the DPRK had entered into diplomatic relations, and they exchanged ambassadors immediately. Similar to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and being inspired by the "Ostpolitik" of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in terms of their policy towards the North (and the communist states of the Eastern Bloc generally), the DPRK took over elements of the reunification concept of the GDR.After the Korean War, the bilateral relations developed positively and rapidly. Otto Grotewohl, minister president of the GDR, visited Pyongyang in December 1955. Kim Il Sung, during those days chairman of the Minister Cabinet of DPRK, visited East Germany a year later. Already in 1953, both countries had entered into a treaty regulating the financing of noncommercial projects. In January 1955, a second treaty followed, establishing technical and scientific collaboratio
{"title":"Phases of the Relationship between East Germany and North Korea after World War II","authors":"S. Horak","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.1.100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.1.100","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionAmong today's and in history's divided countries, such as China/Taiwan, Yemen, Cyprus, Ireland, and India/Pakistan/Bangladesh, the similarities between Korea and Germany are remarkable: Both countries were divided after World War II and both were divided under the involvement of the United Statesand the USSR. The latter assumed the existence of uniform states which emerged from the declaration of intent of the Potsdam conference in August 1945, as well as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs conference in Moscow in December 1945.1Despite the initial similarities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), their further development on the political side-economically and ideologically-almost disappeared in the further progress. Rudolf Appelt, who published an article in the Socialist Unity Party's (SUP)2 magazine Einheit, was probably the first author to analyze the situation of both countries directly after the war in 1947. He found that already in 1947 the political and economic situation and trend in Soviet-occupied North Korea was very similar to the situation in Soviet-occupied East Germany. Appelt discovered similarities between the U.S.-occupied South Korea and the occupied western zones of Germany. Only a little time passed after the foundation of the two states until the DPRK recognized the GDR as a state.The special solidarity of the GDR to the DPRK is exhibited in the political, technical and humanitarian support during the Korean War and beyond. In the 1950s the SUP initiated a broad solidarity and donation campaign for North Korea. The Korea committee was founded in June 1951 and started fund-raising in nationally owned enterprises and other associations of the GDR. Until 1957, the Korea committee transferred donations to North Korea at a value of 40 million deutschmarks ( equivalent toabout 20 million euros) in total under the slogan \"Who helps Korea, helps Germany.\" The total sum of unpaid postwar assistance to rebuild the country was a multiple higher (see table 1).3Commencement of Diplomatic RelationsAlready in November 1949 the GDR and the DPRK had entered into diplomatic relations, and they exchanged ambassadors immediately. Similar to the Republic of Korea (ROK) and being inspired by the \"Ostpolitik\" of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in terms of their policy towards the North (and the communist states of the Eastern Bloc generally), the DPRK took over elements of the reunification concept of the GDR.After the Korean War, the bilateral relations developed positively and rapidly. Otto Grotewohl, minister president of the GDR, visited Pyongyang in December 1955. Kim Il Sung, during those days chairman of the Minister Cabinet of DPRK, visited East Germany a year later. Already in 1953, both countries had entered into a treaty regulating the financing of noncommercial projects. In January 1955, a second treaty followed, establishing technical and scientific collaboratio","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe relationship between the United States and North Korea is wavering between confrontation and communication, depending on the choices made by President Obama and Kim Jong Il. To have a realistic outlook upon the situation, it would be of significant value to categorize the relationship and to determine the South Korean government's countermeasures based on these categories.President Obama has already made public his stance over the two Koreas. For South Korea, he has revealed his plan to develop the U.S.-South Korea relationship into one of companionship, based on alliance. In his electoral manifesto, The Blueprint for Change, he expressed his will to construct a new form of companionship that would go beyond a mutual alliance, summit conferences, and the Six-Party Talks. Instead of emphasizing bilateral relations, he chose to maintain a "strong connection" with multiple allies such as Japan, Australia, and Korea.President Obama has also established his stance1 upon the U.S. relationship with North Korea. In the spring of 2009, relations between North Korea and the United States seemed to be cold. However, by the end of the year, there had been some improvements, and the relationship now seems to have warmed. In the long run, it is likely that President Obama will attempt direct talks with Kim Jong Il, and so we can predict some improvement in the bilateral relations between the United States and North Korea. During the Clinton administration, while the Democrats were in office, North Korea felt unsatisfied due to the fact that there were insufficient improvements in relations. These situations have created the basis for the virtuous circle of dialogue between Kim and President Obama.In the process of improving relations, it is likely that President Obama will promote "smart diplomacy" by alleviating the remaining sanctions, admitting North Korea into a U.S.-led global society, and recognizing North Korea as a normal state. North Korea seems to anticipate this as well.Throughout this process, President Obama may move towards declaring the end of the Korean War and the beginnings of negotiation for a peace treaty. In the end, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) may reach a mutual agreement on the issue of normalization during President Obama's term.However, in the short run, President Obama is unlikely to be able to find an easy solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. North Korea is pressuring the United States with its "Edge-of-Cliff" policy, and is constantly intensifying the pressure.Also, the North Korean nuclear problem can be resolved only if there are changes in North Korea's stance, not those of South Korea or the United States. It is difficult to envisage a peaceful, complete settlement to the North Korean nuclear problem without North Korea's decision-making and participation. A complete settlement of the problem may even have to be delayed until after normalization between the DPRK and the United States
美国与朝鲜的关系在对抗与沟通之间摇摆不定，这取决于奥巴马总统和金正日的选择。对这种关系进行分类，并以此为基础确定韩国政府的应对措施，对现实的形势具有重要意义。奥巴马总统已经公开了他对朝韩两国的立场。对于韩国，他表示将把韩美关系发展为以同盟为基础的伙伴关系。在他的竞选宣言《变革蓝图》(The Blueprint for Change)中，他表达了建立一种超越相互联盟、首脑会议和六方会谈的新型伙伴关系的意愿。他没有强调双边关系，而是选择了与日本、澳大利亚、韩国等多个盟国保持“牢固的联系”。奥巴马总统还表明了他对美国与北韩关系的立场。2009年春天，朝鲜和美国的关系似乎很冷淡。然而，到去年年底，情况有所改善，两国关系现在似乎有所回暖。从长远来看，奥巴马总统很可能会尝试与金正日进行直接对话，因此我们可以预测美朝双边关系会有所改善。在民主党执政的克林顿政府时期，北韩因关系改善不足而感到不满。这些情况为金正恩和奥巴马总统之间的对话良性循环创造了基础。在改善关系的过程中，奥巴马总统很有可能推行“聪明外交”，减轻对北韩的剩余制裁，让北韩进入美国主导的国际社会，承认北韩为正常国家。朝鲜似乎也预料到了这一点。在这一过程中，奥巴马总统可能会宣布朝鲜战争结束，并开始和平条约的谈判。最终，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(DPRK)可能会在奥巴马总统任期内就正常化问题达成共同协议。但是，从短期来看，奥巴马总统很难找到解决北韩核问题的捷径。北韩以“悬崖政策”向美国施压，并不断加大施压力度。而且，北韩核问题的解决，只有北韩改变立场，而不是韩国或美国的立场。没有北韩的决策和参与，很难设想和平、彻底解决北韩核问题。这个问题的彻底解决甚至可能要推迟到朝美关系正常化之后。北韩选择核武器作为保障国家安全的最廉价的方法。美国认为，对“暴政的基地”北韩来说，拥有核武器是危险的，并敦促北韩放弃核武器。决定朝鲜半岛和平的因素有很多，但没有一个因素像朝鲜和美国之间的对抗和沟通那样具有决定性。这并不意味着其他因素，如韩国和中国的作用不重要，这些因素将得到考虑。然而，在本文中，朝鲜与美国之间的关系将被视为我们分析中最重要的因素。如果将北韩与美国之间的沟通和对抗两种可能性混合起来，并将两种关系进行分类，就可以提炼出有关韩半岛未来的四种类型。…
{"title":"U.S.-North Korean Relations: Classifications Based on Policy Decisions and Their Effect on the Korean Peninsula","authors":"S. H. Lee","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.1.88","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.1.88","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe relationship between the United States and North Korea is wavering between confrontation and communication, depending on the choices made by President Obama and Kim Jong Il. To have a realistic outlook upon the situation, it would be of significant value to categorize the relationship and to determine the South Korean government's countermeasures based on these categories.President Obama has already made public his stance over the two Koreas. For South Korea, he has revealed his plan to develop the U.S.-South Korea relationship into one of companionship, based on alliance. In his electoral manifesto, The Blueprint for Change, he expressed his will to construct a new form of companionship that would go beyond a mutual alliance, summit conferences, and the Six-Party Talks. Instead of emphasizing bilateral relations, he chose to maintain a \"strong connection\" with multiple allies such as Japan, Australia, and Korea.President Obama has also established his stance1 upon the U.S. relationship with North Korea. In the spring of 2009, relations between North Korea and the United States seemed to be cold. However, by the end of the year, there had been some improvements, and the relationship now seems to have warmed. In the long run, it is likely that President Obama will attempt direct talks with Kim Jong Il, and so we can predict some improvement in the bilateral relations between the United States and North Korea. During the Clinton administration, while the Democrats were in office, North Korea felt unsatisfied due to the fact that there were insufficient improvements in relations. These situations have created the basis for the virtuous circle of dialogue between Kim and President Obama.In the process of improving relations, it is likely that President Obama will promote \"smart diplomacy\" by alleviating the remaining sanctions, admitting North Korea into a U.S.-led global society, and recognizing North Korea as a normal state. North Korea seems to anticipate this as well.Throughout this process, President Obama may move towards declaring the end of the Korean War and the beginnings of negotiation for a peace treaty. In the end, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) may reach a mutual agreement on the issue of normalization during President Obama's term.However, in the short run, President Obama is unlikely to be able to find an easy solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. North Korea is pressuring the United States with its \"Edge-of-Cliff\" policy, and is constantly intensifying the pressure.Also, the North Korean nuclear problem can be resolved only if there are changes in North Korea's stance, not those of South Korea or the United States. It is difficult to envisage a peaceful, complete settlement to the North Korean nuclear problem without North Korea's decision-making and participation. A complete settlement of the problem may even have to be delayed until after normalization between the DPRK and the United States","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69763784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
BackgroundAlzo David-West: How did you become interested in teaching English as a foreign language?Karen Choi: First, I would like to say that it is my delight that I am able to share a little about my experience teaching North Korean refugees in South Korea. It is my hope that this information will be helpful to others who have the opportunity to teach English to North Koreans.My interest in teaching English began after college. For my undergraduate studies, I pursued my interest in visual arts and studied classical animation in Canada. Upon graduation, I began to realize that working in film companies entailed projects that I did not necessarily care for. It was through this experience that I realized my chance of survival in the commercial arts industry was very slim. I truly enjoyed learning to creatively express and communicate through visuals. However, it seemed very unlikely for me to find a job in a company and work on projects that I was satisfied with. Though I still have hopes to produce my own short film, this dream will have to wait. After much thought, I decided to return to school to pursue my other interests apart from the arts-language and culture.I believe frequent traveling during my childhood influenced me in developing interests for language and culture. I grew up in a few different countries: South Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia. My first seven years of school was spent in Singapore-a very multicultural country-where I learned two of its official languages: English and Mandarin. When I moved to pursue higher education in Canada, its diversity further stimulated my interest in language and culture, so I decided to get a formal introduction to both through a one-year TESL (teaching English as a second language) certificate course. It included courses in linguistics but, as I expected, was largely focused on English education as a second or foreign language.I enjoyed the course a lot more than I expected and proceeded to apply for a graduate program in TESOL (teaching English to speakers of other languages). I had several short-term teaching opportunities in various contexts during those years of training, and I found myself enjoying them despite the challenges in each context. Examples of my teaching contexts varied, from immigrants to university students in Canada to businessmen and graduate students looking for jobs in South Korea. I am currently teaching full-time at Hanyang University in Seoul.AD: How did you come to teach English to North Korean refugees in South Korea?KC: Surprisingly, my interest in North Korea did not begin in South Korea, but during my time in Canada. The initial trigger was non-Koreans frequently asking me which Korea I was from: the North or the South. This was a common follow-up question when I told them I was from "Korea." To be honest, I was initially disappointed with their inability to distinguish South Korea from the Communist hermit country. I assumed it was common sense for the average Nort
zo David-West:你是怎么对英语教学产生兴趣的?崔凯伦:首先，我想说，我很高兴能够分享我在韩国教朝鲜难民的经历。我希望这些信息能对其他有机会教朝鲜人英语的人有所帮助。大学毕业后，我对教英语产生了兴趣。本科期间，我在加拿大学习古典动画，追求自己对视觉艺术的兴趣。毕业后，我开始意识到在电影公司工作所涉及的项目不一定是我喜欢的。正是通过这次经历，我意识到我在商业艺术行业生存的机会非常渺茫。我真的很喜欢通过视觉来学习创造性地表达和交流。然而，我似乎不太可能在一家公司找到一份工作，从事我满意的项目。虽然我仍然希望制作自己的短片，但这个梦想要等等。经过深思熟虑，我决定回到学校去追求艺术之外的其他兴趣——语言和文化。我相信童年时期频繁的旅行影响了我对语言和文化的兴趣。我在几个不同的国家长大:韩国、新加坡和印度尼西亚。我上学的头七年是在新加坡度过的，这是一个多元文化的国家，在那里我学习了两种官方语言:英语和普通话。当我搬到加拿大接受高等教育时，它的多样性进一步激发了我对语言和文化的兴趣，所以我决定通过为期一年的TESL(英语作为第二语言教学)证书课程来正式介绍这两种语言。它包括语言学课程，但正如我所料，主要侧重于英语作为第二语言或外语的教育。我非常喜欢这门课程，远远超出了我的预期，于是我申请了TESOL的研究生课程(向其他语言的人教授英语)。在那些年的培训中，我在不同的环境中有过几次短期的教学机会，尽管每个环境都有挑战，但我发现自己很享受。我的教学背景各不相同，从移民到加拿大的大学生，再到在韩国找工作的商人和研究生。我目前在首尔汉阳大学全职教学。AD:你是怎么开始在韩国教朝鲜难民英语的?KC:令人惊讶的是，我对朝鲜的兴趣并不是在韩国开始的，而是在我在加拿大期间开始的。最初的导火索是非韩国人经常问我来自哪个韩国:朝鲜还是韩国。当我告诉他们我来自“韩国”时，这是一个常见的后续问题。老实说，我最初对他们无法区分韩国和共产主义隐士国家感到失望。我以为对普通北美人来说，更多地了解朝鲜是常识。然而，在被问了几次之后，我开始思考，作为一个韩国人，我对这个神秘的国家了解多少。然后，我痛苦而尴尬地意识到，我对它也知之甚少。为了弥补，我慢慢地开始对这个国家做一些简单的研究。当我了解到朝鲜人民所经历的难以置信的苦难和不公正的细节时，我感到震惊和悲伤。很难相信在我以北的韩国人过着如此不同的生活方式。了解到有一些组织旨在帮助这些受压迫的人，这对我来说是最轻微的鼓励。然而，朝鲜对我来说仍然相当遥远，听到这个国家的所有虐待行为，我感到无能为力。令我惊讶的是，我无意中遇到了几个可以进入朝鲜的加拿大人道主义组织。…
{"title":"Teaching English to North Korean Refugees in South Korea: An Interview with Karen Choi","authors":"A. David-West","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.1.108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.1.108","url":null,"abstract":"BackgroundAlzo David-West: How did you become interested in teaching English as a foreign language?Karen Choi: First, I would like to say that it is my delight that I am able to share a little about my experience teaching North Korean refugees in South Korea. It is my hope that this information will be helpful to others who have the opportunity to teach English to North Koreans.My interest in teaching English began after college. For my undergraduate studies, I pursued my interest in visual arts and studied classical animation in Canada. Upon graduation, I began to realize that working in film companies entailed projects that I did not necessarily care for. It was through this experience that I realized my chance of survival in the commercial arts industry was very slim. I truly enjoyed learning to creatively express and communicate through visuals. However, it seemed very unlikely for me to find a job in a company and work on projects that I was satisfied with. Though I still have hopes to produce my own short film, this dream will have to wait. After much thought, I decided to return to school to pursue my other interests apart from the arts-language and culture.I believe frequent traveling during my childhood influenced me in developing interests for language and culture. I grew up in a few different countries: South Korea, Singapore, and Indonesia. My first seven years of school was spent in Singapore-a very multicultural country-where I learned two of its official languages: English and Mandarin. When I moved to pursue higher education in Canada, its diversity further stimulated my interest in language and culture, so I decided to get a formal introduction to both through a one-year TESL (teaching English as a second language) certificate course. It included courses in linguistics but, as I expected, was largely focused on English education as a second or foreign language.I enjoyed the course a lot more than I expected and proceeded to apply for a graduate program in TESOL (teaching English to speakers of other languages). I had several short-term teaching opportunities in various contexts during those years of training, and I found myself enjoying them despite the challenges in each context. Examples of my teaching contexts varied, from immigrants to university students in Canada to businessmen and graduate students looking for jobs in South Korea. I am currently teaching full-time at Hanyang University in Seoul.AD: How did you come to teach English to North Korean refugees in South Korea?KC: Surprisingly, my interest in North Korea did not begin in South Korea, but during my time in Canada. The initial trigger was non-Koreans frequently asking me which Korea I was from: the North or the South. This was a common follow-up question when I told them I was from \"Korea.\" To be honest, I was initially disappointed with their inability to distinguish South Korea from the Communist hermit country. I assumed it was common sense for the average Nort","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Poor Economic Performance in North KoreaDespite the severe economic hardship, North Korea has devoted its energy to strengthening its military capabilities. Adhering to the so-called "military first politics, the harsh North Korean regime continues to maintain its stranglehold on the people and attempts to avert political democratization. North Korea propagates a "juche ideology" as the foundation of its legitimacy and uses this to insulate its people from the outside world.1 The fundamental obsession with a self-reliant economy has brought about overall economic inefficiency, including a low level of technology, serious neglect of production facilities, and a decrease of labor productivity. As the resultant economic dilemma accumulated, the North Korean economy tumbled severely in the 1990s. North Korea is well aware of the serious problem of its backward economy, but denies the fact that its economic slump can be ascribed to the accumulated problems of its inefficient system. Instead, North Korea blames the hostile policy of the United States, or its weak external economic relations caused by the collapse of the socialist bloc.The economy ceased to function during the 1990s, especially after North Korea suffered severe flooding in 1995. After several years of famine, North Korea announced that the country had overcome its economic hardship through an "arduous march" of sustained effort by Kim Jung-il and the Korean Workers Party. Positive economic growth in the early 2000s seemed to be made possible by foreign subsidies (see Figure 1). In general, however, the North Korean economy is believed to have failed, losing all its potential and ability to overcome the economic deadlock.Furthermore, North Korea has failed to supply daily necessities and subsistencelevel food to meet the demands of its people (see Figure 2). North Korea needs at least 6.5 million tons of grain to distribute to its people, but its grain supply is far below the demand-by more than a million tons. The poor performance of the agricultural sector is due to the shortage of energy and fertilizer. North Korea was too dependent on Soviet oil and fertilizer subsidies prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.2In an effort to ride out the economic hardship, North Korea introduced bold measures to improve economic management on July 1, 2002, by increasing salaries and prices and providing its state-run enterprises with some incentives. The socalled July 1st measures are viewed as the most aggressive economic policy adopted by North Korea in recent years. The measures were targeted at curing the country's economic inefficiency within the framework of the state-controlled economy. Although North Korea is encouraging production more practically than in the past, and has pushed ahead with reform-oriented changes in the economic sector, it has yet to find better alternatives that will yield substantial economic growth. The measures were designed only to smoothly manage the planned econom
{"title":"Reform without Transition: The Economic Situation in North Korea since the July 1, 2002, Measures","authors":"U. Yang","doi":"10.3172/NKR.6.1.71","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.6.1.71","url":null,"abstract":"Poor Economic Performance in North KoreaDespite the severe economic hardship, North Korea has devoted its energy to strengthening its military capabilities. Adhering to the so-called \"military first politics, the harsh North Korean regime continues to maintain its stranglehold on the people and attempts to avert political democratization. North Korea propagates a \"juche ideology\" as the foundation of its legitimacy and uses this to insulate its people from the outside world.1 The fundamental obsession with a self-reliant economy has brought about overall economic inefficiency, including a low level of technology, serious neglect of production facilities, and a decrease of labor productivity. As the resultant economic dilemma accumulated, the North Korean economy tumbled severely in the 1990s. North Korea is well aware of the serious problem of its backward economy, but denies the fact that its economic slump can be ascribed to the accumulated problems of its inefficient system. Instead, North Korea blames the hostile policy of the United States, or its weak external economic relations caused by the collapse of the socialist bloc.The economy ceased to function during the 1990s, especially after North Korea suffered severe flooding in 1995. After several years of famine, North Korea announced that the country had overcome its economic hardship through an \"arduous march\" of sustained effort by Kim Jung-il and the Korean Workers Party. Positive economic growth in the early 2000s seemed to be made possible by foreign subsidies (see Figure 1). In general, however, the North Korean economy is believed to have failed, losing all its potential and ability to overcome the economic deadlock.Furthermore, North Korea has failed to supply daily necessities and subsistencelevel food to meet the demands of its people (see Figure 2). North Korea needs at least 6.5 million tons of grain to distribute to its people, but its grain supply is far below the demand-by more than a million tons. The poor performance of the agricultural sector is due to the shortage of energy and fertilizer. North Korea was too dependent on Soviet oil and fertilizer subsidies prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.2In an effort to ride out the economic hardship, North Korea introduced bold measures to improve economic management on July 1, 2002, by increasing salaries and prices and providing its state-run enterprises with some incentives. The socalled July 1st measures are viewed as the most aggressive economic policy adopted by North Korea in recent years. The measures were targeted at curing the country's economic inefficiency within the framework of the state-controlled economy. Although North Korea is encouraging production more practically than in the past, and has pushed ahead with reform-oriented changes in the economic sector, it has yet to find better alternatives that will yield substantial economic growth. The measures were designed only to smoothly manage the planned econom","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionCompared to other states, it is especially difficult to gather reliable information about North Korean intelligence structures. Every intelligence agency is interested in working under nonpublic conditions and keeping its structures secret. This means that no numbers about employees, or about the size of the organization, or details about operations and cooperations with other agencies, and so on, are available. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) is obsessed with a cult of secrecy, refusing every kind of request concerning security subjects. It is still a widely insular state, its regime of nepotists frightened of being removed by nearly everything: capitalism, the angry crowd, the imperialists, and so on. It controls every move and every communication, both inside and outside. This fear can be perceived as the history of Korea, which had to fight battles with other different states or interest groups over the centuries. In the eyes of the North Korean government, every rumor must be a reason to distrust close allies: in 2003, reports circulated that the Russian intelligence agency Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR) had installed secret nuclear monitoring equipment in Pyongyang-allegedly following a request from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Of course, the ruling elite in the DPRK has something to lose: its boundless power and privileges.There are four main problems in undertaking research about intelligence in the DPRK:* There is a large number of intelligence organizations connected in a nontransparent way.* There is high employee fluctuation and simultaneous multiple occupations in the security and civilian sectors.* Cooperation between the DPRK and Chinese intelligence, as well as with sub-intelligence organizations, is nontransparent.* The Western focus on classic intelligence needs ignores to specific DPRK requirements.For Western intelligence analysts, this means that most data about intelligence in the DPRK is decontextualized, and individual items of information often seem to stand isolated from each other. Requested surveys tend to become more political assumptions rather than independent realistic scenarios. Concerning the media, only a few North Korean spies and illegal traders find a route to publicity; for example, John Joungwoon Yai, Kang Song-hui, Won Jeong-hwa, Chang Min-ho, or So Sokhong, together with his wife Pak Chong-sun.Survey of SourcesMuch of the information about the DPRK's intelligence operations, structure, or personnel is outdated, classified, or more-or-less feasible attempts at speculation. Some information is supplied by defectors or people working in the DPRK-members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or of the slowly growing business sector. Defectors are important, but most of them have "only" a job-defined overview and have tried to exaggerate their own knowledge-a comprehensible form of behavior. You need more defectors, to cross-check the given information, than ever leave
{"title":"North Korean Intelligence Structures","authors":"Stephan Blancke","doi":"10.3172/NKR.5.2.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.5.2.6","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionCompared to other states, it is especially difficult to gather reliable information about North Korean intelligence structures. Every intelligence agency is interested in working under nonpublic conditions and keeping its structures secret. This means that no numbers about employees, or about the size of the organization, or details about operations and cooperations with other agencies, and so on, are available. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) is obsessed with a cult of secrecy, refusing every kind of request concerning security subjects. It is still a widely insular state, its regime of nepotists frightened of being removed by nearly everything: capitalism, the angry crowd, the imperialists, and so on. It controls every move and every communication, both inside and outside. This fear can be perceived as the history of Korea, which had to fight battles with other different states or interest groups over the centuries. In the eyes of the North Korean government, every rumor must be a reason to distrust close allies: in 2003, reports circulated that the Russian intelligence agency Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR) had installed secret nuclear monitoring equipment in Pyongyang-allegedly following a request from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Of course, the ruling elite in the DPRK has something to lose: its boundless power and privileges.There are four main problems in undertaking research about intelligence in the DPRK:* There is a large number of intelligence organizations connected in a nontransparent way.* There is high employee fluctuation and simultaneous multiple occupations in the security and civilian sectors.* Cooperation between the DPRK and Chinese intelligence, as well as with sub-intelligence organizations, is nontransparent.* The Western focus on classic intelligence needs ignores to specific DPRK requirements.For Western intelligence analysts, this means that most data about intelligence in the DPRK is decontextualized, and individual items of information often seem to stand isolated from each other. Requested surveys tend to become more political assumptions rather than independent realistic scenarios. Concerning the media, only a few North Korean spies and illegal traders find a route to publicity; for example, John Joungwoon Yai, Kang Song-hui, Won Jeong-hwa, Chang Min-ho, or So Sokhong, together with his wife Pak Chong-sun.Survey of SourcesMuch of the information about the DPRK's intelligence operations, structure, or personnel is outdated, classified, or more-or-less feasible attempts at speculation. Some information is supplied by defectors or people working in the DPRK-members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or of the slowly growing business sector. Defectors are important, but most of them have \"only\" a job-defined overview and have tried to exaggerate their own knowledge-a comprehensible form of behavior. You need more defectors, to cross-check the given information, than ever leave ","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3172/NKR.5.2.6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69763882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe KIC is of interest to the United States and the two Koreas for six primary reasons.3 First, South Korea wants the United States to consider products made in the KIC as South Korean in origin for the purposes of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Second, the KIC has become a growing source of foreign exchange for North Korea. Third, the KIC is part of South Korea's strategy to ease tensions with North Korea. Fourth, the KIC is an important part of the North Korean economic reforms. Fifth, the KIC raises issues of security, human rights, and working conditions in North Korea. Sixth, U.S. government approval is needed for South Korean companies to ship to the KIC certain U.S.-made equipment that is currently subject to U.S. export controls.Table 1 shows the brief history of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The KIC started in August 2000, with the signing of a contract between Hyundai Corporation and North Korea's Asia-Pacific Peace Committee. In November 2002, the KIC took a big step forward when the North Korean government released the Regulations for the Kaesong Industrial District. During the three years of its preparation, the North and South Korean governments worked on ensuring free passage across the DMZ, and on establishing tax, accounting, banking, and labor laws to be applied to the KIC. Although the KIC is geographically located in North Korea, general North Korean laws do not apply; instead, it is governed by a special set of laws. A ground-breaking ceremony was held in Kaesong to officially inaugurate the KIC in 2003; in June 2004, the first 15 companies set up their plants; and by December 2004, the first Kaesong-made products rolled off the production lines.4Table 2 shows that South Korean firms in the KIC produced a total of $525 million dollars in goods during the period 2005-2008, and exported $96 million of their output for the same period, 18 percent of their total production. All products made in the KIC are shipped to South Korea for sale there, or for export via South Korean customs clearance. The major export destinations are China, Europe, the Middle East, and Russia. Companies in the KIC use labor-intensive manufacturing processes, with raw materials and intermediate goods supplied from South Korea to Kaesong for final assembly. As the KIC has expanded, however, there has been more scope for companies to produce some of their manufacturing inputs locally. Furthermore, the number of North Korean workers in the KIC increased from 7,621 in 2005 to 38,931 in 2008, a five-fold increase. However, the KIC has faced a most serious challenge since February 2008, when a conservative government replaced the liberal governments that had ruled South Korea for ten years.As of February 28, 2009, 93 South Korean firms were operating in the KIC, with a total of 36,650 North Korean workers along with 952 South Korean workers; it is important to note that there were 1,370 South Korean workers and about 40,000 North Korean wor
{"title":"The Kaesong Inter-Korean Industrial Complex: Perspectives and Prospects 1","authors":"Suk‐Hi Kim, Eul-chul Lim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.5.2.81","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.5.2.81","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe KIC is of interest to the United States and the two Koreas for six primary reasons.3 First, South Korea wants the United States to consider products made in the KIC as South Korean in origin for the purposes of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Second, the KIC has become a growing source of foreign exchange for North Korea. Third, the KIC is part of South Korea's strategy to ease tensions with North Korea. Fourth, the KIC is an important part of the North Korean economic reforms. Fifth, the KIC raises issues of security, human rights, and working conditions in North Korea. Sixth, U.S. government approval is needed for South Korean companies to ship to the KIC certain U.S.-made equipment that is currently subject to U.S. export controls.Table 1 shows the brief history of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The KIC started in August 2000, with the signing of a contract between Hyundai Corporation and North Korea's Asia-Pacific Peace Committee. In November 2002, the KIC took a big step forward when the North Korean government released the Regulations for the Kaesong Industrial District. During the three years of its preparation, the North and South Korean governments worked on ensuring free passage across the DMZ, and on establishing tax, accounting, banking, and labor laws to be applied to the KIC. Although the KIC is geographically located in North Korea, general North Korean laws do not apply; instead, it is governed by a special set of laws. A ground-breaking ceremony was held in Kaesong to officially inaugurate the KIC in 2003; in June 2004, the first 15 companies set up their plants; and by December 2004, the first Kaesong-made products rolled off the production lines.4Table 2 shows that South Korean firms in the KIC produced a total of $525 million dollars in goods during the period 2005-2008, and exported $96 million of their output for the same period, 18 percent of their total production. All products made in the KIC are shipped to South Korea for sale there, or for export via South Korean customs clearance. The major export destinations are China, Europe, the Middle East, and Russia. Companies in the KIC use labor-intensive manufacturing processes, with raw materials and intermediate goods supplied from South Korea to Kaesong for final assembly. As the KIC has expanded, however, there has been more scope for companies to produce some of their manufacturing inputs locally. Furthermore, the number of North Korean workers in the KIC increased from 7,621 in 2005 to 38,931 in 2008, a five-fold increase. However, the KIC has faced a most serious challenge since February 2008, when a conservative government replaced the liberal governments that had ruled South Korea for ten years.As of February 28, 2009, 93 South Korean firms were operating in the KIC, with a total of 36,650 North Korean workers along with 952 South Korean workers; it is important to note that there were 1,370 South Korean workers and about 40,000 North Korean wor","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Introduction: A Relationship of Their OwnThe U.S. and North Korea share a unique relationship, and it is loaded with mutual distrust and strategic imperatives. Mutual distrust would drive them to dismiss each other, and yet the regional security imperatives keep them entangled. Pyongyang's 2006 underground test qualifies North Korea as a nuclear power, and its subsequent missile launches make the two nations' relationship ever more tenuous. Nuclear Pyongyang is a sore reminder of Washington's failure in its nonproliferation policy, while the intricacies of bilateral relations go beyond the conventional security realms. Pyongyang's human rights records make it more complicated.1 The U.S. is under mounting pressure from Japan on North Korean human security threats, and from the international community on the plight of refugees. In order to understand Washington's stance towards Pyongyang, this article situates the Korean Peninsula within the American presidency.A perspective entails positionality, which, in turn, reflects upon identity, interests and priorities.2 When observing Washington, D.C., from the sole focus on Northeast Asia, the evolution of North Korean problem can be puzzling.3 If we, however, reverse the directionality from Washington to the global affairs, Pyongyang ceases to be the sole problem, even if still one of many problems. The reversed positionality from the White House to the Korean Peninsula helps us weigh the multitude of competing agendas in the global setting. Had North Korea not been equipped with deadly weapons of mass destruction, it would have earned contempt or, at best, dismissal from the American leadership for its totalitarianism. This article, an inductive analysis of narratives, explains why the current nuclear impasse has emerged at the end of the Clinton administration and how the Bush administration chose to dismiss the Kim Jong Il regime as a legitimate counterpart.An Underexplored TerrainGiven the respective strengths of the four main international relations (IR) theories (e.g., realism, liberalism, institutionalism and constructivism), the human factor is often missing in foreign policy studies.4 This paper explores the probable causal association between the top leaders' belief systems and policy priorities by looking at the Clinton and Bush administrations' attitudes toward the Korean Peninsula. The rationality assumption in realist tradition does not permit the gray area where a top leader's worldviews interact with national agenda setting. Political leaders are assumed only to maximize national interests within the Hobbesian framework, and the murky reality entailing hard-to-quantify variables such as belief system is hardly factored in. The liberalist tradition, on the other hand, focuses on interests of actors leaving the room for ideological influence in the decision-making process. Institutionalism, however, falls short on considering individual human volition because actors are to play the already
{"title":"North Korea's Place in the U.S. Presidency: Ethos and Moral Judgments","authors":"Mikyoung Kim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.5.2.57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.5.2.57","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction: A Relationship of Their OwnThe U.S. and North Korea share a unique relationship, and it is loaded with mutual distrust and strategic imperatives. Mutual distrust would drive them to dismiss each other, and yet the regional security imperatives keep them entangled. Pyongyang's 2006 underground test qualifies North Korea as a nuclear power, and its subsequent missile launches make the two nations' relationship ever more tenuous. Nuclear Pyongyang is a sore reminder of Washington's failure in its nonproliferation policy, while the intricacies of bilateral relations go beyond the conventional security realms. Pyongyang's human rights records make it more complicated.1 The U.S. is under mounting pressure from Japan on North Korean human security threats, and from the international community on the plight of refugees. In order to understand Washington's stance towards Pyongyang, this article situates the Korean Peninsula within the American presidency.A perspective entails positionality, which, in turn, reflects upon identity, interests and priorities.2 When observing Washington, D.C., from the sole focus on Northeast Asia, the evolution of North Korean problem can be puzzling.3 If we, however, reverse the directionality from Washington to the global affairs, Pyongyang ceases to be the sole problem, even if still one of many problems. The reversed positionality from the White House to the Korean Peninsula helps us weigh the multitude of competing agendas in the global setting. Had North Korea not been equipped with deadly weapons of mass destruction, it would have earned contempt or, at best, dismissal from the American leadership for its totalitarianism. This article, an inductive analysis of narratives, explains why the current nuclear impasse has emerged at the end of the Clinton administration and how the Bush administration chose to dismiss the Kim Jong Il regime as a legitimate counterpart.An Underexplored TerrainGiven the respective strengths of the four main international relations (IR) theories (e.g., realism, liberalism, institutionalism and constructivism), the human factor is often missing in foreign policy studies.4 This paper explores the probable causal association between the top leaders' belief systems and policy priorities by looking at the Clinton and Bush administrations' attitudes toward the Korean Peninsula. The rationality assumption in realist tradition does not permit the gray area where a top leader's worldviews interact with national agenda setting. Political leaders are assumed only to maximize national interests within the Hobbesian framework, and the murky reality entailing hard-to-quantify variables such as belief system is hardly factored in. The liberalist tradition, on the other hand, focuses on interests of actors leaving the room for ideological influence in the decision-making process. Institutionalism, however, falls short on considering individual human volition because actors are to play the already","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens from Japan by agents of the North Korean government happened during a period of six years from 1977 to 1983. Although only 16 (eight men and eight women) are officially recognized by the JapaThe nese government, there may have been as many as 70 to 80 Japanese abducted. Analysts believe that some victims were abducted to teach the Japanese language and culture at North Korean spy schools, while other victims were also abducted with the intent of stealing their identities.The abduction of Japanese citizens by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, can be distinguished from other foreign policy issues that Japan faces for the following two reasons. First, this is a rare-probably the only- major diplomatic issue in which Japan is a victim of an egregious act committed by an external entity. For the first time, Japan is conducting diplomacy in order to recover the original status and receive due compensation. As is usual for a novice, unfortunately, Japan has not scored well. The Japanese government says that the abduction issue is the highest priority among the issues between Japan and DPRK and has been putting forth a remarkable effort.1 Yet the goal Japan set might have been too ambitious and might have left too little room for negotiation.The second reason for the uniqueness of the abduction issue is the remarkable convergence of basic policy lines across the Japanese political spectrum. Very few members of the Japanese Diet are openly opposed to pressuring the DPRK on this issue. According to a survey by the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea,2 dubbed Sukuukai in Japanese, 82 percent of the Diet members supported the idea of additional economic sanctions in the event that the DPRK does not show the results of reinvestigation that will lead to the repatriation of all victims.3Public Outrage and Stalemate4The abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea took place in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. At the time, very little was known about the location or fate of the missing people. When a newspaper article reported in 1980 that the missing people might have been kidnapped by a foreign agent, it did not attract much attention from the politicians and was dismissed as mere speculation by the police. This started to change after two incidents. The first was the arrest, in 1985, of a North Korean agent who was carrying the passport of Tadaaki Hara, who disappeared from a beach in Miyazaki Prefecture in June 1980. Then, in 1987, an arrested North Korean agent named Kim Hyong-hee, who perpetrated the bombing of Korean Air flight 858 on November 29 of that year, told the police that she learned the Japanese language from an abducted Japanese person whose name was Yaeko Taguchi. Taguchi had disappeared from the same beach as Hara did, but in 1978. The circumstantial evidence seemed to suggest that North Korea was somehow invo
{"title":"Abduction: Japan's Blunders in Negotiations with North Korea","authors":"Takahiro Yamamoto","doi":"10.3172/NKR.5.2.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.5.2.34","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens from Japan by agents of the North Korean government happened during a period of six years from 1977 to 1983. Although only 16 (eight men and eight women) are officially recognized by the JapaThe nese government, there may have been as many as 70 to 80 Japanese abducted. Analysts believe that some victims were abducted to teach the Japanese language and culture at North Korean spy schools, while other victims were also abducted with the intent of stealing their identities.The abduction of Japanese citizens by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, can be distinguished from other foreign policy issues that Japan faces for the following two reasons. First, this is a rare-probably the only- major diplomatic issue in which Japan is a victim of an egregious act committed by an external entity. For the first time, Japan is conducting diplomacy in order to recover the original status and receive due compensation. As is usual for a novice, unfortunately, Japan has not scored well. The Japanese government says that the abduction issue is the highest priority among the issues between Japan and DPRK and has been putting forth a remarkable effort.1 Yet the goal Japan set might have been too ambitious and might have left too little room for negotiation.The second reason for the uniqueness of the abduction issue is the remarkable convergence of basic policy lines across the Japanese political spectrum. Very few members of the Japanese Diet are openly opposed to pressuring the DPRK on this issue. According to a survey by the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea,2 dubbed Sukuukai in Japanese, 82 percent of the Diet members supported the idea of additional economic sanctions in the event that the DPRK does not show the results of reinvestigation that will lead to the repatriation of all victims.3Public Outrage and Stalemate4The abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea took place in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. At the time, very little was known about the location or fate of the missing people. When a newspaper article reported in 1980 that the missing people might have been kidnapped by a foreign agent, it did not attract much attention from the politicians and was dismissed as mere speculation by the police. This started to change after two incidents. The first was the arrest, in 1985, of a North Korean agent who was carrying the passport of Tadaaki Hara, who disappeared from a beach in Miyazaki Prefecture in June 1980. Then, in 1987, an arrested North Korean agent named Kim Hyong-hee, who perpetrated the bombing of Korean Air flight 858 on November 29 of that year, told the police that she learned the Japanese language from an abducted Japanese person whose name was Yaeko Taguchi. Taguchi had disappeared from the same beach as Hara did, but in 1978. The circumstantial evidence seemed to suggest that North Korea was somehow invo","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69763501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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