In the beginning of his critical period, Kant treated the perfect attainment of the highest good—the unconditioned totality of ends which would uphold the perfect proportionality between moral virtue and happiness—as both the ground of hope for deserved happiness and the final end of our moral life. But I argue that Kant moved in the direction of de-emphasizing the latter aspect of the highest good, not because it is inappropriate or impossible for us to promote this ideal, but because the endless pursuit of it offers no prospect of moral satisfaction. I take this change as one possible reason for him to shift his focus more toward social and political progress in history, which has as its main subject the human species which is in some sense immortal.
{"title":"Why Kant’s Hope Took a Historical Turn in Practical Philosophy","authors":"Jaeha Woo","doi":"10.5209/kant.88695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5209/kant.88695","url":null,"abstract":"In the beginning of his critical period, Kant treated the perfect attainment of the highest good—the unconditioned totality of ends which would uphold the perfect proportionality between moral virtue and happiness—as both the ground of hope for deserved happiness and the final end of our moral life. But I argue that Kant moved in the direction of de-emphasizing the latter aspect of the highest good, not because it is inappropriate or impossible for us to promote this ideal, but because the endless pursuit of it offers no prospect of moral satisfaction. I take this change as one possible reason for him to shift his focus more toward social and political progress in history, which has as its main subject the human species which is in some sense immortal.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78375947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist eine Würdigung des ethischen Konzeptes des zentralen Neukantianers Alois Riehl (1844–1924), dessen 100. Todestag 2024 begangen wird. Obwohl das Hauptaugenmerk Riehls auf der Konzeption einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie lag, die den Bereich der praktischen Philosophie möglichst ausspart, konzipierte er schließlich doch auch eine die „wissenschaftliche Philosophie“ ergänzende „nichtwissenschaftliche Philosophie“, eine „Philosophie der Werte“, die nicht zum Bereich der empirischen Wissenschaften gezählt werden könne. Er näherte sich damit der Werttheorie Heinrich Rickerts an, dessen Ziel es war, Kants Moralismus zu überwinden, das kritische Prinzip aber dennoch beizubehalten. Für Riehl wird Kant, wie gezeigt werden soll, insbesondere der zentrale Bezugspunkt für die Konzeption eines Werteobjektivismus.
{"title":"Kant im Neukantianismus Philosophie als Lebensanschauung: Alois Riehls Auseinandersetzung mit Werten","authors":"Josef Hlade","doi":"10.5209/kant.88699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5209/kant.88699","url":null,"abstract":"Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist eine Würdigung des ethischen Konzeptes des zentralen Neukantianers Alois Riehl (1844–1924), dessen 100. Todestag 2024 begangen wird. Obwohl das Hauptaugenmerk Riehls auf der Konzeption einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie lag, die den Bereich der praktischen Philosophie möglichst ausspart, konzipierte er schließlich doch auch eine die „wissenschaftliche Philosophie“ ergänzende „nichtwissenschaftliche Philosophie“, eine „Philosophie der Werte“, die nicht zum Bereich der empirischen Wissenschaften gezählt werden könne. Er näherte sich damit der Werttheorie Heinrich Rickerts an, dessen Ziel es war, Kants Moralismus zu überwinden, das kritische Prinzip aber dennoch beizubehalten. Für Riehl wird Kant, wie gezeigt werden soll, insbesondere der zentrale Bezugspunkt für die Konzeption eines Werteobjektivismus.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77247225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Razze e umanità","authors":"L. Imperato","doi":"10.5209/kant.88705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5209/kant.88705","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82327945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I aim to resolve the Frierson-Grenberg debate on the nature of Kant’s account of moral motivation that took place in the third issue of Con-textos Kantianos. In their respective interpretations, Frierson and Grenberg fail to accommodate the a priori status of moral feeling when incorporating it into Kant’s moral motivational structure. In response, I provide a novel transcendental interpretation – one that takes the a priori moral feeling both as an incentive of morality and as that which conditions the possibility of morality in human agents. I argue that Kant developed the notion of moral feeling solely in order to resolve the problem of motivational skepticism concerning the moral law. Since this problem occurs as a part of Kant’s search for the supreme principle of morality, the notion of moral feeling becomes a part of both Kant’s moral motivational structure and his argument to justify the moral law.
{"title":"Feeling and Moral Motivation in Kant: A Response to the Frierson-Grenberg Debate","authors":"Vivek K. Radhakrishnan","doi":"10.5209/kant.88709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5209/kant.88709","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I aim to resolve the Frierson-Grenberg debate on the nature of Kant’s account of moral motivation that took place in the third issue of Con-textos Kantianos. In their respective interpretations, Frierson and Grenberg fail to accommodate the a priori status of moral feeling when incorporating it into Kant’s moral motivational structure. In response, I provide a novel transcendental interpretation – one that takes the a priori moral feeling both as an incentive of morality and as that which conditions the possibility of morality in human agents. I argue that Kant developed the notion of moral feeling solely in order to resolve the problem of motivational skepticism concerning the moral law. Since this problem occurs as a part of Kant’s search for the supreme principle of morality, the notion of moral feeling becomes a part of both Kant’s moral motivational structure and his argument to justify the moral law.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83682622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It has been assumed by an important element of Kantian scholarship that there is a central connection between the categories and the logical forms of judgement (let us call this the ‘Standard View’ or SV). Although this suggestion is true in a broad sense, it has prevented interpreters from appreciating one fundamental idea of Kant’s theoretical philosophy: that the employment of pure concepts pertains in an equally fundamental way to the unification of sensory material, or what Kant calls the ‘manifold of sense in intuition’, as Wilfrid Sellars has pointed out in his theory of ‘image- models’. We will call this ‘Kantian Intuitionism’, as opposed to the SV. Not only that, this widely held connection of category to judgement has caused what we may call a ‘propositional’ prejudice in contemporary discussions on conceptualism. Specifically, we can appreciate this misconception within the famous Dreyfus- McDowell debate, and their mutual incapacity to account for the Kantian premise that conceptuality suffuses sensory experience without appealing to propositional structures. Parting from Kant’s ‘Clue’ [B104/A79], our contention in this article is that his idea that conceptuality is embedded in both judgmental thought and perception, can be shown to be an appropriate answer to the Standard View, and furthermore, to constitute a starting point to enlarge the comprehension of some doctrines of Kantian theoretical philosophy. Among these, the Transcendental Deduction and the Schematism. In this sense, our reading will show the broad implications of the ‘Clue’, not only for the comprehension of Kant, but also for the clarification of some contemporary philosophical discussions.
{"title":"Sellarsian image- models and Kantian Imagination","authors":"Santiago Parra Jiménez","doi":"10.5209/kant.88694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5209/kant.88694","url":null,"abstract":"It has been assumed by an important element of Kantian scholarship that there is a central connection between the categories and the logical forms of judgement (let us call this the ‘Standard View’ or SV). Although this suggestion is true in a broad sense, it has prevented interpreters from appreciating one fundamental idea of Kant’s theoretical philosophy: that the employment of pure concepts pertains in an equally fundamental way to the unification of sensory material, or what Kant calls the ‘manifold of sense in intuition’, as Wilfrid Sellars has pointed out in his theory of ‘image- models’. We will call this ‘Kantian Intuitionism’, as opposed to the SV. Not only that, this widely held connection of category to judgement has caused what we may call a ‘propositional’ prejudice in contemporary discussions on conceptualism. Specifically, we can appreciate this misconception within the famous Dreyfus- McDowell debate, and their mutual incapacity to account for the Kantian premise that conceptuality suffuses sensory experience without appealing to propositional structures. Parting from Kant’s ‘Clue’ [B104/A79], our contention in this article is that his idea that conceptuality is embedded in both judgmental thought and perception, can be shown to be an appropriate answer to the Standard View, and furthermore, to constitute a starting point to enlarge the comprehension of some doctrines of Kantian theoretical philosophy. Among these, the Transcendental Deduction and the Schematism. In this sense, our reading will show the broad implications of the ‘Clue’, not only for the comprehension of Kant, but also for the clarification of some contemporary philosophical discussions.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87507509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pasear al filo del sentido. Recuerdo de Paulo Tunhas (1960-2023)","authors":"Nuria Sánchez Madrid","doi":"10.5209/kant.88702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5209/kant.88702","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"309 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77231642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
De acuerdo con una interpretación conceptualista de la filosofía teórica de Kant, el uso de conceptos es una condición necesaria de la percepción. Una objeción frecuente de los no-conceptualistas kantianos en contra de esta posición señala que Kant aceptaba que las percepciones no requieren conceptos porque sostuvo que los animales no-humanos carecen de ellos. El objetivo de este artículo es responder a esta objeción mostrando que Kant imaginaba la vida mental de los animales no-humanos, sin uso de conceptos, como un mecanismo natural que coordina sensaciones, impulsos y respuestas, en el cual no hay representación de objetos en sentido estricto
{"title":"Vida mental sin conceptos y cognición animal en Kant","authors":"Pedro Stepanenko Gutiérrez","doi":"10.5209/kant.88693","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5209/kant.88693","url":null,"abstract":"De acuerdo con una interpretación conceptualista de la filosofía teórica de Kant, el uso de conceptos es una condición necesaria de la percepción. Una objeción frecuente de los no-conceptualistas kantianos en contra de esta posición señala que Kant aceptaba que las percepciones no requieren conceptos porque sostuvo que los animales no-humanos carecen de ellos. El objetivo de este artículo es responder a esta objeción mostrando que Kant imaginaba la vida mental de los animales no-humanos, sin uso de conceptos, como un mecanismo natural que coordina sensaciones, impulsos y respuestas, en el cual no hay representación de objetos en sentido estricto","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76319394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is almost universally accepted that Kant had a theory of language, or that Kant’s theory of experience and knowledge can lay the foundation for reconstructing a Kantian theory of language. Most debatable is whether Kant had something to say on the philosophical problem of translation. In this paper I argue that Kant’s philosophical theory allows dealing with the problem of translation, though recognising it presupposes that we realise Kant could not be content with a short argument for translatability (the argument that the human beings share a universal structure of thought, which is reliably mirrored in language; therefore natural languages are, in principle, symmetrically translatable). Rather, a Kantian theory of translation must take into account the very complex nature of common-sense, and what is grounded on it, i.e., intersubjective communicability and culture.
{"title":"Per una teoria kantiana della traduzione","authors":"Pierluigi D’Agostino","doi":"10.5209/kant.88698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5209/kant.88698","url":null,"abstract":"It is almost universally accepted that Kant had a theory of language, or that Kant’s theory of experience and knowledge can lay the foundation for reconstructing a Kantian theory of language. Most debatable is whether Kant had something to say on the philosophical problem of translation. In this paper I argue that Kant’s philosophical theory allows dealing with the problem of translation, though recognising it presupposes that we realise Kant could not be content with a short argument for translatability (the argument that the human beings share a universal structure of thought, which is reliably mirrored in language; therefore natural languages are, in principle, symmetrically translatable). Rather, a Kantian theory of translation must take into account the very complex nature of common-sense, and what is grounded on it, i.e., intersubjective communicability and culture.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88939741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The introduction to the Dossier on mental disorder in the work of Kant considers the relationship between philosophy and medicine. Its brief suggestions are linked to only one form of pathology: hypochondria, on the one hand; and a highly particular aspect of mental disorder: its relationship with criminal accountability or, if we wish, the legitimacy of punishment, on the other hand.
{"title":"Madness and Kant's Philosophy: The Importance of Philosophy to Medicine","authors":"M. Failla","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.4899296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.4899296","url":null,"abstract":"The introduction to the Dossier on mental disorder in the work of Kant considers the relationship between philosophy and medicine. Its brief suggestions are linked to only one form of pathology: hypochondria, on the one hand; and a highly particular aspect of mental disorder: its relationship with criminal accountability or, if we wish, the legitimacy of punishment, on the other hand.","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"29-34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42796381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With this brief text I introduce the homonymous dossier. The idea of the dossier was to compile texts on matters that are not usually studied in the literature, written from original and polemical perspectives. These papers focus on subjects like the extraterrestrial perspective on humans (Laura Herrero Oliva), the a priori character of political conflict (Paola Romero), drinking alcohol with friends (Maria Borges) and political philosophy of the mind (Robert Hannah).
{"title":"Kant contemporáneo / Kant subterráneo","authors":"Macarena Marey","doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.4899340","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.4899340","url":null,"abstract":"With this brief text I introduce the homonymous dossier. The idea of the dossier was to compile texts on matters that are not usually studied in the literature, written from original and polemical perspectives. These papers focus on subjects like the extraterrestrial perspective on humans (Laura Herrero Oliva), the a priori character of political conflict (Paola Romero), drinking alcohol with friends (Maria Borges) and political philosophy of the mind (Robert Hannah).","PeriodicalId":41959,"journal":{"name":"Con-textos Kantianos-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"161-164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44054846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：