Many actors report a form of dual-consciousness when playing roles on stage: they react to the given circumstances as their characters would do, but they do not forget they are on the stage. This paper analyzes the concept of dual-consciousness and argues that actor dual-consciousness results from the actor’s imaginings, which both recreate the experience of the character and inform the actor about the non-reality of the experience. Keywords: Acting, actor, dual-consciousness, recreative imagination, experiential identification.
{"title":"Actor Dual-Consciousness and Recreative Imagination","authors":"Yuchen Guo","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.233.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Many actors report a form of dual-consciousness when playing roles on stage: they react to the given circumstances as their characters would do, but they do not forget they are on the stage. This paper analyzes the concept of dual-consciousness and argues that actor dual-consciousness results from the actor’s imaginings, which both recreate the experience of the character and inform the actor about the non-reality of the experience.\u0000Keywords: Acting, actor, dual-consciousness, recreative imagination, experiential identification.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46451116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
El movimiento de ‘retorno a Kant’ del siglo XIX se constituye en sus orígenes a través del rechazo a la filosofía especulativa de Hegel. Por diversos motivos que no han sido debidamente clarificados aún, este movimiento filosófico culmina su derrotero a principios del siglo XX afirmando la necesidad de una renovación del hegelianismo. El objetivo del presente estudio es explicar los motivos y las consecuencias de la transformación progresiva del neokantismo de Baden en una variante de neohegelianismo. Palabras clave: Neokantismo, escuela de Baden, Hegel, Windelband, Kroner, filosofía de la historia.
{"title":"Neokantismo y neohegelianismo","authors":"Jacinto Páez Bonifaci","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.231.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.231.08","url":null,"abstract":"El movimiento de ‘retorno a Kant’ del siglo XIX se constituye en sus orígenes a través del rechazo a la filosofía especulativa de Hegel. Por diversos motivos que no han sido debidamente clarificados aún, este movimiento filosófico culmina su derrotero a principios del siglo XX afirmando la necesidad de una renovación del hegelianismo. El objetivo del presente estudio es explicar los motivos y las consecuencias de la transformación progresiva del neokantismo de Baden en una variante de neohegelianismo.\u0000Palabras clave: Neokantismo, escuela de Baden, Hegel, Windelband, Kroner, filosofía de la historia.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42605717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aristotle’s theory of seed has occupied a very important place in the history of ancient embryology and medicine. Previous studies have overemphasized, in light of the APo. II method, Aristotle’s definition of seed as male semen. In this paper, I wish to show that there are at least three independent definitions of seed working in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals: seed as male semen, seed as female menstruation and seed as embryo. Those three definitions are mutually exclusive on the one hand, but on the other hand, they are also capable of being unified into one Aristotelian account, which can help us understand better Aristotle’s theory of seed. Keywords: Aristotle, theory of seed, animal, generation.
{"title":"Aristotle’s theory of seed: seeking a unified account","authors":"Xinkai Hu","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.231.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.231.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Aristotle’s theory of seed has occupied a very important place in the history of ancient embryology and medicine. Previous studies have overemphasized, in light of the APo. II method, Aristotle’s definition of seed as male semen. In this paper, I wish to show that there are at least three independent definitions of seed working in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals: seed as male semen, seed as female menstruation and seed as embryo. Those three definitions are mutually exclusive on the one hand, but on the other hand, they are also capable of being unified into one Aristotelian account, which can help us understand better Aristotle’s theory of seed.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000Keywords: Aristotle, theory of seed, animal, generation.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47245138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Among the many stages of Kant’s problem of a reciprocal collocation of the human knowledges, Encyclopedism, quite unsurprisingly, is one of the most relevant; and yet, quite surprisingly, it is Anthropology which plays here one of the lead parts, insofar as the complex ascertainment of its definition, its position, its task proves to be of irrefutable importance towards solving the greater problem at hand. The question arises as the association – or dissociation – between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology, and their inclusion in, or exclusion from, their greater or lesser relation with Metaphysics; a problem which, to the careless eye, seems to have been promoted by Kant himself. Here, opinions diverge as to the nature of the relation between the two sciences, from their total inter-dependence to their complete separation. We, in turn, propose a different approach. Our objective is to reenact Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, as presented not only in the only extant Lecture on Encyclopedism, but in various others dimensions of Kant’s academic activity; and here, to propose a contrasting analysis between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology; one, however, based not on the assumption of their consonance or dissonance through their characteristics, rather on their respective position and scope amid the field of human knowledges. As such, it is our intention to consider Kant’s Lectures in their interconnection, namely, in their apparently dubious simultaneous collocation of an Empirical Psychology as Anthropology; and, based on their specific position in the scheme of human knowledges, and what this position entails in terms of their scope and task, to ascertain to what extent Empirical Psychology is indeed Anthropology, and from what extent Empirical Psychology is no longer Anthropology – not, at least, Pragmatic Anthropology. In other words, we shall labor towards defining a dividing line in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges; one which for Kant represents a third dimension of knowledge and stands between rational and empirical, Metaphysics and the historical sciences; that line, in our view, being that of a cosmopolitical prism. Keywords: Kant, encyclopedism, anthropology, empirical psychology, cosmopolitanism.
{"title":"“Here (...) Practical Anthropology becomes pure art”: Kant on the distinction between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology","authors":"F. Silva","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.231.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.231.09","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Among the many stages of Kant’s problem of a reciprocal collocation of the human knowledges, Encyclopedism, quite unsurprisingly, is one of the most relevant; and yet, quite surprisingly, it is Anthropology which plays here one of the lead parts, insofar as the complex ascertainment of its definition, its position, its task proves to be of irrefutable importance towards solving the greater problem at hand. The question arises as the association – or dissociation – between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology, and their inclusion in, or exclusion from, their greater or lesser relation with Metaphysics; a problem which, to the careless eye, seems to have been promoted by Kant himself. Here, opinions diverge as to the nature of the relation between the two sciences, from their total inter-dependence to their complete separation. We, in turn, propose a different approach. Our objective is to reenact Kant’s fundamental scheme of human knowledges, as presented not only in the only extant Lecture on Encyclopedism, but in various others dimensions of Kant’s academic activity; and here, to propose a contrasting analysis between Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology; one, however, based not on the assumption of their consonance or dissonance through their characteristics, rather on their respective position and scope amid the field of human knowledges. As such, it is our intention to consider Kant’s Lectures in their interconnection, namely, in their apparently dubious simultaneous collocation of an Empirical Psychology as Anthropology; and, based on their specific position in the scheme of human knowledges, and what this position entails in terms of their scope and task, to ascertain to what extent Empirical Psychology is indeed Anthropology, and from what extent Empirical Psychology is no longer Anthropology – not, at least, Pragmatic Anthropology. In other words, we shall labor towards defining a dividing line in Kant’s scheme of human knowledges; one which for Kant represents a third dimension of knowledge and stands between rational and empirical, Metaphysics and the historical sciences; that line, in our view, being that of a cosmopolitical prism.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000Keywords: Kant, encyclopedism, anthropology, empirical psychology, cosmopolitanism.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43616662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The problem of unconceived alternatives (or the New Induction) states that, since scientists have recurrently failed to conceive relevant theoretical alternatives for some domains of science, current scientists are probably also failing to do so. Therefore, there may be theories which still exceed the grasp of scientists’ imagination, and one should not endorse a realist stance towards current science. In this paper, I raise a conceptual worry for the formulation of this problem: what does it mean to say that scientists failed to conceive a relevant theory? What aggravates the problem is that no simple notion of relevance makes the New Induction as strong as it initially seems. I consider the three more obvious interpretations of relevance: relevance as objective probability; relevance as epistemic probability assessed by current scientists; and relevance as epistemic probability assessed by past scientists. I argue that assuming any of these three notions implies difficulties for the New Induction, hence their proponents shouldn’t take the notion of relevance for granted. A more precise definition of relevance is essential to understand what are the difficulties surrounding the problem of unconceived alternatives as an epistemic worry. Until now, such notion is missing. KeyWords: Scientific realism, unconceived alternatives, Kyle Stanford, New Induction, Pessimistic Induction.
{"title":"A conceptual problem for Stanford’s New Induction","authors":"Bruno Malavolta e Silva","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.231.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.231.10","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000The problem of unconceived alternatives (or the New Induction) states that, since scientists have recurrently failed to conceive relevant theoretical alternatives for some domains of science, current scientists are probably also failing to do so. Therefore, there may be theories which still exceed the grasp of scientists’ imagination, and one should not endorse a realist stance towards current science. In this paper, I raise a conceptual worry for the formulation of this problem: what does it mean to say that scientists failed to conceive a relevant theory? What aggravates the problem is that no simple notion of relevance makes the New Induction as strong as it initially seems. I consider the three more obvious interpretations of relevance: relevance as objective probability; relevance as epistemic probability assessed by current scientists; and relevance as epistemic probability assessed by past scientists. I argue that assuming any of these three notions implies difficulties for the New Induction, hence their proponents shouldn’t take the notion of relevance for granted. A more precise definition of relevance is essential to understand what are the difficulties surrounding the problem of unconceived alternatives as an epistemic worry. Until now, such notion is missing.\u0000KeyWords: Scientific realism, unconceived alternatives, Kyle Stanford, New Induction, Pessimistic Induction.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46114579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Para qualquer tema sobre o qual não se é especialista, deve-se deferir a quem sabe mais. A deferência aos outros entra em conflito com expectativas de autonomia epistêmica e de divisão democrática do saber. Uma solução para esta tensão é ceder a estas expectativas, o que é equivalente a abandonar o conhecimento. Uma outra solução consiste em restringir seus efeitos a temas sobre os quais temos algum interesse prático. Esta proposta é instável, porque o interesse prático pode se estender a qualquer tipo de tema, em virtude do papel identitário de teorias. As pressões pela divisão simétrica do saber se opõem a um traço central da cultura humana: a produção cooperativa do saber. Um grupo humano sempre sabe mais do que cada um de seus membros e, para todo mundo, parte do que sabe o grupo permanece opaco. A recusa da divisão do trabalho cognitivo é uma das fontes do negacionismo. Três elementos que reforçam este efeito: o modo de circulação da informação na internet, o crescimento da desigualdade e o ataque da extrema-direita às instituições que produzem o conhecimento. A pandemia pede mais confiança em conteúdos opacos, ao mesmo tempo em que cria uma atmosfera de profunda desconfiança. Palavras-chave: Epistemologia, divisão do trabalho cognitivo, negacionismo, pandemia.
{"title":"Desinformação, negacionismo e a pandemia","authors":"Ernesto Perini-Santos","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.231.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.231.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Para qualquer tema sobre o qual não se é especialista, deve-se deferir a quem sabe mais. A deferência aos outros entra em conflito com expectativas de autonomia epistêmica e de divisão democrática do saber. Uma solução para esta tensão é ceder a estas expectativas, o que é equivalente a abandonar o conhecimento. Uma outra solução consiste em restringir seus efeitos a temas sobre os quais temos algum interesse prático. Esta proposta é instável, porque o interesse prático pode se estender a qualquer tipo de tema, em virtude do papel identitário de teorias. As pressões pela divisão simétrica do saber se opõem a um traço central da cultura humana: a produção cooperativa do saber. Um grupo humano sempre sabe mais do que cada um de seus membros e, para todo mundo, parte do que sabe o grupo permanece opaco. A recusa da divisão do trabalho cognitivo é uma das fontes do negacionismo. Três elementos que reforçam este efeito: o modo de circulação da informação na internet, o crescimento da desigualdade e o ataque da extrema-direita às instituições que produzem o conhecimento. A pandemia pede mais confiança em conteúdos opacos, ao mesmo tempo em que cria uma atmosfera de profunda desconfiança.\u0000Palavras-chave: Epistemologia, divisão do trabalho cognitivo, negacionismo, pandemia.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46364591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Entre las críticas de los más férreos oponentes de la teoría kuhniana de la ciencia sobresale un reparo que fue planteado simultáneamente tanto por Popper (1970), como por su discípulo Watkins (1970). Ambos filósofos sostuvieron que, si nos comprometemos con la tesis que afirma que hay Ciencia Normal, tendríamos que aceptar la consecuencia absurda de que las teorías científicas degeneran en dogmas. En este trabajo mostraré que la tesis de Kuhn no tiene las implicaciones desastrosas atrás señaladas y que Popper -y Watkins- ofrecen una imagen increíblemente distorsionada de la naturaleza misma de la Ciencia Normal y de los paradigmas, a tal punto que las razones en las cuales Popper basa la acusación de dogmatismo dependen de un argumento defectuoso. Para ello, voy a contrastar los patrones históricos que Kuhn identifica en los episodios de Ciencia Normal, con las características que le atribuyen sus críticos. Argumentaré, a partir de las contribuciones de Hooke a la mecánica clásica, que no es cierto que uno de los atributos que distingue a los “científicos normales” sea la adhesión doctrinaria, i.e., que el científico normal está obligado a suscribir una teoría por moda o por autoridad. Palabras-clave: paradigmas, ciencia normal, teoría dominante, dogma, mecánica clásica de partículas.
{"title":"Paradigmas: ¿prisiones mentales?","authors":"Daian Tatiana Flórez Quintero","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.231.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.231.02","url":null,"abstract":"Entre las críticas de los más férreos oponentes de la teoría kuhniana de la ciencia sobresale un reparo que fue planteado simultáneamente tanto por Popper (1970), como por su discípulo Watkins (1970). Ambos filósofos sostuvieron que, si nos comprometemos con la tesis que afirma que hay Ciencia Normal, tendríamos que aceptar la consecuencia absurda de que las teorías científicas degeneran en dogmas. En este trabajo mostraré que la tesis de Kuhn no tiene las implicaciones desastrosas atrás señaladas y que Popper -y Watkins- ofrecen una imagen increíblemente distorsionada de la naturaleza misma de la Ciencia Normal y de los paradigmas, a tal punto que las razones en las cuales Popper basa la acusación de dogmatismo dependen de un argumento defectuoso. Para ello, voy a contrastar los patrones históricos que Kuhn identifica en los episodios de Ciencia Normal, con las características que le atribuyen sus críticos. Argumentaré, a partir de las contribuciones de Hooke a la mecánica clásica, que no es cierto que uno de los atributos que distingue a los “científicos normales” sea la adhesión doctrinaria, i.e., que el científico normal está obligado a suscribir una teoría por moda o por autoridad.\u0000Palabras-clave: paradigmas, ciencia normal, teoría dominante, dogma, mecánica clásica de partículas.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45279051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En este artículo analizamos la cuestión de la presencia del mundo en los escritos de juventud de Simone Weil, con el objetivo de aprehender su concepción del tiempo. En ese sentido, intentaremos elucidar las relaciones ontológica y epistemológica que ella establece entre el hombre y el mundo. Esta perspectiva nos permite explorar la primera filosofía de la percepción weiliana y trazar las implicaciones existenciales que se desprenden de la experiencia del presente. Igualmente, examinamos la dificultad de pensar la inmovilidad en la realidad humana a partir de la tensión problemática que plantea S.Weil entre las nociones de continuidad y eternidad. Palabras clave: Simone Weil, presencia, mundo, continuidad, eternidad, tiempo.
{"title":"La presencia del mundo en los escritos de juventud de Simone Weil","authors":"Juan Manuel Ruiz Jiménez","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.231.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.231.07","url":null,"abstract":"En este artículo analizamos la cuestión de la presencia del mundo en los escritos de juventud de Simone Weil, con el objetivo de aprehender su concepción del tiempo. En ese sentido, intentaremos elucidar las relaciones ontológica y epistemológica que ella establece entre el hombre y el mundo. Esta perspectiva nos permite explorar la primera filosofía de la percepción weiliana y trazar las implicaciones existenciales que se desprenden de la experiencia del presente. Igualmente, examinamos la dificultad de pensar la inmovilidad en la realidad humana a partir de la tensión problemática que plantea S.Weil entre las nociones de continuidad y eternidad.\u0000Palabras clave: Simone Weil, presencia, mundo, continuidad, eternidad, tiempo.","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46725607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peirce’s triadic logic has been under discussion since its discovery in the 1960s by Fisch and Turquette. The experiments with matrices of three-valued logic are recorded in a few pages of unpublished manuscripts dated 1909, a decade before similar systems have been developed by logicians. The purposes of Peirce’s work on such logic, as well as semantical aspects of his system, are disputable. In the most extensive work about it, Turquette suggested that the matrices are related in dual pairs of axiomatic Hilbert-style systems. In this paper, we present a simple tableau proof for a fragment of Peirce three-valued logic, called P3, based on similar approaches in many-valued literature. We demonstrated that this proof is sound and complete. Besides that, taking the false as the only undesignated value and adding non-classical negations to the calculus, we can explore paraconsistent and paracompleteness theories into P3. Keywords: Charles S. Peirce, many-valued logics, theory of proof, tableau method.
{"title":"Tableau method of proof for Peirce’s three-valued propositional logic","authors":"José Renato Salatiel","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.231.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.231.05","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Peirce’s triadic logic has been under discussion since its discovery in the 1960s by Fisch and Turquette. The experiments with matrices of three-valued logic are recorded in a few pages of unpublished manuscripts dated 1909, a decade before similar systems have been developed by logicians. The purposes of Peirce’s work on such logic, as well as semantical aspects of his system, are disputable. In the most extensive work about it, Turquette suggested that the matrices are related in dual pairs of axiomatic Hilbert-style systems. In this paper, we present a simple tableau proof for a fragment of Peirce three-valued logic, called P3, based on similar approaches in many-valued literature. We demonstrated that this proof is sound and complete. Besides that, taking the false as the only undesignated value and adding non-classical negations to the calculus, we can explore paraconsistent and paracompleteness theories into P3.\u0000Keywords: Charles S. Peirce, many-valued logics, theory of proof, tableau method.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70282310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this article is to set forth conjectures that are likely to explain the inclusion of Plato and Hermes as heralds of Mani in the testimony of Ephrem of Syria. This incorporation should be set against the background of the Syrian religious milieu, which was influenced by both Hellenistic philosophy and Eastern religious traditions. Therefore, it would be better to seek a religious and philosophical environment wherein Plato and Hermes were associated. Keywords: Manichaeism, apocalypticism, theurgy, hermetism, Merkabah mysticism, late platonism.
{"title":"Plato and Hermes in Mani’s Prophetology: a possible adaptation to the theurgical milieu","authors":"João Paulo Dantas, G. Cornelli","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.231.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.231.04","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000The aim of this article is to set forth conjectures that are likely to explain the inclusion of Plato and Hermes as heralds of Mani in the testimony of Ephrem of Syria. This incorporation should be set against the background of the Syrian religious milieu, which was influenced by both Hellenistic philosophy and Eastern religious traditions. Therefore, it would be better to seek a religious and philosophical environment wherein Plato and Hermes were associated.\u0000Keywords: Manichaeism, apocalypticism, theurgy, hermetism, Merkabah mysticism, late platonism.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45970224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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