In Roe v. Wade2 the Supreme Court affirmed three propositions about the status of unborn children as human persons. The first proposition was that the unborn are not constitutional persons. The Court asserted that the word “person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn (156). This conclusion was important because, as the Court plainly stated, the case for abortion liberty would otherwise, “collapse..., for the fetus’s right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment” (156–67). The Court concluded, more specifically, that if the unborn were recognized as constitutional persons, only abortions to save a pregnant woman’s life could be consistent with equal respect for the life of the unborn.3 Writing for the Roe Court, Justice Blackmun treated the constitutional-person question as one about past legal usage, as an inquiry about a technical term whose meaning in Roe depended upon how it was understood in the nineteenth century. He considered just two kinds of historical evidence
在罗伊诉韦德案(Roe v. wade)中，最高法院确认了关于未出生婴儿作为人的地位的三项主张。第一个主张是未出生的人不是宪法规定的人。最高法院断言，第十四修正案中使用的“人”一词不包括未出生的胎儿(156)。这一结论很重要，因为正如最高法院明确指出的那样，否则堕胎自由的情况将“崩溃……，因为胎儿的生命权将得到修正案的具体保障”(156-67)。法院的结论更具体地说，如果未出生的人被承认为宪法人，只有为挽救孕妇的生命而堕胎才符合对未出生者生命的平等尊重布莱克蒙法官在为罗伊案法院撰写的意见书中，将宪法人问题视为一个关于过去法律用法的问题，作为一个关于一个技术术语的问题，这个术语在罗伊案中的含义取决于19世纪对它的理解。他只考虑了两种历史证据
{"title":"Constitutional and Other Persons","authors":"G. Bradley","doi":"10.5840/QD20155221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20155221","url":null,"abstract":"In Roe v. Wade2 the Supreme Court affirmed three propositions about the status of unborn children as human persons. The first proposition was that the unborn are not constitutional persons. The Court asserted that the word “person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn (156). This conclusion was important because, as the Court plainly stated, the case for abortion liberty would otherwise, “collapse..., for the fetus’s right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment” (156–67). The Court concluded, more specifically, that if the unborn were recognized as constitutional persons, only abortions to save a pregnant woman’s life could be consistent with equal respect for the life of the unborn.3 Writing for the Roe Court, Justice Blackmun treated the constitutional-person question as one about past legal usage, as an inquiry about a technical term whose meaning in Roe depended upon how it was understood in the nineteenth century. He considered just two kinds of historical evidence","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75376519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When scholars over the past forty years have proposed definitions of ‘bioethics,’ they have usually addressed the question in terms of methodology:1 do we start with an analytical framework of abstract principles (Beauchamp and Childress),2 or the particularities of individual cases (John Arras, Jonsen and Toulmin);3 do we follow a neo-Kantian method (Alan Donagan),4 a more explicitly Christian approach,5 a narrative-based approach,6 a utilitarian,7 or
{"title":"Bioethics: Ethico-Centric Interdisciplinarity","authors":"E. Brugger","doi":"10.5840/QD20155218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20155218","url":null,"abstract":"When scholars over the past forty years have proposed definitions of ‘bioethics,’ they have usually addressed the question in terms of methodology:1 do we start with an analytical framework of abstract principles (Beauchamp and Childress),2 or the particularities of individual cases (John Arras, Jonsen and Toulmin);3 do we follow a neo-Kantian method (Alan Donagan),4 a more explicitly Christian approach,5 a narrative-based approach,6 a utilitarian,7 or","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90109505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the last decade the marriage laws in many jurisdictions, including Canada where I live, have been changed so as to allow couples of the same sex to be deemed to be married, that is, given the opportunity to marry legally with the result that same sex couples have the legal status—comprised of the legal rights, liberties, and duties that together specify it—which was enjoyed previously only by heterosexual married couples. This trend in the marriage law in Western countries seems unlikely to be reversed in the near future, and, indeed, appears more likely to continue—and perhaps to accelerate—in the present political and jurisprudential climate that so favors equality. This new legal regime seems likely to become the new normal. This change in the law is understood by both its proponents and opponents to be significant. Proponents highlight the greater equality created between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Opponents highlight the radical implications of the new regime for the social forms within which people understand and carry out very basic relationships, including sexual and family relationships and child rearing. These relationships play a central role in personal and communal life, and, within the traditional monotheistic religions, including Catholicism, in understanding the relationship of human beings to God. As a result, Catholics, along with others sharing their evaluation of what is at stake in marriage, have reason to take the measure of this change in the law of marriage, its implications, and the consequences of the new social reality caused by that change. Doing this will allow for the needed assessment of the steps that are to be taken to deal with this new reality, particularly as it affects their own understanding and practice of Christian marriage. Such an assessment will rely on some of the considerations that figure in a strictly philosophical evaluation of the new regime of marriage law. But the evaluation I undertake here begins with a premise which secular reflection generally should avoid—namely, the normative dominance for Catholics of the Catholic teaching about and practice of marriage. It might appear that the change in the civil law of marriage should be of little concern to Catholics, because the new regime of marriage does not pretend to alter the marriage practices of Catholics and other tradition-
{"title":"The New Regime of Marriage Law: Its Significance for Catholic Life","authors":"J. Boyle","doi":"10.5840/qd20155222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/qd20155222","url":null,"abstract":"During the last decade the marriage laws in many jurisdictions, including Canada where I live, have been changed so as to allow couples of the same sex to be deemed to be married, that is, given the opportunity to marry legally with the result that same sex couples have the legal status—comprised of the legal rights, liberties, and duties that together specify it—which was enjoyed previously only by heterosexual married couples. This trend in the marriage law in Western countries seems unlikely to be reversed in the near future, and, indeed, appears more likely to continue—and perhaps to accelerate—in the present political and jurisprudential climate that so favors equality. This new legal regime seems likely to become the new normal. This change in the law is understood by both its proponents and opponents to be significant. Proponents highlight the greater equality created between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Opponents highlight the radical implications of the new regime for the social forms within which people understand and carry out very basic relationships, including sexual and family relationships and child rearing. These relationships play a central role in personal and communal life, and, within the traditional monotheistic religions, including Catholicism, in understanding the relationship of human beings to God. As a result, Catholics, along with others sharing their evaluation of what is at stake in marriage, have reason to take the measure of this change in the law of marriage, its implications, and the consequences of the new social reality caused by that change. Doing this will allow for the needed assessment of the steps that are to be taken to deal with this new reality, particularly as it affects their own understanding and practice of Christian marriage. Such an assessment will rely on some of the considerations that figure in a strictly philosophical evaluation of the new regime of marriage law. But the evaluation I undertake here begins with a premise which secular reflection generally should avoid—namely, the normative dominance for Catholics of the Catholic teaching about and practice of marriage. It might appear that the change in the civil law of marriage should be of little concern to Catholics, because the new regime of marriage does not pretend to alter the marriage practices of Catholics and other tradition-","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81785002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As a scientist, I have written and spoken about the topic of human embryology for many years, and I am continuously reminded of both the mystery surrounding human embryos and of the passionate feelings they evoke. The prenatal origin of human life has fascinated biologists, philosophers, and religious thinkers for a very long time.1 Yet in the modern age, thinking about the earliest stages of human life—and considering the value of life at its very beginning—has become entangled with some of the most emotionally compelling issues society and individuals face, including the bearing of children, the relief of human suffering, and the pursuit of scientific knowledge. For the vast majority of human history, prenatal development has been a profound mystery. A host of folklore, mythology, and religious beliefs have arisen surrounding the origin of human life, but until quite recently, we knew very little for certain beyond the basics that can be readily observed; that after a period of confinement lasting approximately nine months, a baby is brought forth from the mother’s womb with much effort and with considerable risk to both mother and child. Over the last several decades, science has begun to unravel the mysteries of human development. Yet despite these advances in our understanding, in many ways, the true nature of our embryonic origin remains shrouded in darkness, mystery, and controversy. One of the challenges we face in thinking about the human embryo is that embryonic development falls outside every-day human experience. Typically, we formulate our opinions about the world based on what we observe, what we feel about our observations, and what we conclude from these observational and emotional events. We develop an intuitive sense of what things are and how they fit into our lives based on our experiences with them over time. This kind of intuitive understanding allows us to overcome our immediate reactions in favor of what we know to be true overall—even when appearances might beg to differ. For example, many of us, quite understandably, react to human toddlers as members of an alien species. They are louder, messier, and consider-
{"title":"Human Embryology: Science Politics versus Science Facts","authors":"M. Condic","doi":"10.5840/QD20155220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20155220","url":null,"abstract":"As a scientist, I have written and spoken about the topic of human embryology for many years, and I am continuously reminded of both the mystery surrounding human embryos and of the passionate feelings they evoke. The prenatal origin of human life has fascinated biologists, philosophers, and religious thinkers for a very long time.1 Yet in the modern age, thinking about the earliest stages of human life—and considering the value of life at its very beginning—has become entangled with some of the most emotionally compelling issues society and individuals face, including the bearing of children, the relief of human suffering, and the pursuit of scientific knowledge. For the vast majority of human history, prenatal development has been a profound mystery. A host of folklore, mythology, and religious beliefs have arisen surrounding the origin of human life, but until quite recently, we knew very little for certain beyond the basics that can be readily observed; that after a period of confinement lasting approximately nine months, a baby is brought forth from the mother’s womb with much effort and with considerable risk to both mother and child. Over the last several decades, science has begun to unravel the mysteries of human development. Yet despite these advances in our understanding, in many ways, the true nature of our embryonic origin remains shrouded in darkness, mystery, and controversy. One of the challenges we face in thinking about the human embryo is that embryonic development falls outside every-day human experience. Typically, we formulate our opinions about the world based on what we observe, what we feel about our observations, and what we conclude from these observational and emotional events. We develop an intuitive sense of what things are and how they fit into our lives based on our experiences with them over time. This kind of intuitive understanding allows us to overcome our immediate reactions in favor of what we know to be true overall—even when appearances might beg to differ. For example, many of us, quite understandably, react to human toddlers as members of an alien species. They are louder, messier, and consider-","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86889439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We do not call people holy unless they are outstanding morally. Originally, however, the word holy signified the mysterious and awesome reality of the divine. We use the word in that sense in the Gloria: “You alone are the Holy One.” But even those who believed in gods that were anything but morally excellent thought of them as holy. Taking holy to mean the mysteriousness and awesomeness of the divine, people of every religion also used the word to refer to things related to the divinity they worshipped. We too speak of holy pictures and holy water, things incapable of the moral qualities and great charity of a Thomas More or an Angela Merici. How, then, did holiness come to connote moral excellence? In his relationship with Israel, God manifested fidelity and loving kindness, righteousness and compassion (see Ex 34.6–7). And he directed Moses to teach the Israelites to imitate his holiness: “Say to all the congregation of the people of Israel, You shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy” (Lv 19.2). Because Yahweh not only is mighty and terrible but loving and faithful, his chosen people must walk in his ways, love him, and keep his commandments—which he gives them for their own good. Insofar as God’s people sin, they will not be holy but unlike him and alien to him. The New Testament presupposes the Old Testament’s teaching that God communicates holiness to human beings. The new covenant’s communication of holiness, however, is far more profound, for Jesus is the one “called holy, the Son of God” (Lk 1.35). By perfect obedience to the Father, he frees humankind from sin and radically transforms those who believe in him, so that he can present them to the Father: “holy and blameless and irreproachable” (Col 1.22). Thus, moral excellence is not only required of Christians (see, Rom 6.15–23, 8.1–17, 12.1–2; Gal 5.13–6.10) but realized in them as the fruit of charity—of the love of God poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given them (see Jn 13.34; 14.15, 21–24; 15.9–14; Rom 5.5; 13.8–10; 1 Cor 13; Gal 5.13–16).
{"title":"The Call to Holiness and Personal Vocation","authors":"G. Grisez","doi":"10.5840/QD20155217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20155217","url":null,"abstract":"We do not call people holy unless they are outstanding morally. Originally, however, the word holy signified the mysterious and awesome reality of the divine. We use the word in that sense in the Gloria: “You alone are the Holy One.” But even those who believed in gods that were anything but morally excellent thought of them as holy. Taking holy to mean the mysteriousness and awesomeness of the divine, people of every religion also used the word to refer to things related to the divinity they worshipped. We too speak of holy pictures and holy water, things incapable of the moral qualities and great charity of a Thomas More or an Angela Merici. How, then, did holiness come to connote moral excellence? In his relationship with Israel, God manifested fidelity and loving kindness, righteousness and compassion (see Ex 34.6–7). And he directed Moses to teach the Israelites to imitate his holiness: “Say to all the congregation of the people of Israel, You shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy” (Lv 19.2). Because Yahweh not only is mighty and terrible but loving and faithful, his chosen people must walk in his ways, love him, and keep his commandments—which he gives them for their own good. Insofar as God’s people sin, they will not be holy but unlike him and alien to him. The New Testament presupposes the Old Testament’s teaching that God communicates holiness to human beings. The new covenant’s communication of holiness, however, is far more profound, for Jesus is the one “called holy, the Son of God” (Lk 1.35). By perfect obedience to the Father, he frees humankind from sin and radically transforms those who believe in him, so that he can present them to the Father: “holy and blameless and irreproachable” (Col 1.22). Thus, moral excellence is not only required of Christians (see, Rom 6.15–23, 8.1–17, 12.1–2; Gal 5.13–6.10) but realized in them as the fruit of charity—of the love of God poured forth in their hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given them (see Jn 13.34; 14.15, 21–24; 15.9–14; Rom 5.5; 13.8–10; 1 Cor 13; Gal 5.13–16).","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86575336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A well-intentioned concern for the alleviation of suffering—the “relief of man’s estate,” in Francis Bacon’s words—motivates much of modern science, medicine, and biomedical research.1 Such commonality is possible because man’s estate is one of suffering, pervasive suffering. It includes the suffering of disease and disability, obviously, and this is the focus of those parts of medicine that seek to cure. But it also includes the suffering brought about by both our mortality and our awareness of that mortality; by our limitations in the face of nature, including our own biological nature; by our persistently bad choices, bearing both upon ourselves and on others, and by the corresponding bad choices of those others; and by the fact that our reach always exceeds our grasp, leaving us frustrated in our desires and pursuits. Suffering follows upon each of these features of our condition, and we are quick to respond with the resources of modern medicine and biotechnology: we cure what disease and disability we can; we seek to provide relief for incurable suffering; some seek to end the lives of those whose suffering is intolerable; and the most visionary of us look to the days when the sources of our suffering will have been more thoroughly addressed, not only by the elimination of disease and disability, but also by the indefinite extension of the human life span, and the vast increase of our capacities, such that all that we desire lies within reach. But if concern for suffering runs like a thread through the entirety of our medical and biotechnological world, how is it that this world is so riven with disagreement? If there is a common enemy—human suffering— why cannot we all just rally around the flag, and defeat it together? It is surely not the case that so-called bio-conservatives want to suffer, though this caricature seems sometimes to be drawn by their opponents; so why are there bio-conservatives, people who shout “stop!” at some efforts, at least, to end suffering?2
{"title":"Suffering, Enhancement, and Human Goods","authors":"C. Tollefsen","doi":"10.5840/QD20155223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20155223","url":null,"abstract":"A well-intentioned concern for the alleviation of suffering—the “relief of man’s estate,” in Francis Bacon’s words—motivates much of modern science, medicine, and biomedical research.1 Such commonality is possible because man’s estate is one of suffering, pervasive suffering. It includes the suffering of disease and disability, obviously, and this is the focus of those parts of medicine that seek to cure. But it also includes the suffering brought about by both our mortality and our awareness of that mortality; by our limitations in the face of nature, including our own biological nature; by our persistently bad choices, bearing both upon ourselves and on others, and by the corresponding bad choices of those others; and by the fact that our reach always exceeds our grasp, leaving us frustrated in our desires and pursuits. Suffering follows upon each of these features of our condition, and we are quick to respond with the resources of modern medicine and biotechnology: we cure what disease and disability we can; we seek to provide relief for incurable suffering; some seek to end the lives of those whose suffering is intolerable; and the most visionary of us look to the days when the sources of our suffering will have been more thoroughly addressed, not only by the elimination of disease and disability, but also by the indefinite extension of the human life span, and the vast increase of our capacities, such that all that we desire lies within reach. But if concern for suffering runs like a thread through the entirety of our medical and biotechnological world, how is it that this world is so riven with disagreement? If there is a common enemy—human suffering— why cannot we all just rally around the flag, and defeat it together? It is surely not the case that so-called bio-conservatives want to suffer, though this caricature seems sometimes to be drawn by their opponents; so why are there bio-conservatives, people who shout “stop!” at some efforts, at least, to end suffering?2","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88391239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Every day each of us has to decide what we are going to do; we are faced with choices. Should I, on coming to a stop light showing yellow, drive through the intersection if I am in a hurry to meet an important person in a company I want to work for? If I am filling out my income tax or expense report for my employer, should I “pad” it by claiming thirty charitable contributions under $50.00 for my tax report—they do not require written proof—and by claiming as business expenses meals and car rentals that were primarily for personal—not business—use even though one of ten meals was with a business client? To choose the morally good alternative and carry it out in act we need a criterion to distinguish morally good from morally bad alternatives of choice. We can exclude different types of consequentialism such as utilitarianism because consequentialism in all its forms holds as morally good those actions that bring about more benefits for people than would an alternative choice, irrespective of the means elected to produce the benefit. Their motto is “The most good for the most number of people,” even if this choice necessarily includes bringing harm, even death, on a smaller number of people. Consequentialists of all stripes (i.e., act and rule utilitarians, proportionalists, etc.) forget, however, that human acts—ones that we freely choose and are not chosen because our heredity and/or environment determines us to choose—not only “get things done,” (i.e., bring about results or consequences), but also—and more importantly—“get things said.” People recognize this because we commonly say that ‘actions speak louder than words.’ Expressed more technically, human acts are self-reflexive, abiding in the agent as dispositions to engage in similar acts of the same kind. We can indeed truly say that we make ourselves to be the kind of persons we are—selfish or self-giving, turned in on ourselves, or receptive of others—in, and through, the deeds we freely choose to do every day. So true is this that we can say that our integral, existential character as moral persons is shaped by our everyday freely chosen deeds, good and bad. We make ourselves to be the persons we are in, and through, the choices, good and bad, we make each day of our lives.
{"title":"How Are We To Make Good Moral Choices and Do What Is Morally Good?","authors":"W. May","doi":"10.5840/QD20155219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20155219","url":null,"abstract":"Every day each of us has to decide what we are going to do; we are faced with choices. Should I, on coming to a stop light showing yellow, drive through the intersection if I am in a hurry to meet an important person in a company I want to work for? If I am filling out my income tax or expense report for my employer, should I “pad” it by claiming thirty charitable contributions under $50.00 for my tax report—they do not require written proof—and by claiming as business expenses meals and car rentals that were primarily for personal—not business—use even though one of ten meals was with a business client? To choose the morally good alternative and carry it out in act we need a criterion to distinguish morally good from morally bad alternatives of choice. We can exclude different types of consequentialism such as utilitarianism because consequentialism in all its forms holds as morally good those actions that bring about more benefits for people than would an alternative choice, irrespective of the means elected to produce the benefit. Their motto is “The most good for the most number of people,” even if this choice necessarily includes bringing harm, even death, on a smaller number of people. Consequentialists of all stripes (i.e., act and rule utilitarians, proportionalists, etc.) forget, however, that human acts—ones that we freely choose and are not chosen because our heredity and/or environment determines us to choose—not only “get things done,” (i.e., bring about results or consequences), but also—and more importantly—“get things said.” People recognize this because we commonly say that ‘actions speak louder than words.’ Expressed more technically, human acts are self-reflexive, abiding in the agent as dispositions to engage in similar acts of the same kind. We can indeed truly say that we make ourselves to be the kind of persons we are—selfish or self-giving, turned in on ourselves, or receptive of others—in, and through, the deeds we freely choose to do every day. So true is this that we can say that our integral, existential character as moral persons is shaped by our everyday freely chosen deeds, good and bad. We make ourselves to be the persons we are in, and through, the choices, good and bad, we make each day of our lives.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79195926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper will offer a simple propaedeutic to several salient aspects of Kantian ethics and rational theology in order to demonstrate the necessity of God in Kantian ethics. It will be argued that the loss of God fatally compromises Kantian morality. In pursuit of this end, clarification will be offered for some commonly misunderstood or neglected elements of Kantian ethics which are essential to a holistic view of Kantian morality and essential to the integration of Kantian ethics into a coherent worldview which incorporates his rational theology. The argument advanced in this paper seeks to demonstrate that theism and reason are not at cross purposes, and that a rationalistic system of ethics may in fact include God in a prominent and deeply meaningful way. Kant conceives of a position commonly known as the “argument from morality” which acknowledges that the divine being is in fact closed off to our limited knowledge through speculative reason, but whose existence can be postulated as a necessity of practical reason and our relation to the moral law. While this is not so much a proof as a justification, it is nevertheless found rationally as a postulate of practical reason, a necessary condition of, and for, morality. This is achieved through the ultimate possibility of the summum bonum, something which does not seem possible, yet is necessary for our dedication to the moral law. 1
{"title":"Correcting the Caricature: God and Kant","authors":"Andrew Pfeuffer","doi":"10.5840/QD20155111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20155111","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will offer a simple propaedeutic to several salient aspects of Kantian ethics and rational theology in order to demonstrate the necessity of God in Kantian ethics. It will be argued that the loss of God fatally compromises Kantian morality. In pursuit of this end, clarification will be offered for some commonly misunderstood or neglected elements of Kantian ethics which are essential to a holistic view of Kantian morality and essential to the integration of Kantian ethics into a coherent worldview which incorporates his rational theology. The argument advanced in this paper seeks to demonstrate that theism and reason are not at cross purposes, and that a rationalistic system of ethics may in fact include God in a prominent and deeply meaningful way. Kant conceives of a position commonly known as the “argument from morality” which acknowledges that the divine being is in fact closed off to our limited knowledge through speculative reason, but whose existence can be postulated as a necessity of practical reason and our relation to the moral law. While this is not so much a proof as a justification, it is nevertheless found rationally as a postulate of practical reason, a necessary condition of, and for, morality. This is achieved through the ultimate possibility of the summum bonum, something which does not seem possible, yet is necessary for our dedication to the moral law. 1","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88673982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
that kind of thing.” He was telling us, that is, that his moral code depends on does not say that he ought to do what he does, unless he can be construed to mean that what I like to do (or what I choose to do) is what I ought to do. But like ought not to do it.” Nor, of right to be helped if they are suffering or in trouble. On the contrary, he famously commented that such supposed rights are nonsense on stilts; that is, that the notion of a natural right is unintelligible. morality seems to be centred on the sense of the moral force of it—is intelligible, let alone useful.
{"title":"Must Morality be Grounded on God?","authors":"J. Rist","doi":"10.5840/QD2015512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2015512","url":null,"abstract":"that kind of thing.” He was telling us, that is, that his moral code depends on does not say that he ought to do what he does, unless he can be construed to mean that what I like to do (or what I choose to do) is what I ought to do. But like ought not to do it.” Nor, of right to be helped if they are suffering or in trouble. On the contrary, he famously commented that such supposed rights are nonsense on stilts; that is, that the notion of a natural right is unintelligible. morality seems to be centred on the sense of the moral force of it—is intelligible, let alone useful.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2015-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74944065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：