IntroductionOn February 27, 2012, following lawmaker Park Sun-young's2 eleven-day hunger strike highlighting the human rights issue relating to North Korean repatriation, the South Korean Parliament passed a resolution urging China to discontinue the practice of returning North Korean border crossers. This action has triggered intensified international attention toward the human rights of North Koreans, with the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs subsequently approving the extension of the North Korean Human Rights Act, last reauthorized in 2008, until 2017. The British deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, also applied symbolic pressure on North Korea and China by meeting North Korean settlers during a visit to South Korea for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in March. Given the political climate in South Korea as it faces two major elections amidst growing uncertainty across East Asia in the wake of the emergence of the Kim Jong-un regime following the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, it is perhaps not surprising that the North Korea issue is being revisited in 2012. In the bitter competition between the two opposite camps (conservative versus democratic) in the run-up to the two elections in the South, the renewed attention to the North Korean issue has been used to reframe existing indicators that distinguished political positions within the remnants of the Cold War legacy-especially those that capitalized on fostering anti-North Korean sentiments. Aligning with domestic circumstances, the United States has added its voice by pressuring North Korea and China in the language of human rights, foregrounding "humanitarian imperialism," the salient feature of Western discourse in international affairs and post-Cold War policy,3 as a prominent component in the geopolitical matrix of East Asia. Consequently, contrary to the dominant tendency of previous years, 2012 sees North Korean border crossers and arrivals in the South reconstructed as purely "victims of human rights violations" and "political refugees." This paper brings this changing understanding and naming of North Korean arrivals within the transient social discourse of South Korea into question, and argues that specific eras separate and interpellate North Korean arrivals through different names and roles depending on the particular political and economic interests of the time. Such interpellation instrumentalizes the figure of the migrant in the process of stabilizing South Korean society.North Korean arrivals to the South have been defined and understood in various ways over time: from "heroic" figures to "economic migrants." Given the systematic and ideological confrontation following the 1953 separation, strong Cold War ideology governed the two Koreas and produced those people that, to either side, would be labeled as "defectors." The number of North Korean arrivals to the South was 607 for the period between 1953 and 1989, resulting in their rarity being highly valued and f
{"title":"\"Defector,\" \"Refugee,\" or \"Migrant\"? North Korean Settlers in South Korea's Changing Social Discourse 1","authors":"S. K. Kim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.2.94","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.2.94","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionOn February 27, 2012, following lawmaker Park Sun-young's2 eleven-day hunger strike highlighting the human rights issue relating to North Korean repatriation, the South Korean Parliament passed a resolution urging China to discontinue the practice of returning North Korean border crossers. This action has triggered intensified international attention toward the human rights of North Koreans, with the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs subsequently approving the extension of the North Korean Human Rights Act, last reauthorized in 2008, until 2017. The British deputy prime minister, Nick Clegg, also applied symbolic pressure on North Korea and China by meeting North Korean settlers during a visit to South Korea for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in March. Given the political climate in South Korea as it faces two major elections amidst growing uncertainty across East Asia in the wake of the emergence of the Kim Jong-un regime following the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, it is perhaps not surprising that the North Korea issue is being revisited in 2012. In the bitter competition between the two opposite camps (conservative versus democratic) in the run-up to the two elections in the South, the renewed attention to the North Korean issue has been used to reframe existing indicators that distinguished political positions within the remnants of the Cold War legacy-especially those that capitalized on fostering anti-North Korean sentiments. Aligning with domestic circumstances, the United States has added its voice by pressuring North Korea and China in the language of human rights, foregrounding \"humanitarian imperialism,\" the salient feature of Western discourse in international affairs and post-Cold War policy,3 as a prominent component in the geopolitical matrix of East Asia. Consequently, contrary to the dominant tendency of previous years, 2012 sees North Korean border crossers and arrivals in the South reconstructed as purely \"victims of human rights violations\" and \"political refugees.\" This paper brings this changing understanding and naming of North Korean arrivals within the transient social discourse of South Korea into question, and argues that specific eras separate and interpellate North Korean arrivals through different names and roles depending on the particular political and economic interests of the time. Such interpellation instrumentalizes the figure of the migrant in the process of stabilizing South Korean society.North Korean arrivals to the South have been defined and understood in various ways over time: from \"heroic\" figures to \"economic migrants.\" Given the systematic and ideological confrontation following the 1953 separation, strong Cold War ideology governed the two Koreas and produced those people that, to either side, would be labeled as \"defectors.\" The number of North Korean arrivals to the South was 607 for the period between 1953 and 1989, resulting in their rarity being highly valued and f","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69766149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionFluctuating political relations between North and South Korea made it difficult to sustain, at least in the past, any meaningful and lasting economic cooperation between the two Koreas. This paper reviews the history and the scope of economic cooperation between the two Koreas, leading to the conclusion that economic cooperation between North and South Korea should remain unaffected by political turmoil between the two Koreas.Historical Background of Economic CooperationThe first official joint statement between the two Koreas was released on July 4, 1972, nearly nineteen years after the Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. The "SouthNorth Joint Communique" states that "reunification will take place without reliance on or intervention by foreign nations; it will be achieved by a peaceful means"; that "the two sides shall take measures to stop propaganda broadcasting against the other side, stop military aggression and prevent any military clashes"; and that "the two sides shall institute various exchanges in the economic, social and cultural areas; cooperate in holding inter-Korean Red Cross talks; open a Seoul-Pyongyang hotline; and set up a South-North mediation committee."Regardless of the cooperative spirit expressed in the 1972 communique, economic cooperation between the two Koreas did not take place for many more years because of two related reasons: the lack of progress on the political front and several provocative actions carried out by North Korea. On October 9, 1983, for instance, four South Korean cabinet members were killed by North Korean agents in Burma. On November 29, 1987, Korean Air 858 was exploded by two North Korean agents forty-five minutes away from Bangkok, killing all 115 passengers and crew members aboard. As the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1989, ending the Soviet Union's economic support to North Korea, the focus of North Korean issues shifted to the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea. In fact, the current nuclear crisis began during 1989 when Yongbyon's nuclear facility was identified through U.S. satellite photos.On October 21, 1994, the United States and North Korea concluded four months of negotiations by adopting the "Agreed Framework" in Geneva, which called for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that would require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which were still under construction. In exchange, North Korea was promised two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of the reactors. The LWRs were arranged for construction through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). On March 9, 1995, KEDO was formed in New York with the United States, South Korea, and Japan as the organization's original members. On June 1, 2006, the KEDO Executive Board announced that it had formally terminated its project to build two LWRs in North Korea due to the "continued and extended f
{"title":"Economic Cooperation Between the Two Koreas","authors":"Semoon Chang","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.2.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.2.6","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionFluctuating political relations between North and South Korea made it difficult to sustain, at least in the past, any meaningful and lasting economic cooperation between the two Koreas. This paper reviews the history and the scope of economic cooperation between the two Koreas, leading to the conclusion that economic cooperation between North and South Korea should remain unaffected by political turmoil between the two Koreas.Historical Background of Economic CooperationThe first official joint statement between the two Koreas was released on July 4, 1972, nearly nineteen years after the Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. The \"SouthNorth Joint Communique\" states that \"reunification will take place without reliance on or intervention by foreign nations; it will be achieved by a peaceful means\"; that \"the two sides shall take measures to stop propaganda broadcasting against the other side, stop military aggression and prevent any military clashes\"; and that \"the two sides shall institute various exchanges in the economic, social and cultural areas; cooperate in holding inter-Korean Red Cross talks; open a Seoul-Pyongyang hotline; and set up a South-North mediation committee.\"Regardless of the cooperative spirit expressed in the 1972 communique, economic cooperation between the two Koreas did not take place for many more years because of two related reasons: the lack of progress on the political front and several provocative actions carried out by North Korea. On October 9, 1983, for instance, four South Korean cabinet members were killed by North Korean agents in Burma. On November 29, 1987, Korean Air 858 was exploded by two North Korean agents forty-five minutes away from Bangkok, killing all 115 passengers and crew members aboard. As the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1989, ending the Soviet Union's economic support to North Korea, the focus of North Korean issues shifted to the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea. In fact, the current nuclear crisis began during 1989 when Yongbyon's nuclear facility was identified through U.S. satellite photos.On October 21, 1994, the United States and North Korea concluded four months of negotiations by adopting the \"Agreed Framework\" in Geneva, which called for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that would require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which were still under construction. In exchange, North Korea was promised two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of the reactors. The LWRs were arranged for construction through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). On March 9, 1995, KEDO was formed in New York with the United States, South Korea, and Japan as the organization's original members. On June 1, 2006, the KEDO Executive Board announced that it had formally terminated its project to build two LWRs in North Korea due to the \"continued and extended f","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Research Question and StructureThis article was written mostly before Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011. However, not only do our main points remain valid; the need for a long-term, systematic understanding of the political system of North Korea (formally the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK) and leadership succession has even grown amidst the current uncertainty. We thus discuss the background of the transfer of political power in North Korea and the related options in general, with a first outlook on Kim Jong-un and his leadership.Any leader needs first to gain and then to maintain a certain degree of power and legitimacy.1 We therefore first look at the issue of legitimacy itself and then explore the tradition of leadership, legitimacy, and power transfer in Korea in order to combine the general suggestions derived from the political scientist's perspective with the society-specific characteristics of the North Korean system. We look particularly closely at the sources of the personal legitimacy of Kim Jong-il, including the process of his own accession to power. Against this background, the current situation in North Korea and the ongoing power transfer to Kim Jong-un are analyzed.Leadership and LegitimacyAn important category for the classification of political systems is their mechanism for the legitimization of power. Max Weber suggested using the base for the claim to legitimacy as the sole criterion for classifying various types of rule.2 According to Merkel, the scope for achieving legitimacy ranges from what he calls "people's sovereignty" in a democracy to "mentality" (such as nationalism) in authoritarian and a "closed worldview" in totalitarian systems.3 Note that even totalitarian systems cannot rely only on repression but also need some kind of legitimization.In which category does North Korea belong? Authoritarian systems can be understood as severely limiting democratic principles, while the latter are completely abolished in totalitarian systems.4 Well-documented features such as restricted access to power, leadership by a single person, the power monopoly of one party, the regime's paternalistic claim to control its people's lives, the repression of opposition, and the existence of chuch'e as a closed worldview suggest that North Korea can indeed be classified as totalitarian. Merkel associates North Korea with the communist-totalitarian sub-type, although he also acknowledges parallels with "sultanistic-totalitarian" systems.5Other authors point at the changing nature of the North Korean system. Scobell classifies North Korea as an eroding totalitarian regime of the communist variety.6 In a similar vein, Silberstein argues that totalitarianism in North Korea exists but is fading, mainly because of the vanishing of the central planning system.7 Accordingly, if we want to explore the question of succession in North Korea, we are looking at the puzzle of power transfer in a totalitarian system -not in a monarchy.Bu
{"title":"From Monolithic Totalitarian to Collective Authoritarian Leadership? Performance-Based Legitimacy and Power Transfer in North Korea","authors":"Rüdiger Frank, P. Park","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.2.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.2.32","url":null,"abstract":"Research Question and StructureThis article was written mostly before Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011. However, not only do our main points remain valid; the need for a long-term, systematic understanding of the political system of North Korea (formally the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK) and leadership succession has even grown amidst the current uncertainty. We thus discuss the background of the transfer of political power in North Korea and the related options in general, with a first outlook on Kim Jong-un and his leadership.Any leader needs first to gain and then to maintain a certain degree of power and legitimacy.1 We therefore first look at the issue of legitimacy itself and then explore the tradition of leadership, legitimacy, and power transfer in Korea in order to combine the general suggestions derived from the political scientist's perspective with the society-specific characteristics of the North Korean system. We look particularly closely at the sources of the personal legitimacy of Kim Jong-il, including the process of his own accession to power. Against this background, the current situation in North Korea and the ongoing power transfer to Kim Jong-un are analyzed.Leadership and LegitimacyAn important category for the classification of political systems is their mechanism for the legitimization of power. Max Weber suggested using the base for the claim to legitimacy as the sole criterion for classifying various types of rule.2 According to Merkel, the scope for achieving legitimacy ranges from what he calls \"people's sovereignty\" in a democracy to \"mentality\" (such as nationalism) in authoritarian and a \"closed worldview\" in totalitarian systems.3 Note that even totalitarian systems cannot rely only on repression but also need some kind of legitimization.In which category does North Korea belong? Authoritarian systems can be understood as severely limiting democratic principles, while the latter are completely abolished in totalitarian systems.4 Well-documented features such as restricted access to power, leadership by a single person, the power monopoly of one party, the regime's paternalistic claim to control its people's lives, the repression of opposition, and the existence of chuch'e as a closed worldview suggest that North Korea can indeed be classified as totalitarian. Merkel associates North Korea with the communist-totalitarian sub-type, although he also acknowledges parallels with \"sultanistic-totalitarian\" systems.5Other authors point at the changing nature of the North Korean system. Scobell classifies North Korea as an eroding totalitarian regime of the communist variety.6 In a similar vein, Silberstein argues that totalitarianism in North Korea exists but is fading, mainly because of the vanishing of the central planning system.7 Accordingly, if we want to explore the question of succession in North Korea, we are looking at the puzzle of power transfer in a totalitarian system -not in a monarchy.Bu","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionIt has been said that everything is for sale. What about peace? Can peace and reunification between North and South Korea be purchased? Can war be avoided by simply paying for peace? This may not be as far-fetched as it might seem. Indeed, this was a U.S. government topic of discussion during the Clinton administration.1 If war is fought over money, and power and control over the people, land, and resources that produce it, why cannot we pay in advance to prevent it? I think we can, and I will present a model to accomplish this task, recommend who should be paid how much, and suggest where this money might come from.To convince the North Korean leadership to disband the army and to proceed with reunification, this model prioritizes three fundamental motivating incentives: (1) private wealth, (2) personal safety and freedom, and (3) honor and prestige. In addition to this top-down approach, bottom-up incentives are provided to the military and to the general population, recognizing the motivating role of women and children and the organic desire for family security. And perhaps most importantly, this model allows the North Korean leadership to save face and honorably opt out of their current predicament with dignity.2The Korean Peace Fund is explicitly designed to create the personal, economic, and political motivation for peaceful reunification. It is based on compelling personal and economic incentives, and on an empathetic appreciation of the North Korean political leadership and the average North Korean family. I propose nothing less than paying for the allegiance of 24 million people by offering sums equal to years of work to an average North Korean citizen and publicly honoring the North Korean leadership (for their "heroic" wisdom in stepping down) and buying them off with tangible in-the-pocket private wealth and international assurances of their personal safety and freedom to live and travel wherever they wish. The total price of peace is affordable, and a bargain of inestimable value when one considers that the possible alternative is war.This model provides enormous incentives to all North Koreans to join in the relative prosperity of the rest of the world. Popular support improves the likelihood of reaching a "tipping point" for Korean unification. Tipping points are moments of sensitivity when thresholds are reached and small things can have enormous consequences. Stoessinger calls them "moments of truth" when leaders cross thresholds into war (or peace).3 They can arise unexpectedly and alter the course of history.An Incentive Model for PeaceThe potential efficacy of this model is enhanced by cultural diffusion and the word-of-mouth rumor currently spreading across North Korean social networks that the outside world is a better place to live. A porous border with China and increased market activity has increased the spread of outside information and South Korean cultural products.4 Analyzing data from two large defector p
{"title":"The Korean Peace Fund","authors":"Shepherd Iverson","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.2.62","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.2.62","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionIt has been said that everything is for sale. What about peace? Can peace and reunification between North and South Korea be purchased? Can war be avoided by simply paying for peace? This may not be as far-fetched as it might seem. Indeed, this was a U.S. government topic of discussion during the Clinton administration.1 If war is fought over money, and power and control over the people, land, and resources that produce it, why cannot we pay in advance to prevent it? I think we can, and I will present a model to accomplish this task, recommend who should be paid how much, and suggest where this money might come from.To convince the North Korean leadership to disband the army and to proceed with reunification, this model prioritizes three fundamental motivating incentives: (1) private wealth, (2) personal safety and freedom, and (3) honor and prestige. In addition to this top-down approach, bottom-up incentives are provided to the military and to the general population, recognizing the motivating role of women and children and the organic desire for family security. And perhaps most importantly, this model allows the North Korean leadership to save face and honorably opt out of their current predicament with dignity.2The Korean Peace Fund is explicitly designed to create the personal, economic, and political motivation for peaceful reunification. It is based on compelling personal and economic incentives, and on an empathetic appreciation of the North Korean political leadership and the average North Korean family. I propose nothing less than paying for the allegiance of 24 million people by offering sums equal to years of work to an average North Korean citizen and publicly honoring the North Korean leadership (for their \"heroic\" wisdom in stepping down) and buying them off with tangible in-the-pocket private wealth and international assurances of their personal safety and freedom to live and travel wherever they wish. The total price of peace is affordable, and a bargain of inestimable value when one considers that the possible alternative is war.This model provides enormous incentives to all North Koreans to join in the relative prosperity of the rest of the world. Popular support improves the likelihood of reaching a \"tipping point\" for Korean unification. Tipping points are moments of sensitivity when thresholds are reached and small things can have enormous consequences. Stoessinger calls them \"moments of truth\" when leaders cross thresholds into war (or peace).3 They can arise unexpectedly and alter the course of history.An Incentive Model for PeaceThe potential efficacy of this model is enhanced by cultural diffusion and the word-of-mouth rumor currently spreading across North Korean social networks that the outside world is a better place to live. A porous border with China and increased market activity has increased the spread of outside information and South Korean cultural products.4 Analyzing data from two large defector p","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to examine North Korean threat perceptions in the context of Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory. This theory argues that states actually react to perceived threat rather than to power, and aim to balance it. North Korea, as surrounded by four big powers-China, Russia, Japan, and the United States (U.S.)-perceives the U.S. policy toward itself, and the strengthening of U.S.-South Korea security cooperation, as posing serious threatening challenges. To balance this threat, North Korea has developed an alliance system with the People's Republic of China (PRC) based on common ideology,1 anti-Japanese sentiment, and anti-U.S. sentiment. Geographically, North Korea shares an 800-mile-long frontier with China. Historically, China and Korea have had shared relations, symbolized by a hierarchical tributary system. In this age-old relationship, China enjoyed the role of "big brother" to Korea's "little brother." Culturally, ideologically, and socially, North Korea belonged to the Chinese zone of influence. Common threat perceptions alone would have argued for a cooperative arrangement between these two countries. China was vast, powerful, economically strong, and therefore the dominant party. Hence, it was a partnership not between equals, but between two unequal states-one strong and powerful and the other a client.The Korean Peninsula, Hub of the Balance of Power in East AsiaMuch of Korea's history is "the story of its struggle, not always successful, to maintain its independence against external pressures."2 Contrary to its name, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is located within one of the world's most heavily militarized areas. There is little "strategic depth" between the DMZ and the capital cities of Pyongyang, which is about 125 km north of the DMZ, and Seoul, which is approximately 40 km south of the DMZ. Following the consolidation of Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe and the signing of the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance," the United States perceived that the consequences of a South Korean defeat would be highly detrimental to its own political and strategic interests. Chinese leaders had concluded that intervention in the Korean War would temper and caution Washington, whereas inaction would embolden it. Thus, the Korean War of 1950-1953 reminded China of the importance of Korea to its national security. The Korean War ended, but the peninsula remained divided at the Demilitarized Zone.Threat Perceptions until 1979: The North Korean PerspectiveThe U.S. Threat. North Koreans harbor a very deep grudge against the United States for two main reasons: the division of Korea and the American occupation of the southern part of Korea from 1945 to 1948. North Koreans also resent other American actions taken since 1953, the mutual security agreement with South Korea, and the maintenance of 36,000 American troops in South Korea. As the United States treated North Korea as a mere satel
{"title":"North Korea-China Relations: An Asymmetric Alliance","authors":"Sangit Sarita Dwivedi","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.2.76","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.2.76","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to examine North Korean threat perceptions in the context of Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory. This theory argues that states actually react to perceived threat rather than to power, and aim to balance it. North Korea, as surrounded by four big powers-China, Russia, Japan, and the United States (U.S.)-perceives the U.S. policy toward itself, and the strengthening of U.S.-South Korea security cooperation, as posing serious threatening challenges. To balance this threat, North Korea has developed an alliance system with the People's Republic of China (PRC) based on common ideology,1 anti-Japanese sentiment, and anti-U.S. sentiment. Geographically, North Korea shares an 800-mile-long frontier with China. Historically, China and Korea have had shared relations, symbolized by a hierarchical tributary system. In this age-old relationship, China enjoyed the role of \"big brother\" to Korea's \"little brother.\" Culturally, ideologically, and socially, North Korea belonged to the Chinese zone of influence. Common threat perceptions alone would have argued for a cooperative arrangement between these two countries. China was vast, powerful, economically strong, and therefore the dominant party. Hence, it was a partnership not between equals, but between two unequal states-one strong and powerful and the other a client.The Korean Peninsula, Hub of the Balance of Power in East AsiaMuch of Korea's history is \"the story of its struggle, not always successful, to maintain its independence against external pressures.\"2 Contrary to its name, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is located within one of the world's most heavily militarized areas. There is little \"strategic depth\" between the DMZ and the capital cities of Pyongyang, which is about 125 km north of the DMZ, and Seoul, which is approximately 40 km south of the DMZ. Following the consolidation of Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe and the signing of the \"Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance,\" the United States perceived that the consequences of a South Korean defeat would be highly detrimental to its own political and strategic interests. Chinese leaders had concluded that intervention in the Korean War would temper and caution Washington, whereas inaction would embolden it. Thus, the Korean War of 1950-1953 reminded China of the importance of Korea to its national security. The Korean War ended, but the peninsula remained divided at the Demilitarized Zone.Threat Perceptions until 1979: The North Korean PerspectiveThe U.S. Threat. North Koreans harbor a very deep grudge against the United States for two main reasons: the division of Korea and the American occupation of the southern part of Korea from 1945 to 1948. North Koreans also resent other American actions taken since 1953, the mutual security agreement with South Korea, and the maintenance of 36,000 American troops in South Korea. As the United States treated North Korea as a mere satel","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionNorth Korean "military-first" politics (son'gun chongch'i) is known to privilege the Korean People's Army (KPA) as "an important resource and catalyst for developing the national economy."2 As the role of the KPA in the national economy and national defense has increased, there has been speculation that the military will ascend to power in North Korea under military-first politics. The difficulty of collecting internal information on the political situation in North Korea has made Kim Jongil's reported public appearances a useful source of information for researchers. Many researchers have thus analyzed the public appearances of the North Korean leader to understand military-first politics. The conclusion has been drawn that the KPA has taken priority over all North Korean state affairs, since the number of Kim's public appearances at military installations and the number of military officers among his entourage have increased.3 Still, the question of which factor causes Kim to appear where and when in public, under military-first politics, remains unanswered. Predictors of Kim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance are thus necessary in an effort to address the question. The application of a predictive model furnishes a meaningful estimate of the frequency of Kim's on-the-spot guidance visits to the military sector and other sectors, with the corresponding implications.Avoiding Circular ReasoningKim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance is conducted in order to inspect implementation of national policies and to discuss state affairs with his entourage, who have allegedly gained an upper hand in the decision-making process.4 "Military-first politics" brought about a significant change to Kim's on-the-spot guidance, as his visits to the military sector have increased, as well as the number of military officers among his entourage.5 This change has been interpreted as evidence that military-first politics prioritizes the KPA over all affairs of state.6 If this interpretation is correct, the number of Kim's on-the-spot guidance visits to the military sector should remain at a relatively high level under military-first politics.Demonstrable statistics, however, are not in favor of that proposition. Figure 1 on page 95 shows that the number of Kim's visits to the military sector has not been constant, but has fluctuated over time. This might indicate that the priority of the KPA rises and falls according to certain variables. If one accepts that Kim's increased visits to the military sector are prioritizing the KPA, it is relevant to ask, "What makes Kim Jong-il visit the military sector?"Assuming that Kim visits the military because the KPA is a top priority, one needs to inquire as to why prioritization has occurred. Yet if one suggests that the increasing number of visits to the military are in themselves proof of the priority of the KPA, the result is the fallacy of circular reasoning. A cause is simultaneously considered an effect. Avoiding circular
{"title":"Predictors of Kim Jong-Il's On-the-Spot Guidance under Military-First Politics 1","authors":"Insoo Kim, Min Yong Lee","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.1.93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.93","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionNorth Korean \"military-first\" politics (son'gun chongch'i) is known to privilege the Korean People's Army (KPA) as \"an important resource and catalyst for developing the national economy.\"2 As the role of the KPA in the national economy and national defense has increased, there has been speculation that the military will ascend to power in North Korea under military-first politics. The difficulty of collecting internal information on the political situation in North Korea has made Kim Jongil's reported public appearances a useful source of information for researchers. Many researchers have thus analyzed the public appearances of the North Korean leader to understand military-first politics. The conclusion has been drawn that the KPA has taken priority over all North Korean state affairs, since the number of Kim's public appearances at military installations and the number of military officers among his entourage have increased.3 Still, the question of which factor causes Kim to appear where and when in public, under military-first politics, remains unanswered. Predictors of Kim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance are thus necessary in an effort to address the question. The application of a predictive model furnishes a meaningful estimate of the frequency of Kim's on-the-spot guidance visits to the military sector and other sectors, with the corresponding implications.Avoiding Circular ReasoningKim Jong-il's on-the-spot guidance is conducted in order to inspect implementation of national policies and to discuss state affairs with his entourage, who have allegedly gained an upper hand in the decision-making process.4 \"Military-first politics\" brought about a significant change to Kim's on-the-spot guidance, as his visits to the military sector have increased, as well as the number of military officers among his entourage.5 This change has been interpreted as evidence that military-first politics prioritizes the KPA over all affairs of state.6 If this interpretation is correct, the number of Kim's on-the-spot guidance visits to the military sector should remain at a relatively high level under military-first politics.Demonstrable statistics, however, are not in favor of that proposition. Figure 1 on page 95 shows that the number of Kim's visits to the military sector has not been constant, but has fluctuated over time. This might indicate that the priority of the KPA rises and falls according to certain variables. If one accepts that Kim's increased visits to the military sector are prioritizing the KPA, it is relevant to ask, \"What makes Kim Jong-il visit the military sector?\"Assuming that Kim visits the military because the KPA is a top priority, one needs to inquire as to why prioritization has occurred. Yet if one suggests that the increasing number of visits to the military are in themselves proof of the priority of the KPA, the result is the fallacy of circular reasoning. A cause is simultaneously considered an effect. Avoiding circular","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69766104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionInternational efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program are still looking for a way out. Nearly two decades have passed since the North first alarmed the world with its nuclear reprocessing facilities in 1992, but the multiple international negoDepartment tiations ever since have yet to find an effective deterrent. More perplexing than the unfruitful negotiations per se is the indeterminacy that the international community has shown throughout the process. An obvious example is the drifting policies of the U.S., the leader of the world anti-proliferation community. Throughout the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the U.S. policies wildly swung between containment and engagement. The ambiguity continues even today as we see the Obama government switching policy positions off and on.1Why isn't there a consistent solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis? Why are the international (the U.S. in particular) responses to the North's nuclear challenge drifting?Keeping in mind a normative origin of the policy inconsistency, this research delves into the contextual backgrounds of the uneven nuclear non-proliferation policies. Due to the controversial nature of the issues involving the nuclear crisis like sovereignty and national security, the nonproliferation efforts are supposed to call for a choice of only relatively better policy each time without any absolute solution. Borrowing Reinhold Niebuhr's insights, the North Korean nuclear crisis is a typical case of "relative justice" where a definitive behavioral principle is hard to utilize.2 Consequently an objective analysis of policy conditions is rarely available, which in turn makes a rational or institutional choice by political elites out of the question. Instead, the public perception of the issues at the bottom of the society takes its place as the matter of consequence.Ironically a social normative cause of the U.S. policy inconsistency looms large from the solid international norm for nuclear nonproliferation. Despite the solid consensus on the principle of blocking the spread of nuclear weapons at all costs, a few technical differences that rose in the middle of negotiating how to implement the norm have directed the course of negotiation. It is an irony that the methods employed to apply a principle ruled over the principle. As a response, this research asserts that some of the suggested policy means, even if they are efficient in practice, raise several fundamental social concerns that are not compatible with the norm of nuclear nonproliferation. The North Korean crisis involves two or more ideas that stand at odds with each other. The normative conflicts generate the policy indeterminacy.This research reflects on Reinhold Niebuhr's thoughts about international politics-relative justice, in essence-as the reference of normative ambiguity arising from the process of negotiation with North Korea. His ideas are helpful to identify the social context where a du
阻止朝鲜核项目的国际努力仍在寻找出路。自1992年朝鲜首次以其核再处理设施震惊世界以来，已经过去了近20年，但此后的多次国际谈判仍未找到有效的威慑手段。比毫无成果的谈判本身更令人困惑的是，国际社会在整个进程中表现出的不确定性。作为世界防扩散共同体的领头羊，美国的政策摇摆不定就是一个明显的例子。在比尔·克林顿(Bill Clinton)和乔治·w·布什(George W. Bush)执政期间，美国的政策在遏制和接触之间摇摆不定。直到今天，当我们看到奥巴马政府的政策立场时断时续时，这种模棱两可的态度仍在继续。1 .为什么朝鲜核危机没有一个一致的解决方案?国际社会(特别是美国)对北韩核问题的反应为何出现了变化?考虑到政策不一致的规范性根源，本研究深入探讨了不平衡的核不扩散政策的背景。由于涉及主权和国家安全等核危机问题的争议性，防扩散工作每次都应该要求选择相对较好的政策，而不是任何绝对的解决方案。借用尼布尔(Reinhold Niebuhr)的见解，北韩核危机是“相对正义”的典型案例，在这种情况下，很难利用明确的行为原则因此，很难获得对政策条件的客观分析，这反过来又使政治精英无法做出理性或制度性的选择。相反，公众对社会底层问题的看法占据了重要地位。具有讽刺意味的是，美国政策不一致的一个社会规范原因，在牢固的核不扩散国际规范中隐约可见。尽管就不惜一切代价阻止核武器扩散的原则达成了坚实的协商一致意见，但在谈判如何执行这一规范的过程中出现的一些技术性分歧，却指导了谈判的进程。运用原则的方法凌驾于原则之上，这是一种讽刺。作为回应，本研究断言，一些建议的政策手段，即使它们在实践中是有效的，也引起了一些与核不扩散准则不相容的基本社会关切。朝鲜危机涉及两种或两种以上相互矛盾的观点。规范冲突产生了政策的不确定性。本研究反思了莱因霍尔德·尼布尔关于国际政治的思想——本质上是相对正义——作为与朝鲜谈判过程中产生的规范性歧义的参考。他的想法有助于确定难以获得持久政策的社会背景。从尼布尔的角度来看，北韩核挑战是一个缺乏绝对正义的典型案例。朝鲜的核冒险虽然不像美国阻止它那样可以接受，但从它的国防主张来看，仍然是可以原谅的。该研究表明，朝鲜的防御担忧有多大，是美国应对核挑战的方向和水平的决定因素，而美国社会尚未达成共识。此外，美国政府内部存在着多种矛盾，而且美国社会内部也存在着理念争论，因此美国的政策也会出现波动。本文运用尼布尔的相对正义理论，从以下几个角度批判性地审视美国对朝核政策。首先，文献综述介绍了相关研究，并指出仍有必要进行规范性考虑。…
{"title":"Social Origins of Nuclear Policy: A Niebuhrian Dilemma of the U.S. Policies toward North Korea","authors":"R. Kim","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.1.117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.117","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionInternational efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear program are still looking for a way out. Nearly two decades have passed since the North first alarmed the world with its nuclear reprocessing facilities in 1992, but the multiple international negoDepartment tiations ever since have yet to find an effective deterrent. More perplexing than the unfruitful negotiations per se is the indeterminacy that the international community has shown throughout the process. An obvious example is the drifting policies of the U.S., the leader of the world anti-proliferation community. Throughout the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the U.S. policies wildly swung between containment and engagement. The ambiguity continues even today as we see the Obama government switching policy positions off and on.1Why isn't there a consistent solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis? Why are the international (the U.S. in particular) responses to the North's nuclear challenge drifting?Keeping in mind a normative origin of the policy inconsistency, this research delves into the contextual backgrounds of the uneven nuclear non-proliferation policies. Due to the controversial nature of the issues involving the nuclear crisis like sovereignty and national security, the nonproliferation efforts are supposed to call for a choice of only relatively better policy each time without any absolute solution. Borrowing Reinhold Niebuhr's insights, the North Korean nuclear crisis is a typical case of \"relative justice\" where a definitive behavioral principle is hard to utilize.2 Consequently an objective analysis of policy conditions is rarely available, which in turn makes a rational or institutional choice by political elites out of the question. Instead, the public perception of the issues at the bottom of the society takes its place as the matter of consequence.Ironically a social normative cause of the U.S. policy inconsistency looms large from the solid international norm for nuclear nonproliferation. Despite the solid consensus on the principle of blocking the spread of nuclear weapons at all costs, a few technical differences that rose in the middle of negotiating how to implement the norm have directed the course of negotiation. It is an irony that the methods employed to apply a principle ruled over the principle. As a response, this research asserts that some of the suggested policy means, even if they are efficient in practice, raise several fundamental social concerns that are not compatible with the norm of nuclear nonproliferation. The North Korean crisis involves two or more ideas that stand at odds with each other. The normative conflicts generate the policy indeterminacy.This research reflects on Reinhold Niebuhr's thoughts about international politics-relative justice, in essence-as the reference of normative ambiguity arising from the process of negotiation with North Korea. His ideas are helpful to identify the social context where a du","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69764828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe denuclearization of North Korea (officially, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has been the most important policy objective in U.S.-North Korea relations since the end of the Cold War. But U.S. foreign policy in North Korea proved unsuccessful when Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. Both the William J. Clinton administration (1993-2000) and the George W. Bush administration (2001-2008) sought to prevent a nuclear North Korea by adopting a ety of toward the country, ranging from a possible use of military force to a negotiated settlement. Despite many years of hard work, however, their efforts failed.President Obama has been seeking the denuclearization of North Korea since his inauguration in 2009. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and counterterrorism are top priorities in his foreign policy. Like his predecessors, Obama also believes that nuclear nonproliferation is critical not only for the security of the United States, but also for the peace of the international community. On April 5, 2009, he revealed his vision for a world without nuclear weapons in Prague, Czech Republic.1 Approximately one year later, the Obama administration also announced a radical shift in U.S. nuclear weapons strategy in that the United States will not use its nuclear weapons to retaliate against attacks involving biological or chemical weapons or large- scale conventional forces.2 On April 8, 2010, he also signed a historic nuclear arms control treaty with Russian president Dmitri A. Medvedev.3 He was even awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize "for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples."4However, Obama has not been so successful with the North Korean nuclear issue. Since the Obama administration adopted a "strategic patience" policy, no progress has been made: neither the denuclearization process nor the Six-Party Talks have resumed. Pyongyang even conducted a second nuclear test during Obama's term, and has not rejoined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).The central goal of this paper is to explain why the Obama administration has not had any noticeable accomplishment in its policy on the North Korean nuclear issue. By closely examining the policy goals and strategies of the Obama administration over the past two and a half years, this paper seeks to uncover what is missing from U.S. policy toward North Korea. The starting point is to make sense of what Pyongyang really wants from Washington. Giving due consideration to Pyongyang's objectives, President Obama faces a choice of three different strategies: coercive diplomacy, strategic patience (the status quo), and constructive engagement.This paper argues that the success of the Obama administration in achieving the denuclearization of North Korea is dependent on an appropriate understanding of Pyongyang's security concerns and a careful analysis of North Korean nuclear policy. It suggests that Presid
自冷战结束以来，朝鲜(朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，简称DPRK)的无核化一直是美朝关系中最重要的政策目标。但是，当平壤在2006年进行第一次核试验时，美国对朝鲜的外交政策被证明是失败的。威廉·j·克林顿(William J. Clinton)政府(1993-2000)和乔治·w·布什(George W. Bush)政府(2001-2008)都试图通过对朝鲜采取一系列措施，从可能使用武力到谈判解决，来阻止朝鲜拥有核武器。然而，尽管多年的努力，他们的努力还是失败了。奥巴马总统自2009年就职以来一直在寻求朝鲜的无核化。防止核武器扩散和反恐是他外交政策的首要任务。与他的前任一样，奥巴马也认为核不扩散不仅对美国的安全至关重要，而且对国际社会的和平也至关重要。2009年4月5日，奥巴马在捷克共和国的布拉格发表了他对无核世界的愿景。大约一年后，奥巴马政府也宣布了美国核武器战略的根本转变，即美国将不会使用核武器报复涉及生物或化学武器或大规模常规部队的攻击2010年4月8日，他还与俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫签署了一项具有历史意义的核军备控制条约。他甚至因为“在加强国际外交和各国人民之间的合作方面做出的非凡努力”而被授予2009年诺贝尔和平奖。然而，奥巴马在北韩核问题上并不那么成功。自奥巴马政府采取“战略耐心”政策以来，没有取得任何进展:无核化进程和六方会谈都没有恢复。朝鲜甚至在奥巴马任期内进行了第二次核试验，而且没有重新加入《不扩散核武器条约》(NPT)。本文的中心目标是解释为什么奥巴马政府在朝鲜核问题上的政策没有取得任何显著的成就。本文通过仔细分析奥巴马政府过去两年半的政策目标和战略，试图揭示美国对朝鲜政策中缺失的东西。首先要弄清楚平壤到底想从华盛顿得到什么。考虑到朝鲜的目标，奥巴马总统面临三种不同的战略选择:强制外交、战略忍耐(维持现状)和建设性接触。本文认为，奥巴马政府在实现朝鲜无核化方面的成功取决于对平壤安全关切的适当理解和对朝鲜核政策的仔细分析。这表明奥巴马总统应该彻底改变他的对朝政策。更具体地说，他应该放弃战略忍耐政策，采取“建设性接触”政策，以实现朝鲜的无核化和东亚地区的安全。奥巴马政府的对朝政策奥巴马总统被认为不仅会给美国的国内政策，而且会给美国的外交政策带来巨大的变化。这些期望高得令人难以置信，因为奥巴马作为美国历史上第一位非洲裔美国总统象征着变革，也因为他在民主党控制国会两院的情况下保留了这样做的政治权力。奥巴马总统的就职也在平壤引发了这样的期待:“在美国新政府的领导下，紧张的朝美关系将得到改善，因为奥巴马在2008年总统竞选期间曾表示，如果能解决北韩核问题，他甚至愿意与北韩金正日等流氓国家的领导人会晤。”…
{"title":"Patience or Lethargy?: U.S. Policy toward North Korea under the Obama Administration","authors":"Taehyun Ahn","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.1.67","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.67","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe denuclearization of North Korea (officially, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) has been the most important policy objective in U.S.-North Korea relations since the end of the Cold War. But U.S. foreign policy in North Korea proved unsuccessful when Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. Both the William J. Clinton administration (1993-2000) and the George W. Bush administration (2001-2008) sought to prevent a nuclear North Korea by adopting a ety of toward the country, ranging from a possible use of military force to a negotiated settlement. Despite many years of hard work, however, their efforts failed.President Obama has been seeking the denuclearization of North Korea since his inauguration in 2009. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and counterterrorism are top priorities in his foreign policy. Like his predecessors, Obama also believes that nuclear nonproliferation is critical not only for the security of the United States, but also for the peace of the international community. On April 5, 2009, he revealed his vision for a world without nuclear weapons in Prague, Czech Republic.1 Approximately one year later, the Obama administration also announced a radical shift in U.S. nuclear weapons strategy in that the United States will not use its nuclear weapons to retaliate against attacks involving biological or chemical weapons or large- scale conventional forces.2 On April 8, 2010, he also signed a historic nuclear arms control treaty with Russian president Dmitri A. Medvedev.3 He was even awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize \"for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.\"4However, Obama has not been so successful with the North Korean nuclear issue. Since the Obama administration adopted a \"strategic patience\" policy, no progress has been made: neither the denuclearization process nor the Six-Party Talks have resumed. Pyongyang even conducted a second nuclear test during Obama's term, and has not rejoined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).The central goal of this paper is to explain why the Obama administration has not had any noticeable accomplishment in its policy on the North Korean nuclear issue. By closely examining the policy goals and strategies of the Obama administration over the past two and a half years, this paper seeks to uncover what is missing from U.S. policy toward North Korea. The starting point is to make sense of what Pyongyang really wants from Washington. Giving due consideration to Pyongyang's objectives, President Obama faces a choice of three different strategies: coercive diplomacy, strategic patience (the status quo), and constructive engagement.This paper argues that the success of the Obama administration in achieving the denuclearization of North Korea is dependent on an appropriate understanding of Pyongyang's security concerns and a careful analysis of North Korean nuclear policy. It suggests that Presid","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionNorth Korea is at a crossroads. Its ailing leader, seemingly rapid political transition, and unstable domestic political and economic situation all lead to a greater possibility of regime collapse. Although the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) still has a strong grip on its political power and maintains tight control of every layer of the society, a possible DPRK collapse or contingency continues to be one of the main issues for North Korea watchers, including pundits, scholars, policymakers, and even laymen who are interested in the changing North Korean affairs and their implications in the domestic and/or international arenas.1If North Korea collapses, then it would be a failed state in the sense that its government could not sustain its citizenry. Some commentators even say that the collapse of the DPRK has already begun. Thus, it is critical that regional powers discuss the possible outcomes of the North Korean stalemate and its impact on Northeast Asian regional security. The Republic of Korea (ROK) government, especially, should prepare for the possible outcomes of a North Korean catastrophe based on discussions, dialogues, and consultations with influential regional actors, such as the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Of the various possible future scenarios concerning the future of the DPRK regime, this article will focus on its deteriorating situations, analyze surrounding states' policy positions, and provide some meaningful policy considerations that the ROK government might consider in terms of the political, security, and legal aspects of the North Korean contingency. Regional powers surrounding the peninsula would play a critical role in a North Korean catastrophe for the following reasons: first, China has vital interests in North Korea; second, the U.S., the strategic ally of South Korea, is supposed to protect South Korea from any effect of the turbulence in North Korea; third, Russia and Japan also have strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula, so they may try to step in any contingency situation; and fourth, the U.S. and China would be highly concerned about the situation especially in the context of Sino-U.S. competition over East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, the South Korean government will be a key player in dealing with this matter, given that changes in North Korea could have a direct influence on the government in terms of security, economics, geography, and even national status. It is, therefore, timely and of the utmost importance to think about the possibility of the North Korean contingency from the perspective of the ROK.This article attempts to explain the general issue of North Korean contingency and then explores the various political and security considerations among concerned states, especially China. Next, it focuses on the legal perspectives that the South Korean government can and should employ in case of a catastrophic situat
{"title":"North Korean Contingency and Resolving Conflicts among Regional States","authors":"Jung-hyun Cho, Donglin Han, Ji-Yong Lee","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.1.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.37","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionNorth Korea is at a crossroads. Its ailing leader, seemingly rapid political transition, and unstable domestic political and economic situation all lead to a greater possibility of regime collapse. Although the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) still has a strong grip on its political power and maintains tight control of every layer of the society, a possible DPRK collapse or contingency continues to be one of the main issues for North Korea watchers, including pundits, scholars, policymakers, and even laymen who are interested in the changing North Korean affairs and their implications in the domestic and/or international arenas.1If North Korea collapses, then it would be a failed state in the sense that its government could not sustain its citizenry. Some commentators even say that the collapse of the DPRK has already begun. Thus, it is critical that regional powers discuss the possible outcomes of the North Korean stalemate and its impact on Northeast Asian regional security. The Republic of Korea (ROK) government, especially, should prepare for the possible outcomes of a North Korean catastrophe based on discussions, dialogues, and consultations with influential regional actors, such as the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Of the various possible future scenarios concerning the future of the DPRK regime, this article will focus on its deteriorating situations, analyze surrounding states' policy positions, and provide some meaningful policy considerations that the ROK government might consider in terms of the political, security, and legal aspects of the North Korean contingency. Regional powers surrounding the peninsula would play a critical role in a North Korean catastrophe for the following reasons: first, China has vital interests in North Korea; second, the U.S., the strategic ally of South Korea, is supposed to protect South Korea from any effect of the turbulence in North Korea; third, Russia and Japan also have strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula, so they may try to step in any contingency situation; and fourth, the U.S. and China would be highly concerned about the situation especially in the context of Sino-U.S. competition over East Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Nonetheless, the South Korean government will be a key player in dealing with this matter, given that changes in North Korea could have a direct influence on the government in terms of security, economics, geography, and even national status. It is, therefore, timely and of the utmost importance to think about the possibility of the North Korean contingency from the perspective of the ROK.This article attempts to explain the general issue of North Korean contingency and then explores the various political and security considerations among concerned states, especially China. Next, it focuses on the legal perspectives that the South Korean government can and should employ in case of a catastrophic situat","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
IntroductionThe Arab Spring suggests a transition to a new social order, a new phase of modern capitalism. The Arab states sit at a critical moment in which old institutions are frail, and what they do over the next few years will lay the groundwork for the next generation's institutionalized "rule of capitalism."1 It is clear that Arab regimes were deeply unpopular and faced serious demographic, economic, and political problems.The young Egyptian university graduate who burned himself to death yearning for democratization triggered democratic uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The democratic wind has been blown by the Arab youth who attempted to topple dictators. The democratic movement in Tunisia has bestowed a momentum to the Egyptian democratic uprising. The winds have swept through to Iran, Libya, and Bahrain in the wake of the Tunisian democratic movement. In spite of the brutal crackdown by the authoritarian regimes, the independent democratic movement of the Arab states has gained support from democratic society. "People all over the Arab world feel a sense of pride in shaking off decades of cowed passivity under dictatorships that ruled with no deference to popular wishes."2 The kind of collective actions most likely to change the existing social structure are likely to be triggered by members of disadvantaged groups.3 The state's failure to meet the needs of the people and to represent their will may cause class struggle where rival class forces fight to control the vital political organs that wield immense power.4 North Korea as a failed state has considerable potential to be overthrown by mass collective action. Robert I. Rotberg has classified political goods in five categories-safety and security, rule of law and transparency, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. Failed states are those states that fall below a threshold of political goods and fail to satisfy the safety and security minimums.5 "Given the scarcity of food supplies in North Korea, given its lack of human capital and other human capacities, and given the long poverty of internal discourse within the state, the removal of state security will plunge the otherwise failed state straight into true failure and, likely collapse."6 A nation-state fails when citizens finally perceive that its rulers are running the state as a criminal enterprise to their own advantage and the state no longer cares about most of its inhabitants.Against this backdrop, the feasibility of a democratic movement in North Korea is on the rise. Conditions for a democratic uprising in North Korea are growing gradually. There are many cautious predictions that a democratic movement can happen in North Korea eventually. The democratic movement in North Korea might be somewhat different from the Arab democratic movement.This article briefly reviews the feasibility of the democratization of North Korea. Drawing on this understanding, the article focuses on th
{"title":"Paradox of Neoliberalism: Arab Spring's Implications on North Korea","authors":"Sang-soo Lee","doi":"10.3172/NKR.8.1.53","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3172/NKR.8.1.53","url":null,"abstract":"IntroductionThe Arab Spring suggests a transition to a new social order, a new phase of modern capitalism. The Arab states sit at a critical moment in which old institutions are frail, and what they do over the next few years will lay the groundwork for the next generation's institutionalized \"rule of capitalism.\"1 It is clear that Arab regimes were deeply unpopular and faced serious demographic, economic, and political problems.The young Egyptian university graduate who burned himself to death yearning for democratization triggered democratic uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The democratic wind has been blown by the Arab youth who attempted to topple dictators. The democratic movement in Tunisia has bestowed a momentum to the Egyptian democratic uprising. The winds have swept through to Iran, Libya, and Bahrain in the wake of the Tunisian democratic movement. In spite of the brutal crackdown by the authoritarian regimes, the independent democratic movement of the Arab states has gained support from democratic society. \"People all over the Arab world feel a sense of pride in shaking off decades of cowed passivity under dictatorships that ruled with no deference to popular wishes.\"2 The kind of collective actions most likely to change the existing social structure are likely to be triggered by members of disadvantaged groups.3 The state's failure to meet the needs of the people and to represent their will may cause class struggle where rival class forces fight to control the vital political organs that wield immense power.4 North Korea as a failed state has considerable potential to be overthrown by mass collective action. Robert I. Rotberg has classified political goods in five categories-safety and security, rule of law and transparency, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development. Failed states are those states that fall below a threshold of political goods and fail to satisfy the safety and security minimums.5 \"Given the scarcity of food supplies in North Korea, given its lack of human capital and other human capacities, and given the long poverty of internal discourse within the state, the removal of state security will plunge the otherwise failed state straight into true failure and, likely collapse.\"6 A nation-state fails when citizens finally perceive that its rulers are running the state as a criminal enterprise to their own advantage and the state no longer cares about most of its inhabitants.Against this backdrop, the feasibility of a democratic movement in North Korea is on the rise. Conditions for a democratic uprising in North Korea are growing gradually. There are many cautious predictions that a democratic movement can happen in North Korea eventually. The democratic movement in North Korea might be somewhat different from the Arab democratic movement.This article briefly reviews the feasibility of the democratization of North Korea. Drawing on this understanding, the article focuses on th","PeriodicalId":40013,"journal":{"name":"North Korean Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69765434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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