Este artigo trata da individuação dos seres incorpóreos no Kalām fī maḥḍ al-ẖayr ou Liber de Causis (LdC). Tendo isso em vista, apresentarei a hierarquia dos seres, em especial, a distinção entre o intelecto e a alma. Após uma breve comparação entre os princípios no LdC (causa primeira, intelecto e alma) e nos Elementos de Teologia de Proclo (Uno, limite-ilimitado, henádes, intelecto e alma), discutirei a ausência das henádes divinas no LdC e as dificuldades encontradas pelo autor anônimo frente às mudanças realizadas na estrutura metafísica procliana. Riggs (2017) entende que o autor do LdC desenvolveu uma nova teoria para explicar a individuação, sem a mediação das henádes, baseada na distinção entre dois tipos de atividade: a criação realizada pela causa primeira e a doação de forma realizada pelo primeiro intelecto criado. Contudo, como discutirei, essas duas atividades não são capazes de justificar alguns aspectos do processo de individuação já que cada uma delas é um ato único realizado por um tipo de princípio externo, não por um princípio imanente ao próprio ser individuado. Uma interpretação alternativa para a teoria da individuação presente no LdC será proposta a partir de dois critérios: o princípio da semelhança (LdC X) e o princípio da proporcionalidade (LdC IX, XI).
{"title":"A individuação dos seres incorpóreos no Liber de Causis","authors":"Meline Costa Sousa","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2023.241.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2023.241.05","url":null,"abstract":"Este artigo trata da individuação dos seres incorpóreos no Kalām fī maḥḍ al-ẖayr ou Liber de Causis (LdC). Tendo isso em vista, apresentarei a hierarquia dos seres, em especial, a distinção entre o intelecto e a alma. Após uma breve comparação entre os princípios no LdC (causa primeira, intelecto e alma) e nos Elementos de Teologia de Proclo (Uno, limite-ilimitado, henádes, intelecto e alma), discutirei a ausência das henádes divinas no LdC e as dificuldades encontradas pelo autor anônimo frente às mudanças realizadas na estrutura metafísica procliana. Riggs (2017) entende que o autor do LdC desenvolveu uma nova teoria para explicar a individuação, sem a mediação das henádes, baseada na distinção entre dois tipos de atividade: a criação realizada pela causa primeira e a doação de forma realizada pelo primeiro intelecto criado. Contudo, como discutirei, essas duas atividades não são capazes de justificar alguns aspectos do processo de individuação já que cada uma delas é um ato único realizado por um tipo de princípio externo, não por um princípio imanente ao próprio ser individuado. Uma interpretação alternativa para a teoria da individuação presente no LdC será proposta a partir de dois critérios: o princípio da semelhança (LdC X) e o princípio da proporcionalidade (LdC IX, XI).","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136173987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Resenha do artigo "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives", de Philippa Foot.
Resenha do artigo“道德作为一个假设的命令系统”，德·菲利帕·富特。
{"title":"É a moralidade categórica e inescapável?","authors":"Felipe Taufer, L. M. Dalsotto","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.233.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.10","url":null,"abstract":"Resenha do artigo \"Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives\", de Philippa Foot.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000 \u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45141805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article is devoted to the question of whether unknowable obligations are possible. According to the popular view (known as Access), an act is obligatory only if its agent can know that this act is obligatory. Sorensen (1995) argues against Access, and Sider and Wieland both defend Access by suggesting (S) – For any obligation O, individual X must refrain from making O unknowable. We consider various difficulties concerning the possibility of (S) – an infinite regress, self-referential nature of (S), unprovability of (S). It is argued that (S), from a certain perspective, is itself the unknowable obligation. Keywords: Obligations, access, regress, self-reference.
{"title":"Access and Unknowable Obligations","authors":"O. Bondar","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.233.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.04","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000The article is devoted to the question of whether unknowable obligations are possible. According to the popular view (known as Access), an act is obligatory only if its agent can know that this act is obligatory. Sorensen (1995) argues against Access, and Sider and Wieland both defend Access by suggesting (S) – For any obligation O, individual X must refrain from making O unknowable. We consider various difficulties concerning the possibility of (S) – an infinite regress, self-referential nature of (S), unprovability of (S). It is argued that (S), from a certain perspective, is itself the unknowable obligation.\u0000Keywords: Obligations, access, regress, self-reference.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48566867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to Dorothea Debus (2007), all emotional aspects related to an act of remembering are present and new emotional responses to the remembered past event. This is a common conception of the nature of the emotional aspect of personal memories, if not explicitly defended then at least implicitly accepted in the literature. In this article, I first criticize Debus’ arguments and demonstrate that she does not give us valid reasons to believe that all the emotional aspects related to a memory are present and new emotional responses to that past event. I then criticize Debus’ thesis tout court for being a direct consequence of assuming a particular conceptualization of the nature of emotions: emotions as physiological changes. Finally, based on a different conceptualization of emotions that focuses on their relational nature, I propose an alternative framework for analyzing the different possible emotional aspects of our personal memories. This leads me to conclude, contrary to Debus, that some emotional aspects of our memories are not occurrent emotions but are better conceived as a sort of quasi-emotions. Keywords: Personal memory, emotion, quasi-emotion, appraisal.
{"title":"Different Ways of Being Emotional about the Past","authors":"Marina Trakas","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.233.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.08","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000According to Dorothea Debus (2007), all emotional aspects related to an act of remembering are present and new emotional responses to the remembered past event. This is a common conception of the nature of the emotional aspect of personal memories, if not explicitly defended then at least implicitly accepted in the literature. In this article, I first criticize Debus’ arguments and demonstrate that she does not give us valid reasons to believe that all the emotional aspects related to a memory are present and new emotional responses to that past event. I then criticize Debus’ thesis tout court for being a direct consequence of assuming a particular conceptualization of the nature of emotions: emotions as physiological changes. Finally, based on a different conceptualization of emotions that focuses on their relational nature, I propose an alternative framework for analyzing the different possible emotional aspects of our personal memories. This leads me to conclude, contrary to Debus, that some emotional aspects of our memories are not occurrent emotions but are better conceived as a sort of quasi-emotions.\u0000Keywords: Personal memory, emotion, quasi-emotion, appraisal.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46182755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the chapter "Of Identity and Diversity" of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke claims that justice is based on personal identity and that personal identity is based on consciousness. However, this view of justice leads to an impasse when the defendant alleges that he has no consciousness of the crime and, therefore, that he does not identify himself as the person who committed the crime: if it is not possible to determine that he is the one who committed the crime, can we say that the punishment is just? This article seeks (i) to analyse the impasse exploring (a) its conceptual framework and (b) its development in the letters Molyneux and Locke exchanged in order (ii) to elaborate a criticism of Locke’s answer to it. Compared to the secondary bibliography, in which one objection to Locke’s answer is well established, the originality of this article consists in elaborating a new objection based on the distinction between the first and third person perspectives and in showing that, when questioned by Molyneux, Locke failed to discuss the conceptual issue necessary to give an adequate answer to the impasse. Keywords: Locke, Molyneux, personal identity, justice.
{"title":"John Locke and personal identity: an impasse concerning justice","authors":"Flavio Fontenelle Loque","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.233.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.06","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000In the chapter \"Of Identity and Diversity\" of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke claims that justice is based on personal identity and that personal identity is based on consciousness. However, this view of justice leads to an impasse when the defendant alleges that he has no consciousness of the crime and, therefore, that he does not identify himself as the person who committed the crime: if it is not possible to determine that he is the one who committed the crime, can we say that the punishment is just? This article seeks (i) to analyse the impasse exploring (a) its conceptual framework and (b) its development in the letters Molyneux and Locke exchanged in order (ii) to elaborate a criticism of Locke’s answer to it. Compared to the secondary bibliography, in which one objection to Locke’s answer is well established, the originality of this article consists in elaborating a new objection based on the distinction between the first and third person perspectives and in showing that, when questioned by Molyneux, Locke failed to discuss the conceptual issue necessary to give an adequate answer to the impasse.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000Keywords: Locke, Molyneux, personal identity, justice.\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43787412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Following a trend in bioethical/applied ethics approaches, one of the frustrating features of studies on technological human enhancement is their dichotomous tendency. Often, benefits and risks of technological human enhancement are stated in theoretically and empirically vague, polarized, unweighted ways. This has blocked the debate in the problematic ‘pros vs. cons’ stage, leading to the adoption of extremist positions. In this paper, we will address one side of the problem: the focus on risks and the imprecise approach to them. What motivates our approach is the identification of the weaknesses of the anti-enhancement criticism, which stem from its use of the concept of risk, as well as the heuristic of fear and the precautionary principle. Thus, ‘taking a step back’ to move forward in the debate, our purpose is to establish some theoretical foundations concerning the concept of risk, recognizing, at the same time, its complexity and importance for the debate. Besides the concept of risk, we emphasize the concept of existential risk, and we make some considerations about epistemic challenges. Finally, we highlight central features of more promising approaches to move the debate forward. Keywords: Human enhancement technologies, risk, uncertainty, conceptual problem, epistemic challenges.
{"title":"Not Too Risky. How to Take a Reasonable Stance on Human Enhancement","authors":"M. Vilaça, A. Lavazza","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.233.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.05","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Following a trend in bioethical/applied ethics approaches, one of the frustrating features of studies on technological human enhancement is their dichotomous tendency. Often, benefits and risks of technological human enhancement are stated in theoretically and empirically vague, polarized, unweighted ways. This has blocked the debate in the problematic ‘pros vs. cons’ stage, leading to the adoption of extremist positions. In this paper, we will address one side of the problem: the focus on risks and the imprecise approach to them. What motivates our approach is the identification of the weaknesses of the anti-enhancement criticism, which stem from its use of the concept of risk, as well as the heuristic of fear and the precautionary principle. Thus, ‘taking a step back’ to move forward in the debate, our purpose is to establish some theoretical foundations concerning the concept of risk, recognizing, at the same time, its complexity and importance for the debate. Besides the concept of risk, we emphasize the concept of existential risk, and we make some considerations about epistemic challenges. Finally, we highlight central features of more promising approaches to move the debate forward.\u0000Keywords: Human enhancement technologies, risk, uncertainty, conceptual problem, epistemic challenges.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48904972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Naturalistic accounts of culture share the assumption that culture is nothing more than information in people minds/brains and the environment. They do not provide, however, neither a definition nor a theory of information. I address this lacuna adopting a theory of information called “Situation Theory” (Barwise and Perry, 1983). I argue that the notions of constraint and attunement allow to account for cultural information, and, furthermore, that culture is, at a fundamental level, constituted by a set of constraints. Constraints are necessary for information to flow, and attunement to constraints is necessary for an organism to exploit such cultural information. Keywords: Situations, situation theory, naturalistic theories of culture, cultural groups, constraints, conventions.
{"title":"The subject matter of culture: constraints, attunement and information","authors":"J. Acosta","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.233.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.02","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Naturalistic accounts of culture share the assumption that culture is nothing more than information in people minds/brains and the environment. They do not provide, however, neither a definition nor a theory of information. I address this lacuna adopting a theory of information called “Situation Theory” (Barwise and Perry, 1983). I argue that the notions of constraint and attunement allow to account for cultural information, and, furthermore, that culture is, at a fundamental level, constituted by a set of constraints. Constraints are necessary for information to flow, and attunement to constraints is necessary for an organism to exploit such cultural information.\u0000Keywords: Situations, situation theory, naturalistic theories of culture, cultural groups, constraints, conventions.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48930743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A partir da hipótese de que a inteligência artificial como tal não representaria o fim da supremacia humana, uma vez que, na essência, a IA somente simularia e aumentaria aspectos da inteligência humana em artefatos não biológicos, o presente artigo questiona sobre o risco real a ser enfrentado. Para além do embate entre tecnofóbicos e tecnofílicos, o que se defende, então, é que as possíveis falhas de funcionamento de uma inteligência artificial – decorrentes de sobrecarga de informação, de uma programação equivocada ou de uma aleatoriedade do sistema – poderiam sinalizar os verdadeiros riscos existenciais, sobretudo quando se considera que o cérebro biológico, na esteira do viés da automação, tende a assumir de maneira acrítica aquilo que é posto por sistemas ancorados em inteligência artificial. Além disso, o argumento aqui defendido é que falhas não detectáveis pela provável limitação de controle humano quanto ao aumento de complexidade do funcionamento de sistemas de IA representam o principal risco existencial real. Palavras-chave: Inteligência artificial, risco existencial, superinteligências, controle humano.
{"title":"Inteligência Artificial e os Riscos Existenciais Reais: Uma Análise das Limitações Humanas de Controle","authors":"Murilo Karasinski, K. B. Candiotto","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.233.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.07","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000A partir da hipótese de que a inteligência artificial como tal não representaria o fim da supremacia humana, uma vez que, na essência, a IA somente simularia e aumentaria aspectos da inteligência humana em artefatos não biológicos, o presente artigo questiona sobre o risco real a ser enfrentado. Para além do embate entre tecnofóbicos e tecnofílicos, o que se defende, então, é que as possíveis falhas de funcionamento de uma inteligência artificial – decorrentes de sobrecarga de informação, de uma programação equivocada ou de uma aleatoriedade do sistema – poderiam sinalizar os verdadeiros riscos existenciais, sobretudo quando se considera que o cérebro biológico, na esteira do viés da automação, tende a assumir de maneira acrítica aquilo que é posto por sistemas ancorados em inteligência artificial. Além disso, o argumento aqui defendido é que falhas não detectáveis pela provável limitação de controle humano quanto ao aumento de complexidade do funcionamento de sistemas de IA representam o principal risco existencial real.\u0000Palavras-chave: Inteligência artificial, risco existencial, superinteligências, controle humano.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43519377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
O presente artigo busca não somente reconstruir as noções de “avaliação” (Werthschätzung) e “valor” (Werth) presentes nas obras de Nietzsche, mas pretende mostrar que ambas precisam ser pensadas à luz da noção de “medida de valor” (Werthmaass), haja vista que esta é imprescindível para a compreensão do conceito de transvaloração de todos os valores na filosofia nietzschiana. Palavras-chave: Nietzsche, avaliação, medida de valor, valor, transvaloração.
{"title":"Avaliação, medida de valor, valor: três noções interligadas ao conceito de transvaloração em Nietzsche","authors":"Luís Rubira","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.233.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.09","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000O presente artigo busca não somente reconstruir as noções de “avaliação” (Werthschätzung) e “valor” (Werth) presentes nas obras de Nietzsche, mas pretende mostrar que ambas precisam ser pensadas à luz da noção de “medida de valor” (Werthmaass), haja vista que esta é imprescindível para a compreensão do conceito de transvaloração de todos os valores na filosofia nietzschiana.\u0000Palavras-chave: Nietzsche, avaliação, medida de valor, valor, transvaloração.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49572247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
O artigo avança a hipótese de que, na leitura de Thomas Reid, o ceticismo de David Hume apresentado no Tratado da natureza humana não é devido apenas à sua adoção da ‘hipótese ideal’ – o princípio de que as ideias são objetos imediatos das operações da mente –, mas também deriva de outra fonte: a dúvida sobre a fiabilidade das faculdades mentais, em específico, dos sentidos, da memória e da razão. Ademais, argumenta-se que essa distinção entre duas raízes para o ceticismo humiano permite uma avaliação mais precisa da leitura reidiana de Hume e soluciona alguns equívocos interpretativos. Palavras-chave: História da filosofia, ceticismo, Thomas Reid, David Hume.
{"title":"O Ceticismo de David Hume na Leitura de Thomas Reid","authors":"Vinícius França Freitas","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2022.233.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000O artigo avança a hipótese de que, na leitura de Thomas Reid, o ceticismo de David Hume apresentado no Tratado da natureza humana não é devido apenas à sua adoção da ‘hipótese ideal’ – o princípio de que as ideias são objetos imediatos das operações da mente –, mas também deriva de outra fonte: a dúvida sobre a fiabilidade das faculdades mentais, em específico, dos sentidos, da memória e da razão. Ademais, argumenta-se que essa distinção entre duas raízes para o ceticismo humiano permite uma avaliação mais precisa da leitura reidiana de Hume e soluciona alguns equívocos interpretativos.\u0000Palavras-chave: História da filosofia, ceticismo, Thomas Reid, David Hume.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":41989,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Unisinos","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47645086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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