Pub Date : 2017-12-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2017.12.15.3.359
B. Early, Christopher R. Way
If countries invest in acquiring missile technology, does that in turn raise their likelihood of obtaining nuclear weapons capabilities? We argue that states that make long-term investments in mastering rocket technology are more likely to become latent nuclear weapons states or acquire nuclear weapons. Investing in the development of scientific and military industrial complexes (SMICs) within the military rocketry sector provides positive spillover from the research infrastructure that is built, the industries and scientific communities that are cultivated, and the lessons derived from managing complex research endeavors. Furthermore, such programs create constituencies that will advocate for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Via a global analysis from 1945 to 2007, we find that possessing mature military rocketry R&D programs, as opposed to simply possessing short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), increases the likelihood that a country will acquire the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. Our findings contribute to the research agendas on the domestic sources of security policy and supply-side theories of nuclear proliferation.
{"title":"First Missiles, then Nukes? Explaining the Connection between Missile Programs and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons","authors":"B. Early, Christopher R. Way","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2017.12.15.3.359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2017.12.15.3.359","url":null,"abstract":"If countries invest in acquiring missile technology, does that in turn raise their likelihood of obtaining nuclear weapons capabilities? We argue that states that make long-term investments in mastering rocket technology are more likely to become latent nuclear weapons states or acquire nuclear weapons. Investing in the development of scientific and military industrial complexes (SMICs) within the military rocketry sector provides positive spillover from the research infrastructure that is built, the industries and scientific communities that are cultivated, and the lessons derived from managing complex research endeavors. Furthermore, such programs create constituencies that will advocate for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Via a global analysis from 1945 to 2007, we find that possessing mature military rocketry R&D programs, as opposed to simply possessing short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), increases the likelihood that a country will acquire the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. Our findings contribute to the research agendas on the domestic sources of security policy and supply-side theories of nuclear proliferation.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"359-389"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48275888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-12-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2017.12.15.3.449
Bumjoon Kwon, K. Lee
Historical reconciliation has been an enduring problem in Northeast Asia and an oft-cited source of the “Asian paradox.” This article examines the varying degrees of reconciliation dynamics observed in the U.S.-Japan, China-Japan, ROK-Japan, and ROK-China dyads in order to provide a more systematic understanding of the “Asian paradox.” Contrary to the conventional wisdom that interstate reconciliation hinges upon a certain set of domestic and/or individual variables, this study posits that the process and outcome of reconciliation are determined by a particular set of structural tendencies exhibited in a dyadic relationship. More specifically, this article contends that the interaction of security and status dilemmas in the post-conflict stage can either foment or forestall reconciliation between former adversary states. Strategic incentives for reconciliation remain low when a dyad experiences a heightened sense of both security and status dilemmas; and the absence of both security and status dilemmas presents structural conditions ripe for meaningful reconciliation. Introducing a simple two-by-two model using the security-status dilemmas hypothesis, this article offers a parsimonious and generalizable theory on international reconciliation from a systemic perspective. Ranging from deep reconciliation (U.S-Japan) to no reconciliation (China-Japan), and shallow reconciliation (ROK-Japan) to latent reconciliation (ROK-China), the case studies illustrate the saliency of the security-status dilemmas model. The findings also suggest that the attendant “Asian paradox” can be construed as a byproduct of the divergent reconciliation dynamics observed in the region.
{"title":"The Structural Sources of Security Tension in Northeast Asia : Reconciliation Dynamics and the Effects of the Security-Status Dilemma","authors":"Bumjoon Kwon, K. Lee","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2017.12.15.3.449","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2017.12.15.3.449","url":null,"abstract":"Historical reconciliation has been an enduring problem in Northeast Asia and an oft-cited source of the “Asian paradox.” This article examines the varying degrees of reconciliation dynamics observed in the U.S.-Japan, China-Japan, ROK-Japan, and ROK-China dyads in order to provide a more systematic understanding of the “Asian paradox.” Contrary to the conventional wisdom that interstate reconciliation hinges upon a certain set of domestic and/or individual variables, this study posits that the process and outcome of reconciliation are determined by a particular set of structural tendencies exhibited in a dyadic relationship. More specifically, this article contends that the interaction of security and status dilemmas in the post-conflict stage can either foment or forestall reconciliation between former adversary states. Strategic incentives for reconciliation remain low when a dyad experiences a heightened sense of both security and status dilemmas; and the absence of both security and status dilemmas presents structural conditions ripe for meaningful reconciliation. Introducing a simple two-by-two model using the security-status dilemmas hypothesis, this article offers a parsimonious and generalizable theory on international reconciliation from a systemic perspective. Ranging from deep reconciliation (U.S-Japan) to no reconciliation (China-Japan), and shallow reconciliation (ROK-Japan) to latent reconciliation (ROK-China), the case studies illustrate the saliency of the security-status dilemmas model. The findings also suggest that the attendant “Asian paradox” can be construed as a byproduct of the divergent reconciliation dynamics observed in the region.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"449-482"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2017-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49655805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-31DOI: 10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.247
Lim Seong-Ho
How do U.S. administrations occasionally achieve significant policy progress and sustain policy governance despite the usual political turmoil that seemingly bogs down the legislative process? This paper answers this question theoretically, takes an empirical look into U.S. nuclear power policy as an illustrating case, and draws comparative implications for South Korean politics. The theoretical rationale employed here suggests that political conflicts and legislative gridlock motivate the president and administrative actors to bypass the legislative process and unilaterally resort to the use of executive tools in pursuing their policy agendas. Neither able to lead by themselves nor willing to take the blame for policy failures, calculating lawmakers would condone executive unilateralism by strategically acquiescing and would try for rent-seeking by ex post facto oversight. This theoretical rationale is supported by an inquiry into executive-legislative relations with respect to U.S. nuclear power policymaking. Comparatively, however, South Korean politics features no such dual presence of executive unilateralism and strategic condoning by the legislature, consequently suffering chronic woes regarding policy governance. The difference between the two countries is explained in terms of strategic calculations, or a lack thereof, on the part of legislators and executive officials. The presence or absence of these strategic calculations, in turn, depends on the varying degrees of partisan rigidity and the (in)effectiveness of legislative oversight measures.
{"title":"Legislative Gridlock, Executive Unilateralism, and Policy Governance: The Implications of U.S. Nuclear Power Policymaking for Korean Politics","authors":"Lim Seong-Ho","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.247","url":null,"abstract":"How do U.S. administrations occasionally achieve significant policy progress and sustain policy governance despite the usual political turmoil that seemingly bogs down the legislative process? This paper answers this question theoretically, takes an empirical look into U.S. nuclear power policy as an illustrating case, and draws comparative implications for South Korean politics. The theoretical rationale employed here suggests that political conflicts and legislative gridlock motivate the president and administrative actors to bypass the legislative process and unilaterally resort to the use of executive tools in pursuing their policy agendas. Neither able to lead by themselves nor willing to take the blame for policy failures, calculating lawmakers would condone executive unilateralism by strategically acquiescing and would try for rent-seeking by ex post facto oversight. This theoretical rationale is supported by an inquiry into executive-legislative relations with respect to U.S. nuclear power policymaking. Comparatively, however, South Korean politics features no such dual presence of executive unilateralism and strategic condoning by the legislature, consequently suffering chronic woes regarding policy governance. The difference between the two countries is explained in terms of strategic calculations, or a lack thereof, on the part of legislators and executive officials. The presence or absence of these strategic calculations, in turn, depends on the varying degrees of partisan rigidity and the (in)effectiveness of legislative oversight measures.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"247-274"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2017-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42461099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2017.08.15.2.275
Taeeun Min
Who are the protectionists in the United States? This paper aims to answer this question. Specifically, I explore whether regional industrial features matter. I also examine whether the economically insecure, who were highlighted as swing vot ers in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, are protectionists. My empirical findings suggest that American preferences for free trade agreements are decided by eco nomic motives. Specifically, evidence indicates that Americans living in the states with higher shares of manufacturing employment are more likely to hold more negative attitudes toward free trade agreements between the United States and other countries. I also find that all the suggested swing voters in 2016 are not pro -tectionists. Millennials with lower family income are less supportive of trade deals. However, they are not protectionists. In addition, white men with higher, not lower, family income are more likely to see free trade deals as a bad thing.
{"title":"American Attitudes toward Free Trade Agreements","authors":"Taeeun Min","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2017.08.15.2.275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2017.08.15.2.275","url":null,"abstract":"Who are the protectionists in the United States? This paper aims to answer this question. Specifically, I explore whether regional industrial features matter. I also examine whether the economically insecure, who were highlighted as swing vot ers in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, are protectionists. My empirical findings suggest that American preferences for free trade agreements are decided by eco nomic motives. Specifically, evidence indicates that Americans living in the states with higher shares of manufacturing employment are more likely to hold more negative attitudes toward free trade agreements between the United States and other countries. I also find that all the suggested swing voters in 2016 are not pro -tectionists. Millennials with lower family income are less supportive of trade deals. However, they are not protectionists. In addition, white men with higher, not lower, family income are more likely to see free trade deals as a bad thing.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"275-291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2017-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43814558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-31DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2017.08.15.2.191
Jungsub Shin
The state of the economy and the extent of corruption have been considered two significant factors predicting the success of incumbent parties in elections. However, the effects of economic growth and the perceived level of government corruption on an incumbent party’s electoral fortunes vary across countries. Why do the strengths of economic voting or corruption voting vary and under what conditions does their influence become weaker or stronger? This paper attempts to answer these questions using the following rationale: the economy may become a less salient election issue in affluent societies, or other competing issues such as corruption may become more salient. Similarly, corruption may become less salient in trustworthy societies, or other competing issues such as the economy may become more salient. Based on this logic, this paper hypothesizes that economic voting becomes weaker as a country’s national wealth increases (based on GDP per capita) and as voters’ perceived level of government corruption increases. Moreover, corruption voting becomes weaker in countries where government is perceived to be highly accountable and when there is great progress or severe downturns in economic growth. By examining 92 elections from 41 democracies between 1996 and 2011, this paper finds empirical evidence supporting the hypotheses. The strength of the relationship between economic growth and an incumbent party’s vote share decreases as GDP per capita or perceived level of government corruption increases, whereas the extent to which perceived government corruption influences incumbent party vote share decreases as the absolute level of government corruption increases or GDP per capita severely changes.
{"title":"The Economy, Corruption, and Conditional Voting : A Cross-National Analysis","authors":"Jungsub Shin","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2017.08.15.2.191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2017.08.15.2.191","url":null,"abstract":"The state of the economy and the extent of corruption have been considered two significant factors predicting the success of incumbent parties in elections. However, the effects of economic growth and the perceived level of government corruption on an incumbent party’s electoral fortunes vary across countries. Why do the strengths of economic voting or corruption voting vary and under what conditions does their influence become weaker or stronger? This paper attempts to answer these questions using the following rationale: the economy may become a less salient election issue in affluent societies, or other competing issues such as corruption may become more salient. Similarly, corruption may become less salient in trustworthy societies, or other competing issues such as the economy may become more salient. Based on this logic, this paper hypothesizes that economic voting becomes weaker as a country’s national wealth increases (based on GDP per capita) and as voters’ perceived level of government corruption increases. Moreover, corruption voting becomes weaker in countries where government is perceived to be highly accountable and when there is great progress or severe downturns in economic growth. By examining 92 elections from 41 democracies between 1996 and 2011, this paper finds empirical evidence supporting the hypotheses. The strength of the relationship between economic growth and an incumbent party’s vote share decreases as GDP per capita or perceived level of government corruption increases, whereas the extent to which perceived government corruption influences incumbent party vote share decreases as the absolute level of government corruption increases or GDP per capita severely changes.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"191-218"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2017-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47141125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-31DOI: 10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.165
M. Bas, Elena V. McLean, Taehee Whang
This study focuses on sources of uncertainty in two substantive areas of international security: militarized disputes and economic sanctions. We revisit realist and liberal debates as two long-standing paradigmatic approaches that address the role of uncertainty, and draw on their insights to identify key variables that represent sources of uncertainty. We evaluate these variables’ effects on uncertainty using a heteroskedastic probit model and data on disputes and sanctions. We find that measures of power parity, system multipolarity, joint democracy and trade are significantly linked to levels of uncertainty for disputes and military conflict. For sanctions, only realist variables affect uncertainty levels. We also find some evidence of a substitution effect suggesting that factors that increase the likelihood of military conflict and the amount of uncertainty about military options tend to have the opposite effect when it comes to sanctions.
{"title":"Uncertainty in International Crises","authors":"M. Bas, Elena V. McLean, Taehee Whang","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.165","url":null,"abstract":"This study focuses on sources of uncertainty in two substantive areas of international security: militarized disputes and economic sanctions. We revisit realist and liberal debates as two long-standing paradigmatic approaches that address the role of uncertainty, and draw on their insights to identify key variables that represent sources of uncertainty. We evaluate these variables’ effects on uncertainty using a heteroskedastic probit model and data on disputes and sanctions. We find that measures of power parity, system multipolarity, joint democracy and trade are significantly linked to levels of uncertainty for disputes and military conflict. For sanctions, only realist variables affect uncertainty levels. We also find some evidence of a substitution effect suggesting that factors that increase the likelihood of military conflict and the amount of uncertainty about military options tend to have the opposite effect when it comes to sanctions.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"165-189"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2017-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44644437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-31DOI: 10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.219
Min-hua Huang, W. Hong
Many studies have shown that Internet use may be a driver of real world political participation. However, we still have a lot to learn about the dynamics of this relationship. This article elaborates this relationship by exploring the effect of different types of Internet use (including social media) on participation in real world political activism. We also explain how two contextual factors – regime type (level of authoritarianism) and the level of government control over the Internet (level of Internet control) interact and affect the relationship between Internet use and political activism. Our findings in general corroborate the expected positive and significant relationship between Internet use and political activism. However, this relationship is highly contingent on how the level of authoritarianism and level of Internet control interact, producing two contrasting patterns of relationships between Internet use and political activism, labeled as “digital revolution” and “digital dominance.” We find that one-party authoritarian regimes are closer to the “digital dominance” type, meaning that the interaction between regime type and Internet control weakens the relationship between Internet use and political activism; how-ever, in limited democracies or democracies with excessive Internet control or authoritarianism, citizens’ participation in political activism through online channels is emboldened, producing the “digital revolution” type. In democracies with little Internet control, citizens may have an incentive to participate in political activism through the Internet, but institutional rules that allow rotation of power might prevent either “digital dominance” or “digital revolution” from developing.
{"title":"Digital Revolution or Digital Dominance? Regime Type, Internet Control, and Political Activism in East Asia","authors":"Min-hua Huang, W. Hong","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.219","url":null,"abstract":"Many studies have shown that Internet use may be a driver of real world political participation. However, we still have a lot to learn about the dynamics of this relationship. This article elaborates this relationship by exploring the effect of different types of Internet use (including social media) on participation in real world political activism. We also explain how two contextual factors – regime type (level of authoritarianism) and the level of government control over the Internet (level of Internet control) interact and affect the relationship between Internet use and political activism. Our findings in general corroborate the expected positive and significant relationship between Internet use and political activism. However, this relationship is highly contingent on how the level of authoritarianism and level of Internet control interact, producing two contrasting patterns of relationships between Internet use and political activism, labeled as “digital revolution” and “digital dominance.” We find that one-party authoritarian regimes are closer to the “digital dominance” type, meaning that the interaction between regime type and Internet control weakens the relationship between Internet use and political activism; how-ever, in limited democracies or democracies with excessive Internet control or authoritarianism, citizens’ participation in political activism through online channels is emboldened, producing the “digital revolution” type. In democracies with little Internet control, citizens may have an incentive to participate in political activism through the Internet, but institutional rules that allow rotation of power might prevent either “digital dominance” or “digital revolution” from developing.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"219-245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2017-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48247175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-30DOI: 10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.293
Hwa-jung Kim
{"title":"Bridging the Theoretical Gap between Public Diplomacy and Cultural Diplomacy","authors":"Hwa-jung Kim","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2017.08.15.2.293","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"293-326"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2017-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45769446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-04-30DOI: 10.14731/KJIS.2017.04.15.1.85
Vee Chansa-Ngavej, K. Lee
The puzzle of whether or not Area Studies needs its own theories to progress as a social science is as old as the discipline itself. The question has been revisited several times throughout the evolution of the field, most apparent in the “area scholars vs. universalists” debate. This paper argues that area studies does not need its own specific theories per se. As an amalgamation of several social science disciplines, area studies is already well positioned to advance scientific knowledge. More attention should instead be focused on how to move from a multidisciplinary to a transdisciplinary approach, with the ultimate goal of achieving “area science.” Recently renewed interest in the subfield of comparative area studies can provide a path forward. Such foundations will enable area studies to contribute to theory building in other social science subjects while also garnering respect for itself as an academic discipline. Otherwise, area studies could become a rudderless scholastic blackhole that is neither systematic nor standardized. What is at stake in this puzzle, therefore, is the very future of area studies itself.
{"title":"Does Area Studies Need Theory? Revisiting the Debate on the Future of Area Studies","authors":"Vee Chansa-Ngavej, K. Lee","doi":"10.14731/KJIS.2017.04.15.1.85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/KJIS.2017.04.15.1.85","url":null,"abstract":"The puzzle of whether or not Area Studies needs its own theories to progress as a social science is as old as the discipline itself. The question has been revisited several times throughout the evolution of the field, most apparent in the “area scholars vs. universalists” debate. This paper argues that area studies does not need its own specific theories per se. As an amalgamation of several social science disciplines, area studies is already well positioned to advance scientific knowledge. More attention should instead be focused on how to move from a multidisciplinary to a transdisciplinary approach, with the ultimate goal of achieving “area science.” Recently renewed interest in the subfield of comparative area studies can provide a path forward. Such foundations will enable area studies to contribute to theory building in other social science subjects while also garnering respect for itself as an academic discipline. Otherwise, area studies could become a rudderless scholastic blackhole that is neither systematic nor standardized. What is at stake in this puzzle, therefore, is the very future of area studies itself.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"85-101"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2017-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45638762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-04-30DOI: 10.14731/kjis.2017.04.15.1.1
S. Harnisch, Gordon M. Friedrichs
Pundits and policymakers have articulated growing concerns about a coming clash between the U.S. and China. In this view, the U.S. Pivot to Asia is a (merely hidden) attempt of the Obama administration to preempt the competition with Beijing through strengthening a formidable web of military alliances and partnerships to frustrate Chinese ambitions. If this interpretation was true, U.S. allies in the region would heed Washington’s call to arms, because their military dependence would make them comply. Our role theoretical appraisal of the U.S. Pivot and reactions suggests that the material dynamics of security dilemmas in the region have been exaggerated: both, factions within the U.S. and U.S.’ allies, Japan and South Korea, differ considerably in casting China as a military threat while they continue to treat China as an economic partner. Focusing on the social structure of security dilemmas, we examine role taking behavior by U.S. allies in all three dimensions of the Pivot. We find that security dynamics depend as much on the role-taking of U.S. allies, and their respective historical experiences, as on the alleged intentions of the two protagonists. It follows that security cooperation and/ or competition in Asia is what concerned states as role holder make of it.
{"title":"Alliances Rebalanced? The Social Meaning of the U.S. Pivot and Allies’ Responses in Northeast Asia","authors":"S. Harnisch, Gordon M. Friedrichs","doi":"10.14731/kjis.2017.04.15.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2017.04.15.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"Pundits and policymakers have articulated growing concerns about a coming clash between the U.S. and China. In this view, the U.S. Pivot to Asia is a (merely hidden) attempt of the Obama administration to preempt the competition with Beijing through strengthening a formidable web of military alliances and partnerships to frustrate Chinese ambitions. If this interpretation was true, U.S. allies in the region would heed Washington’s call to arms, because their military dependence would make them comply. Our role theoretical appraisal of the U.S. Pivot and reactions suggests that the material dynamics of security dilemmas in the region have been exaggerated: both, factions within the U.S. and U.S.’ allies, Japan and South Korea, differ considerably in casting China as a military threat while they continue to treat China as an economic partner. Focusing on the social structure of security dilemmas, we examine role taking behavior by U.S. allies in all three dimensions of the Pivot. We find that security dynamics depend as much on the role-taking of U.S. allies, and their respective historical experiences, as on the alleged intentions of the two protagonists. It follows that security cooperation and/ or competition in Asia is what concerned states as role holder make of it.","PeriodicalId":41543,"journal":{"name":"Korean Journal of International Studies","volume":"15 1","pages":"1-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2017-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46386097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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