In this article I respond to objections that Matias Orono, Silvia del Lujan di Saanza, Pedro Stepanenko and Luciana Martinez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics. The objections are both, substantial and instructive. I first sketch my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s doctrine of judgments of taste and then turn to what I take to be the most important criticisms that these authors have put forward. Two difficulties with a non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics seem to be central: the cognitive status of judgments of taste and the representationalist capacity of aesthetic feeling as non-conceptual mental content. I respond to these and additional objections and defend my overall non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics against my critics. I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is highly relevant for the debate over whether or not Kant is a (non-)conceptualist.
在这篇文章中，我回应了Matias Orono、Silvia del Lujan di Saanza、Pedro Stepanenko和Luciana Martinez对我对康德美学的非概念主义解读提出的反对意见。反对意见既有实质性的，也有启发性的。我首先概述了我对康德品味判断学说的非概念主义解读，然后转向我认为这些作者提出的最重要的批评。非概念主义阅读康德美学的两个困难似乎是核心：味觉判断的认知状态和美感作为非概念心理内容的表征能力。我回应了这些和额外的反对意见，并为我对康德美学的整体非概念主义解释辩护，反对我的批评者。我认为康德的美学与康德是否是一个（非）概念主义者的争论是高度相关的。
{"title":"Response to my critics: In defense of Kant’s aesthetic non- conceptualism","authors":"Dietmar Heidemann","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.4304075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.4304075","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I respond to objections that Matias Orono, Silvia del Lujan di Saanza, Pedro Stepanenko and Luciana Martinez have raised against my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics. The objections are both, substantial and instructive. I first sketch my non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s doctrine of judgments of taste and then turn to what I take to be the most important criticisms that these authors have put forward. Two difficulties with a non-conceptualist reading of Kant’s aesthetics seem to be central: the cognitive status of judgments of taste and the representationalist capacity of aesthetic feeling as non-conceptual mental content. I respond to these and additional objections and defend my overall non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics against my critics. I argue that Kant’s aesthetics is highly relevant for the debate over whether or not Kant is a (non-)conceptualist.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"173-190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42277605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
My contribution deals directly with the problem of Kant’s apparent commitment to pan- aestheticism, which is in particular attached to the task of explaining the possibility of the free play of the faculties. The aim is to provide an overview of the ways in which this problem can be confronted and eventually solved. In this regard, one way to deal with this problem consists in revisiting the assumption that the free play of the faculties is to be understood as simply occurring without presupposing any concept. By contrast, one can fully endorse Kant’s commitment to pan- aestheticism and hence focus on how Kant’s account explains the fact that one does not actually experience everything as beautiful. Both of these alternatives, I firmly reject. By remarking upon the merely reflecting status of judgments of taste, I explain why Kant’s account of taste does not lend itself to pan-aestheticism.
{"title":"Can everything be beautiful? Pan-aestheticism and the Kantian puzzle of the free play of the faculties","authors":"E. Romano","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.4304097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.4304097","url":null,"abstract":"My contribution deals directly with the problem of Kant’s apparent commitment to pan- aestheticism, which is in particular attached to the task of explaining the possibility of the free play of the faculties. The aim is to provide an overview of the ways in which this problem can be confronted and eventually solved. In this regard, one way to deal with this problem consists in revisiting the assumption that the free play of the faculties is to be understood as simply occurring without presupposing any concept. By contrast, one can fully endorse Kant’s commitment to pan- aestheticism and hence focus on how Kant’s account explains the fact that one does not actually experience everything as beautiful. Both of these alternatives, I firmly reject. By remarking upon the merely reflecting status of judgments of taste, I explain why Kant’s account of taste does not lend itself to pan-aestheticism.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"292-313"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49636770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In what follows, I will try to show how the sublime reveals a fundamental aspect of the subject as a human being: a striving to comprehend the absolute. Although at first this striving appears to lead to a futile pursuit – we cannot represent the absolute – we ultimately succeed in presenting it (as a symbol or in art), thus re-affirming the fundamental role of intuition for the human being: the need to make our notions, concepts and ideas tangible. The sublime thus appears to be in close relation to an aesthetic idea, symbols and art, manifesting a profound kinship between reason and the imagination.
{"title":"Striving: Feeling the sublime","authors":"Stelios Gadris","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.4304106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.4304106","url":null,"abstract":"In what follows, I will try to show how the sublime reveals a fundamental aspect of the subject as a human being: a striving to comprehend the absolute. Although at first this striving appears to lead to a futile pursuit – we cannot represent the absolute – we ultimately succeed in presenting it (as a symbol or in art), thus re-affirming the fundamental role of intuition for the human being: the need to make our notions, concepts and ideas tangible. The sublime thus appears to be in close relation to an aesthetic idea, symbols and art, manifesting a profound kinship between reason and the imagination.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"358-380"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44384234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The role of the imagination within Kant’s Critical framework remains an issue for any attempt to unify the three Critique s through the Doctrine of the Faculties. This work provides a reading of the imagination that serves to unify the imagination through its formal capacity, or ability to recognize harmony and produce the necessary lawfulness that grounds the possibility of judgment. The argument of this work exists in 2 parts. 1) The imagination’s formal ability is present, yet concealed, as early as the Schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason and reaches its fullest exposition in instances of harmonious free play in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. 2) This formal capacity is key to not only demonstrating the imagination as an original, unified, and independent faculty across Kant’s Critical framework, but also serves as grounds for the purposiveness of nature – a key aspect of Kantian aesthetics.
{"title":"Schematism and Free Play: The Imagination’s Formal Power as a Unifying Feature in Kant’s Doctrine of the Faculties","authors":"Jackson R Hoerth","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.4304099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.4304099","url":null,"abstract":"The role of the imagination within Kant’s Critical framework remains an issue for any attempt to unify the three Critique s through the Doctrine of the Faculties. This work provides a reading of the imagination that serves to unify the imagination through its formal capacity, or ability to recognize harmony and produce the necessary lawfulness that grounds the possibility of judgment. The argument of this work exists in 2 parts. 1) The imagination’s formal ability is present, yet concealed, as early as the Schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason and reaches its fullest exposition in instances of harmonious free play in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. 2) This formal capacity is key to not only demonstrating the imagination as an original, unified, and independent faculty across Kant’s Critical framework, but also serves as grounds for the purposiveness of nature – a key aspect of Kantian aesthetics.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"314-337"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42356733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment , Kant claims that the Critique of Pure Reason accounted for the necessary conditions of experience and knowledge in general, but that it was not a complete transcendental account of the possibility of a particular empirical experience of objects and knowledge of empirical laws of nature. To fill this gap the third Critique puts forward, as an additional transcendental condition, the regulative principle of the purposiveness of nature. In this paper, I will attempt to show how Kant’s account of pure aesthetic judgment can be read as articulating an aesthetic non-conceptual condition of the search for the conceptual order of nature and so as constituting an essential part of the account of the transcendental conditions of empirical experience and knowledge.
{"title":"Aesthetic Normativity and the Acquisition of Empirical Concepts","authors":"Ido Geiger","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.4304060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.4304060","url":null,"abstract":"In the Introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment , Kant claims that the Critique of Pure Reason accounted for the necessary conditions of experience and knowledge in general, but that it was not a complete transcendental account of the possibility of a particular empirical experience of objects and knowledge of empirical laws of nature. To fill this gap the third Critique puts forward, as an additional transcendental condition, the regulative principle of the purposiveness of nature. In this paper, I will attempt to show how Kant’s account of pure aesthetic judgment can be read as articulating an aesthetic non-conceptual condition of the search for the conceptual order of nature and so as constituting an essential part of the account of the transcendental conditions of empirical experience and knowledge.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"71-104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44432008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For both John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum, the concept of love plays a significant role in moral psychology. Rawls views the sense of justice as grounded in parental love, and continuous with love of mankind. Nussbaum’s recent defence of patriotism revives the emotio n of love as essential for political contexts. I argue that love ought to play a substantial part in the shaping of global politics, and that a moral psychology of love based merely on a combination of Rawls’s and Nussbaum’s accounts fails to produce an ad equate ground for conceptualizing moral motivation with respect to addressing transnational concerns of justice. I contend that by critically synthesizing Rawls’s and Nussbaum’s conceptions of love and moral psychology with resources from Kant’s ethics, it is possible to develop a more attractive, and potentially politically effective, conception of love of human beings in the framework of political liberalism.
{"title":"Love and Moral Psychology in Global Politics: A Kantian Reworking of Rawls and Nussbaum","authors":"Pärttyli Rinne","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.3865015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.3865015","url":null,"abstract":"For both John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum, the concept of love plays a significant role in moral psychology. Rawls views the sense of justice as grounded in parental love, and continuous with love of mankind. Nussbaum’s recent defence of patriotism revives the emotio n of love as essential for political contexts. I argue that love ought to play a substantial part in the shaping of global politics, and that a moral psychology of love based merely on a combination of Rawls’s and Nussbaum’s accounts fails to produce an ad equate ground for conceptualizing moral motivation with respect to addressing transnational concerns of justice. I contend that by critically synthesizing Rawls’s and Nussbaum’s conceptions of love and moral psychology with resources from Kant’s ethics, it is possible to develop a more attractive, and potentially politically effective, conception of love of human beings in the framework of political liberalism.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"291-312"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48593876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Resena de: Cavallar, G., Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right , Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2020, 272 paginas, ISBN 978-1-78683-552-9.
{"title":"El campo del derecho internacional: una mediación entre la teoría y la práctica en Kant","authors":"N. Quiroga","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.3862870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.3862870","url":null,"abstract":"Resena de: Cavallar, G., Kant and the Theory and Practice of International Right , Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2020, 272 paginas, ISBN 978-1-78683-552-9.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"470-473"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49261799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Kant uses terms translatable as ‘synthesis’ and ‘perception’ in different ways in different contexts, which suggests that there are different kinds of synthesis and perception. I propose that there are two main basic functions of perception according to Kant: that of singling out a thing and that of getting perceptually informed about the configuration of the thing’s perceptible features. I argue that the first function is not dependent on the kinds of syntheses Kant analyzes in the Critique of Pure Reason but grounds any such synthesis. I also argue that if singling out a thing is considered to involve synthesis, then the term ‘synthesis’ is identified with a unification of sensory information itself, which is not of much consequence for the transcendental philosopher. The paper also aims to clarify what ‘manifold’ consist s in and what the starting point of the ‘synthesis in apprehension’ might be.
{"title":"Two Functions of Perception in Kant","authors":"Hemmo Laiho","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.3865041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.3865041","url":null,"abstract":"Kant uses terms translatable as ‘synthesis’ and ‘perception’ in different ways in different contexts, which suggests that there are different kinds of synthesis and perception. I propose that there are two main basic functions of perception according to Kant: that of singling out a thing and that of getting perceptually informed about the configuration of the thing’s perceptible features. I argue that the first function is not dependent on the kinds of syntheses Kant analyzes in the Critique of Pure Reason but grounds any such synthesis. I also argue that if singling out a thing is considered to involve synthesis, then the term ‘synthesis’ is identified with a unification of sensory information itself, which is not of much consequence for the transcendental philosopher. The paper also aims to clarify what ‘manifold’ consist s in and what the starting point of the ‘synthesis in apprehension’ might be.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"272-290"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46597018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Resena de: Rafael Reyna Fortes, La evolucion hacia el criticismo. Estudios sobre la Dissertatio de 1770 y el comienzo del criticismo kantiano , Madrid, Faber and Sapiens - A peiron Ediciones, 2020, 160 pp. ISBN: 978-84-17898-81-6
{"title":"La evolución hacia el criticismo. Estudios sobre la Dissertatio de 1770 y el comienzo del criticismo kantiano","authors":"L. Pelegrin","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.3862841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.3862841","url":null,"abstract":"Resena de: Rafael Reyna Fortes, La evolucion hacia el criticismo. Estudios sobre la Dissertatio de 1770 y el comienzo del criticismo kantiano , Madrid, Faber and Sapiens - A peiron Ediciones, 2020, 160 pp. ISBN: 978-84-17898-81-6","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"518-523"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49405537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Resena de: Huseyinzadegan, D., Kant’s Nonideal Theory of Politics , Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 2019, 204 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8101-3987-9.
{"title":"Reivindicación de la teleología en la filosofía política de Kant","authors":"Guillermo López Morlanes","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.3862865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.3862865","url":null,"abstract":"Resena de: Huseyinzadegan, D., Kant’s Nonideal Theory of Politics , Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 2019, 204 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8101-3987-9.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"474-480"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41930465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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